Chaotic Dynamics: A Novel Approach to Intelligence Analysis in Asymmetric Warfare

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Originally Posted by Jedburgh

:rolleyes:

As stated, mirror imaging, along with falling into logical fallacies and permitting various biases to determine judgments, are a common failing among new and poorly trained analysts. However, "common" does not equate to "pervasive".

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If what you're saying is correct, then that means that the CIA is filled with incompetent senior people. What other explanation can there be for not implementing proper training for new analysts year after year?

For the record, I don't believe that to be the case. I just don't have another explanation for how this problem can properly be attributed to habitual poor training.

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There are also significant differences in quality and type of analysis produced by the different agencies and services. There is perhaps an agency or two out there that hires far too many people who don't really deserve the title of "intelligence analyst"; but there are others that are lucky enough to have several consummate professionals on the payroll. Throughout the community we have many outstanding analysts who are very much in touch with reality as it exists on the ground and in the heads of the threat.

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I think so as well.

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Reads the literature? Well, I've spent a couple of years as a collector and worked a bit of analysis here and there, and, as limited as my academic qualifications may be, I stand solidly by my opinions.

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That's understandable.

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The disparagement of seemingly simple solutions is in itself an analytic failing. Despite the apparent simplicity, they are still dependent upon the human vagaries of the people implementing them. The existing problems with selection, training and professional development of career analysts may have a simple solution - but the primary obstacle is not so simple, as it tends to lie with bureaucrats outside the field of intelligence analysis. If you were able to conduct such a study in-depth, you would find that the degree of severity of these quality problems ebb and flow as much with changes in senior management as it does with hiring and training of analysts.

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I don't deny that it's a complex problem, nor that there can be a multitude of possible solutions. Mine is simply one of many. As long as solutions are being offered, implemented, and evaluated, I think that's all that anyone can expect, particularly in very large organizations.

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Along the lines of my last statement, I recommend giving a read of Knowing One’s Enemies – Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars. The book is a collection of essays that amply illustrate the point that, even when a nation is in possession of sufficient intelligence of a quality to make effective policy decisions, it can all come to disaster due to the inherent biases, proclivities and abilities of key policy makers. The harmful effects of internal disputes within intelligence agencies, and turf battles between competing agencies, are also laid out in careful detail.

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Thanks for the recommendation. I'll add it to my reading list.

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This is where you complexity in reaching an effective solution. Hell, its been over six years since the wake-up call and we're still not ready for work yet. Hiring, training and developing good analyst is the easy part.

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Don't get me started. :)

I think he is correct.

However, I do not think your analysis of his statement is necessarily correct:

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"If what you're saying is correct, then that means that the CIA is filled with incompetent senior people. What other explanation can there be for not implementing proper training for new analysts year after year?"

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It is entirely possible that said senior people are competent but either bureaucratically constrained and more concerned with protecting their institution or simply are strongly inclined to not stick their necks out to demand competence and release those who are not capable.

Those alternatives are similar but not synonymous though the result is the same. There is, of course the possibility that pure incompetence is part of the problem and there are other alternatives but experience with our government leads me to believe my provided alternatives are more probable; as they say, "indications lead me to believe" the bureaucracy and it's natural ally, risk avoidance, are your culprits. :mad:

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For the record, I don't believe that to be the case. I just don't have another explanation for how this problem can properly be attributed to habitual poor training.

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Having briefly been an analyst -- and not a good one, I'm too impatient and arbitrary; realized that and went on to other things :o -- I have to agree with others who point out that we can produce a large number of fair analysts but that good one are naturals and hard to find. I'm not at all sure they can be created without that talent. Lot of good basketball players out there, very few Michael Jordans.

I have been immersed in another culture fairly thoroughly for over a year -- I think maybe the Jesuits have it right; get 'em before they're seven -- after that, the culture in which they got to that age is pretty thoroughly embedded and is unlikely to be shed.

There are always exceptions but I'm unsure how you'd determine who would be receptive and who not. :confused:

You also have the factor that thorough cultural attunement with one grouping does not provide better analysis capability for a multinational and multi ethnic grouping...

