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Fraud or Fuzziness? Dissecting William Owen’s Critique of Maneuver Warfare
Fraud or Fuzziness? Dissecting William Owen’s Critique of Maneuver Warfare
By Eric Walters, Small Wars Journal blog
Quote:
See William Owen, "
The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud," in
Small Wars Journal. Also published in August 2008, Vol 153, Vol 4.
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal.
As a very minor contributor to a couple of the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication “White Books” outlining Maneuver Warfare and having once been a professor teaching Maneuver Warfare for American Military University, my attention was caught by William F. Owen’s piece, “The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud," if nothing else than for its catchy title. One might expect it to get a fair amount of visibility due to its controversial thesis. Owen is rightly frustrated with the maneuver warfare concept, especially since he appears to rely on the U.S. Marine Corps publications FMFM-1 and its successor, MCDP-1 Warfighting as the best contemporary articulation. But to characterize the concept as a fraud? A perversion of the truth perpetrated on the U.S. military in order to deceive it? There are indeed difficulties with the maneuver warfare concept, but to label it a fraud seems a bit much. Owen argues that the “the community it was intended to serve” embraced maneuver warfare uncritically. So who is to blame—the advocates who maliciously perpetrated the concept or the U.S. Marine Corps that accepted it so naively and so readily? ...
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I'm gratified to see that I'm not the only one with some misgivings about this article.
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As a civilian lifer I'm loath to critisize those who have or are serving in uniform. But this article seems (to me) to have several serious mistakes and/or unfounded conclusions that aren't supported by a casual glance at the historical record.
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MCDP-1 is far from the only USMC manual and is pretty clearly part of an entire spectrum of such manuals. Is there a reason this manual was cherry picked out of that spectrum?
On pg5 Owen claims that Liddell-Hart "denigrated" the importance of Allenby's Palestine campaign, yet Liddell-Hart thought highly enough of Allenby and the Palestine Campaign to include them in a chapter of their own in his 'The Real War 1914-18' and Liddell-Hart wrote glowingly of Allenby in the aformentioned chapter.
To Wit;
"When full deduction is made for the advantages conditions of September 1918, the conclusion remains that the triumph immortalized by the already immortal name of Meggiddo is one of history's masterpieces by reason of breadth of vision and treatment. If the subject was not a difficult one, the picture is almost unique as a perfect conception perfectly executed."
-B.H.Liddell-Hart
Those are simpily not words of "denigration" by any definition or standard.
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On a personal bias issue I have an issue with anybody or anything that quotes John Mearsheimer as an authority on anything beyond obtaining Saudi oil money grants for a university.
If we're going to rehabilitate Foch (who clearly seems to deserve it, as clearly his students do not), is it possible to do so without it being at the expense of Liddell-Hart (whose concepts have proven themselves over and over again), and without resorting to the veracity challenged (Mearsheimer) as a voice of authority?
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On the conclusions...
I offer the Blitzkrieg (1939-41), The Israeli Six-Day War, and Operations Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom as examples of "manoeuvre warfare."
I offer Kursk, Stalingrad, Dien Bien Phu, Khe Sahn, and Grozny '95 as "attritional warfare."
Von Falkenhayn's "Bleed the French White" qoute is not of the MV school of thought, whatever that school may be determined to be.
["The purpose of manoeuvre is to gain position of advantage relative to an opponent. This advantage may be used to deliver overwhelming violent attrition."]
Not manoeuvering means fixed defenses, which may or may not have advantage relative to an opponent. This advantage may also be used to deliver overwhelming violent attrition.
- or the opponent could withdraw, surrender, just fade away, or all three.
EQUALLY
ASYMETRICAL,
R
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Response to Fuzziness!
First, off, as I am sure Eric is aware, you have limited space to pursue an issue such as this. This was not a Research MSc, so I went with what I was comfortable with. The limited number of writers I surveyed were the most influential, and well known.
Robert Leonhard is a good friend of mine and I would suggest that his “Principles of Warfare for the Information Age,” actually stands in opposition to his “Manoeuvre Warfare” writing. Robert and I do not agree on all, but I have questioned the source closely. I have all his books, bar one. In my opinion, “POWFTIG” is one of the most of the most important and original works on military thought ever written, and understanding it lead to my rejection of MW of which I have previously been a rabid groupy!
I know and have great difficulty with Shimon Naveh’s work. I fear it is misleading, and draws erroneous conclusions. I am trying to find Shimon to get to grips with him on this before becoming any more strident. Nikolas Zetterling’s rebuttal of Naveh is well worth reading. I know and have read Franz Osinga’s book. I have also met and conversed at some length with Bill Lind, so I submit I have made not come to my conclusions lightly.
I also have Hookers book,
– but obviously my attempts to remove the fuzziness have not been successful.
The use of the Word, “Fraud” may have been better considered in terms of a question, rather than a statement. I do not name names, but submit that some of those progressing the adoption of MW knew that the reasoning was weak, but dismissed that shortcoming for a supposed “greater good.”
The OODA loop I addressed was that as written about by Lind, is not what Boyd had in mind (according to Chet Richards). I have issues with the OODA loop in general, but I was concentrating on Lind’s use of it. Lind did claim it as a unique element, as he did Recon Pull and Mission Command. The defining elements are nothing to do with MW. That is my issue.
I never said that Sun-Tzu thought of in terms of a bloodless victory. I actually said the opposite.
If Lind’s understanding of Recon Pull was so worthwhile, where is the Pamphlet definition? I have received 5-6 emails with “recon pull” explanations and all are different. If nothing else, the role of “recon” is to find the enemy. Not find “gaps”. As someone with some practical experience of conducting reconnaissance, I never understood how using my initiative, (which I was required to do) defined my actions as pull or push. If I was doing my job, stuff was following. Unless recon has good comms, recon is generally useless, so letting Command know where you are is inherent to the process and cannot be avoided.
All in all, if I am only right in the areas where Eric says I am, then I am a pretty happy rabbit! :D
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
Render
I'm gratified to see that I'm not the only one with some misgivings about this article.
So am I!
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Quote:
On pg5 Owen claims that Liddell-Hart "denigrated" the importance of Allenby's Palestine campaign, yet Liddell-Hart thought highly enough of Allenby and the Palestine Campaign to include them in a chapter of their own in his 'The Real War 1914-18' and Liddell-Hart wrote glowingly of Allenby in the aformentioned chapter.
My reference to the denigration comes from BLH's wording in his book, "Strategy of the Indirect Approach" - and yes BLH does contradict himself.
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On a personal bias issue I have an issue with anybody or anything that quotes John Mearsheimer as an authority on anything beyond obtaining Saudi oil money grants for a university.
I also have issues with Mearsheimer. That was why I cited 3 other sources.
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If we're going to rehabilitate Foch (who clearly seems to deserve it, as clearly his students do not), is it possible to do so without it being at the expense of Liddell-Hart (whose concepts have proven themselves over and over again), and without resorting to the veracity challenged (Mearsheimer) as a voice of authority?
Good question. Very interesting in any answer you may have. I think BLH did great damage and his work is still causing problems. I think Fuller was far brighter, but equally flawed.
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Seems to me this
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
...I think BLH did great damage and his work is still causing problems. I think Fuller was far brighter, but equally flawed.
is accurate and a fair summation of reality -- to wit, no Great Guru exists with all the answers. Nor is any theory of warfare of which I'm aware at this time the answer to all questions.
I though your article was balanced and pretty accurate, it illustrated flaws but did not totally discard maneuver while illustrating that maneuver without a firepower and even attritional backup is dangerous. This is a long way of saying I don't think there's much real disagreement over the pros and cons shown in the two articles. Perhaps 'flawed' in lieu of 'fraud' might've meant no discussion -- but discussion is good. ;)
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Thanks Ken!
I am actually reading Fullers thoughts on Air Power. They are far more rational and balanced than his ideas on tanks and what is more, history has shown them to be generally true! - unlike his ideas on tanks!
... and I think that "tanks" actually seem to be the start of this all MW malarkey for reasons I cannot quite yet fathom. For as much as we have gained, their seems to be much we do not yet understand.
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Fuller has a great deal to recommend him, not least
his ideas on staffs and age of Generals...
I think the Tank led us to Maneuver Warfare simply because it existed and offered a combination of offensive power and mobility that begged to be exploited, a combination that nothing previous could provide. Fuller's swarms were not outrageously impossible but they were and are beyond the state of technology, training and human capability available to large Armies -- and by definition, swarms take numbers...
Unattended Vehicles, air or ground, OTOH... :cool:
I think the natural tendency of combat between individuals or Armies and most conglomerations in between is to stasis which leads to pure attritional warfare. Instinctively, most realize this is not good and thus a desire to avoid it yet such opportunities to preclude having to "...fight it out on this line if it takes all Summer..." are offered only by a relatively rare combinations of synergistic events, a significant mistake on the part of one side or the other -- or by a truly exceptional and innovative Commander literally making an opportunity.
Lengthy way to say maneuver warfare is important and desirable but rarely able to be practiced much above Battalion level however any decent Army must have the capability of employing the techniques when that chance or stroke allows.
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Other references
One point that I agree with in this argument is that there is very little apparently written about "attrition warfare"--or whatever could be considered the opposite of manuever warfare. I'd offer the following:
A History of Modern Wars of Attrition. Carter Malkasian. Malkasian is better known to the SWJ community for his recent book on counterinsurgency, but I enjoyed this earlier effort that looked at campaigns whose focus was to attrite the enemy. Surprisingly to some, Slim's Imphal-Kohima battles in Burma (1944) are listed as purely attrition battles--to good effect.
One of Malkasian's case studies is that of Ridgeway in Korea. For that reason, Ridgeway's book on the Korean War is a good companion. In there, Ridgeway discusses his philosophy on limited war where the intent is to cause a continual stream of enemy casualties (pain) to support achieving political objectives.
"Naval Maneuver Warfare" Wayne Hughes (Naval War College Review Summer 1997). Hughes is also the author of the excellent Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat. In this essay, he discusses manuever as not really being applicable to Navy tactics, but that "Power Warfare" is the opposite of Maneuver. He defines Power Warfare as creating a spiraling attrition effect on the enemy.
