Ah, another subscriber to the "Pied Piper" theory...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
Keep in mind that many (all) roads lead to Rome.
The emergence of a smart & charismatic politician, an effective domestic intelligence service, an enlargement of the police, a change in economic structure and military action can all lead to the end of an insurgency.
I find fascinating those who give so little credit to the free will of people, nor attention to history so as to believe that if conditions of good governance exist among a populace, that a dynamic leader can come along with his magic flute of ideology and lead them to their doom... :-)
I spent a lot of time thinking about this. I had to, becuase a huge segment of the US Government still subscribes to a believe that "Ideology" is the COG for AQ. Really. CR, sure, but COG? I just can't get there.
I see poor governance as "Causation" (see chart for two-part definition), that dry tinder of conditions among a populace; and that things like ideology and dynamic leadership are "motivaiton" that when applied to the dry tender of poor governance causation will burst into insurgency; but when applied to a satisfied, well governed populace have little to no significant effect.
I realize I am not in a majority position on this, but I am comfortable with that .
OK, WILF, I gotta tell ya, I don't think you brought your "A" game
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
OK, so the Southern Secessionists in the Civil War had a point? Lincoln failed them?
Agreed. Warfare has to involve the promotion of a political aim, by violence and has to be of scale where it can reasonably effect policy.
Why should I seek to make peace with or in anyway ameliorate the agendas of those I dislike to the point of violence? Once they use violence against me, why should I listen?
- so don't build badly! :D
1. OF COURSE Southern Seccessionists had a point! Would their point have destroyed America and led to a Europe-like cluster of small countries in North America? Certainly. They felt that States rights were being inappropriately curtailed by National rights, and voted as states to succeed from the Union. This wasn't insurgency, it was divorce. This was not the failure of a single man, it was, however a failure to appreciate the dire consequences of forcing a significant, and geographically united, segement of ones populace to adopt a course that they saw so counter to both their rights as citizens and to their livlihoods. Growing pains of a young nation experimenting with new forms of popular government.
2. As to your next to last point, I never said you should make peace with those who act illegally to oppose the government in insurgency. I simply said that it isn't war (in a Clauswitzian sense), and that if a true insurgency it is happening for a reason that you must deal with as the COIN government with every bit as much dilligence as you deal with the illegal actors. I would just caution constraint, becuase governments who employ organized violence against their own populaces too freely or injustly (as perceived by the populace, not as rationalized by the government) are on a slippery slope.
3. Your last point is a shot at the US Declaration of Independence. I don't need to remind you what happened to the last Brit to take that document lightly...
Coming Back to Clausewitz
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
2. As to your last point, I never said you should make peace with those who act illegally to oppose the government in insurgency. I simply said that it isn't war (in a Clauswitzian sense), and that if a true insurgency it is happening for a reason that you must deal with as the COIN government with every bit as much dilligence as you deal with the illegal actors. I would just caution constraint, becuase governments who employ organized violence against their own populaces too freely or injustly (as perceived by the populace, not as rationalized by the government) are on a slippery slope.
I still haven't read anything in this thread that suppports the assertion that Clausewitz isn't relevant. If you choose to think that On War only provides insight when two established states fight each other with militaries, then I think you are overlooking alot.
Clausewitz talks about the use of violence in the pursuit of policy and the primacy of that policy. He discusses the need for policymakers to understand the strengths and limitations of the forces the use in violance and the peculiar nature of violent conflict itself. Once one side chooses a violent option, things happen that may alter the nature of the policy goals or the route to obtaining them.
I'm not making the case that he has all the answers, but I think he prompts most of the correct questions.
Phil Ridderhof
1 Attachment(s)
tailoring ones efforts for max effect
A key point for any COG analysis for insurgency is to first appreciate this one point:
COIN: In insurgency the insurgent and the counterinsurgent share the same COG. Therefore a COG is not something to be either defeated nor defended, but rather something that one must compete for the support of.
(I developed a similar process for focusing CT efforts, but that is another story altogether.)
Oh and I realize nothing sparks a good debate better than COG, so I will simply say that I attempted to stay true to the principles espoused by CvC; I took into account the good work of Dr. Strange and modified it to make more useful sense to me; and read, but largely ignored the highly dogmatic approach currently captured in US Joint Pub Doctrine as being for the most part unhelpful.
My belief is that neither random acts of charity, nor massive programs of governmental effectiveness are partiularly helpful (acceptable, suitable, feasible) in a COIN / FID effort. That a focused approach is required that is rooted in grass roots assessments.
fighting regardless of the government
Posted by Dayuhan,
Quote:
True enough, but the assumption of "a government" and "a populace" does not always hold together. Populaces are rarely uniform; they may in some cases be bitterly divided - particularly in countries where post-colonial borders have lumped traditional antagonists into a single "nation". One segment of a populace may find a government completely acceptable while another may find it utterly unacceptable. An insurgency does not of necessity consist of "a populace" fighting "a government"; it's as likely to result from one segment of a populace fighting another, while a government either takes sides (generally aggravating the problem) or looks on helplessly.
Any perception of populace-based warfare that assumes a monolithic populace will often be inconsistent with reality.
No truer words have been written. I think we in the West tend to oversimplify our world into a bi-polar world (them and us), or in some cases a tri-polar world (we're helping them against them) while fully knowing that isn't the reality, yet we still make decisions based on our simplistic view that fits nicely in models and on power point slides.
I don't buy the argument that all insurgencies are due to government failure. There are certainly cases where this is true, but there are also many other examples where it isn't. There are (and have been) wars amongst people based upon hate and greed that have little or nothing to do with the government or governments that reign over this hostile human terrain. These conflicts emerge regardless of how well the government runs its courts, picks up the trash and provides ample drinking water. In many cases the government will be unable to do anything but apply military force to stop the violence (or to choose a side and join in the killing as Serbia and others have done). To simply assume the populace is the COG can be misleading, because in many, if not most, cases there is no monolithic population to win over.
The norm is we pick a side, and that often involves picking a partner or partners (coalition). Most recently we have picked Karzai (a lame horse if there ever was one) in Afghanistan and the Shi'a and Kurds in Iraq. A segment of the population is now oppressed and dishonored, scared, and many times displaced, they are not liberated, their grievances are not addressed, so in fact we have set the conditions for continued conflict.
Ethnic wars, class wars, street gangs fighting for the same drug market, or foreign sponsored violence within another's borders, etc., demonstrate that violence is not always tied to ineffective governance. This is also true with insurgencies, but they are always tied in various forms to competing agendas. As Thucydides wrote, war is driven by fear, honor, and interest. This still seems to ring true today.
The populace can only be a COG if you pursue a population centric approach. Very easy to say, very hard to do in a foreign culture where we push our values upon a culture that doesn't accept them. For us to be effective at population centric approaches we need to learn to be morally flexible, which is just as important as being culturally aware. It doesn't really matter if you understand a tribal method for enforcing local laws, if you disagree with their due process and attempt to change it.
We'll continue to harp the population centric approach and talk to one another about it until we think we're pro's at it, but all this time we'll refuse to really listen to the locals (the population) to see what they're telling us. We'll them we're too busy working on models to determine what they need. Go back to your village, and once we figure it out we'll come riding into town on our white horses to save the day. It is the American way of war. You're slide simply supports that.
Perhaps an acceptable outcome in Afghanistan is within grasp if we would just listen to the Afghan people and not the Karzai government, but I suspect Iraq will be another matter altogether, as border nations can and likely will provide sufficient bad influence to keep fanning the flames of instability.