Cops or Police in Counterinsurgency COIN

Moderator's Note

This thread contains two old threads 'Send more cops' and 'Cops Show Marines How To Take On Taliban'. It has been renamed 'Cops or Police in Counterinsurgency' following today's post.

There is another related thread, but that refers to COIN coming home to assist law enforcement (mainly in the USA):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5424 (ends).

Hat tip to Leah Farrell on:http://allthingsct.wordpress.com/

An interesting article by Spencer Ackerman, on his blog, entitled 'Three Cheers For A Law Enforcement Approach To Terrorism': http://attackerman.firedoglake.com/2.../sendmorecops/

He starts citing President Obama's speech:

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Although our intelligence community had learned a great deal about the al Qaeda affiliate in Yemen — called al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula — that we knew that they sought to strike the United States and that they were recruiting operatives to do so — the intelligence community did not aggressively follow up on and prioritize particular streams of intelligence related to a possible attack against the homeland… this contributed to a larger failure of analysis —- a failure to connect the dots of intelligence that existed across our intelligence community and which, together, could have revealed that Abdulmutallab was planning an attack.

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Ackerman's reflections ends with:

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A joint approach is the right approach if you want to see everyone’s information. But it is to say that within that joint entity, (my emphasis) analysts need — wait for it — a law enforcement approach to terrorism.

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Spencer Ackerman is a new name for me and his wiki entry is: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spencer_Ackerman . He is a reporter for The Washington Independent.

Leah's blog has a follow-on piece, drawing on her Australian experience: http://allthingsct.wordpress.com/201...-to-terrorism/

Taken from it:

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the crucial issue: Intel Agencies collect, they aren’t meant to share. It’s not what they do. Ergo sometimes they’re not good at sharing, even though this is changing....Cops investigate and share. Not all the time..

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Many of these issues have appeared post-Detroit on a number of threads: the main Detroit attack thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9331 and the wider discussions on intelligence after MG Flynn's report:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9412

Here is a UK academic review 'Tracking terrorist networks: problems of
intelligence sharing within the UK intelligence community' by Anthony Field (University of Warwick), not read fully yet and the link:
http://journals.cambridge.org/action...4&aid=6459944#

This is currently free and is part of a collection of pieces on the future of UK intelligence and special forces: http://journals.cambridge.org/action...=0&issueId=04# )

I attended a number of conferences in 2008-2009, which underpin the publication and this is the first aspect that has been published to my knowledge.

This could sit in the 'Law Enforcement' thread, but is more on intelligence IMHO.

between Law of War advocates (the "military" approach; often coupled with "Let's take the gloves off") and Rule of Law advocates (the "law enforcement" approach) is phony, introduces an artificial dichotomy that does not exist under present US law, and has become a "litmus test" for whether you support the Obama administration or not. In short, a lot of smoke and political spin.

Under US law as it presently exists (subject to change primarily by the executive and legislative branches), we are in a state of armed confict with certain named or defined groups. As such, the US LOAC (Laws of Armed Conflict) apply. Under them, people who are security risks may be detained or interned for the duration of the conflict or until they cease to be security risks: regular combatants under GC III (EPWs); irregular combatants under Common Article 3; and civilians under GC IV. Interrogation across the board is subject to the Army Field Manual. The DTA (Detainee Treatment Act) generally applies.

Detention and internment are separate from prosecutions, whether under domestic criminal law, "war crimes" legislation, or "anti-terrorist" legislation. Here are the two US paths:

1. Prosecution in the Federal courts.

2. Prosecution before military commissions under the MCA (Military Commissions Act).

Frankly, the proponents of each pump up its supposed advantages; and the opponents of each its supposed disadvantages. In so doing, they often manage to expose their abject ignorance of the subject matter.

I believe it is a good thing that we (US) have two arrows in our quiver. The trick is to use wisdom and discernment in picking which arrow to shoot in each particular case.

The foregoing is obviously a personal opinion commentary.

Regards

Mike

David:

Attackerman writes for Washington Independent, and from his perch high over the DC Canyons, frequently drops down on issues associated with congressional actions re: federal funding, foreign policy/affairs initiatives, and intergovernmental stuff.

