British Army Chief of Staff plus
Two rather laudatory articles as General Sir David Richards tours Afghanistan: a general report:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ve-turned.html and an article around an interview:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html
On the strategic front very different opinions see the "round up" thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9718
I note the speculation on how many Taliban commanders were thinking of reconciliation.
Only if you are out to 'fix' Marjah
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve the Planner
jcustis:
I came to the conclusion about two months ago that the only viable way forward would be some form of provisional management like Brit provincial governance.
Maybe it is through UN, or NATO, but it has to be, in many areas, not local. Local may come later, but not on schedule.
That is the only effective way to stabilize and improve things consistent with US objective s and schedules.
It means US or foreigners as administrators in many of these places, and not just as advisers, and short-tour passersby. Maybe they can work themselves out of a job later, but not right away.
The rest is just window dressing--pretending that Karzai can do it, or that the US civilians have a plan.
As Rajiv's artcile said, the real power is the drug-dealer-backed police chief. He can bring ruthless justice of the same kind that led the folks to the Taliban in the first place.
It's a very sad situation.
I find it interesting that, at the same time as Afghanistan is still ship without a rudder, Iraq is just going through birth pains. Others think its bad, but, aside from the routine risks and dangers of that area, its their start.
But they were no more ready to start in 2006 than the Afghans are now. Byan Jabr running the death squads, etc...
The plan and action has to match the circumstances.
Marjah doesn't need "fixed" though. We need to resist the urge make things more effective, make things more like us (ok, that's a bit of an oxymoron, but you know what I mean).
All we need to do is enable local solutions. Enable the development of governance that enjoys populace-based legitimacy. To impose "effective Westerners" would be, IMO, a disaster of the highest order. In fact, if I were a Taliban commander I would PRAY that the coalition attempted such a tact, as it would ensure I had a steady supply of rank and file fighters for my unit.
We need some things we are not too good at:
1. Patience
2. Willingness to cede control of outcomes
3. Astuteness to avoid being overly manipulated by the current government.
4. Ability to overcome our fears of what would happen if the current challengers to that government made inroads.
Even flying Karzai appointees in in USMC aircraft makes me cringe...the strategic communications of that are so hard to overcome. Far better to wait until the man could drive in in a small convoy of white hilux's with an ANA or ANP escort. Even better wait until the local siystem of Shuras could apoint their own governor.
General Nick is pushing hard to do the right things in the right ways, but we have the iniertia of good intentions that we must overcome first.