Arrogant & condescending is an improvement over racist
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Cannoneer,
Easy big guy, not calling you racist, rather just pointing out that your observation is one that is commonly made of certain groups based upon the perceptions those outside the group in question. While a satisfactory brand of "liberty" for an average Libyan is likely quite different than for the average American the critical issue is that there is a universal quest in alll mankind for whatever it is they see as meeting that mark.
It is the unsatisfactory brand of liberty they have a nasty habit of taking that concerns me.
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It is no less arrogant and condescending to assume that an Arab doesn't understand what liberty is today than it was for some southerner to assume that African Americans wouldn't know what to do if they were freed from slavery.
Not going there. Google "Reconstruction"
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But yeah, I do want to "kill you message" if your message is that Libyans wouldn't know what to do with liberty if they had it. One has to assume that the current rebels come from a cross-section of the populace. Some are looking for loot, some for power, most simply to achieve what they have no legal peaceful means the achieve. One should also assume that there are agents representing Islamist groups seeking to gain an advantage. I would assume there are a variety of national agents at work as well. All seeking to advance the interests of their respective organizations..
My message is that the anti-KaDaffy forces are not necessarily Good Guys. One does NOT have to assume that the current rebels come from a cross-section of the populace. Didn't they tell you what happens when you assume? The rebels are more deeply aggrieved, more actively hostile, more violent than the fence-sitters. Some of them were trying to kill me in Iraq four years ago.
Have we identified those factions that we would prefer did not gain the greatest influence, or do we provide close air support for whoever is fixing to get whipped? Does the whole coalition support and blacklist the same factions? How does a faction get off the excrement list and become eligible for CAS & air drops & all the material benefits of being a valued tool of the Great Satan?
Whole lot of assuming going on here...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
LIFG has not been mentioned much in reporting on recent events in Libya. I would assume that is more intentional than accidental given their past affiliations, espoused ideologies, and the fact that we have been carrying them as a Terrorist organization on our books for several years now, and since 2007 have been working with Qaddafi to help suppress them in the name of GWOT.
Exactly how have we been "working with Qaddafi to suppress them"? That seems a quite dramatic overstatement.
Do we have any real evidence that LIFG is a significant player in the current rebel movement?
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
It is safe to assume that LIFG is perhaps the most organized aspect of the current movement and that AQ is doing their best to strengthen their ties and spin current events as something that they have brought about.
I'm not sure it's ever safe to assume. Unless there's tangible evidence, best to leave such questions open. "We don't know yet" is a lot more honest and a lot less dangerous than "it is safe to assume". Once we assume that it's safe to assume we get committed to our assumption, and that can make it more difficult to adapt down the line if our assumptions prove invalid.
I'm not sure the model of nationalist insurgencies accepting help from AQ because they need help from anywhere they can get it is necessarily valid. What has AQ actually done to help these insurgencies? In many cases (not necessarily in Libya) the affiliated movements are the ones supporting AQ, not the other way round.
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Once liberty is attained though, often the ideologies employed to motivate the masses, and the leaders and organizations that carried much of the fight fade away, as their sole purpose for existing is no longer there.
Are you assuming that LIFG is essentially a nationalist insurgency that is simply using Islamist ideology as a tool? If so, on what evidence is that assumption based?
How are you defining "liberty" when you say "once liberty is attained"? It's a relevant question, because the fall of a despot often does not mark the arrival of "liberty".
Why would you assume that the ideology will fade away once the despot falls and the revolutionaries take over (let's not pretend that this has any intrinsic relationship to "liberty")? Did the Taliban's ideology fade when they gained power? We've a limited data set for Islamist revolutionaries, but if we look at communist revolutions, the ideology didn't necessarily fade when the revolutionaries won. Did the ideology fade in Cuba or North Korea? Sometimes it faded down the line, or was overthrown, but there was often a wee mess in the interval. Ask a Cambodian about that... or a Russian, or a Chinese.