Regarding the discussion on Liddell Hart, I'd recommend Azar Gat's take in his tome A History of Military Thought. While this is off the current MW debate, Gat credits Liddell Hart with developing the thoughts that led to concept of limited war and applying measured responses rather than overwhelming force to strategic problems.
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Ken - I would think the tank returned us to the maneuver warfare of the past. In that the tank provided the cavalry with a way to get past those horse killing machine guns.
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Phil, somebody out there really doesn’t like Carter Malkasian’s A History of Modern Wars of Attrition.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m..._/ai_116732507
I haven’t read it (65 bux!) so I’ll refrain from further comment on that.
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Ironically, Captain Wayne Hughes’s Fleet Tactics was mentioned on another blog I frequent…
http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/
As I mentioned on that blog, I only have the much older Cold War (1986) version of Fleet Tactics, so I’m just a couple of decades late on that subject…
GOING
HOME,
R
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Cavalry was never unstoppable
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Originally Posted by
Render
Ken - I would think the tank returned us to the maneuver warfare of the past. In that the tank provided the cavalry with a way to get past those horse killing machine guns.
Tanks under many circumstances are.
Cavalry offered mobility, not maneuver warfare. Other than the Mongols, most Cavalry supplemented but did not replace Infantry and combat was at Infantry speed, maneuver at an Infantry pace. The Tank changed that.
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What is maneuver warfare exactly?
This is the real issue here, and we can see it in the various posts on this discussion thread. I'm not even sure I understand what William Owen thinks it is. I agree that the MCDP 1 definition as articulated is not much help. Robert Leonhard's definition works much better for me, but that isn't exactly the way Bill Lind, John Boyd, and others would see it. For them, it's either German School Maneuver Warfare (Auftragstaktik) or nothing.
A lot of worthwhile points to discuss and I'm going to wade into this since Mr. Owen seems willing. But I need to get through a bit of truth in advertising before diving into this so everybody understands my particular bents and biases.
When I came into the U.S. Marine Corps in 1980, I was pretty dismayed at what I found. I'd been a military history buff and wargamer since I was 14, and what I was seeing in the Marine Corps (I was a tank officer) wasn't squaring with what I was reading and experiencing on the historical board wargame maps. Of course, the USMC had a rich tradition of storming fortified areas and throwing bodies/ordnance/ammo against it. But I noted that we all too often went for the "thickest part of the hedge" instead of going around when that chance was offered. I still see this today, believe it or not. More on that in a bit.
Met Bill Lind in 1988 and we became fast friends. It was then I first got exposed to MW and got the terminology I needed to explain things that just didn't seem quite right. Through him I met John Schmitt, the author of FMFM 1 who was working on a "white book" on campaigning. We seemed to see things in much the same way. In 1993 as an AMU masters student, I met Colonel Mike Wyly (who figures so prominently in the Marine Corps adoption of MW) and Bruce Gudmundsson, author of STORM TROOP TACTICS, a seminal work on German tactical innovation in WWI that busted a lot of myths about storm troop tactics in that era. Bill and Bruce ran a TV show called "Modern War" in 1994 that I was fortunate enough to have participated in. I'm still in contact with all of them. I will admit all these men affected my thinking a great deal. In 1994 I was part of "The Great Synchronization Debate" in the pages of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE and carried on a lengthy correspondence with Robert Leonhard who was writing PRINCIPLES OF WAR FOR THE INFORMATION AGE--that's me as a Major in the acknowledgements. We didn't agree on a number of things, but I think I can articulate his views relatively well after all that. His work affected me greatly, particularly his book FIGHTING BY MINUTES as I quote it extensively in my chapter on Soviet decentralization in Stalingrad, 1942 in John Antal's and Brad Gericke's anthology, CITY FIGHTS.
So here is the "Apostles of Mobility" creed--yes, I am a maneuverist. I need to say that up front. Hopefully I can make points better than what we have often seen in the advocacy rhetoric. That said, I am not one to claim MW is the end all be all warfighting philosophy. I happen to particularly like it, but that's because I grew up in a Marine Corps that was unable to think beyond the beachhead and/or fortified line, that had been seared by its institutional experience against the Japanese, Koreans, and Vietnamese that seemed inured to any other approach than "kill them all and let God sort them out." There is certainly a time and place for that, but what I noticed was that we were seemingly incapable of doing anything else, even when the situation seemed to call for it.
I'll just make two points before I address the specific items brought up here in future postings.
1) MW was a medicine designed to address a particular warfighting "disease," borne out of Vietnam war experience. Like any medicine, it loses a great deal of its relevance when the disease goes away. I have a hard time talking and thinking about maneuver warfare in any instance other than when seeing attritionist approaches applied to situations that aren't suited for such a style of warfare--but the attritionist approach is applied nevertheless.
2) I am not sure MW has really been embraced by the USMC. I'd say there are those who have--and they are about 10-20% of the total. That may be enough. Sure, many can parrot the manuals and the buzzwords, but they show little practical understanding in the cases, TDGs, field exercises, and combat situations handed to them. For those who point to the doctrine, I will simply say that doctrine has no force if it is not followed. Additionally, many of the doctrinal tenets in the USMC "White Books" are not carried through to the detailed Marine Corps Warfighting Publications that contained more of the "how to" guidance. In fact, in some situations they are actually contradictory.
Some will point to Grenada, the Persian Gulf War, and OIF I to prove that I am wrong--that the Marine Corps had leaders who understood and applied MW. I can't disagree with that--we were lucky to have had them. And perhaps one should not expect more than this, that our senior leadership understands and can apply the concept. It's far from clear that our juniors can. It's very much a mixed bag. And much depends on how you define the term "maneuver warfare," which brings this particular reply back full circle to where I open.
In short, I want to make sure I understand what flavor of MW we are talking about. Are we talking the USMC definition? Lind/German School definition? Or Leonhard definition?
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Can't speak for others but for me,
it's an amalgamation of all three plus Fuller, et.al. and others even including De Saxe and Gustavus Adolphus; probably best summarized as the Lind/German school for most purposes. It is IMO a valuable form of warfare but it is not a panacea that will fit all situations; it's a tool in the toolbox for use if possible by the substitution of innovation, surprise and agility for mass...
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
ericmwalters
This is the real issue here, and we can see it in the various posts on this discussion thread. I'm not even sure I understand what William Owen thinks it is. I agree that the MCDP 1 definition as articulated is not much help. Robert Leonhard's definition works much better for me, but that isn't exactly the way Bill Lind, John Boyd, and others would see it. For them, it's either German School Maneuver Warfare (
Auftragstaktik) or nothing.
Being from a branch which worships at the altar of Auftragstaktik in the pages of ARMOR but has had significant trouble putting it in practice, great summary.
Very enlightening history of why MW was conceived and pushed to the USMC. At Knox in the 1990's I had a conversation with two former enlisted Marines who became Army officers. I asked why they didn't go back to the USMC as an officer. Their answer has stayed with me.
"If the Marine Corps thinks it will take 30 men killed to take a hill, they'll send 31." ;)
Glad to see things have changed.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
ericmwalters
A lot of worthwhile points to discuss and I'm going to wade into this since Mr. Owen seems willing. But I need to get through a bit of truth in advertising before diving into this so everybody understands my particular bents and biases.
Very willing, and always interested in the truth. My inclination to question the dogma that became MW is based on exactly this.
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1) MW was a medicine designed to address a particular warfighting "disease," borne out of Vietnam war experience. Like any medicine, it loses a great deal of its relevance when the disease goes away.
This is what I call the "TX Hammes" position and it is true on one level. Was it a medicine or a placebo? The problem is that it provably morphed way beyond being a medicine. The British and Australian Armies picked it up as a "doctrine." As a a medicine, for the USMC, OK. But someone took the medicine and wrote doctrine on it. Is it useful. Yes, very!, but not when considered in isolation or by the poor historical evidence used.
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2) I am not sure MW has really been embraced by the USMC. I'd say there are those who have--and they are about 10-20% of the total. That may be enough.
It's in the manuals and everyone thinks they are. How do we judge? Why does it matter?
My point being that what is required is a sound doctrine. Sound doctrine rears its head in success in the face of challenge. I would say the USMC conduct of the 2nd Fallujah Operations provides a great deal of material for discussion on this. Strange you mention John Antal, as I was discussing this all with him, just a month ago, when he dropped by my neck of the woods.
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In short, I want to make sure I understand what flavor of MW we are talking about. Are we talking the USMC definition? Lind/German School definition? Or Leonhard definition?
What makes Leonhard so different, is his approach, and, to repeat myself, it was he that got me to question the whole idea of there being something useful in swallowing the idea of MW.
The point of my article was to show that the reasoning and evidence used to advocate MW was weak/non-existent. As I said,
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In all its various definitions a premise of MW is the acceptance of the idea that there is a separate and distinct alternative ‘style’ of warfare identified as Attrition Warfare.
That's my "break in battle" right there. This is the problem with modern military thought. (What is EBO? What "Information Operations?") Yes, Fuzziness is an issue and some people assured us that there was no Fuzziness. They told us MW was a sound Doctrine. Where is the evidence?
As I told the Australian Army's Land Warfare Conference, I swallowed MW whole. There is some self-flagellation here! If anyone took bait, I did!
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
Cavguy
Being from a branch which worships at the altar of Auftragstaktik ...
So you were in the Royal Navy in the 18th and early 19th Century :)
Seriously, there is an excellent work called "Rules of the Game" which should be required reading for anyone interested in this area!
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Lind let me borrow his copy of Rules of the Game, and he said it was one of the best books to understand his vision of MW.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ski
Lind let me borrow his copy of Rules of the Game, and he said it was one of the best books to understand his vision of MW.
Yep, it's an excellent book, by all accounts. Strangely Bill never mentioned it to me. I only found about it, as I was sitting next to Andrew Gordon at a conference at Watchfield a couple of years back.
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I turned Bill onto Gordon's book because he was always talking about how the Navy had no comparable historical work that married well with Maneuver Warfare theory. Of course, RULES OF THE GAME is all about command and control, and that's what is most controversial about MW, and that's why Bill loves it. I found out about RULES OF THE GAME from Don Hanle, an Air Force officer. Well, Boyd was an Air Force guy, after all...
