AQ's Centre of Gravity: A Discussion with NYPD Intel Chief
Hat tip to ICSR for providing a link to the London book launch of 'The Al-Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West' by Mitchell Silber, NYPD's Head of Intelligence Analysis:http://icsr.info/news/al-qaedas-cent...pd-intel-chief
Quote:
Silber analyses sixteen of the biggest jihadist plots against Western countries in order to determine the precise role, if any, played by the central al-Qaeda organisation.
His findings include the following:
Al-Qaeda Core’s actual role in plots against the West has been overstated, though their importance as an external inspiration endures.
Much more of the “action of the conspiracies” has taken place in the West, by Westerners, independent of Al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda has not actively recruited in the West; rather the plots are underpinned by a “bottom-up” process, driven by individuals in the West who radicalise and then take the initiative to go overseas for training or to get into the fight.
Al-Qaeda has been opportunistic, taking advantage of the Westerners who have shown up on its doorstep to utilise them in plots against the West.
Post Bin-Laden, given the combination of Westerners who continue to radicalise/mobilise plus the rise of other important nodes in al Qaeda’s worldwide network of allies and affiliates, the threat from al Qaeda type terrorism has not ended.
On the link is a podcast and the PPT slides used. I've ordered the book and will add a review when read.
Amazon has no reviews yet:http://www.amazon.com/Al-Qaeda-Facto...7947515&sr=1-1
Al Qaeda’s Strategy Paper on Its War of Attrition
A strange document seized by the Germans from an AQ courier and now in the public arena; hat tip to various sources.
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a strategy paper drafted by the al-Qa’ida leadership based in the Pakistani-Afghan border area suggests that a combination of smaller and larger attacks “will drive the enemy to despair.” Other documents describe the taking and subsequent killing of hostages, the use of toxic substances, and how to give cover to fighters smuggled in.
Al-Qa’ida expects that growing fear among the general population and increasing reprisals on the part of the security authorities will marginalize Muslims. As a result of such escalation, Muslims will join the Holy War in ever larger numbers, security sources quote from the papers.
Link, with no more citations alas from the paper:http://gunpowderandlead.wordpress.co...-of-attrition/
The author's commentary (in part):
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...this strategy paper shows that the group continues to depend on the West’s reactions to advance its objectives, demonstrated by its expectation that “increasing reprisals on the part of the security authorities will marginalize Muslims,” thus causing more Muslims to flock to al Qaeda’s jihad.
Having listened recently to several Muslim community members they would echo the danger of reprisals. Their words were more direct:
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What pisses off a jihadi? Think about it.
and:
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Add Do not provoke to Op Contest (the UK CT strategy).
Al Qaeda in its Third Decade
Al Qaeda in its Third Decade
Entry Excerpt:
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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
Assessing al-Qaeda’s in-theater capabilities
An excellent analysis by Leah Farrell, from Australia, and in summary:
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Despite leadership losses, Al-Qaeda has exhibited significant consistency and continuity in its operational focus and planning and training activities, which are driven largely by institutional factors rather than by key individuals.
Al-Qaeda can remain operationally active and viable so long as it can access and deploy a small number of recruits. It has demonstrated in recent years that, even with the loss of its senior leaders, this capacity continues.
Prolonged operational impotence is the greatest threat to Al-Qaeda’s organizational unity and viability
It ends with:
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The solution for Al-Qaeda central in maintaining its operational effectiveness and forward focus is likely to be much as it has always been: to continue efforts to successfully carry out mass impact attacks against Western targets, which are an assured means of raising
its profile, attracting support, and quelling any internal dissent and rivalries within the organization.
Thus, despite its current operational impotency, and its inability to carry out a successful external attack, Al-Qaeda’s focus on this approach is unlikely to change over the medium- and long-term, regardless of who assumes the leadership position. Rather, maintaining this focus will be crucial to ensuring organizational unity and longevity as it deals with more generational change. Such a focus would also help ameliorate any issues caused by parochial or local focuses becoming more prominent in Al-Qaeda’s public narrative.
Absent of this success, Al-Qaeda’s longer-term future as a unified and functioning organization is questionable. Nevertheless, as a mode of action, the notion of Al-Qaeda will endure
Link:http://allthingsct.files.wordpress.c...ticle-2012.pdf
Al Qaeda’s Strategy Paper on Its War of Attrition: Part Two
A fascinating analysis by Raffaello Pantucci of ICSR that refers to the documents seized in Germany from an AQ courier (See Post 23); the title is 'The British End of the German al Qaeda documents' and the focus is on the UK and terrorism. Security, strategy and much, much more to absorb.