When his gaze shifts to our areas, he is very informative and effective' althought his prey is usually left strewn all over the road.

One day, if he keeps at it for a decade or two, he could become the next Ken White (with Ken's consent, of course), or, at least, the journalistic equivalent of Chuck Norris's cousin twice removed.

Steve

under Blog Roll: "Dave Dilegge and His COIN Jedi Knights". We can now all be addressed as "SIR" - have to dream up a good Jedi domain to go with that.

I find Ackerman's 3-para piece to be basic mush. Here are the last two paras of the piece:

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And here’s where it’s become unfortunate that mainstream political discourse has created negative connotations around a “law enforcement approach to terrorism.” I can guarantee you that if you said to someone, “Hey, do you think that in terrorism investigations, we should create the perspective amongst counterterrorists that their job doesn’t stop until someone is neutralized?” they would say “Yes.” Well, you goddamn hippie: you’ve got a law enforcement mindset. I guess people don’t understand this enough, but intelligence analysts approach their craft rather differently. They look for patterns in information, and pass those patterns up the chain. They do not investigate in the sense of the word that you and I understand from TV. That’s why there was no APB inside the CIA or the National Counterterrorism Center on Abdulmutallab after his father’s walk-in. Abdulmutallab, in the intelligence world, is a data point. He is not a suspect.

Now, if you had the FBI handling the Abdulmutallab portfolio, or people who think like FBI agents, maybe it still doesn’t go anywhere. But maybe they start compiling information and building a case and new information turns up and the guy gets yanked before he’s on the plane. I gather that’s what John Brennan meant when he said yesterday there was “no one intelligence entity or team or task force [that] was assigned responsibility for doing that follow-up investigation.” None of this is to say the FBI has to be given the lead for these sorts of things. A joint approach is the right approach if you want to see everyone’s information. But it is to say that within that joint entity, analysts need — wait for it — a law enforcement approach to terrorism.

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Ackerman is hung up on the need for some kind of criminal prosecution in these cases. Whether he opposes military commissions as an option, I can't tell from the piece. However, even if military commissions are used, evidentiary standards have to be met - in Ackerman's jargon, "a law enforcement approach to terrorism."

It is interesting that he uses the term "neutralized" (in the sentence I bolded). Whether he knows it or not, the readers here of threads dealing with Vietnamese Pacification and the Phoenix segment of it, know that "neutralize" meant "kill, detain or convert" (roughly in 1/3 ratios) in that program, which combined the LOAC and law enforcement rules.

The bottom line is that under LOAC (per the US), Abdulmutallab does not have to be prosecuted. He could simply be detained or interned (depending on his status determination under the GCs); and interrogations could proceed or not according to the Army Field Manual.

The general run of those I called above, the Law of War advocates (the "military" approach; often coupled with "Let's take the gloves off"), are equally confused by asserting that reference must be to milkitary commissions. No "gloves off" there - he'd be just as lawyered up (and perhaps with counsel more competent in "Small Wars" issues).

The option not to prosecute in either venue seems to escape both sets of political spinners - as it has also escaped the Obama administration, except as a last resort.

Regards

Mike

PS: detention, as a standalone, often escaped the Bush II administration - depending on the direction of the wind blowing into the Oval Office.

jmm:

Like I said, a decade or two.

Ain't it funny how, after you've been in a field awhile, the same issues come around again and again.

He looks young enough that most things are his first impressions.

Steve

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...ategy/#c006641

For some reason my post on "Obama needs a new strategy" posted as anonymous, but the jest of my response is that we need a new national defense strategy for AQ and like threats that seamlessly blends law enforcement, intelligence and special operations forces. All three would have to undergo a significant culture change, and all three need to.

http://www.nationalterroralert.com/u...ag/terrogence/

As for Attackerman's post that there wasn't sufficient intelligence available to connect the dots, that may be true, what also may be true is that all the intelligence available wasn't considered due to established procedures.

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ABC News reports details on an Israeli intelligence company that monitored jihadist web discussions about plane bombing tactics weeks before the Detroit attack.