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Framing the MW Discussion--Definitions
Please bear with me on this, but in my experience in grappling with the issues surrounding MW, we have to agree on what we are talking about. Otherwise, we'll talk past each other.
William Owen has already well described the problem with the MCDP-1 statement on MW, but there's much more to this definition that we need to pull out. The USMC says one thing but really means another; to understand this, I've got to walk everyone through a few things. Once I do this, some of the implications of Lind and Leonhard will become much more clear.
On pages 37 and 38 of MCDP 1 we get what I consider to be the best "definition" of MW in the publication, and you'll see I say that because I tend to agree with Leonhard's characterization in The Art of Maneuver. The below paragraph follows a brief charaterization of Attrition Style of warfare:
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On the opposite end of the spectrum is warfare my maneuver which stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a psotion of advantage rather than meet it straight on. Rather than pursuing the cumulative destruction of every component in the enemy arsenal, the goal is to attack the enemy "system"--to incapacitate the enemy systematically. Enemy components may remain untouched but cannot function as a cohesive whole." Rather than being viewed as desirable targets, enemy concentrations are generally avoided as enemy strengths. Instead of attacking enemy strength, the goal is the application of our strength against selected enemy weaknesses in order to maximize advantage....Maneuver relies on speed and surprise for without either we cannot concentrate strength against enemy weakness. Tempo itself is a weapon--often the most important. Success by maneuver--unlike attrition--is often disproportionate to the effort made. However, for exactly the same reasons, maneuver incompetently applied carries with it a greater chance for catastrophic failure. With attrition, potential losses tend to be proportionate to risks incurred.
There is no discussion on command and control here, but the two statements regarding the reliance on speed and surprise and the idea that tempo itself is a weapon are key ideas that are intended to justify decentralized C2, with attendant improvisation, initiative, adaptation and cooperation between elements, particularly laterally. We don't really get to that until nearly the end of the publication, at the top of page 78, when MCDP-1 "drops the hammer" in a section called "Philosophy of Command:"
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It is essential that our philosophy of command support the way we fight. First and foremost, in order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command and control must be decentralized. [emphasis in the original--EMW]
This is practically unchanged from the version orginally published in FMFM-1 Warfighting. Not can, not should, not possibly or probably--C2 must be decentralized to "support the way we fight," which is a maneuver style. If MW requires decentralized C2, then it's easy to conclude that if there is no decentralized C2, you cannot then do the MW style.
Given the influence of John Boyd and Bill Lind on the development of MW in the Marine Corps, it's understandable that, to the USMC, decentralized C2 is quite possibly the defining characteristic of MW, but you have to get to page 78 to get there. Interestingly, we don't see this explicit linkage in the earlier description of the "maneuver style."
And that is where Robert Leonhard lives in his first book. Mr. Owen brings up Leonhard's misgivings in later works (and I'll get to that eventually, and it's a very worthwhile discussion, but I won't right now). Leonhard sticks very closely to the description of the "maneuver style" without characterizing the C2 philosophy that achieves it. To Leonhard, defining the C2 characteristic is too narrow. He appears to agree with Colonel Mike Wyly who is reputed to have said that the two defining principles of MW are "speed and focus." That accords well with the USMC description we have. So all agree that this is what discriminates MW. Where the differences emerge is whether or not you can do MW without decentralized C2. Leonhard in his book The Art of Maneuver will say you can, and we call that Soviet School MW.
Speaking from an academic standpoint and as a former analyst of Soviet military theory (my first masters was a Soviet concentration), I agree with Leonhard. The Russians perfected by 1944 a system where they could mount maneuver warfare style in very much the way our MCDP 1 page 37-38 description would conform, only they had a much more hierarchical and centrally controlled method, one that persisted for decades afterwards.
But as a frustrated Marine junior officer who bridled under what I perceived to be as an oppressive training regime where intiative was routinely stifled and compliance to orders was prized above all (even if it compromised success), I am far more sympathetic to the German School and am ready to concede that--for the Marine Corps--I've signed up to the USMC/Boyd/Lind definition that you can't do MW without decentralized C2. What's extremely interesting to me is that Bob Leonhard grumbles about much the same thing in The Art of Maneuver--the Army may preach initiative and mission tactics, but it practices something else in AirLand Battle, despite the doctrine.
The Soviets had no choice but to do things the way they did, especially after The Great Patriotic War when they had short conscriptions and still had a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic force. They did not exhibit a lot of characteristics for independent thinking (at least successfully) and individuality that we see in the American military. German school fit more with American talents and capabilities, although I kept seeing U.S. military doctrine begin to look more and more like their Soviet enemies, particularly with regard to command and control. I first wrote about this in 1993 and 1994 and haven't seen much--at least regarding conventional U.S. warfare--that makes me change my mind. The Soviet model, while achieving speed and focus, meant more stifling of initiative, more rigid compliance to orders regardless of success at a particular level, and so on. The U.S. is wedded to synchronization, an impossible goal given the original definition for it, and I'd argue Soviet Troop Control methods did a better job of it in the 1970s (at least from a doctrinal standpoint) that does our most recent official articulation of the concept. But that's a whole seperate discussion.
So where does this leave us?
Regarding the MCDP-1 quote that William Owen gives us, it contains the gist of the MW style, but doesn't really get at what the USMC thinks is the necessary component--decentralized C2. Even Owen's restatement of the quote doesn't treat this, but that's because he is going elsewhere with his argument:
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The US Marine Corps seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions, which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.
He goes on to say that:
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However, the usefulness of this aspiration is in the precise nature of those unexpected actions. Identifying what these actions should be and how to perform them is a necessary step in defining the concept.
He's absolutely right, of course, but it's at this point where he and I part ways. I focus on the C2 issue as being the problem, whereas he attacks the issue of the dichotomy that MW set up, a contrast between "the attrition style" (or Attrition Warfare) and "the maneuver style." He's got good reason to do this and we'll get into that, but it fails to scratch the itch of those of us who are watching our superiors, peers, and subordinates oftentimes pit strength against strength, fail to be discriminating in what, where, and how we attack, and innumerable other things that the "maneuverists" associate with the attrition style.
So I'll propose this before going forward. If we are talking about MW as a "style" (speed and focus) compared to something else, we'll keep calling it MW. If we're talking about "German School" MW (as Leonhard would call it) which is what the USMC, Boyd, and Lind would term MW, then I suggest we call that "mission tactics" which is really all about decentralized C2. Just so we can keep the ideas straight. "Maneuver Warfare" without all this qualification is just too slippery a term, meaning too many things to too many people.
Any problems with that?
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I don't agree at all with your assertion that the
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"..."German School" MW (as Leonhard would call it) which is what the USMC, Boyd, and Lind would term MW, then I suggest we call that "mission tactics" which is really all about decentralized C2.
is anywhere near that simplistic but I'll certainly accept the stipulation for now to further the discussion. :cool:
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
ericmwalters
So I'll propose this before going forward. If we are talking about MW as a "style" (speed and focus) compared to something else, we'll keep calling it MW. If we're talking about "German School" MW (as Leonhard would call it) which is what the USMC, Boyd, and Lind would term MW, then I suggest we call that "mission tactics" which is really all about decentralized C2. Just so we can keep the ideas straight. "Maneuver Warfare" without all this qualification is just too slippery a term, meaning too many things to too many people.
Any problems with that?
No problem with that. (and please call me Wilf). I don't have an issue with any particular "school". My issue was and is with the evidence used to suggest to advocate MW as a doctrine.
Mission tactics are always good.
"It means that one frankly adopts the thoughts and views of the superior commander and that one uses all humanly practical means in order to give him satisfaction" - Foch 1903.
I am interested in the idea that,
Quote:
"The Russians perfected by 1944 a system where they could mount maneuver warfare style"
Looking at the conduct of operations such as the attack of Seelow Heights that the Soviets necessarily walked the walk when it came to MW. All the theory yes - not the practice. - and I don't think Naveh's characterisations are accurate. I am not alone in this.
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Eric's Reframing
If I understand the discussion so far, maneuver warfare, "speed" and "focus" as Eric (following Leonard and Wyly) stipulates it, is really just focussing on 2 of the the US's 9 traditional principles of war--speed and objective. What happened to the other 7? I am particularly concerned because one of the missing 7 just happens to be something called maneuver.
I also wonder about the apparent conflation of speed and tempo. I, for one, do not view these two as synomyms without a fair amount of further clarification and modification. As a minimum., I tend to think of speed as a tactical consideration while tempo is an operational one. Speedy movements (AKA sprints) may be part of my overall tempo, but I will also jog along between sprints and try to ensure I save enough for the final "kick" if I need it. Tempo also implies that I "kick" at the right time, neither too early nor too late. Getting there "firstest with the mostest" is all about speed, but not necessarily focus. Getting to the right place at the right time with the right amount of force is about tempo and focus.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
wm
I also wonder about the apparent conflation of speed and tempo.
One of things I take from Leonhard is that speed is only relevant to creating surprise. Speed for speeds sake is both harmful and useless. Speed in terms of doing something for which the enemy is unprepared (temporally, positionally or technically) is a war winner every time.
Another point is that surprise does not work unless the enemy is unable to cope with the action you are performing. This is also one of my issues with the idea of cycling the OODA loop faster and faster. Speed in itself, gets you nothing.
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Granted--the label is simplistic
Ken,
Oh, for sure "Mission Tactics" in not the same thing as "German School" MW, but it's awkward to always say "German School MW" and "mission tactics" is what nearly all the usual arguments are about. So it's convenient shorthand that isn't analytical defendable, since "mission tactics" is merely one component of "German School MW." If you've got a snappier name/handle for what I'm trying to differentiate, by all means please give it to us.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
One of things I take from Leonhard is that speed is only relevant to creating surprise. Speed for speeds sake is both harmful and useless. Speed in terms of doing something for which the enemy is unprepared (temporally, positionally or technically) is a war winner every time.
Another point is that surprise does not work unless the enemy is unable to cope with the action you are performing. This is also one of my issues with the idea of cycling the OODA loop faster and faster. Speed in itself, gets you nothing.
Wilf, I understand the notion of speed but it still seems to be very different from tempo. Your additional post has not deconflicted this for me (I am just dense?)