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
If one slapped a bell curve on the Libyan populace one would probably find hardcore Qaddafi people on one tail, and hard core Islamists on the other. The vast center is that moderate majority that just wants reasonable liberty, rights, and the ability to live their lives to the best of their abilities in freedom and peace. The evil, the greedy, and those who lust for power will all show up to exploit to their ends.
Is that assumption based on specific evidence emerging from Libya, or is it based on an abstract model?
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
From Chaos comes opportunity. From great Chaos come great Opportunity. Our challenge is to shape and mitigate the chaos. Effects in Libya must be secondary to how we employ this operation as a Stratcom to the Arabian Peninsula.
How exactly do you propose to "employ this operation as a Stratcom to the Arabian Peninsula"? What exactly do you propose that we do in Libya, and how do you propose to leverage that action as "Stratcom to the Arabian Peninsula".
My concern in Libya is that there are major limits to the end-state goals that we can realistically hope to achieve with the level of force we are willing (and, realistically, able) to commit. We prevented the sack of Benghazi; that's done. We might be able to remove MG or enable the rebels to remove him. We absolutely cannot assure liberty or good governance, and it would be folly to establish those as goals when we know we cannot achieve them.
Our folly in Iraq and Afghanistan was that once we'd done what we had the capacity to do (remove governments) we attempted what we did not have the capacity to do (replace them with governments that would govern the way we would like to see these countries governed). Gotta hope we don't fall into that trap in Libya.
According to the LA Times, we have ...
on one hand, U.S. finds no organized Al Qaeda presence in Libya opposition, officials say (on p.1):
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Eastern Libya, the rebels' base, has a history as a breeding ground for Islamic militants, but an intelligence-gathering effort has not uncovered a significant number of extremists, officials say.
March 23, 2011
By Ken Dilanian, Los Angeles Times
Despite fears that Islamic extremists may be playing a hidden role in the rebellion against Moammar Kadafi, the U.S. intelligence community has found no organized presence of Al Qaeda or its allies among the Libyan opposition, American officials say.
A U.S. intelligence-gathering effort that began shortly after anti-Kadafi forces started seizing towns in eastern Libya last month has not uncovered a significant presence of Islamic militants among the insurgents.
"We're keeping an eye out for extremist activity in Libya, but we haven't seen much, if any, to date," said a U.S. counter-terrorism official. A Defense official added that the U.S. had not seen a direct link between the opposition and extremists. ...
But, on the other hand (on p.2):
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Charles Faddis, who led a CIA team in northern Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and who retired in 2008, questioned whether the U.S. intelligence community really understands who the rebels are.
"Everyone wants to believe the opposition consists of individuals dedicated to a democratic revolution," Faddis said. "Is that true?"
"Is this a political movement or a tribal one? What we need is solid intelligence on the nature of the opposition, who the key figures are, who is going to emerge on top. I suspect we do not have that, because our collection inside Libya, a denied area, has probably been very weak for a very long time."
Since his retirement, Faddis has written several interesting books: Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq; Willful Neglect: The Dangerous Illusion of Homeland Security; and Beyond Repair: The Decline and Fall of the CIA.
If you search SWC for "Faddis", you will find about a dozen posts that mention him: military background, legal background (as a death penalty prosecutor) and CIA Operations.
All in all, the verdict is far from definitive as to what the Libyan rebels actually are, now - much less as to what their revolt will become if a "success".
"Regime removal" is different from "regime change" - as Steve correctly points out:
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from Dayuhan
My concern in Libya is that there are major limits to the end-state goals that we can realistically hope to achieve with the level of force we are willing (and, realistically, able) to commit. We prevented the sack of Benghazi; that's done. We might be able to remove MG or enable the rebels to remove him. We absolutely cannot assure liberty or good governance, and it would be folly to establish those as goals when we know we cannot achieve them.
Our folly in Iraq and Afghanistan was that once we'd done what we had the capacity to do (remove governments) we attempted what we did not have the capacity to do (replace them with governments that would govern the way we would like to see these countries governed). Gotta hope we don't fall into that trap in Libya.
