When we judge them to be ready?
Our faulty assumption is that we think we must wait until the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are at some standard of readiness that only makes sense in the West before we step back. The only reason they're not ready is that we're trying to make them like us, and to maneuver them like Western military forces. It's time to get a grip on reality and realize that they're not western forces, but they're good enough, and in some ways better for dealing with the security problem at hand.
Forget the so called ISF readiness pre-conditions, since these preconditions change constantly depending on what way the political wind is blowing in Washington. Cut them lose to fight now before the threat increases in sophistication. The problem isn't their ability to fight, it is that we're handicapping their tactics. You really don't think Arabs know how to deal with terrorists?
This isn't a call to end training, we can continue to march down this road, but stop trying to produce a Western standard Army.
What the ISF needs now besides continued training, is logisitcs support. They also need us to get out of the way, so they can solve their problem without us tying their arms behind their backs with our rules. It will get messy for a while, but it will also get to an end point.
The sooner we fall back to a QRF and supporting role, and put the ISF up front the better for all concerned. This option will take the ideolgical wind out of the insurgent's sails. If they're not fighting an occupying power, just what are they fighting for? The terrorists will fight on for Sharia Law, but the Iraqi people will reject them and more than likely kill them.
The terrorists don't want us to pull out, that is why they continue to target the ISF. They know if we pull out and the ISF leads the fight, their days are numbered. Pulling our forces back, again back, not out of the fight, will once again put us in the position we desire to be in, that of the liberater.
The conventional military should focus its combat power on key centers of gravity that will have an impact on the terrorist and insurgent ability to continue the fight. A QRF to crush any insurgents foolish enough to mass to engage ISF is important. More importantly, our forces need to be positioned to destroy cross border safe havens. Why do we allow our fighting men and women to be killed, and allow Iraqi citizens murdered by terrorists with safe havens in Syria and Iran? Again, we have to ask ourselves if we are fighting a war on a global war on terrorism or not?
In a more perfect world, the ISF is taking care of their problems, we're simply setting conditions for their success by sealing the borders and providing logistical support. Let them fight by their rules, so no imbeded press.
As for the militias being controlled, that is a problem that will have to be solved down the road. Right now the militias could actually be used to strike terror in the terrorist's hearts for a change. Once they have a political system in place that works, then the militias can eventually be put away. I'm not writing this problem off, because it is complex and serious, but it is secondary to addressing the main threat at the moment.
15 DEC is right around the corner, and the terrorists should be scared, because we stated we would pull back to a position of greater effect, instead of continuing with a strategy that plays into their hands. The ISF should be preparing for a near immediate transition to become the lead in the fight, because they "know" we're going to pull back to a supporting role on a specified date. Nothing like necessity to drive change.
Theyre definatly better at some things.
Bill Moore makes a convincing case for our pullback out of the cities. As Ive said elsewhere, I would like to see a CAP type program instituted, rather than just a scattering of advisers. The problem is really assessing an ISF unit. Its still questionable how many would stand in a Fallujah type battle. There are many who would, some who wouldnt. Because of militia infiltration, some units would evaporate if ordered to fight by the government, but told to stand down by their imam or sheik or whoever. They will listen to their religious and tribal leaders before the government. One of the best things we can do to strengthen the ISF is get those community leaders on board. Now, there are undoubtably things that the ISF do better than us. When it comes to counter-insurgency, they know the score. Ive heard of civilians throwing those guys a few hand gestures, and the ISF suddenly charge into a house and drag out the sh*thead they were lookin for. A lot of people here really do want to help, but theyre afraid to because we have failed to provide security for them. But the ISF, they can go in plain cloths and talk to people. There was one dude who spent his week of leave riding a donkey cart around Salman Pak to stake out some insurgent cell. Did it on his own free time. A lot of the ISF really seem to ENJOY the counter-insurgency sneaky squirrel stuff. And a lot of them are highly motivated. If they can stack the deck in their favor, they'll fight like lions. I led my platoon on plenty of cordon and knocks/searches and came up with nothing. But the ISF have a far better track record, because theyre locals. I think if let them, they could really smoke the insurgents. Only the most hardcore fighters in heavy urban combat can scare away the ISF.
First Two-Cent's Worth...
Congressman Murtha's plan (points) for Iraq:
Quote:
1. Immediately redeploy U.S. troops consistent with the safety of U.S. forces.
2. Create a quick reaction force in the region.
3. Create an over- the- horizon presence of Marines.
4. Diplomatically pursue security and stability in Iraq.
I cannot agree with Murtha's proposal to "immediately redeploy" U.S. troops if it means a complete withdraw from Iraq. Moreover, his caveat (point 1) of redeploying to an area consistent with the safety of U.S. forces is quite ambiguous and could mean anything from Fort Apache type bases in-country to a complete redeployment to home bases. Neither option contributes to a favorable end-state in Iraq.
The implication of Congressman Murtha’s point is that force protection is the focus of main effort. Force protection as a friendly center of gravity has never won battles nor contributed to winning a war. Force protection is inherent in all operations we conduct and must be looked at as risk vs. gain – not as the mission statement, not as a specified task nor an implied task. The trick here is to define the desired end-state and the lines of operations that, if successfully accomplished, lead to achieving that end-state. A part of the lines of operations analysis addresses risk vs. gain and naturally includes force protection.
In consideration of points two and three in his plan; create a quick reaction force in the region and create an over-the-horizon Marine presence – again, fairly ambiguous statements. A quick reaction force is a desirable and normally planned for capability in any military operation.