BTW, speed has value for things besides creating surprise. For example, when on the defense, speed quite often is an effective mitigation for the risk of being surprised. Speed allows an offensive force to mass quicker than the opponent expects, even though the point of attack comes as no surprise. Speed may also enable a better/more effective pursuit of a defeated enemy (again surprise does not seem to be involved here).
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Ees hokay -- I'm simplistic...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
ericmwalters
Ken,
Oh, for sure "Mission Tactics" in not the same thing as "German School" MW, but it's awkward to always say "German School MW" and "mission tactics" is what nearly all the usual arguments are about. So it's convenient shorthand that isn't analytical defendable, since "mission tactics" is merely one component of "German School MW." If you've got a snappier name/handle for what I'm trying to differentiate, by all means please give it to us.
Nah, just wanted to make the point; I can go with your definitions. I also agree that in the minds (and actions) of many, it evolves to that definition.
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A couple more digressions--
Just to clear the decks before plunging on, since these were brought up....
Soviet-school MW: Sure, there are exceptions to just about everything. More than just the Seelow Heights assault. But in 1944, the Soviets began to achieve the ability to enjoy the benefits of tight centralized synchronization within and between echelons without many of the usual disadvantages in execution--the operation outruns the plan. That had long been the problem. Employing successive echelons where units are expended like rounds of ammunition, only having to maintain synchronization for a day's operation to take an objective and then having the follow-on echelon (with fresh forces) continue the attack solved a lot of problems. And while there were many tactical defeats, overall the operations enjoyed success as a whole because victories were won when and where they were needed and defeats were either not in very important places or were used to set conditions for victories elsewhere. The big limitation was when you ran out of echelons or you didn't have the sustainment power to back up the forces the field, everything came to a grinding halt. So you couldn't go very far, although the short distance you could go was blistering fast. So there was this pulsing quality to operations--lots of time prepping and planning, a helluva lunge, then consolidation and prepping and planning for the next big lunge. Kind of like the old WWI "bite and hold" on a much larger scale. But these met the "speed" and "focus against enemy weakness" criteria that we seem to judge MW style by.
Contrast that with Rommel's conduct of operations in Africa in December of 1941--tactically, the Germans win against OPERATION CRUSADER. Operationally, they lose since they have to retreat back due to lack of supplies. One of the big problems with Mission Tactics is that you can easily lose operational coherence and/or step too far out of your ability to consolidate and sustain your successes. That would be a master's thesis in and of itself.
Certainly speed alone is not enough for success. That speed has to be sustained (thus we often use the term tempo instead) and aimed at something. Why Boyd and Lind were significant--at least to the USMC--was that nobody had EXPLICITLY explained the mechanics of victory in such a way that there were immediately obvious implications in force structure, organization, and command and control. If Boyd's theories of fast transients were significant to the original designs of the F-15 and F-16, then "Mission Tactics" (as I'm terming German School MW) should have resulted in different USMC equipment, force structure/organization, and C2. Not sure we've seen that, not to the same degree we saw the U.S. Army reorganize for AirLand Battle. The USMC's abortive efforts towards "Distributed Operations" was perhaps the most obvious step in achieving real structural/organizational/functional realizations of "mission tactics"--at least as seen in some quarters, if not in other (for example, Bill Lind was horrified by what he was seeing with this). But there is still a Marine Corps drive towards decentralization as a way to increase speed and focus--we're just not insitutionalizing it yet. But the intent to do so is there.
Regarding speed and surprise, it's really about aiming for surprise. Like a boxer who runs through combinations of punches in a boxing round, you never are really sure which blow will land successfully ahead of time. You run through the combination hopefully faster than your opponent can parry/defend and/or counterpunch and that you get an opening.
As Wilf points out, speed by itself gets you nowhere. Using the above analogy, running through a punch combination in boxing that isn't aimed at your opponent's weaknesses/vulnerable points won't get you anywhere. It's the focus, it's the drive to make him react so much and so often that he uncovers himself and you are positioned to take advantage of it by landing a surprise blow.
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Mission Tactics versus Mission Tactics
Wilf writes:
Quote:
Mission tactics are always good.
"It means that one frankly adopts the thoughts and views of the superior commander and that one uses all humanly practical means in order to give him satisfaction" - Foch 1903.
Well, there's mission tactics and then there's Mission Tactics. Directive control, where the commander gives you a mission, tells you the intent/endstate he wants, and leaves it to you to figure out how to get the job done, is one thing. Detailed control, where the commander not only tells you the mission and endstate, but also the concept of operations, detailed tasks, and micromanages a lot of the warfighting functions and appears to prize the method of execution over accomplishing the mission is quite another. And having to ask "mother may I" before changing anything so that it slows down execution is definitely another.
In some situations, you want slavish obedience to orders without any deviation and absolutely NO initiative. When I was building a course on attrition warfare, I found myself looking at a lot of siege operations. Given that the enemy tied himself down, time was not typically a major factor, and that optimizing friendly force utilization was paramount; the situation turned into more of an engineering problem and one didn't tolerate too much variability/non-reliability in terms of subordinate unit performance. Likewise, the Germans threatened to shoot anyone who violated roadspace control measures as they moved mech forces through the Ardennes in 1940, prior to making contact with Belgian and French forces. For Marines, ship-to-shore movements--especially when under fire--are more choreographed than the biggest Broadway musical you can imagine. Given that, I'm not sure I can say "Mission Tactics is always a good thing." But I suspect that's because I'm thinking of this (and Foch's quote) a bit differently than Wilf is. I think this differentiation/discrimination must exist--"mission tactics" compared to something else (e.g., "orders-tactics")!
But I'm being very literal with the term here and not with this as a label for "German School" MW.
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Leonhard's Misgivings and the basis for MW
Here I want to dive into Wilf's issues with the evidentiary basis for MW as a doctrine. This starts to dive into some pretty heavy intellectual, theoretical, and historical territory. It's also good that he brings up Robert Leonhard's later writings, compared to earlier ones, because this actually illustrates part of the larger context that MW must be seen within.
Here's what Wilf wrote:
Quote:
Robert Leonhard is a good friend of mine and I would suggest that his “Principles of Warfare for the Information Age,” actually stands in opposition to his “Manoeuvre Warfare” writing. Robert and I do not agree on all, but I have questioned the source closely. I have all his books, bar one. In my opinion, “POWFTIG” is one of the most of the most important and original works on military thought ever written, and understanding it lead to my rejection of MW of which I have previously been a rabid groupy!
I'll start by saying Bob's "transformation" as we begin to see in his Fighting By Minutes and matured in his Principles of War for the Information Age occur because of this very fundamental question--why MW? Why not simply "The Art of War?" By the way, he doesn't bring this out explicitly in his book. But it's there--implicitly--by how it's laid out and written. I'll get back to that.
Let's go back to the frustrations the "maneuverists" had with the post-Vietnam USMC (and for you soldiers, imagine the post-Vietnam Army as well). Instead of coming up with MW, could we not have simply said, "Bring back the Art of War!" If commanders were always reaching for the attritional style even when it wasn't the best tool for the job, couldn't we just argue for using ALL the tools in the toolbox?
I'm going to oversimplify here, but it's done so some of you will get an idea of the emotional level that the frustration of many "maneuverists" had at this time. You know the old saying of "when all you've got is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." Well, that's kind of what we had back then. We had our mastery of supporting arms against a defended beach. That's what we did, that's what we were good at, and we could throw more Marine bodies onto a hot beach than the enemy could throw back at us. We used those methods for nearly everything. They worked. Like a very strong carpenter who used the claws on the back of his hammer to hack a board apart, we could use this style for any problem. A saw would have been better. Or a plane to smoothen rough spots (we would whap at it with the hammer head until it got a little less bumpy than it was--never mind we could never get it smooth).
The maneuverists didn't want to talk about the whole toolbox. "Look at this marvelous saw!" "See these various sizes of screwdrivers!" "This plane is really good at getting edges straight and smooth!" Oh no. Given that everybody was rushing towards fighting the Soviets in Europe (and, for the Marines, that meant Scandinavia) it was clear to the maneuverists that our usual ways of doing business weren't going to work. Methods built around attrition styles weren't going to cut it when so horribly outnumbered, out-firepowered, and out-resourced. The only hope many of the maneuverists saw was how the Germans had achieved some successes (notably in the early Blitzkrieg period) against these guys. And so the German "mission tactics" model was seized upon. "Wanna make two boards out of one?" the maneuverists cried. "Use a saw! A SAW!" And so, instead of focusing on all the tools in the toolbox, they focused on one. "Mission tactics"/German school MW. Against the Soviet hordes in Europe. Yup. And it wasn't just the USMC--the Army did the same thing.
What made this adoption of German School MW more easy was that decentralized C2 was pretty much a Prussian/German tradition, dating back to the 1813 campaign against Napoleon (all the Allied armies had Prussian chiefs of staff and the Trachenberg Plan depended on independent army maneuver with lateral communications). This tradition eventually worked its way down to the battalion and occasionally company level in the Franco-Prussian War and the platoon and squad level in the stosstruppen in certain assault units in World War One.
The saw doesn't mean a whole lot without a board to cut into two. Given a board, you reach for the saw. Same thing with Mission Tactics. Doesn't stand alone quite as well as it stands when coupled with a problem it is best suited to solve.
This is why Robert Leonhard and Wilf are standing where they are on the issue. Why MW? Why a saw? If you are going to fight a war, don't you need to master all the styles? If you are going to build a house, don't you need to use all the tools in the toolbox? They are right, of course.
But that didn't fly with those watching somebody whack at a board with hammer claws. "Here's a SAW! Use it! Don't know how? LEMME SHOW YOU! HERE!" Thus the judged "pre-occupation" with MW.
Okay, hopefully by now you understand how it happened and why. This still doesn't address Wilf's complaint about this being Marine Corps doctrine. Isn't this too limiting? Too confining? What's wrong with being highly proficient across the entire range of "The Art of War?"