Regards
Mike
Obama Adminstration - Legal Position
State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh gave this Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya:
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Remarks
Harold Hongju Koh
Legal Advisor U.S. Department of State
American Society of International Law Annual Meeting
Washington, DC
March 26, 2011
The crux of the statement on I Law is contained in this paragraph:
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These United States military actions rest on ample international legal authority. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter grants authority to the Security Council to decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security where it determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression (Article 39). Articles 41 and 42 further specify that the Security Council may take such action by air, sea and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Acting under Chapter VII, in Resolution 1973, the Security Council determined that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes a threat to international peace and security (PP21), and : (1) in operative paragraphs 6 to 8 of the resolution imposed a No-Fly Zone in the air space of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians, and authorized states to take “all necessary measures” to enforce that No-Fly Zone in accordance with the Resolution, (2) in operative paragraph 4 authorized Member States to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory; and (3) in operative paragraph 13 authorized Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out inspections aimed at the enforcement of the arms embargo. Under the Security Council authorizations, Member States may also work through regional organizations or arrangements and with local partners who share the goal of preventing attacks on civilians or civilian populated areas.
So far as I Law is concerned, this statement is unexceptionable. According to its Charter, the UN had and has very broad authority to mandate "peace enforcement". Whether that mandate was or was not wise in this case - e.g., how far do "all necessary measures" go ? - is another question (not of law, but of policy). Whether the US should or should not belong to the UN, NATO or any other multi-national organization are also political questions.
As to US domestic (constitutional) law, I find L.A. Koh's statement problematic:
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The President directed these actions, which are in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, pursuant to his constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. The President has well-recognized authority to authorize a mission of this kind, which as he explained, will be time-limited, well-defined, discrete, and aimed at preventing an imminent humanitarian catastrophe that directly implicates the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. The Administration has been closely consulting Congress regarding the situation in Libya, including in a session with the bipartisan leadership that the President conducted before his announcement. Before Resolution 1973 was adopted, on March 1, 2011 the Senate adopted its own resolution by unanimous consent (S. Res. 85) calling for a No-Fly zone. The President has acted consistently with the reporting requirements in the War Powers Resolution, and has furthermore indicated that he is committed to ongoing, close consultations with Congress as the situation develops.
What was and what was not done here by Pres. Obama parallels that done by Presidents Truman (Korea) and Clinton (Kosovo), which I felt and still feel were unconstitutional - and also unwise because they failed to enlist the affirmative support of the other elected branch of government.
But, the sin of unconstitutionality in this type of case is a "political question" (not one to be decided by the courts). And, the remedy under the Constitution would be impeachment of the President by Congress - which is not about to happen. It is up to Congress to declare the President's actions illegal. In the absence of such congressional action, the President's actions stand legally.
I find it interesting that Mr Koh's position is not that far removed from Mr Yoo's.
Regards
Mike
cracks in the Daffy forces?
The rebels just announced they took Syrthe. If proven true, this would be a major shift.
Personnaly, I need explanation on the declarations of Mr Gate who said operation could take months. Must be motivated by domestic politic but does not reflect, even partialy, reality on the ground.
About the rebels:as in all civilian uprising or rebellion, the ones who have military/weaponery knowledge are not Mr and Mrs smith. For the recall, during WW2, allied forces used italian and corsica mafia (not really good guys). The question is rather can the west establish strong enough contacts with guys who are muslims, nationalist and also shaped by their cultural environment to become the next government? You cannot blame people because they did fight the US in Irak. You can blame them if they intend to set a fascist calliphat in Libya.
Countering AQ ambitions in Libya
My assumption is that AQ will try to take credit and take advantage of the Libyan uprising. I think AQ-LIFG linkages with the rebels have been overstated thus far. But, I don't think we should be naive about AQ types trying to influence key jihadi leaders in Darnah.
Here's six things I think we (US) should begin doing now to offset AQ ambitions. Would enjoy any further thoughts on what the U.S. should be considering. What else should we be doing?
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1. End the Gaddafi regime immediately- Opposition to Gaddafi links rebels generally amenable to the West with jihadi's affiliated with LIFG-AQ types. The longer LIFG-AQ types remain embedded with other Libyan opposition groups, the stronger the bonds will be between them. Eliminating the Gaddafi regime will allow for more moderate rebel groups to emerge and repel AQ aggression.