Just some thoughts for your consideration.

Regards,
Ken

He's to the point, and most of it rings true to me, although I have not seen the inner bureau side enough to be able to say one way or another. It fits the analysis of Soviet deficiencies well. I will say that from what I've seen the "boots on the ground" of our CIA are quite weak even now. Shot through with political correctness and using simplistic methodologies "out of the book". But basically, I think he's right and it goes wider than that to the public at large and the weird conversation that sometimes goes on there.

I honestly think that this discussion, JeffC, is a symptom of the problems. Why go to all that trouble simulating what you don't know instead of go out and see the real thing? Some journalists do it, even get to Quetta from time to time. (Though none I know of personally recently.) Is the reluctance because it's dangerous? I'm trying to wrap my mind around where you're coming from.

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Originally Posted by Brian Hanley

There is no substitute for field experience and wide reading. I'd say forget about trying to duplicate Al Qaeda. Send a group of guys out into the field alone, without any support but $10-$20K to spend 1 year without any help at all. Have them set up a business and survive in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, etcetera. Have them required to spend at least 50% of their time in country, and don't allow them to employ anyone that isn't a local.

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You are correct, there is no substitute for field experience. But, that’s where my concurrence ends.

Allow me to point out the blatantly obvious. We are talking about the US Armed forces, not setting up a shop in Sub-Sahara or the CIS for a large US-based company, with responsibilities such as entertaining guest speakers and smooching with drug lords.

Our missions include an exit strategy, not merely a 'do or die scenario' with good luck on the way out the door. Our missions often include, but are not limited to, social and political upheaval, civil war and subsequent refugee crises. While I understand you may have experienced these situations as an individual, you are applying your cookie cutter to hundreds of thousands (that can’t and don’t blend into the background or duck for cover around a corner).

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Originally Posted by Brian Hanley

(Yes, some may not make it back. That's the price for learning what you need to.)

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Am I glad you didn't join the Armed Forces...No response to this is needed.

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Originally Posted by Brian Hanley

Here's another simple method of getting in touch with the world. There are women all over the world looking for dates with Americans.

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We don’t turn loose our soldiers so they can begin fraternizing with whomever while overseas. There are still rules and regulations (you’ve concluded it’s bureaucracy). Furthermore, most developed nations aren’t still chasing American males around, and certainly are not introducing their 'ticket out of the country' to mom and dad. Not everybody will be going to Georgia or Romania on missions. This IMHO is of limited value.

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Originally Posted by Brian Hanley

He's to the point, and most of it rings true to me, although I have not seen the inner bureau side enough to be able to say one way or another. It fits the analysis of Soviet deficiencies well. I will say that from what I've seen the "boots on the ground" of our CIA are quite weak even now. Shot through with political correctness and using simplistic methodologies "out of the book". But basically, I think he's right and it goes wider than that to the public at large and the weird conversation that sometimes goes on there.

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You’re striking a comparison between the CIA today and Soviet deficiencies? Care to run that one by with a little more detail? We’ve sufficiently covered your background of an Embassy’s inner workings, so I’m wondering where you collected all this info on the CIA.

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Originally Posted by Brian Hanley

I honestly think that this discussion, JeffC, is a symptom of the problems. Why go to all that trouble simulating what you don't know instead of go out and see the real thing? Some journalists do it, even get to Quetta from time to time. (Though none I know of personally recently.) Is the reluctance because it's dangerous? I'm trying to wrap my mind around where you're coming from.

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There’s inherent danger in anything the US Military does. The object of training and simulation is to remove the ‘stupid’ factor. The Armed Forces do not automatically factor in death with her missions abroad.

I’ve been through Kwatah city more than five times in the last 3 years. What’s the big deal in visiting basically a huge flea market? Might be dangerous if you ate something :wry:

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Originally Posted by Stan

You are correct, there is not substitute for field experience. But, that’s where my concurrence ends.

Allow me to point out the blatantly obvious. We are talking about the US Armed forces, ...