I'll go back to my medicine analogy. Given the USMC's "long and illustrious" history, particularly as crack assault troops thrown into the teeth of enemy defenses, we have a very nearly reflexive reach for the attrition style of warfare. It shows up in our institutional culture in so many ways. We lionize Marine Corps General Lewis "Chesty" Puller, a commander who conducted his operations with usually very high casualty rates in his obsession to kill more of the enemy. He was often the right man in the right place, but we as Marines tend to overlook some of the more thoughtful yet effective commanders we had, such as Oliver P. Smith. We celebrate our catastrophic victories, such as Iwo Jima--a battle in which more Marines were casualties than there were Japanese defenders. We do this out of pride that we can and will persevere when given the toughest jobs. All this is admirable. But it also means we are less aware, less cognizant, less practiced, and therefore less adept at alternatives. "It's easy to be hard, but hard to smart" is one Marine wag's axiom about the Marine Corps. "I'm not smart and you can't make me," is another.
So Mission Tactics/German School MW was a very specific medicine that was fed to the U.S. Marine Corps at a very specific time. Wilf suggests this is the TX Hammes perspective. Well, TX was my company commander in Okinawa back in 1991, so perhaps that viewpoint rubbed off on me. This particular medicine may not work for you given what ails you. It might even harm you. But it sure was what the doctor ordered for us at that time....
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
wm
Wilf, I understand the notion of speed but it still seems to be very different from tempo. Your additional post has not deconflicted this for me (I am just dense?)
BTW, speed has value for things besides creating surprise. For example, when on the defense, speed quite often is an effective mitigation for the risk of being surprised. Speed allows an offensive force to mass quicker than the opponent expects, even though the point of attack comes as no surprise. Speed may also enable a better/more effective pursuit of a defeated enemy (again surprise does not seem to be involved here).
This is why I adhere to Leonhard. Surprise is about creating actions with which the enemy cannot cope. Massing, quicker than he expects fulfils this criteria. The point of attack may be no surprise, but the massing quicker is!
As concerns "Tempo" perhaps I am not using tempo in the same way you are. I would class Tempo as performing consistent set of actions in a way that aims to gain you benefit by being prepared, versus un-prepared. EG: Trenches dug to stage one in 6 hours and not 8.
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To Eric Walters
Robert Leonhard
I wish Bob was here to pitch in. I did send him a link a while back. I think you have accurately summarised both his and my thoughts on this, though, I am some what of a mental dwarf in comparison to Leonhard. If it hadn't been for him, I'd still be waffling about MW. Strangely, we first met at an EBO conference in London, where I was defending MW in the face of EBO!
It also occurs to me that, while in no way comparing myself to Hammes, Lind, Leonhard, Chet Richards, or even Eric, the amount of folks who think about this stuff seriously, seems to be very small and they all seem to know each other! Small world at the top of the pyramid.
Soviet Operational Art
As I've said I do have some issues with the Sov way of doing things in practice versus all their pretty solid theory. Their writing is very seductive in both it's clarity and certainty, but it just worries me that they never seem to be able to it.
Mission Orders
Mission orders, always have a place for, IF you are in command and no one can do what needs to be done. Thus I think you characterisation is both clear and useful.
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Of Spectrums, Styles, and Pendulum Swings: Part 1
Here I'm going to address another point Wilf raises in his piece. I had issues with this particular line of argument of his:
Quote:
In 1997 the re-written manual, issued as MCDP-1, stated that the two styles were part of a spectrum. This spectrum was never illustrated nor described.
Then,
Quote:
Thus the USMC sought to portray themselves as adherents to MW placing themselves in contrast to an organisation that may have sought proficiency across a spectrum or styles, to be used as and when appropriate.
And finally,
Quote:
The idea that MW and Attrition are either separate styles or part of a spectrum does not stand analysis. While the selective use of examples by MW adherents has sought to prove them as opposing or differing styles, they are better explained as complimentary [methinks he means complementary in American English--EMW]. They are in no way distinct or alternative forms of warfare.
So I wrote this:
Quote:
If Owen is dismissive of the notion that there are separate styles or forms of warfare, one wonders how he would judge Leonhard’s careful characterization of the two maneuver warfare schools, which he differentiates in how they practiced command and control. I would also strongly recommend Leonhard’s 2000 book, Principles of War for the Information Age, in describing the idea of spectrum ranges and justifying styles of operations.
Wilf said this--now, remember, this was before the discussion board missive of mine articulating where I think both he and Leonhard agree:
Quote:
Robert Leonhard is a good friend of mine and I would suggest that his “Principles of Warfare for the Information Age,” actually stands in opposition to his “Manoeuvre Warfare” writing. Robert and I do not agree on all, but I have questioned the source closely. I have all his books, bar one. In my opinion, “POWFTIG” is one of the most of the most important and original works on military thought ever written, and understanding it lead to my rejection of MW of which I have previously been a rabid groupy!
Now, I think we don't have an argument that mastery of the Art of War in its entirety is preferable. That's where we all want to be. I can't argue against that perspective. All I'm saying is that MW was a very specific remedy for a very specific warfighting "ailment" that was perhaps unique to the Marine Corps (although I suspect it wasn't since the U.S. Army adopted a good bit of it as well). That "remedy" does not appear to make much sense without the "ailment" it is intended to address. It may be that outsiders can't see the ailments that the USMC suffers from, but I'll readily concede that quite a number of Marine Corps insiders can't see it either (and Colonel Craig Tucker isn't the only one who doesn't, whose Masters Thesis Wilf acknowledges). Over the years there's been a lot of articles questioning MW in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette and elsewhere.
Okay, I've got two bones to pick at here--and Part 1 of this post will start with the first. This is the idea that Mission Tactics was intended as preferable over the ability to attain "proficiency over a variety of styles, to be used where and when appropriate." Wilf says this (see above) but I wish he'd put an explanatory footnote and/or citation, because I can't find that anywhere. Mission Tactics was preferable over a slavish devotion to the attrition style of warfare. That was the dichotomy set up and none other. The attrition style is NOT representative of a capability to attain "proficiency over a variety of styles, to be used where and when appropriate." So if Wilf has got something that says USMC MW is the best thing for everybody in all circumstances, I'd like to see it.
That's not what I read. I'll cite the original FMFM-1 introduction by General A.M. Gray:
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This book describes my philosophy on warfighting. It is the Marine Corps' doctrine and, as such, provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight.
and further:
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You will notice that this book does not contain specific techniques and procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and values. It requires judgment in application.
In other words, this is a doctrine for the Marine Corps. There's no claim that it's intended for anyone else. And, as I hope I've illustrated, it was designed to scratch a particular itch of ours. If you buy that (1) we had that itch (contentious in some quarters) and (2) this was the right scratch for that itch (also contentious in some quarters as some would say just advocate a return to the Art of War), then this makes sense. If you have an issue with either (1) or (2) or both, you won't buy this. And that's pretty much the end of discussion argument, because the debate then centers around differing assumptions about the nature of the problem and the best solution. Fine.
But if you do buy (1) and (2), you may have a legitimate worry that the USMC will be too focused on Mission Tactics to the exclusion of all else. Well, I'd submit we've never had a problem mastering Attrition Warfare styles--ever. Maybe someday. But not in the past, recent past, or even now. Still, attrition and maneuver are two styles and so far we've been characterizing them pretty theoretically. There's dangers in that. Very interestingly, the revision of FMFM-1, MCDP-1, contained this in General Charles Krulak's forward to the document:
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Since Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, was first published in 1989, it has had a significant impact both inside and outside the Marine Corps. That manual has changed the way Marines think about warfare. It has caused energentic debate and has been translated into several foreign languages, issued by foreign militaries, and published commercially. It has strongly influenced the development of doctrine by our sister services.
General Gray (retired) piled on in the Preface:
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Warfighting has stimulated discussion and debate from classrooms to wardrooms, training areas to combat zones.
and
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Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 stated, "While the basic nature of war is constant, the means and methods we use evolve continuously." Like war itself, our approach to warfighting must evolve. If we cease to refine, expand, and improve our profession, we risk becoming outdated, stagnant, and defeated.
So while the basic tenets and principles of Mission Tactics/MW are refined in MCDP-1, both FMFM-1 and MCDP-1 concede that this is not the end-all, be-all. And while other militaries and U.S. services are interested and copied some of what is written, this doctrine remains USMC doctrine. That's who it is intended for. And it will change over time.
Of course, we're not seeing much change at this point. But that's not to say the doctrine won't change--there's an intention that it will. Let's assume that we fight Irregular Warfare for over twenty years and get pretty comfortable with Mission Tactics/decentralized C2 (which is what many of our most successful units are using right now). Then that becomes what we reflexively reach for in any and all situations. Then we get involved in a major conventional fight where there are times and places where centralized C2 is not only desired, but absolutely needed/demanded. Then I'd expect some changes in doctrine to reflect that. But trust me, we're nowhere near that--Marine Corps culture is pretty hierarchical and centralized. It will be a while before we forget how to do that.
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Of Spectrums, Styles, and Pendulum Swings: Part 2
The title of this series of posts is "Of Spectrums, Styles, and Pendulum Swings." Here's my second bone to pick with Wilf's argument.
Wilf appears to take issue with the notions of spectrums/styles when he wrote: "The idea that MW and Attrition are either separate styles or part of a spectrum does not stand analysis." By now I hope it's clear that he is thinking of the Leonhard definition of MW, not the USMC/Boyd/Lind defintion, which is really "Mission Tactics" with a huge focus on decentralized C2. Given his understanding/definition of MW, I can understand why he would say this. But that's not the definition the USMC understands or officially accepts.
One of the goals of MCDP 1 revision of FMFM 1, according to General Krulak in the Foreword, was to: "...clarify the descriptions of the styles of warfare." And it seems that Wilf is not satisfied with the description of the styles on pages 36-39. Again, given the definition he's using for MW, this is understandable. I do want to point out a couple sentences that should disabuse anyone that the USMC advocates one style over all others and it's found on page 39:
Quote:
All warfare involves both maneuver and attrition in some mix. The predominant style depends on a variety of factors, not the least of which are our own capabilities and the nature of the enemy.
