Afghanistan was our version of the Vietnam War
A simple eloquent article, under the title:
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Christina Schmid: ' I question the wisdom of what we did in Afghanistan'
Christina Schmid, who gave defiant public support to the Armed Forces after the death of her husband, reveals her reservations about the human cost of the campaign
One wonders, even after the Syria vote, if our politicians will follow her advice:
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This country is still on its knees. We cannot intervene. Morally, spiritually, physically, economically, we are broken from the last decade of conflict. We have to be realistic, to tread carefully, to ask what can be achieved.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html
A doomed mission - Rory Stewart writes
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It is time that the British government, the military and Parliament draw the correct lessons from this failure, and change the way we operate. The decision to “surge” troop numbers was doomed to fail because we had the wrong people, and the wrong objectives for our Afghan strategy. And we lacked the structures, oversight, and culture to put this right, over more than a decade. This was true across all parts of government.....It took us 10 years to begin to acknowledge failure. and extract ourselves, rather than “digging deeper”. Much of this mind set was reminiscent of the attitudes that led to the banking crash of 2008.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...s-failure.html
Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand Deployment
Having an insider write about recent political decision-making is quite rare, so I have created this thread for Matt Cavanagh's May 2012 RUSI Journal article 'Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand Deployment', which today was made freely available (8 pgs):http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/1...47.2012.675798
He is not sparring in his criticism of politicians, the military and civil servants. The wider context is set, in which going to Helmand Province appears almost a "side issue"; until 2006 the UK's contribution was a PRT in the north west, troops in Kabul and sharing ISAF command - excluding SOF. Going to Helmand was an opportunity to display the UK's power, to 'crack on', principally to the USA and NATO.
How much intelligence existed on the conditions "on the ground" he says was minimal. A point some insiders dispute, partly citing UK SOF's scouting presence. As Carter Malkasian wrote it takes a long time to understand the Afghan 'human terrain'; something it took the UK a long time to grasp IMHO.
Write a book please Captain. Wot critical, stop it you!
Almost laughable MoD performance:
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A captain in the Territorial Army has resigned after a dispute with the Ministry of Defence over a book he has written that is critical of the conduct of the campaign in Afghanistan's Helmand province.
The MoD commissioned the book by Dr Mike Martin, but took exception to parts of the account. The dispute has gone on for more than a year.
Officialdom said the MoD:
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has a strong record of learning from previous campaigns and encourages its officers to challenge existing norms and conventional wisdom. However, the publication of books and articles by serving military personnel is governed by well-established policy and regulations. When these are breached, the MoD will withhold approval.
The book, An Intimate War – An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012., is due to be published next week.
Link:http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2...ok-afghanistan
The author has Kings Ph.D. and is speaking there tomorrow. From the Kings website:
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This book—based on both military and research experience in Helmand and 150 interviews in Pushtu—offers a very different view of Helmand from those in the mainstream. It demonstrates how outsiders have most often misunderstood the ongoing struggle in Helmand and how, in doing so, they have exacerbated the conflict, perpetuated it and made it more violent—precisely the opposite of what was intended when their interventions were launched.
Dr. Mike Martin is a Pushtu speaker who spent almost two years in Helmand as a British army officer (covering Operation HERRICKs 9-16). During that time, he pioneered and developed the British military’s Human Terrain and Cultural Capability—a means to understanding the Helmandi population and influencing it. He also worked as an advisor to several British commanders of Task Force Helmand. His previous publications include A Brief History of Helmand, required reading for British commanders and intelligence staff deploying to the province. He holds a doctorate in War Studies from King’s College London.
Ex-CDS General Sir David Richards review (yes the CDS and ex-ISAF CO):
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An Intimate War is, quite simply, the book on Helmand. I sincerely wish it had been available to me when I was ISAF Commander in Afghanistan. Military, diplomatic and development professionals involved in Afghanistan, and elsewhere for that matter, read this and take note.
Link:http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/department...ds/martin.aspx
Amazon UK:http://www.amazon.co.uk/An-Intimate-.../dp/1849043361
Will this be a British equivalent to Carter Malkasian's book? Time will tell and I might ask for this as a present.
Insider comments on lessons exploitation
An insider has written a blog commentary after his three years working with the British Army as a lessons analyst for the British Army’s Lessons Exploitation Centre (LXC). He was an infantry officer for ten years, left to work as an analyst and then back inside.
From his commentary:
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The British Army has put much effort, time and resources into improving its learning capabilities but it has much more to do, as does any organisation that seeks to learn. My article at this link here sets out how the Army developed learning capabilities but also argues, strongly, that cultural factors remain that, unless addressed, will continue to inhibit its opportunity to improve performance. It imparts no classified information but covers the following:
The expansion of the British Army’s KM and OL analytical capacity from 2009 onwards;
The development of Mission Exploitation Symposia to socialise hard-won knowledge;
The use of lessons as part of risk management;
The endorsement of the ‘lessons learned’ approach by the Army Inspectorate;
Small signs of progress that learning is actually taking place
He cites from 'Dead Men Risen' by Toby Harnden:
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Major Giles Harris DSO, who commanded the Prince of Wales’s Company of the Welsh Guards on their bloody tour of Afghanistan in 2009:
The British are very good at whipping ourselves into a sense of achievement….we almost have to, to make it bearable. You can’t do something like this and analyse it all the way through and think: “Actually we got that wrong.” You just can’t. It takes so much emotional investment. I’m not saying we lie to ourselves but there’s an element of telling yourself that it’s all right and it’s going well, just to keep going.