We don’t turn loose our soldiers so they can begin fraternizing with whomever while overseas. There are still rules and regulations (you’ve concluded it’s bureaucracy).

There’s inherent danger in anything the US Military does. The object of training and simulation is to remove the ‘stupid’ factor. The Armed Forces do not automatically factor in death with her missions abroad.

I’ve been through Kwatah city more than five times in the last 3 years. What’s the big deal in visiting basically a huge flea market? Might be dangerous if you ate something :wry:

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Stan, he's talking about training of analysts for intelligence work. You appear to be talking about training of regular soldiers for combat. Perhaps if you were discussing the same topic it might work better? (Biting my toungue over the 'stupid factor' opening... ;))

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Originally Posted by Brian Hanley

Stan, he's talking about training of analysts for intelligence work. You appear to be talking about training of regular soldiers for combat. Perhaps if you were discussing the same topic it might work better? (Biting my toungue over the 'stupid factor' opening... ;))

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Brian, the analysts I know and have worked for are Soldiers, and members of CIA and DIA. Furthermore, the analysts that work in the field are fully exposed to basic military functions. Training and simulations that Chris is referring to, if approved and further defined, would in fact be used in other areas.

We probably still won't be using your versions in place of traditional and simulated training.

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Originally Posted by Brian Hanley

Stan, he's talking about training of analysts for intelligence work. You appear to be talking about training of regular soldiers for combat. Perhaps if you were discussing the same topic it might work better? (Biting my toungue over the 'stupid factor' opening... ;))

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analysts -- and others -- a lot of guvmint agencies have been sending people to other nations (a bunch of them...) for a couple of years or more as civilians and in various modes to live on the economy and learn the culture as you suggest. Been doing it for years, a lot of years, even before WW II and in large numbers since then. Most everyone here's aware of that.

Fear's not an issue. Excessive publicity about it isn't helpful to a lot of programs though it is not classified. Just Google 'foreign area specialists' and skim the subjects on the first eight or ten pages.

Sometimes all of us wrongfully assume that everyone knows all the things we know... :wry:

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Originally Posted by Ken White

analysts -- and others -- a lot of guvmint agencies have been sending people to other nations (a bunch of them...) for a couple of years or more as civilians and in various modes to live on the economy and learn the culture as you suggest. Been doing it for years, a lot of years, even before WW II and in large numbers since then. Most everyone here's aware of that.

Fear's not an issue. Excessive publicity about it isn't helpful to a lot of programs though it is not classified. Just Google 'foreign area specialists' and skim the subjects on the first eight or ten pages.

Sometimes all of us wrongfully assume that everyone knows all the things we know... :wry:

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I wasn't gonna go there just yet.

An excellent point, Ken. I have the utmost respect for those and the FAO program in general. Regretfully, most know little about our service's finest. Little however need be said, and attention we don't need.

At about the 10-year 'time in service' mark, a single individual can, and often does pay back his/her service training ten-fold.

wife and kids. Sorry, didn't mean to preempt... :o

Your comment is true on all counts.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

wife and kids. Sorry, didn't mean to preempt... :o

Your comment is true on all counts.

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No worries mate !

I might add for the uninitiated, that these Soldiers are not exempt from the stringent rules and regulations that govern the Armed Forces. They are, more often than not, faced with greater moral dilemmas.

Sadly, as Jedburgh once pointed out, some of our intel folks are literally forced into service without the benefits of language training. Granted, these fine men and women excel all on their own and could be considered masters of their occupational specialty.

I see no good reason to send a soldier anywhere unprepared.

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Originally Posted by JeffC

For example, a Red Team of intelligence analysts are deployed to a facility where they are immersed in an environment as realistically constructed as possible to simulate the daily experience of a member of Al-Qae’da in Iraq, or the Taliban in Afghanistan. This may include religious education in the Koran, daily prayers to Allah, all written and spoken communication done only in Arabic, and other like-minded activities. Any scenario that displaces the previous mindset of the analyst and replaces it with one more closely aligned with the terrorist would accomplish the goal.

