Quiting...the US Military forced to loose?
Quiting...the US Military forced to LOSE?
This question could be asked under the thread of rear area politics, but I prefer to couch it in future war theory. The rhetoric of late has ratcheted up nicely, the war in Iraq has dropped in opinion polls to about 29% approval or less. We have addressed the idea of quitting in many different forums but lets bring it home here.
Put the brain power of SWC together and imagine the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Imagine it forced by the election of 2008. What happens to us (the US Military) when we quit?
A major black eye for the Army and Marines, humiliatingly abandonded by the country we defend. I heard today on the news a unique statement. The Congress was debating the war talking to a General, stating that while they (congress) support the troops, they are disgusted by the constant statements by military officers claiming increased progress levels in Iraq, they no longer "trust" the Generals to give candid assesments. But they reiterate they support the troops. --Ok, I are confused. They say the US Military is one of the most respected professions in America, they profess support, they express undieing devotion AND yet they don't trust us, or our leaders (reminds me of a pitbull in the closet). When they voted for the invasion of Iraq we went gladly. When they vote us out of Iraq we will leave sadly. When we went in we were invincible, superman. And now Iraq is our kryptonite--it is the stuff that weakens us from within.
Can we demonstrate in the next few months that we can do this, that 'winning iraq' can be done? (may just be a rhetorical question). WHat happens if we cannot convince the powers that be that the war and the sacrifice can be won? What happens next after we withdraw?
Dark predictions for a post-withdraw world.
Ripples of Retreat
Quote:
In fact, “redeployment” is a euphemism for flight from the battlefield. And we should no more expect an al Qaeda that won in Iraq to stop from pressing on to Kuwait or Saudi Arabia than we should imagine that a defeated U.S. military could rally and hold the line in the Gulf. Would the IEDs, the suicide bombers, the Internet videos of beheadings, the explosions in schools and mosques cease because they now would have to relocate across the border into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia?
In essence, the American military would be reconstituted for a generation — and recognized as such by our enemies — as a two-pronged force of air and sea power. The army at best would stay capable of fighting non-existent conventional wars but acknowledged as incapable of putting down increasingly frequent insurgencies. If Vietnam, Beirut, or Mogadishu left doubt as to the seriousness of American guarantees, Iraq would confirm that it is a dangerous thing to ally oneself with an American government and military. Aside from realignment in the Middle East, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines would have to make the necessary “readjustments.”
The “surge” would be our high-water mark, a sort of 21st-century Pickett’s charge, after which skilled retreat, consolidation, holding the line, and redeployment would be the accepted mission of American arms.
It is not easy securing Iraq, but if we decide to quit and “redeploy,” Americans should at least accept that the effort to stabilize Iraq was a crushing military defeat, that our generation established a precedent of withdrawing an entire army group from combat operations on the battlefield, and that the consequences will be better known even to our enemies than they are to us.
Heh. Victor's trying to rally the troops...
Unnecessarily gloomy.
Predictions about what will happen in the ME by any westerners (or even its denizens) are best avoided, little there is as it seems.
Disagree with his second paragraph also; if the Army acknowledges the pretty obvious fact that the domestic political will does not accord with long scenario counterinsurgencies and I think it has; and that the possibility of future insurgencies is quite good then the key is to develop tactics, techniques and equipment to deploy, rapidly secure an acceptable outcome to us -- not a 'victory' -- and depart. It would only take one or two of those to dispel any lingering reservations. The nations he names as needing to readjust are in process of doing so and have been for some time. He, like most talking heads must've missed that -- rather surprising in a historian. Though, as I said, he is trying to rally the doubters so a little hyperbole is probably required.
While I agree with his last sentence and think the penultimate one is correct, I also think '"crushing defeat" is, umm, excessive...
Military Smeared in Aftermath
My gut says that many are being too sanguine regarding the US military escaping involvement in a post-OIF "blame game." I don't see it. I hear very little insistence upon specificity in fault finding in general and for the military in particular. For instance, Tom Ricks often writes of the failure of the generals during these past six years or so in a fashion that creates the vision of pervasive imbecility. I don't say that Tom intends this effect, but I don't see the balance. In a day when folks aren't reading, and they are forming their oppinion on what they're told by someone else, the role of pieces and approaches like that cited above will be much greater than just direct readership. Bottom line: the general public believes that the senior military folks are generally not good, and while there is always room to debate this, it misses the point.
The point seems to be that when an administration in the US decides to engage in a protacted conflict without engaging the national will, John Q. Public doesn't understand why the effort is necessary in the long run. When the administration fails to provide a plausible vision of success and a general plan to get there, the lack of durable domestic support is exacerbated.
So "what will play out in the public discourse?" is one question, and "what lessons will be learned?" is another, and "what subsequent action will be taken to improve capability and capacity?" is yet another.
The Hinge of Fate in Iraq.
Here is an interesting article published on RealClearPolitics.com that some of you might find worthy of interest.
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/art...e_in_iraq.html
It begins thus way:
Quote:
"That this House, while paying tribute to the heroism and endurance of the Armed Forces, in circumstances of exceptional difficulty, has no confidence in the central direction of the war."
"That would be June 25, 1942. The House would be the House of Commons in London, England. And the government in which no confidence was expressed was that of Winston Churchill.
Almost three years into World War II, repeated military failures had induced considerable war fatigue in Britain. In February 1942, Singapore fell to the Japanese with 25,000 British troops being taken prisoner. In March, Rangoon fell. This was vastly damaging to Churchill's prestige in Washington as Rangoon was the only port through which aid could be shipped to China's Chiang Kai-shek -- a very high priority for the United States in Asia.”