Most of the analysts at Terrogence are former Israeli intelligence operatives. From a converted chicken coop in a village in central Israel they monitor Islamic internet sites devoted to global jihad and terrorism. Their mission is to identify new and credible threats against western targets.

According to Terrogence founder Gadi Aviran the online discussion ran to 25 pages and continued until a critical posting in late November by a known extremist with a proven track record in explosives. This individual has been monitored for several years and is widely respected by participants in the forums. His posting in Arabic read:

“You can ignite a detonator using a medical capsule and put concentrated sulphuric acid into it, and then put it over the explosive materials.”

They believe the “medical capsule” mentioned in the post could easily refer to a syringe as used in the attack on North West Flight 253.

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Law enforcement brings a critically important set of investigative skills to the fight, investigations that yield intelligence that frequently doesn't get into intelligence channels because it must be protected to ensure the case is not compromised prior to prosecution. The intelligence community is pretty impressive in what they can collect, but less so when determining what it means. Special operations forces obviously bring unique capabilities to act upon the intelligence unilaterally or in partnership with foreign partners if they're given the authority to neutralize the threat if it is beyond the scale of law enforcement to handle. There is much room for improvement on how we can better blend the capabilities of these great organizations to defeat terrorist and terrorist related threats.

STP:

It's like Clemenza's (IIRC) line in the Godfather to the effect that every 10-15 years we have to go to mattresses. So, we now have to re-learn the lessons from Vietnamese Pacification (what worked and what didn't; and the whys for both).

Bill Moore:

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Law enforcement brings a critically important set of investigative skills to the fight, investigations that yield intelligence that frequently doesn't get into intelligence channels because it must be protected to ensure the case is not compromised prior to prosecution. The intelligence community is pretty impressive in what they can collect, but less so when determining what it means. Special operations forces obviously bring unique capabilities to act upon the intelligence unilaterally or in partnership with foreign partners if they're given the authority to neutralize the threat if it is beyond the scale of law enforcement to handle. There is much room for improvement on how we can better blend the capabilities of these great organizations to defeat terrorist and terrorist related threats.

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No argument as to the above (I think Slap will join us), as you know from what we've discussed publically and privately.

You know that, sooner or later, we are going to get into that "irrregular combatant" and "unconventional wafare" thread - setting out the "best practices" in a unified military-legal schema in the context of comtemporary realities. :eek:

Cheers

Mike

PS: yup, you have to wonder about that "Anonymous" (with whom I agreed). Maybe, you need to introduce yourself. :D

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Originally Posted by jmm99

No argument as to the above (I think Slap will join us), as you know from what we've discussed publically and privately.

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Yep!

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

For some reason my post on "Obama needs a new strategy" posted as anonymous, but the jest of my response is that we need a new national defense strategy for AQ and like threats that seamlessly blends law enforcement, intelligence and special operations forces. All three would have to undergo a significant culture change, and all three need to.

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We must do this! I don't understand this whole argument about it's a LE problem or it's a Military problem or it's all Intelligence. It's all three and the only way to win is with all three......combined into one organization that becomes our Main Effort against Terrorist Organizations. Need to fire about half those temporary Political Appointees that couldn't even find and arrest their Grandmother much less a Terrorist..... let the Professionals do it. Pisses me off:mad:

Billy Jack would know what to do. His first movie "The Born Losers" was essentially CT-Counter Terrorism........Fight Like Injuns!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FLAKEM0bO2A

And like Slap, I'm :mad:

However, the problem is that Bill's right:

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defense strategy for AQ and like threats that seamlessly blends law enforcement, intelligence and special operations forces. All three would have to undergo a significant culture change, and all three need to.

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and that's just the problem -- all three need major changes in culture -- but all three (cops at the Fed level) will fight any changes. :eek: :(

Does Billy Jack do Rice Bowls? ;)

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from Slap
... combined into one organization that becomes our Main Effort against Terrorist Organizations.

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cuz we have a model that combined "law enforcement, intelligence and special operations forces" (not always seamlessly, but they were good) - the KGB.