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Originally Posted by wm

Usually, one is a native speaker of only one language. Native speakers of Iraqi Arabic are English As A Second Language (ESL) speakers. They will have the same kinds of cultural disconnects when trying to get the words right for their English native speaking employers. And, that is without consideration for such things as idiolects, regionalisms, colloquialisms, and slang.

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Interesting. The problems I see with simulation as described above is that we cannot replicate the social-cultural and religious norms and rituals learned natively, beginning in the crib; nor the language issues that "wm" raises above. One of my Arabic instructors replied to a question I posed, "the only way you can learn [fill in the blank] is if you have an Arab mother." Holds true for different situations, I have discovered. Further, many Arab relationships are via kinship ties, which prevent us from truly entering their domains socially, or being seeing them with their guard down, i.e., with their true souls bared.

Simulation/immersion is great, and will go a long way toward reducing mirror imaging and cultural ignorance, but it can only do so much.

Thanks all for your comments. Very helpful.

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Originally Posted by Shivan

Simulation/immersion is great, and will go a long way toward reducing mirror imaging and cultural ignorance, but it can only do so much.

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We are striving to identify as much of the cultural ignorance as possible during future mission rehearsals using simulations. Multiple stovepipes are being worked on now which will eventually within 12-18 months lead to a mission rehearsal capability that should cover as much of the warfighters environmental spectrum as possible.

The foundation of the simulation is the VBS-2 / VTK:

http://www.vbs2.com/site/index.html

http://community.bistudio.com/wiki/Virtual_Tool_Kit

The requirements for the VTK were driven by a cognitive task analysis done for anti terrorism force protection. The end state for the VTK is a tool kit that is as 'nicholized' as possible in order for the non-gamer trainer to create realistic scenarios with geo-specific virtual terrain. A key piece is the open API that will allow the Marines to 'plug-in' third party artificial intelligence.

The next stove pipe is the Tactical Language series of simulations that currently uses the Unreal game engine:

www.tacticallanguage.com

This contract is known as ALTS; Automated Language Training System. A portion of it is plugable language and geo-specific culture artificial intelligence that will give the trainer the ability to verbally engage the avatars in the target language. Currently it is being built to plug into VBS2/VTK and DARPA's Real World simulation. The other portion of ALTS is a web based application that we are doing in conjunction with the Air Force (gotta aim high:D). This will be available through Marine Net as part of distance education.

The next stove pipe is part of Doc Silverman's PMServ artificial intelligence:

http://www.seas.upenn.edu/~barryg/HBMR.html

ONR is working on this one, eventually it will get transitioned over to Trasys.

We are attempting to develop a capability to do the following scenario:

The MEU is sitting off the coast of Africa, Burkina Faso has just launched the balloon and a NEO Op is ordered. On the big boat the intell bubbas pull down NGA data sets for Ouagadougou and import then into the virtual world. Mean while back at the embassy the Gunney or Embassy Stan type bubba sends the detailed buildings that they have created of thier hooch via secure line to the big boat. The intell bubbas put this into the virtual world. Now they pull up the AI library and insert Sahel French language and culture plugin. The final effort is edit the artificial intelligence to match current intel. Now the intell bubbas can go watch a movie.

Down in the bowels of the ships, the running around the flight deck 300 times to get a miles lenth of running has ceased. No more chow lines, the Marines are plugging the DVTE computers into the SWAN to begin mission rehearsal for the upcoming NEO. During the rehearsal da Gunney notices that everytime Rudy with the rusty rifle in the third rank that never gets the word...talks to a local avatar, the avatar gets pissed off. A decision is made to assign Rudy to LZ security and he is not to talk to any local people. After the NEO has finished, Rudy is told in loving terms to log on Marine Net and take the targeted language course because they still have another 5 months to go before they are CONUS.

We aren't to far from being able to create the above scenario.

Hi Shivan !