2. Push moderate rebel leaders to the forefront- The West should move to place a face on the Libyan opposition. Strategic communications should be implemented quickly to demonstrate to the world that the Libyan opposition is clearly not the result of AQ inspiration. This could be accomplished through publicized communication with select opposition leaders and widely broadcast television interviews with key rebel partners allied against Gaddafi and LIFG-AQ linked groups. Current amorphous descriptions of the Libyan opposition create ambiguity allowing for biased interpretation; ambiguity easily capitalized on by AQ elements taking credit for a revolution they missed.
3. Don’t waste an opportunity-The U.S. wanted to counter jihadi elements in Darnah three years ago. The NFZ and the vacuum created by the crumbling Gaddafi regime should not be wasted. If AQ moves to bolster their position in Libya, the West should be prepared early to use soft and hard power options directly and through surrogates.
4. Isolate Darnah if necessary- LIFG-AQ support and presence in Darnah has existed for a long time. The West should move aggressively to monitor and isolate Darnah if it goes the way of AQ. Own the border crossing from Egypt. Monitor desert crossings with aerial surveillance. Control the coast through the Navy. Darnah is one of the few places AQ might reside where the West retains distinct capabilities to monitor the region from land, sea and air.
5. Engage the EU reference an AQ Libyan safe haven - Should AQ gain a safe haven in Libya, the greatest threat will initially be to Europe. The U.S. has proceeded responsibly by letting NATO take the reins of the NFZ. EU countries need to step up in the CT effort in Libya. Italy, France and the UK all have reason to get engaged.
6. Prepare for something other than democracy in Libya - I hope lessons learned from trying to institute democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan reasonably moderate the West’s vision of Libya’s political future. Freedom comes in many forms and often time incrementally. Libya remains a tribal, oil dependent country. Constructing a unified democracy without occupation is likely impossible. Libya may find renewed political stability and economic vitality quicker if it pursued an emirate type structure; a form closer to the original Barbary states or similar to the UAE. Can the West accept this? Can they help this happen? This will be tough. Bottom line: a weak democracy is more beneficial to AQ while stronger sub-states can be a useful counter against AQ aggression.
From:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=187
Not only can I blame them
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Originally Posted by
M-A Lagrange
You cannot blame people because they did fight the US in Irak. You can blame them if they intend to set a fascist calliphat in Libya.
I can withhold my support for this war of choice that SECDEF himself doesn’t think is a vital interest for the United States and I can persuade, change and influence as many American voters as I can to do the same.
Whoever is in charge of strategically communicating to me and managing my perception that the consumers of Libyan oil, the Libyan people, and the anti-Kadaffy rebels are worthy of the American treasure (and, inevitably, blood) expended on their behalf has his work cut out for him.
May be you should look at it twice
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Originally Posted by
Cannoneer No. 4
I can withhold my support for this war of choice that SECDEF himself doesn’t think is a vital interest for the United States and I can persuade, change and influence as many American voters as I can to do the same.
Whoever is in charge of strategically communicating to me and managing my perception that the consumers of Libyan oil, the Libyan people, and the anti-Kadaffy rebels are worthy of the American treasure (and, inevitably, blood) expended on their behalf has his work cut out for him.
Then you better change your mind as the US flotte in the Mediterrane buys oil from the Italian who bouht it from the Libyans. Then it's quite in your interrest to get involved and make sure that you have friends in Libya rather than ennemies. :D
From Oz: West's vain Libyan venture must end
Full of adjectives and I've no idea who the author is, but it is ......
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THE grotesque competition between Britain, France and the US to see who can fire the most missiles at Libya confirms the emergence of a new form of Western militarism.
Link:http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news...-1226026968542
U.S. deploys low-flying attack planes in Libya
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...s=rss_homepage
Not surprised. FMCNL told me when they left England.
The C-in-C could use some dramatic gun camera video of kinetically disassembling Kadaffy's tanks to sell this war. Love watching Air Force gun bunnies feed that 105mm.