Now, if we look at this from a C2 philosophy perspective, MCDP 6 Command and Control gives us more on the spectrum/style description, and those are found on page 41 (a diagram of opposing conceptions of command and control), and page 81 (the command and control spectrum). Surrounding text and the OPERATION VERBAL IMAGE vignette in Chapter 1 of the publication provide a great deal of illustration showing contrasts between "orders-tactics" used in the attrition warfare style and "mission tactics" used in the maneuver warfare style. Significantly, there is a definite bias towards "mission tactics"/maneuver warfare style--there's no discussion of when and where "orders tactics"/attrition style would be most effective. And that would be a fair criticism. But remember who the patient is that we're administering this medicine to!
Given this definition of MW that is focused on "mission tactics"/decentralized C2, we now turn to Leonhard's book, Principles of War For the Information Age. I argued that he makes the case for thinking about spectrums and styles in this work. For those not familiar with this ground-breaking thesis, Leonhard's primary contribution is to point out the deficiencies in past principles of war, stated as a string of words such as "Maneuver," "Objective," "Offensive," "Surprise," "Economy of Force," "Mass," "Unity of Effort," "Speed," and "Security." These are static terms that don't readily show relationships and tradeoffs. His principles are articulated into couplets that indicate the bounds of a range of action, or--dare I say it--a spectrum. As one example, instead of "Mass" and "Economy of Force," he pairs the ideas as "the Principle of Distribution and Concentration." Or, more controversially, there are "the Principle of Option Acceleration and Objective" (because objectives often can and do change so you need to keep options open--and pick them before your enemy can pre-empt or effectively react), and "the Principle of Command and Anarchy." The best, most agile, most supple, and most effective organization can slide along those spectrums/scales/ranges outlined by these principles as circumstances change.
But not all organizations and commanders are that supple or agile. They exhibit preferences, tendencies, or biases for one end of the spectrum over the other, and so their operations exhibit a particular "style."
Coming full circle to the beginning of this post, we'll summarize by revisiting Wilf's complaints:
Quote:
In 1997 the re-written manual, issued as MCDP-12, stated that the two styles were part of a spectrum. This spectrum was never illustrated nor described.
I'd disagree, but that's because of the Marine Corps definition of MW is operative, not Robert Leonhard's/Wilf's. If I were using their definition, I can well understand this. But the manuals are explaining the spectrum and two styles in terms that are consistent with USMC focus on the "Mission Tactics" definition of MW that focuses on decentralized C2.
Quote:
Thus the USMC sought to portray themselves as adherents to MW placing themselves in contrast to an organisation that may have sought proficiency across a spectrum or styles, to be used as and when appropriate.
I find no basis for this in the manuals or any other "maneuverist" article/chapter/book or reference that I know, but Wilf may have something I don't. In fact, as I have just shown, there are acknowledgements/provisions for the choice of style as the circumstances dictate, at least within MCDP 1.
Quote:
The idea that MW and Attrition are either separate styles or part of a spectrum does not stand analysis. While the selective use of examples by MW adherents has sought to prove them as opposing or differing styles, they are better explained as complimentary [methinks he means complementary in American English--EMW]. They are in no way distinct or alternative forms of warfare.
Again, using the Leonhard understanding of MW, this makes sense. But if you apply the USMC MW definition, you can begin to see how Leonhard's principles of war for the information can make the case for spectrums and distinct styles of war.
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I have to say I am learning a lot here, but the premise of my article was that the idea was not subjected to sufficient rigour and the historical and epistemological evidence not challenged. Had it been, we may have got a better product.
I still stand by that premise.
In fact the first person I know who actually looked for sources of MW thinking and wrote them down was Leonhard.
It could be that you could place MW in the left hand column of Leonhard’s paradigm and Attrition in the right, but this would only make sense (as you allude) if we were using Leonhard's arguments. – and I find that instructive.
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Is it just me or are you two talking past each other?
I find myself in the unusual position of agreeing with both of you on four salient points:
1. MW offers many benefits on paper but is devilishly hard to do in practice; I'll add: the increased training at all levels required to attain true proficiency is possibly not worth the cost due to the fact cited in number 2. below.
2. MW is not a replacement for attrition or other forms of warfare but is a methodology to be used when possible.
3. The USMC (Full disclosure; been there, done that) is prone to frontal assaults and really needed an antidote to that. The US Army suffers from the same disease to a slightly lesser extent and also jumped on the wagon -- well, on the tailgate of it anyway. In both cases, the adoption was primarily but not totally lip service while a strong strain of skepticism about it was maintained by senior people who feared loss of control and (wrongly, IMO) excessive casualties. I'll again add: this is partly due to a tacit knowledge that our training is only marginally adequate thus leading to an innate distrust or lack of total faith in subordinates taking the 'correct' actions.
4. Both services have made some strides toward decentralization (thanks primarily to Afghanistan and Iraq) but still tend to hold the reins a little too tightly.
Thus we (both services) have a doctrine which says one thing while we actually do something a little different -- and more cautious...
Nothing new in that, been that way since 1949 at least in my observation. :wry:
Obviously some paraphrasing in there and I do not mean to pin either of you to my choice of words. My additions re: training are my own and not inferred from either of you. However, my sensing is that you two are closer than you seem to think. ;)
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
I find myself in the unusual position of agreeing with both of you on four salient points:
1. MW offers many benefits on paper but is devilishly hard to do in practice; I'll add: the increased training at all levels required to attain true proficiency is possibly not worth the cost due to the fact cited in number 2. below.
2. MW is not a replacement for attrition or other forms of warfare but is a methodology to be used when possible.
3. The USMC (Full disclosure; been there, done that) is prone to frontal assaults and really needed an antidote to that. The US Army suffers from the same disease to a slightly lesser extent and also jumped on the wagon -- well, on the tailgate of it anyway. In both cases, the adoption was primarily but not totally lip service while a strong strain of skepticism about it was maintained by senior people who feared loss of control and (wrongly, IMO) excessive casualties. I'll again add: this is partly due to a tacit knowledge that our training is only marginally adequate thus leading to an innate distrust or lack of total faith in subordinates taking the 'correct' actions.
4. Both services have made some strides toward decentralization (thanks primarily to Afghanistan and Iraq) but still tend to hold the reins a little too tightly.
Thus we (both services) have a doctrine which says one thing while we actually do something a little different -- and more cautious...
Nothing new in that, been that way since 1949 at least in my observation. :wry:
Obviously some paraphrasing in there and I do not mean to pin either of you to my choice of words. My additions re: training are my own and not inferred from either of you. However, my sensing is that you two are closer than you seem to think. ;)
Wow! Great summary Ken, and well articulated.
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Ken White may well be right!
Yep, we may be violently agreeing. I may not be totally right. As I say, my beef was/is with the evidence.
Good is good, and having more than one bat in the golf bag seems to get the best results. No argument there.
...I will now retire to the garden and read Clausewitz!
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Theory before practice? Or practice before theory?
Here I'm about to finish with expanding on my argument with Wilf's main points. All else is really nitpicking, which I can get into later, but aren't central to the thesis that he presented.
It's worth looking at Wilf's recent post above where he writes:
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...the premise of my article was that the idea was not subjected to sufficient rigour and the historical and epistemological evidence not challenged. Had it been, we may have got a better product.
I still stand by that premise.
In fact the first person I know who actually looked for sources of MW thinking and wrote them down was Leonhard.
This seems like a pretty straightforward and simple set of statements, but it isn't. There's a lot to dicuss here. If I've not killed everyone with the length of my previous posts, I probably will with this one.
Okay, let's cut to the chase for starters--that the maneuver warfare idea in the Marine Corps "was not subjected to sufficient rigor and the historical and epistemological evidence not challenged." I'll say right up front that I agree with the first part--MW wasn't subjected to sufficient rigor--but not necessarily on the last part. Not challenged is a pretty bold statement. Maybe insufficiently challenged, possibly. I'll just point Wilf to Fideleon Damian's masters thesis, The Road to FMFM-1, particularly Chapter 3 entitled "The Maneuver Warfare Debate" which spells out in a good bit of detail the challenges to the historical and epistemological evidence made in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette. And Fideleon really only mentions a handful of them, not all of them. Now, are these challenges as sophisticated as they could have been? Of course they weren't. And they could not have been, given the venue. But these challenges were still made. So I'll disagree with Wilf that they weren't.
Now, had there been a Robert Leonhard with his 1996-2000 mindset challenging the concept as opposed to the authors we had writing against MW at the time, no doubt we would have gotten a better product. Oh well.
Gotta work with what you have to work with.
Let's face it, Marines are practical people with not a lot of patience for theory. Let's go back to my medicine example made in previous posts for a minute. If you are sick with something, you are far more interested in that the cure works. You are less interested in HOW it works. So long as the "fix" cured your "ailment," you are not as obsessed with whether an medieval alchemist's potion hooked you up or whether a modern doctor and pharmacy did. Of course, your risks of undesired side effects and other health factors are higher with that alchemist, right? But back in the bad old days, you didn't get a choice. Today you do.
Today, if you are having muscle spasms in your back, you can get Chinese acupuncture, chiropractic, or traditional medicine. You'll find people that swear by one over the other two. Who is right? Each will claim they have all the "sufficient rigor" they need to justify the treatment, but their justifications won't sit well with adherents to other treatments.
So it is with Marine Corps-style MW/"Mission Tactics." We grabbed it because it worked to cured our attrition warfare style bias "ailment." We weren't terribly interested in the arcane theoretical ups and downs of it.
To borrow a phrase from Wilf's tag line, "I don't care if it works in practice! I want to see if it works in theory!" is not something the USMC was adhering to.
Okay, so the Marine Corps grabbed onto this without studying the thing to death. So what?
After all, we'd done this before. Amphibious Warfare doctrine didn't go through a lot of "sufficient rigor" either--and the then-contemporary historical examples (e.g., Gallipoli) didn't offer a lot of encouragement. Helicopter-borne operations--whether practiced by the Marine Corps or the Army in the 1950s and early 1960s didn't go through a lot of sufficient rigor either. Neither did U.S. Navy, British, and Japanese efforts at carrier-borne aviation. Or submarine warfare. And these were NEW, UNTRIED fields of endeavor!
Of course, all that conceptual work didn't deliver a "better product" either for amphibious warfare, heliborne ops, carrier warfare, submarine warfare (and so on), when it came to doctrine. But it was good enough. And it's been refined over the decades. Marine Corps MW wasn't trying anything particularly new. It was actually a fairly well-established and well-proven concept. We were, in fact, adopting something old, something accepted in other militaries. I'd say our adoption of amphibious warfare doctrine was far more bold, daring, and risky than was our adoption of maneuver warfare doctrine.