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Originally Posted by Shivan

Interesting. The problems I see with simulation as described above is that we cannot replicate the social-cultural and religious norms and rituals learned natively, beginning in the crib; nor the language issues that "wm" raises above. One of my Arabic instructors replied to a question I posed, "the only way you can learn [fill in the blank] is if you have an Arab mother." Holds true for different situations, I have discovered. Further, many Arab relationships are via kinship ties, which prevent us from truly entering their domains socially, or being seeing them with their guard down, i.e., with their true souls bared.

Simulation/immersion is great, and will go a long way toward reducing mirror imaging and cultural ignorance, but it can only do so much.

Thanks all for your comments. Very helpful.

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I don’t think we’ll ever get that many soldiers to ‘natively’ learn the Arabic language, cultural and religious norms. Even though I’ve lived and worked here for 12 years, speak colloquial Estonian and even recite poetry from the 13th century, I still can’t fool everybody. You’re 110% correct, you have to start from birth.

But that’s not the point of the simulation training packages today. I think Jeff's first post explained it best.

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Originally Posted by JeffC

The first step is realizing that what we think we know about any situation is several steps removed from that situation’s authentic components, based on how the brain processes information coming from outside of itself. The solution is to consciously break down and rebuild the brain’s internal model of the environment in question (i.e., the cultural and societal influences of religious terrorists in the Middle East or Central Asia).

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This will in effect allow common soldiers and analysts to not only understand the Arabs (or Africans) better, but more importantly those nuances such as social taboos. Although I’m very effective on my own, it took years to get ‘there’ and I had nothing more than 13 weeks of language training to prepare for my tour. That barely prepared me for anything Estonian.

Paul and I (we were both previously station in Africa) have observed how a typical military situation can rapidly escalate from ‘calm to a firefight’ over little more than a misunderstanding. One could simply say that 50% of the blame was the African that didn’t understand the circumstances or situation, and fair enough.

But what we’d like out of our soldiers, is to remove the other 50% and level the playing field. The other good news about simulation training is getting shot, does not result in death :wry:

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Originally Posted by Stan

This will in effect allow common soldiers and analysts to not only understand the Arabs (or Africans) better, but more importantly those nuances such as social taboos. Although I’m very effective on my own, it took years to get ‘there’ and I had nothing more than 13 weeks of language training to prepare for my tour. That barely prepared me for anything Estonian.

Paul and I (we were both previously station in Africa) have observed how a typical military situation can rapidly escalate from ‘calm to a firefight’ over little more than a misunderstanding. One could simply say that 50% of the blame was the African that didn’t understand the circumstances or situation, and fair enough.

But what we’d like out of our soldiers, is to remove the other 50% and level the playing field. The other good news about simulation training is getting shot, does not result in death :wry:

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I have these visions of a scene in the movie "Men In Black," the one where during marksmanship testing with the military's "best of the best," Will Smith/James Edwards blows away the sim of the little girl carrying the physics book rather than the aliens being blasted by everyone else. I would be very impressed if our situatonal awareness training would allow a successful graduate to be able to give the kind of explanation that Smith gave for his action:

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Originally Posted by http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0119654/quotes

[in a shooting range, confronted with numerous menacing-looking targets, Edwards shoots a cardboard little girl]
Zed: May I ask why you felt little Tiffany deserved to die?
James Edwards: Well, she was the only one that actually seemed dangerous at the time, sir.
Zed: How'd you come to that conclusion?
James Edwards: Well, first I was gonna pop this guy hanging from the street light, and I realized, y'know, he's just working out. I mean, how would I feel if somebody come runnin' in the gym and bust me in my ass while I'm on the treadmill? Then I saw this snarling beast guy, and I noticed he had a tissue in his hand, and I'm realizing, y'know, he's not snarling, he's sneezing. Y'know, ain't no real threat there. Then I saw little Tiffany. I'm thinking, y'know, eight-year-old white girl, middle of the ghetto, bunch of monsters, this time of night with quantum physics books? She about to start some ####, Zed. She's about eight years old, those books are WAY too advanced for her. If you ask me, I'd say she's up to something. ...