The issue would be how to create that organization and not end up with a KGB on the domestic front (except for chasing down TVNSAs who cross or attempt to cross the border). Have to give some thought to that.

Careful Slap - you might end up with a lot of lawyers (e.g., Putin and Ivanov). :D

Cheers

Mike

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Originally Posted by jmm99

cuz we have a model that combined "law enforcement, intelligence and special operations forces" (not always seamlessly, but they were good) - the KGB.

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The UK had one during WW2 or close to it the SOE. Special Operations Executive.

again violent agreement as to rice bowls - and I'll (this time) throw in venal politicians (elected and appointed; executive and legislative) as well.

Just as no one asked us about our plans (I posit some differences; maybe not) for Iraq and Astan ab initio; so too, here, what we might write up will most probably be ignored by the chattering classes.

The alternative is not to suggest anything that is anathema to the risk averse. At least, we can vent our frustrations by suggesting some things that we think are positive.

What do you think of a US KGB (or expanded SOE or OSS - neither had LE powers IIRC); and the limits that would have to be imposed on that 600 lb gorilla ? Posit no rice bowls and no venal politicos - and something akin to the original understanding of our Constitution.

The question is put to everyone, not just Ken. ;)

Hey, and if you get into something akin to the OSS, you'll have lots of lawyers involved. :eek:

Regards

Mike

We did have LE involved for awhile. The CIC-Counter Intelligence Corps had LE powers. I had a link to a declassified paper which describes their mission in detail but the link went bad:eek: will try again later.

Also for a short time we actually had an SF MP Company or Battalion, I think John T. Fishel knows about them.


Here is the Link. CIC In WW2 Mission and History.

http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/cic.pdf

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Originally Posted by slapout9

We did have LE involved for awhile. The CIC-Counter Intelligence Corps had LE powers. I had a link to a declassified paper which describes their mission in detail but the link went bad:eek: will try again later.

Also for a short time we actually had an SF MP Company or Battalion, I think John T. Fishel knows about them.


Here is the Link. CIC In WW2 Mission and History.

http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/cic.pdf

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Slap, we actually have LEOs involved to this day on MTTs (State partnership bilateral programs). While it's clear they are not specifically here for intel collection or training, the general thrust of these MTTs is intel gathering and analysis - Obtaining the big picture and takin' down the bad guys ;)

I've participated in both the USG (as a terrorist) and the UK (as a humble student) courses held and hosted here.

Bill's got it right - There's much to be learned...

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... a critically important set of investigative skills that yield intelligence that frequently doesn't get into intelligence channels

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for what it's worth:

Attachment 1018

This model is derived from how a large international law firm was organized (note horizontal flows); and how it formed operational teams for large matters - with some MAGTF input - to give credit where credit is due.

The model is more "stochastic" than "deterministic", as those terms are used by Steve's post here:

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SWJ/SWC could be described as a digital community frequented by stakeholders in the nuts and bolts of America’s day-to-day efforts to make the world a better place. The demographics include experts and students of the myriad facets of security, economics, and governance from various lands. Pacing daily changes, ‘best of breed’ ideas, concepts, and Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP) are examined and debated in a non-hierarchal, open, Socratean manner. The community is an example of the results of democratization and globalization of information and knowledge, in that transactional costs associated with gathering and analyzing information are very low and flash mobs of stakeholders can form, as time and resources permit, for 24-hour analysis of interesting/vexing problems. The quality of output from the SWJ/SWC knowledge model varies (trending towards stochastic) as a factor of the educational, experiential, and motivational levels of the participants.

The USG could be described as a physical and digital community comprised, primarily, of paid stakeholders in the nuts and bolts of America’s day-to-day efforts to make the world a better place. It uses a more common, closed model of vertical and hierarchical integration (with high transaction costs) in which information gathering and analysis is, more often than not, primarily limited to in house personnel specialized in the myriad facets of security, economics, and governance (among many other topics). Standardized training, and educational experiences are part of an attempt to provide a regulated and dependable (trending towards deterministic) output from stakeholders.