So Wilf can stand by that premise that the MW concept "was not subjected to sufficient rigor" and I just shrug my shoulders and say, so what?
To me, the most important questions are (1) has the Marine Corps really embraced MW? And (2) is it better at combat because of it? If anybody is looking for a master's thesis or PhD dissertation topic, there you have it.
Before I get accused of being too combative with Wilf, I'll just say this--I have no objection with anybody trying to apply analytical rigor to the MW concept now and continuously. And as we saw in the FMFM 1 and MCDP 1 preliminary matter, neither did Generals Krulak or Gray. No problems there. I just think it's unrealistic to expect militaries to study things to death before they embrace change and/or innovation (especially the latter). And my academic/professorial side is sympathetic to many of his complaints when they are well founded in historical examples and theory.
Now, regarding Wilf's last observation that Robert Leonhard was the only one who had "looked at the sources of MW thinking and wrote them down"--I have to take issue with that. Understand that I think Robert Leonhard has done THE BEST JOB of looking at the sources of MW thinking. I used his The Art of Maneuver as the central text of my 400-level maneuver warfare course. But there were other people who did this before he did.
The most prominent, if outdated, example is William S. Lind's own Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Westview Press published it in 1985, whereas Leonhard's first book did not come out until 1991. This work contains not only Lind's writings, but also Colonel Michael D. Wyly's lectures on tactics and self-paced Tactical Decision Games that were developed at Amphibious Warfare School when he was there and leading the Maneuver Warfare Seminar (see Fideleon Damien's thesis for the details on this).
Keep in mind, however, that this book is STRICTLY "German School" maneuver warfare. Leonhard is much more comprehensive and critical. Which is why I used his book in my course and not Lind's/Wyly's. Plus, Lind's/Wyly's was really written for Marines, and that comes out in the text. It has much less power for other audience not afflicted with the USMC-peculiar "attritionitis disease." (See previous posts on that). As such, it's really a work of advocacy and basic instruction in the USMC flavor of MW/Mission Tactics. It resonates best with Marine audiences, although it's less so now than when it was first published.
I might say the Robert Leonhard's was the first "scholarly" work on the maneuver warfare subject, even though he was a practicioner/serving Army officer. But he was certainly not the first to have written about MW and sources of MW thinking (Sun Tzu, Liddell-Hart, "those dead Germans," etc).
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Ken White May Well Be Right!
Ken wrote:
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MW offers many benefits on paper but is devilishly hard to do in practice; I'll add: the increased training at all levels required to attain true proficiency is possibly not worth the cost....
I'll take the liberty of quoting my April 1995 Marine Corps Gazette article, "Is Mission Control The Weakness of Maneuver Warfare?," which goes into this to some depth. For thread readers, mentally substitute "Directive Control" or "Mission Tactics" for "mission control" (which has nothing to do with NASA or space flight in this context!):
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The problem "maneuverists" have with detailed control is that we Marines spend so much time and effort doing it. Mission control always seems to get short shrift....
Substantive criticisms of Mission Control:
Maj Leonhard remarked in his Army [magazine] article that "mission control fails at least as much as it succeeds." This is a serious charge, although his one example, that of Guderian at Yelnia, does not support his claim....
Units unfamiliar with mission control are bound to have major problems when they first try it....But continuous practice brings with it mistakes and continuous learning. After a few successes, the unit grows confident and is encouraged to try more. After this, success comes more frequently and the effect snowballs. Of course, this doesn't happen if the same people aren't kept on the team....what is to be done with a unit that hasn't practiced and/or is victimized by constant personnel turnover?
This, then, is the fulcrum of the whole argument, that mission control is simply too hard for Marine Corps to do, given current operational realities. It could be true that without the necessary institutional changes to support it, mission control cannot be expected to work well enough in combat to bring success.
Funny to read this again after thirteen years. COIN operations in combat would seem to be engendering decentralization even when our institutions back in the rear aren't able to--at least not able to sufficiently enough.
Is MW not worth the cost? I suspect it may be in peacetime, but the crucible of extended combat is making us adopt more of its features (the German School aspect of it, anyway). Why else would we be doing development on Enhanced Company Operations (ECO), which is looking more and more like "stosstruppen on steroids?"
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Former Corp Commandant (29) General A. M. Gray also wrote the foreword for the Tom Clancey non-fiction book “Marine.”
MCDP 1-2 Campaigning is available online at…
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Bibl/mcdp1_2.pdf
FMFM-1 Warfighting is available online at…
http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallAr...arfighting.htm
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Sports analogy warning (sorry, it’s football season)…
From my perspective as a civilian lifer I see MW as somewhat analogous to the NFL’s Run-And-Shoot offense. At the right time, on the right field position, and against the right opponent the Run and Shoot is all but unstoppable, but you wouldn’t want to build your whole team around that one offensive scheme at the expense of all other offensive schemes. There is a time and a place in every single game where plowing the ball up the middle for three yards and a cloud of dust (attrition strategy) isn’t just the right plan, it’s the only plan.
The three late 80’s – early 90’s NFL teams that went to the full Run and Shoot package, (no Tight Ends or Fullbacks even on the roster), at the expense of all other offensive options (Detroit, Houston, and Atlanta) were fun to watch as they moved the ball up and down the field like aerial flying circuses. But once they reached the Red Zone, (inside the opponent’s 20 yard line), they couldn’t score as often as there was less room on the field for pass patterns, and they lacked the traditional Tight Ends and Fullbacks to block for a short yardage running game. (160lb Wide Receivers don’t block 250lb Linebackers and 280lb Defensive Ends, they just get in the way for a second or two. As a former 155lb 4.2/40 high school and semi-pro Wide Receiver I would know this – and have a special love for the Run and Shoot.)
Nowadays many NFL teams use the West Coast offense or some variation of it, but they almost all keep a four or even five Wide Receiver formation in their playbooks, for special occasions.
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Eric: I’m a Strategypage alumnus who remembers an all black 10-3 Squad Leader named Major Hendricks (that bastard), 6-6-8’s, and still plays Steel PanthersMBT/WW2 instead of Solitare. And that’s really about all I have left to offer this table. My “Render” nic is homage to OSC.
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Wilf: All in all kudos for the article. Not because I agree with some points and disagree with others, but for spurring an extremely informative and interesting (to me at least) thread. I learned a bunch of stuff, so it had to be good.
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Ken: I think I was leaning toward the Hussites and their war wagons at some point back in there, but your Mongels and infantry outflanked me so I’ll yield the right of way while hiding my chariots behind a hill.
Marines to the front, because somebody has to rescue the Airborne.
STREAK
PATTERN,
R
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Am I missing something or is
Quote:
Originally Posted by
ericmwalters
I'll take the liberty of quoting my April 1995 Marine Corps Gazette article, "Is Mission Control The Weakness of Maneuver Warfare?," which goes into this to some depth. For thread readers, mentally substitute "Directive Control" or "Mission Tactics" for "mission control" (which has nothing to do with NASA or space flight in this context!):
directive control awfully close to the Soviet process? Sounds like it -- and which is the default, half fish / half fowl solution the US Army had almost inadvertently arrived at (only to be saved by Afghanistan and Iraq).
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Funny to read this again after thirteen years. COIN operations in combat would seem to be engendering decentralization even when our institutions back in the rear aren't able to--at least not able to sufficiently enough.
True, combat will always do that, not just COIN. Centralization of command only works in peacetime; every war sees more decisions pushed to lower levels -- with no particular problems. You'd think we'd learn... :mad:
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Is MW not worth the cost? I suspect it may be in peacetime, but the crucible of extended combat is making us adopt more of its features (the German School aspect of it, anyway). Why else would we be doing development on Enhanced Company Operations (ECO), which is looking more and more like "stosstruppen on steroids?"
Because ECO makes sense... :cool:
One visitor to Iraq made the comment on a slide that to do better, we had to "Delegate beyond the point of discomfort." Just so -- and we should embrace that but letting go is hard to do... :wry:
Actually, it's worth the cost in peacetime but the US tendency toward micromanagement and the desired retained perks of the upper echelons of the hierarchy mitigate against it; add in that Congress is amenable to funding any kind of superfluous hardware made in multiple districts but loth to fund training -- particularly that training which lets junior officers control the fates of many -- and the likelihood for the much needed improvement of our initial entry training, officer and enlisted, is totally illogically and very regrettably, not good...
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
Render
Sports analogy warning (sorry, it’s football season)…
Uh. Good. What's football?
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Ken: I think I was leaning toward the Hussites and their war wagons at some point back in there, but your Mongels and infantry outflanked me so I’ll yield the right of way while hiding my chariots behind a hill.
Happens. Mobility does not equal maneuver. Ask James Ewell Brown Stuart.
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Marines to the front, because somebody has to rescue the Airborne.
Nor is a battering ram needed to rescue LGOP. :D
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Directive vs Detailed Control and Distributed Operations
Okay, let me clear this up right quick:
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Detailed Control:
...described as coercive, a term which effectively describes the manner by which the commander achieves unity of effort. In such a system, the commander holds a tight rein, commanding by personal direction or detailed directive. Command and control tends to be centralized and formal. Orders and plans are detailed and explicit, and their successful execution requires strict obediance and minimizes subordinate decisonmaking and initiative. Detailed command and control emphasizes vertical, linear information flow: in general, information flows up the chain of command and orders flow down. Discipline and coordination are imposed from above to ensure compliance with the plan. In a system based on detailed command and control, the command and control process tends to move slowly... (pp.77-78, MCDP 6, Command and Control)
Directive Control:
[called "mission command and control" in this publication, which was a confusing term. Don't know that "directive control" is any better, but that's what many maneuverists called it when I wrote the April 1995 article--EMW] By contrast, mission command and control accepts the turbulence and uncertainty of war. Rather than increase the level of certainty we seek, by mission command and control we reduce the degree of certainty that we need. Mission command and control can be described as spontaneous: unity of effort is not the product of conformity imposed from above but of the spontaneous cooperation of all the elements of the force. Subordinates are guided not by detailed instructions and control measures but by their knowledge of the requirements of the overall mission. In such a system, the commander holds a loose rein, allowing subordinates significant freedom of action throughout the organization. Because it decentralizes decisionmaking authority and grants subordinates significant freedom of action, mission command and control demands more of leaders at all levels and requires rigorous training and education. Mission command and control tends to be decentralized, informal, and flexible. Orders and plans are as brief and simple as possible, relying on subordinates to effect the necessary coordination and on the human capacity for implicit communication....By decentralizing decisionmaking authority, mission command and control seeks to increase tempo and improve the ability to deal with fluid and disorderly situations.
