Answering my own questions...
Within the framework of the Air Force, I think their reliance on the technology totem (to the point of cutting people to retain programs...so long as they're "high tech") really cripples them when it comes to Small Wars practice. The AF has always been tied at a very basic level to technology (the airplane, the doctrine of strategic bombing that became their bedrock idea for many years), and this reliance is especially hard to break in their case. It is furthered by the cult of the bomber and high-speed fighter to (in some cases) the exclusion of all else.
The application of bombers and fighters to small wars is limited, although precision close air support is always welcome. What is really needed is a robust capability for airlift, both of personnel and supplies. With its totem bombers and fighters, the AF is weak in transport and has been for the majority of its existence. This limits their ability to participate in the full spectrum of small wars operations. Instead of working to correct this, the AF simply denies the viability of small wars or insists that a fleet of B-2s is more useful for stopping insurgents in the Horn of Africa than C-17s would be for providing logistical lift into those areas.
By supporting its totems through denial, the AF also shortchanges the ability of its people to make a difference in Small Wars. It also hurts their ability to provide good advisors, since true believers in the twin totems would not necessarily be prepared to view each small war as unique and provide the necessary unique advice. Instead they might try to "mirror image" the AF.
And that's my rather half-baked thought for Tuesday....:)
Strategic Speed as a Totem
In the current mantra/dogma concerning transformational theory, strategic speed is a central totem; the theory that lighter, "higher capacity" forces must be able to get anywhere in a nano-second.
I say this is a "totem" because it is hardly transformational; the idea of strategic mobility has been central to military strategy for centuries. What has changed are our reference points on what constitutes speed.
But in the current mantra, transformational "speed" is very much a bandaid for intellectual sluggishness. The idea that we have to get anywhere fast to confront various crises begs the question about anticipating such crises in the first place. Moreover the assumption that speed is the answer assumes that the same sluggish decisionmaking apparatus will make the correct decision on using such highly deployable forces in the first place. Desert Shield to me remains an excellent example of where adequate strategic mobility delivered the proper forces into theater at a rate consonant with decisionmaking capacities. And for those who still point to the "long build up" for Desert Storm, I merely point to the fact that those same forces were largely home inside 18 months.
There are other historical examples: the debate between the US and the Brits over invading France rapidly versus pursing Churchill's pet theory about a "soft under belly" of fortified Europe is one. Another would be the force mixtures and decisionmaking that sent ultra-light forces into Somalia and then refused to reinforce them when a need for heavier forces was apparent.
And yes the theory and practice of airborne warfare remains a central front in the struggle to define strategic, operational, and tactical speed. It applies not only to those who use parachutes; it applies equally to vertical envelopment with rotary, fixed, or soon to be in use tilt wing aircraft.
The central reality in the debate over speed is often overlooked: getting there quickly or even just getting there are less important than deciding what you are going to do there in the first place.
Best
Tom