The bottom line here is “quick” and able to “react” decisively. The QRF cannot be, either real or perceived, an impotent force laying in wait while a thinking and adaptive enemy conducts an intelligence preparation of that battlefield and concludes their actions can be conducted decisively before a decision to commit the QRF is made, the QRF can be properly in-briefed on the situation (actionable intelligence), deployed and decisively engage the enemy. Our enemy is acting on the tactical level and desires our forces to “react” rather than act. This is a “boots on the ground war”, the implication that a regional quick reaction force may be successful is wishful thinking and a throwback to the Cold War era when the U.S. and our NATO allies could template the two-up and one-back doctrine and tactics of our Soviet foe should they attempt a punch-through in the Fulda Gap.
On an over-the-horizon Marine presence – we have that now – wherever our National Command Authority wants it. That said - I assume Congressman Murtha is considering such a presence as being afloat and stationed in the Persian Gulf. This proposal has the same drawbacks I addressed in the discussion on the QRF, compounded.
A sea-based over-the-horizon capability is a good thing, a very good thing. But there are limitations - fine if your destination is Basra or even maybe Nasiriya, but complicated at best if your final destination might be Baghdad, the volatile An Anbar province or even further north in such urban areas as Tikrit, Mosul and Kirkuk. We are talking distances that range 300 – 500 miles. I submit that this would be a bridge too far.
Considering Congressman Murtha’s fourth point - diplomatically pursue security and stability in Iraq. I will be the first to jump on the bandwagon – especially when our Congress properly funds and otherwise resources our sister departments / agencies to ensure that their full capabilities can be brought to bear to ensure all elements of our national power are executed and coordinated. Unity of command comes to mind here.
This means pushing those capabilities and resources out of “inside the beltway” and the Combatant Commander level down to the tactical level - where decisive military, political, economic, security, cultural, and information actions make a difference.
We are building a legacy of attempting to build from the top – down. Fine if you just defeated Nazi Germany – not so fine if you just placed a tribal centered culture into a situation of no central control and removed all elements of what might have been considered “normal” in that culture only hours / days after crossing the LOD…
In summation, and to avoid writing a tome here, I’ve addressed what I consider the weak points in Congressman Murtha’s plan. Next post – after I finish researching tomorrow’s SWJ news links – will be some suggestions to address the issues that Murtha posed.
Another Two Cents Worth...
In a previous post I outlined what I believe are the flaws in Rep. Murtha’s plan. Most of the argument I presented centered on the ambiguity of his proposal, not a mention of this in the Mainstream Media (MSM) to date. Yet, the MSM was quick as lightening in claiming the President’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq was vague. Go figure…
All that said and with an attempt not to digress, I offer these bullets on what I would like to see referencing our efforts in Iraq.
- Tooth-to-Tail: Reduce non-essential support troops and staffs. Reduce overall troop commitment while increasing trigger-pullers and other essential BOS-related personnel – civil affairs and PYSOP comes to mind here.
- Combined Action Program: CAP-like program implemented (see previous posts and threads for discussion). What I add is the CAP personnel would be on a one-year staggered individual rotation to ensure continuity of relationships and avoid “abrupt turnovers” with Iraqi forces a particular CAP unit is embedded with. Offer a significant pay-bonus to high-performer CAP personnel who sign on for an extended tour. All CAP units must have the authority to conduct forward air-control.
- Quick Reaction Force: In-country combined arms QRF. Suitable to rapidly deploy and capable of conducting “precision” urban operations. Must be repeatedly / randomly employed in a “pre-emptive” manner to ensure operations are more than “reactive” and to get within the enemy’s decision-making cycle. Pre-emptive and “show of force” operations must be accompanied by significant information and humanitarian – good will actions.
- Border Security: Okay, okay, we can’t even secure our own southern border. Still, the Syrian and Iranian (Saudi Arabian too) borders must be policed to ensure free passage of legitimate traffic and blocked at all costs to terrorist transit and logistics-related activities. Most likely scenario is the preponderance of the ground forces are Iraqi (with US embeds) backed by US air assets in a reconnaissance / surveillance and strike capacity. UAVs are a must here.
- Information Operations: Drop the whole term (IO) and do it right. Be upfront and attempt to influence through media venues directly attributed to the US and yet popular with the local population. If Hollywood and Madison Avenue can get it right I opine the Department that invented the Internet (sorry Mr. Gore) can too. Getting the right and truthful word out must also extend to CONUS. We are being defeated by US and international press coverage in the sheer volume of “if it bleeds, it leads” articles and news spots. Moreover, the DoD must devote a significant effort to “fact checking” each and every MSM article that is blatantly false or implies a position that does not mirror “ground truth”. Right now it is ###-for-tat; DoD releases five or so positive articles to the hundreds released by the MSM. Now is the time to take the MSM to task. While some may think this extreme – many MSM articles, editorials and opinion pieces are indirectly (and with some - directly) “aiding and abetting” our nation’s enemies. Bottom-line – call them on this, often and prominently.
- “No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy”: General Mattis’ guidance still holds true and needs to be ingrained at every level of command. That said, no worse enemy must be brutal and decisive. We aren’t in Kansas anymore and our actions, velvet glove and the stick, go a long way in at least aiding our information campaign. Operating in a tribal culture such as Iraq, the stick must sting and sting hard and the recipients of the sting must include those aiding and abetting our terrorist foes. The velvet glove must be extended after careful consideration, the alliances we make often seem to backfire in the long run. Still, we must reward our allies and punish our foes with consistency (everyone knows the score) and decisiveness.