(p. 79, MCDP 6, Command and Control)
I've been asked in other quarters what is driving modern militaries to decentralize, so here's a presentation I did when the USMC was first looking at Distributed Operations. Keep in mind that term is no longer used and has been "officially" quieted--we are doing "Enhanced Company Operations" instead. I'll leave it up to you on what you think that means. We're still working on it. Anyway, this will give you some context.
This brief entitled "Distributed Operations and Command: A Brief Historical Perspective" is archived in The Defense and the National Interest website here. Those who are interested in what the "old" USMC Distributed Concept was, look here.
Lastly, slide 7 of my Distributed Ops brief quotes Lind's MANEUVER WARFARE HANDBOOK on what "reconnaissance pull" REALLY is. Yes, MCDP 1 isn't that clear. I wish it was. Good news for the Marine Corps is that our internal correspondence course materials had this explained relatively well (such as the Marine Corps Institute correspondence courses called the Warfighting Skills Program (now defunct) and the older "Warfighting" block for the Amphibious Warfare School (AWS), also defunct--it's now the Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS)). At least the vignette, OPERATION VERBAL IMAGE, which the first chapter in MCDP 6 Command and Control, shows recon pull marvelously as a helicopter pilot touches down to tell an infantry company commander that enemy is coming his way...and they hatch plans together--cooperatively--and the entire Marine Air-Ground Task Force starts to coalesce an operation around the initiative of these two captains...
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Reading the book definition of Directive Control reassures me that
my possible misinterpretation is probably indicative of the confusion that unwieldy term and that definition could cause. Instead of all that, why not call it Decentralized Control and describe it thusly:
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Subordinates are guided by their knowledge of the requirements of the overall mission and are given significant freedom of action. Decentralized Control demands more of leaders and requires rigorous training and education. Orders and plans are as brief and simple as possible, relying on subordinates to effect the necessary coordination and on the human capacity for implicit communication. Decentralized Control seeks to increase tempo and improve the ability to deal with fluid and disorderly situations.
Couching old ideas in new terms always leads to confusion; the US impetus to reject anything "not invented here" is always fascinating -- but is rarely very helpful.
Having applied that bit of superfluous nit-picking (with no harm or slam intended), I'd like to thank you for the effort you put into the comments. Always good to learn something new and get partly understood background clarified.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
ericmwalters
Those who are interested in what the "old" USMC Distributed Concept was, look
here.
Sounds like the old Shoot...Move...and Communicate I was taught in the 82nd Airborne. Which leads me to ask has anyone ever looked at the history of Airborne Operations from WW2? They were very good at distributed Operations?
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
Render
Wilf: All in all kudos for the article. Not because I agree with some points and disagree with others, but for spurring an extremely informative and interesting (to me at least) thread. I learned a bunch of stuff, so it had to be good.
My work here is done.... :D
Thanks. That is ALL I am trying to do. I am quite prepared to be wrong but I just want a people to question the areas of orthodoxy that seem to serve us poorly.
What is more, I don't do "original". 99% of what I say has been said by others. I just wave it around a bit!
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Uh. Good. What's football?
uh...
Something the Army and Navy Academies don't do very well at the collegiate level?
GALLOPING
GHOSTS,
R:p
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Odds and End for Ken and Slapout
Ken: I remember talking about labels like "decentralized control" but then we'd have to pair it against "centralized control" in the spectrum. It was felt at the time we were wrestling with MCDP 6 and C2 issues in particular that we wanted to tie it to the commander's style. Was he "directive" kind of person--gives you direction (an azimuth, an aiming point)? Or was he a "detailed" kind of guy--gets in your knickers about seemingly everything? We felt it was the commander's command philosophy that drove the kind of C2you ended up with--directive commanders tended to decentralize, detailed commanders tended to centralize. Of course, none of this thinking ended up translating well, probably due to innumerable revisions along the way to publication (which weren't nearly as bad as what it used to be--then MajGen Paul K. Van Riper, as director C4I, was the parent of MCDP 6 Command and Control and he did it completely outside existing Doctrine Divison channels, which did not endear him to the doctrine gods at Quantico. Even worse for them, he transferred from HQMC to be their boss as Command General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Poetic, I'd say).
I'm sure this will come up when somebody decides to revise the publications.
For Slapout--actually, U.S. Army airborne operations provide quite a cautionary tale about both the advantages and disadvantages of distributed operations. Same with Merrill's Mauraders in the CBI theater. While Marines and Airborne tease each other quite a bit, the mentalities are very similar. All I have to do is hold a hip pocket/short class on the attack by 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, against the SS defenders at the Cheneux bridge on 20 December 1944, to get attention from Marines (that unit earned a PUC for its incredible tenacity and courage--relatively few came back alive).
But the problem with DO is that elements tend to be out of support range of each other, and therein lies the key to defeating the tactic. Defeat in detail is a real risk, and you had better be sure you are more nimble, agile, and mobile than your adversary or you are going to get your butt kicked. There's a number of situations in Sicily, Normandy, and MARKET-GARDEN where that nearly happened--and the fact that it didn't was due more to individual courage/bravery and luck than any tricky/slicky application of the DO concept. As a leader, I don't like counting too reliably on pluck and the gods of war when planning an operation. I like to rig the situation so it simply can't help but succeed, given average luck. 'Course, that's easier said than done!
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MW "Orthoroxy" Serving Us Poorly?
Wilf wrote:
Quote:
I am quite prepared to be wrong but I just want...people to question the areas of orthodoxy that seem to serve us poorly.
I'd like to expand on this for any Small Wars Journal readers who are currently pursuing an advanced degree or thinking of doing so. Fideleon Damian has done good service in explaining how we got FMFM-1 and the Maneuver Wafare "ball" rolling in the Marine Corps. But that isn't the end of the story.
Wilf brings up the notion of "orthodoxy" here, and I'm assuming he thinks that either maneuver warfare is an "orthodox" concept or there are parts of it that are. Hmmmm. This begs a number of questions that someone could write a master's thesis and/or PhD dissertation on. For starters, let's see what the dictionary definition of "orthodox" is:
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1.a: conforming to established doctrine, expecially in religion; b. conventional. --Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
So we've gone from "The Maneuver Warfare Fraud" to "The Maneuver Warfare Religion." Fair enough. Some Marines have made that observation in the course of past (far older) maneuver warfare debates: "It's all just religion/theology of warfighting." As you might guess, I smile at the "orthodox" label.
But religion means beliefs and believers, and it would be interesting to see how many and who these believers have been since MW became doctrine in the Marine Corps. Is MW really orthodoxy in the USMC? And what does this belief mean, for practical purposes? I've suggested that I do not think there are that many who truly believe (and even fewer who can demonstrate effective understanding) of MW in the USMC today. This would be worth a serious academic investigation.
Secondly, Wilf brings up the question of whether this MW "orthodoxy" (or "religion" or "belief system") serves us poorly. Very good question. I take it from this sentence that he thinks so, but I'm still not clear on why beyond the problem that it's just one style where we should demonstrate mastery of all styles. Okay, I can buy that line of thinking. But remember, MW was designed as an "antidote" for a particularly corrosive "attritionist" ill, and it would be worthwhile to ask whether this specific medicine actually cured the patient of that particular ill. And if it did, were there any undesirable "side effects." I don't know the answer to either of these questions with any degree of evidentiary or analytical defendability. There certainly can be a positive case made for MW, I'd think, given how we achieved some of our more recent victories. But I've not seen any kind of academic study (yet) that explicitly addressed how adopting maneuver warfare as doctrine made this possible. So there is another rich motherlode for serious academic investigation.
What is great about both topics--(1) was MW actually embraced and followed by the USMC after it became official doctrine? (2) Was it actually effective in improving Marine performance in war?)--is that no matter what answer you arrive at for either question (yes or no), it would be significant.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by
ericmwalters
For Slapout--actually, U.S. Army airborne operations provide quite a cautionary tale about both the advantages and disadvantages of distributed operations. Same with Merrill's Mauraders in the CBI theater. While Marines and Airborne tease each other quite a bit, the mentalities are very similar. All I have to do is hold a hip pocket/short class on the attack by 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, against the SS defenders at the Cheneux bridge on 20 December 1944, to get attention from Marines (that
unit earned a PUC for its incredible tenacity and courage--relatively few came back alive).
But the problem with DO is that elements tend to be out of support range of each other, and therein lies the key to defeating the tactic. Defeat in detail is a real risk, and you had better be sure you are more nimble, agile, and mobile than your adversary or you are going to get your butt kicked. There's a number of situations in Sicily, Normandy, and MARKET-GARDEN where that nearly happened--and the fact that it didn't was due more to individual courage/bravery and luck than any tricky/slicky application of the DO concept. As a leader, I don't like counting too reliably on pluck and the gods of war when planning an operation. I like to rig the situation so it simply can't help but succeed, given average luck. 'Course, that's easier said than done!
Hi Eric, I was 2/504 and yes being cut off is or was a problem. With more modern resupply and fire support that becomes less of a risk. That is DO's problem from what I have read...also sometimes taking a risk is not taking a risk because it is unexpected. MG Robert Scales wrote a paper I read called Precision manuever or something like that, which somewhat addresses the problem. But I have never understood why you would want to seperate Firepower and Manuever??? as Wilf points out in his article? It's like Baptist Iced Tea... you have to have a lot of sugar in it or it just isn't tea.:eek: And in SBW-Slapout Based Warfare it's all 3- manuver,firepower and communications. We should not be seperating to a single concept we should be combining to create muti-option concept. Just my thoughts for now more later getting kinda busy at work but I will pop in when I can.