First link:http://rupertlescott.blogspot.co.uk/...tish-army.html
Second link is to a twelve page article, which expands upon the first:http://www.slideshare.net/barmychap/...armyexperience
Britain didn't understand the enemy in Helmand
Former Captain Mike Martin and author of a new book has a lengthy comment in The Daily Telegraph:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...n-Helmand.html
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But we have yet to leave Afghanistan and I believe that it is worth studying our experience there, and in Iraq, while it is fresh in our minds. I would argue that our performance – in terms of achieving our objectives – has been very poor. In the case of Afghanistan, and specifically Helmand Province, where the majority of our forces have been based, we have failed to understand the Helmandis. We have also failed to understand their culture, their history and their motivations.
Most importantly, we have singularly failed to understand the Helmandi conflict. And to paraphrase Clausewitz, the most important thing to do in war is understand what type of war you are fighting. Many non-Helmandis view the violence through the narrative adopted by the international community. According to the “insurgency narrative” widely espoused by Western governments, a legitimate Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), which is recognised and supported by the international community, is violently opposed by a movement of insurgents, called the Taliban, who have sanctuary in Quetta, Pakistan.
Thus, the Taliban are religiously inspired insurgents who are opposed to the democratic and women’s rights that the GIRoA embodies and promotes. But this “insurgency narrative” does not fit with my experiences as an officer. I went to Helmand several times (in and out of uniform), with appropriate gaps between visits for study and reflection, and this analysis seemed further and further from the events that I was observing and participating in. In my view, the Taliban are not the main drivers of conflict; and earlier periods, including the Soviet, the civil war and the Taliban eras, have been similarly misconstrued.
Just when you thought it couldn't get any worse...
Afghans 'Thought UK Troops Worked With Taliban'
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Former Captain Mike Martin said the clear conflict between British commitment to reconstruction and their actions - the use of firepower - meant the British, in the view of locals, must have been working with their stated enemies.
That British tactics were manifestly inconsistent with their stated aims was proof of a conspiracy was derived from the notion that "the Helmandis could not believe that the British were that stupid".
Little wonder the MoD wants the publication of the book stopped.
Engage fully in learning lessons
A WoTR review of An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012by a former British Army officer, who servied in Helmand twice alongside the author, Mike Martin:http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/an-...in-in-helmand/
Here are two passages:
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I find that his picture of Helmand and Helmandis resonates with my own experiences exactly. I found myself nodding along enthusiastically during his discussion on the unsatisfactory labels of ‘Taliban’ and ‘Government’ and his conclusion that “whilst they may have simplified the narrative, they ended up robbing us of an intelligent war.”
The reading then becomes even more uncomfortable for the MOD as Martin asks: “if you side with the Government because you assume they are the good guys, what happens when your assumption is wrong and the Government is acting worse towards its people – then when do you stand? And how useful is counterinsurgency as a doctrine?” Uncomfortable or not, these are sorts of difficult questions that the MOD now needs to reflect on in the aftermath of the Afghanistan campaign
The last paragraph is aimed at the UK MoD:
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When former CDS,
General Sir David Richards lent his praise to
An Intimate War (saying, “I wish it had been available to me when I was ISAF Commander in Afghanistan”) he was presumably talking about the quantity and quality of the research contained within its 398 pages, rather than its stinging criticisms. The irony is that the unless the MOD changes its attitude towards criticism from within and actually engages with learning lessons, the next ISAF Commander won’t get this type of knowledge either.
The book has arrived here today, so one day I will add my armchair review.
David Cameron: the UK paid a very high price
The British PM has spoken in Kabul today and his speech referred to the thirteen years of intervention and the loss of 453 British service personnel:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...president.html
Then there was this admission, in full and his words:
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When you think about it in very bald, British terms, what is it we have been trying to achieve? That is to deny a safe haven to al-Qaeda....This was the place where the 9/11 attacks were plotted from. This was the place where countless attacks were planned. Al-Qaeda and the training camps have been driven out of Afghanistan. When I became Prime Minister I think something like nine out ten plots we faced on the streets of Britain came from the Afghanistan-Pakistan area. That is now well down - somewhere below half, from the latest figures I saw.
Earlier this week the UK Defence Secretary acknowledged the fragility of the Afghan state after 13 years of Western involvement:
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There can be no guarantees but we can be proud of having helped to give Afghanistan the best possible chance of a stable future...
SWC has a long running thread on the UK in Afghanistan, from 2006, with 1,027 posts and 127k views. Yes, into which this thread will merge one day.
'We shall remember them'.
Just what the political impact back home will be is very unclear. The armed services have shrunk and appear to want to avoid reviewing what happened. The national politicians, from the three main parties, would prefer we forgot thirteen years - already our role in Iraq is largely forgotten. Yes there is a high degree of public support for the armed services, for them, not their mission.