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Originally Posted by Shivan

Interesting. The problems I see with simulation as described above is that we cannot replicate the social-cultural and religious norms and rituals learned natively, beginning in the crib; nor the language issues that "wm" raises above. ...

Simulation/immersion is great, and will go a long way toward reducing mirror imaging and cultural ignorance, but it can only do so much.

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Agreed. One of the most surprising revelations to me as I was working on that essay was the artificial roadblocks that CIA has in place in terms of their hiring practices. Lack of qualified translators is a serious issue for them, yet they reject applicants who are, in fact, from the Middle East because they don't have a four-year degree, or because they're gay (which is even more ludicrous).

I was a bit of a leader in VR once, have a videotape "Fundamentals of Virtual Reality" sold to over 4000 universities around the world through UVC (now defunct.) Worked on image processing real time acquisitions since. I am aware of the state of AI etcetera. We are a ways from that scenario still.

What we aren't so far from is a situation where actors can play virtual parts who are in a distant location. That's doable now.

That said, while military regulations may restrict fraternization, enforcing those for intel gathering is just plain silliness. Those are the networks that get you places.

For instance, staying out of the drug transport/payment networks means you are kept away from Osama's support system. Get into it in Afghanistan, you'll have a shot at finding him. Staying out of gun running networks means you can't keep tabs on who is selling what to whom without a scorecard. Etcetera.

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Originally Posted by Brian Hanley

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That said, while military regulations may restrict fraternization, enforcing those for intel gathering is just plain silliness. Those are the networks that get you places.

For instance, staying out of the drug transport/payment networks means you are kept away from Osama's support system. Get into it in Afghanistan, you'll have a shot at finding him. Staying out of gun running networks means you can't keep tabs on who is selling what to whom without a scorecard. Etcetera.

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Now, if we can just convince those great brains in Congress who insist on no contacts with the less savory much less the totally illegal... :rolleyes:

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Originally Posted by JeffC

...or because they're gay (which is even more ludicrous).

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The CIA ended its prohibition on hiring gay employees in 1991. Indeed, there is even an Agency Network of Gay and Lesbian Employees.

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Originally Posted by Rex Brynen

The CIA ended its prohibition on hiring gay employees in 1991. Indeed, there is even an Agency Network of Gay and Lesbian Employees.

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Thanks for that, Rex.

I think Jeff needs real CIA contact and perhaps even an interview. Just because an individual claims to be an area expert or linguist, does not automatically equate to employment. There's a lot of gays around today...just don't tell, and I won't ask :rolleyes:

The general thrust of this thread was a mistake an (ahem) agent made by watching a video, but yet missed something (I feel he/she fell asleep during that exciting video). We then concluded his/her brain was shut down or poorly programmed. Huh ? If one has the attention span of a gerbil, there's little modern science or the CIA can do...it's too late.

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Originally Posted by Brian Hanley

....while military regulations may restrict fraternization, enforcing those for intel gathering is just plain silliness. Those are the networks that get you places.

For instance, staying out of the drug transport/payment networks means you are kept away from Osama's support system. Get into it in Afghanistan, you'll have a shot at finding him. Staying out of gun running networks means you can't keep tabs on who is selling what to whom without a scorecard.

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There is a lot of opinion based on assumption in this thread; much of that assumption itself based on poorly informed and/or dated sources.

While the nuts and bolts of source ops and building networks is not something that is up for discussion in this forum, I will just throw a thought out there for y'all:

To infil Afghan, Albanian, Indonesian, Nigerian or Russian organized crime networks - let alone getting into the core of al-Qa'ida, Chechen or JI terror structures - ain't as simple as just getting someone to approve mixing in with the bad guys - or of the operator being up to speed on language and cultural nuances. These groups operate on tight-knit trust networks, and are generally composed of individuals linked by kinship and friendship ties that are very difficult to compose and live cover to enough of a degree to get inside. It is also not exactly easy to spot and recruit someone inside one of those targets from the outside. So its a helluva difficult and dangerous job that should never be underestimated or taken for granted - but don't assume that nothing is going on in that regard.