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From the understanding I have, the papers are essentially a post-operation report on the July 7, July 21, and Overt bomb plots (Overt was the codename for the 2006 attempt by Abdulla Ali and a bunch of his mates to bring down about eight planes as they made there way to America) and German intelligence seems pretty convinced that this was written by Rashid Rauf, the infamous British-Pakistani terrorist operator. This is apparently based on the detailed knowledge of the British plots and some biographical details that are mentioned.
Link:http://icsr.info/blog/The-British-En...aeda-documents
A summary of the original documents, in English is on:http://abususu.blogspot.co.uk/2012/0...urface-in.html
Having listened to the author at a conference I can commend his work
Caveat:
Quote:
..Die ZEIT is only published in German and the article is not online..
There is another German journalist who has commented on his blog:http://ojihad.wordpress.com/2012/03/...red-in-berlin/
AQ Papers found in porn file
An updated CNN article on Rashid Rauf's role on Operation Overt, the planned airliners liquid bombs attack:http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/30/wo...nts/?hpt=hp_t1
Alongside a CNN piece on the German seizures :http://edition.cnn.com/video/?iid=ar...s-combined.cnn
AQ core: still has the ability to resurrect?
Leah Farrell's comment:
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By my count AQ core has resurrected itself three times--each when it had less than 50 members.
Nothing like an Australian to ask painful questions. For those not familiar with Leah's background:http://allthingscounterterrorism.com/about/
On SWC we have looked a number of aspects about AQ, not its ability to resurrect itself.
My first thoughts are: a) it is the resilience of the message, b) 'small is beautiful' easy to finance, organise etc and c) will it work minus OBL?
Older threads? Which ones, please help
Bill,
Thanks for this. Posted by Davidbfpo:
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On SWC we have looked a number of aspects about AQ, not its ability to resurrect itself.
Bill posted:
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I disagree David, we have addressed this repeatedly directly and indirectly. A 50 man base is not a small base for a terrorist organization, especially one as creative and capable as AQ after a decade of co-evolving with the various counterterrorism tactics.
I looked around, in particular this arena and found nothing. Nor did my memory help. So if anyone can point to previous threads please help!:)
OK there is 'Confronting al-Qaeda (Afghanistan to the global level)':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9360 and maybe 'Why so few have joined al Qaeda's jihad':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=13957
Appraising AQ: The practitioner's perspective
A lengthy review of two books by Raffaello Pantucci: 'Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of al Qaeda since 9/11' by Seth Jones and 'The Al Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West' by Mitchell D. Silber:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts...rs_perspective
A short review comment:
Quote:
Jones's Hunting in the Shadows could be described as an official history of sorts of al-Qaeda from the U.S. government perspective. This makes it a different beast to Silber's The Al Qaeda Factor, in which a much more coldly analytical process draws a clear conclusion about the ‘al Qaeda factor' in various terrorist plots.
Longer excerpt:
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..offer different insights into this question, while reaching largely similar conclusions about what al-Qaeda is and how it has targeted the West.
Both of these books were published over a decade after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington bloodily thrust al-Qaeda into the public consciousness, meaning they are able to look back at a considerable amount of data. While Jones' is the more narratively satisfying book, telling a story of al Qaeda around the world, there are omissions in the text that reflect its heavy American focus. Silber's, on the other hand, is a case-by-case analysis that lacks a narrative storyline, but the accounts of the plots in question are drawn from primary sources that make them some of the most factually accurate versions yet told of the various plots, and bring new and interesting insights useful to analysts and researchers
Link to Seth Jones's book:http://www.amazon.com/Hunting-Shadow...rds=seth+jones
Link to Mitchell Silber's book: http://www.amazon.com/Al-Qaeda-Facto...itchell+silber
Al-Qaeda's Response to Arab Spring
An article from an Arab paper, id'd via Twitter:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/poli...ab-spring.html
It opens with:
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The emergence of Ansar al-Sharia [Partisans of Islamic Law] in several Arab countries as democratic uprisings sweep across the Arab world represents a new phase of the Salafist-jihadist movement and its strategic goals.
Are today’s AQ offshoots following Bin Laden’s vision?
SWC member Clint Watts has a paper on FPRI:http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/201...-ladens-vision
It opens with:
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The May 2011 raid killing Osama Bin Laden in his Abbottabad compound not only eliminated the world’s most notorious terrorist but also provided a unique glimpse into the strategic musings of al Qaeda’s leadership. The Abbottabad documents released in May 2012 reveal Bin Laden’s strategic recalibration as he witnessed the demise of his organization in Afghanistan and Pakistan while missing out on an Arab Spring that toppled many of the so-called “apostate dictators” he despised. All of the documents disclosed to the public reveal different aspects of al Qaeda's operations. However, two documents in particular shed light on Bin Laden's last thoughts on the future direction.
OBL made several points on lessons learnt and future options, rightly Clint concludes:
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It is too early to assess whether Bin Laden's guidance is the basis for the disaggregated Salafi-Jihadi violence occurring around the world.