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Something to think about.

About 70 Marines from Camp Pendleton are spending time with LAPD in order to learn how to adapt Police Techniques to fight gangs. My favorite is stop calling them Taliban and start calling them Gangsters!!!!Yes,the more you criminalize them the more you De-legitimize them. Absoulutely Outstanding!

http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/lo...-98202989.html

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Originally Posted by slapout9

My favorite is stop calling them Taliban and start calling them Gangsters!!!!Yes,the more you criminalize them the more you De-legitimize them. Absoulutely Outstanding!

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I'm not sure ordinary Afghans are likely to find it all that convincing, especially in a context where many of the most powerful real gangsters are on the government/coalition side (AWK, anyone?)

I was wondering if John P. Sullivan had anything to do with this? I like the cross-talk between police/military.

where the locals select the Taliban courts (despite their drawbacks) in preference to the national courts.

Since we don't have a gendarmerie, the rest of the program looks like a "good start". Of course, IIRC, a "good start" is 1000 lawyers in chains at the bottom of the sea. ;)

Cheers

Mike

I'm torn on this one: part of me wants to argue that street gangs have been fighting a small, dirty, limited war against the government and the police for years; but as soon as I say that, there's a part of me that's gonna want to point out that the government and the police have been losing that war.

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Originally Posted by 40below

I'm torn on this one: part of me wants to argue that street gangs have been fighting a small, dirty, limited war against the government and the police for years; but as soon as I say that, there's a part of me that's gonna want to point out that the government and the police have been losing that war.

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If you're interested, we've compared and contrasted the nature of gangs and insurgencies in various threads. This one is about the issues in NorCal.

John P. Sullivan has also written extensively in SWJ on the issues in LA and future threats.

This is some really interesting stuff and in my opinion, should have happened a while ago. Not only are we possibly causing the Taliban to appear as criminals (which may or may not be good as Rex mentioned), but we are strengthening the enforcement of the law. Having guys trained take down gangs with the proper law enforcement techniques is better than sending in heavily armed guys that start a firefight for obvious reasons. Ideal results: Less "gangs" through action that doesn't completely disturb and annoy the population.

It would even be better if we could try to pass this law enforcement training to the Afghan National Police. Yes the ANP have alot of issues to work out, but we are mainly providing them with paramilitary training right now. If they learn how to do "proper" law enforcement (methods of handling evidence, undercover agents, CSI, etc), then in the long term, I think they would be more efficient and the situation would be better. An interesting article discussing this was published by FP a couple of weeks ago.

This is a good step, especially when thinking long term. We will see how it works out.

I will make sure to check out John Sullivan's work.

This is exactly how you attack the counter message. They are "fakers" of Islam. They are not heroes they are punks. Battles for legitimate rules of neighborhoods happen everyday. Insurgencies can be gangs/organized crime on empowered to the level of direct action against it rivals or legitimate government. The other way to combat them would be through a rival gang. Crips vs blood then their resources are expended at that level instead of government actors. Gang A kills Gang B and you put Gang B in prison two for the price of one.

Interesting article and great initiative by the Marines...certainly supports various findings over the years that this 'new war' is possibly more akin to policing and CRIMINT than it is to the Fulda Gap...

...however I'm a little wary about criminalising the Taliban at the same as they are one of the key power blocs that needs to be brought to the table. It's just not a simple case of black and white, good v bad where groups can be categorised and boxed up that easily - and as Rex points out the bigger criminals maybe those in the Afghan government. I think that we might be better off int he long term considering the Taliban as competitors in AFG as opposed to direct adversaries/enemies (as we may once have thought of Soviet Russia, China, Nazi Germany, etc) and accept that this new environment just multiple layers of grey and that means that we will probably need to accept unsavoury partnerships and alliances in support of the long term game...

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Originally Posted by SJPONeill

Interesting article and great initiative by the Marines...certainly supports various findings over the years that this 'new war' is possibly more akin to policing and CRIMINT than it is to the Fulda Gap...

...however I'm a little wary about criminalising the Taliban at the same as they are one of the key power blocs that needs to be brought to the table. It's just not a simple case of black and white, good v bad where groups can be categorised and boxed up that easily - and as Rex points out the bigger criminals maybe those in the Afghan government. I think that we might be better off int he long term considering the Taliban as competitors in AFG as opposed to direct adversaries/enemies (as we may once have thought of Soviet Russia, China, Nazi Germany, etc) and accept that this new environment just multiple layers of grey and that means that we will probably need to accept unsavoury partnerships and alliances in support of the long term game...

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Thomas Barnett

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Originally Posted by MikeF

If you're interested, we've compared and contrasted the nature of gangs and insurgencies in various threads. This one is about the issues in NorCal.

John P. Sullivan has also written extensively in SWJ on the issues in LA and future threats.

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This topic has actually come up at a few NA security conferences I've attended, with fun sidebars like how Iran is underwriting Columbia's cocaine industry. Thanks for the link, I'm reading.

Ian

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Originally Posted by huskerguy7

This is some really interesting stuff and in my opinion, should have happened a while ago. Not only are we possibly causing the Taliban to appear as criminals (which may or may not be good as Rex mentioned), but we are strengthening the enforcement of the law.

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If you enforce the law without favoring any side but the Law itself you will gain the respect of the people.....may take awhile but if you are really fair, I think they will come around.

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Originally Posted by OfTheTroops

This is exactly how you attack the counter message. They are "fakers" of Islam.

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Fakers of Islam....I like that;)

Sullivan's writings can be found here. My favorite is his last with Adam Elkus, an up and coming defense analyst. Adam has his own blog on strategy and security issues here.

IRT Taliban/AQ as criminals, I still tend towards the thoughts of some of my Pak Army brothers that I got to spend some time with in Monterey.

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Mike, they are nothing more than miscreants. Your stupid GWOT gives them credence and credibility of which they do not deserve.

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Originally Posted by 40below

I'm torn on this one: part of me wants to argue that street gangs have been fighting a small, dirty, limited war against the government and the police for years; but as soon as I say that, there's a part of me that's gonna want to point out that the government and the police have been losing that war.

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The Police just like the military can enforce the Law and enforce the Peace but only the Government can win it. The Police always win the battles unless our budget gets cut. What happens is the Government never addresses the underlying causes of the problem, it is easier just to call 911.

A recent article by FP discussing this was published. May be of interest to SWC. LINK

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Originally Posted by huskerguy7

A recent article by FP discussing this was published. May be of interest to SWC. LINK

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There is often one critical element that is overlooked in these constant engagement programs. In America we(police) can constantly engage the community because we all speak the same language:eek:

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Originally Posted by slapout9

There is often one critical element that is overlooked in these constant engagement programs. In America we(police) can constantly engage the community because we all speak the same language:eek:

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That's a very good point. I wonder how much the language barrier in Afghanistan will bog down law enforcement (by ISAF). I bet it will not only slow things down, but hamper the development of relationships with people in neighborhoods.

Gretchen Peters adds her experienced viewpoint:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...dahar?page=0,0

So, how does this wonderful framework account for LAPD's response under fire?

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Originally Posted by Presley Cannady

So, how does this wonderful framework account for LAPD's response under fire?

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Presley,

For a non-American member, what do you refer to? I know LAPD have been accused of being too harsh in the past, e.g. Rodney King, but have seen little on the current situation and especially since Bratton has been Chief of Police.

Moderator's Note

This thread contains two old threads 'Send more cops' and 'Cops Show Marines How To Take On Taliban'. It has been renamed 'Cops or Police in Counterinsurgency' following today's post.

There is another related thread, but that refers to COIN coming home to assist law enforcement (mainly in the USA):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5424 (ends).

Found in the IISS Library, London thsi week is a hitherto unknown book: Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents. Edited by C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly. Published by OUP (India) in 2013.

Contents: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprofso/9780198094883.001.0001/acprof-9780198094883

No reviews on either Amazon websites: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Policing-Ins...nterinsurgents

A lengthy review of the book 'Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents'. Edited by C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly; is attached; it concerns all the chapters, not just those on India.