Blind men and elephants...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
It is worth pointing out, that the meaning and essence of nearly every sentence above was originally said by Clausewitz in some shape or form - back when warfare was "simple" and before it become "complex."
Wilf,
Clausewitz certainly has something to say, for me however his is not the only business model when it comes to warfare.
I am interested in chasing down a copy of his work to reread but this time I want to try it in German. Any suggestions?
Best,
Steve
Yeah -- I've got a suggestion
Don't screw w/the German. The language used is almost impossible to put in context due to evolution of the German language.
Get the Paret/Howard annotated translation, even if just from the library. It is the touchstone of Clausewitz translations. It also has great interpretive notes by two of the world's great military historians.
When I was still a callow youth ...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
slapout9
What I found confusing was the concept that somehow Design had become separated from systems analysis or systems engineering!!! It used to be called Brain Storming (I think) but it was the first step and progressed through planning and engineering to make sure it was feasible. Anyhow here is the entire process that Colonel Warden teaches for over 10 years now. Design is the first and hadest step.
Short version: is Design-Target-Campaign-Finish.
Long Version: is Design The Future-Target for Success-Campaign to Win-Finish with Finesse.
In the 1970s, I was taught that the first step in addressing a problem was "qualitative system analysis." (The text I was given to get a handle on the technique was On Thermonuclear War by Herman Kahn.) The process consisted of expanding the problem as given to include "the whole world." After doing so, you began to shrink it back down. The purpose of the exercise was:
- Make sure you were solving the right problem. On several occasions the SA/SE group would be tasked with optimizing X, only to come back with the answer that "X" wasn't the issue.
- Account for the non-quantifiable dimensions of the problem. It's possible to come up with a count of victims of the Rwanda Genocide. But the event and aftermath are governed by the hate of the perpetrators and the anger and grief of the survivors. Those are thing that cannot be quantified, but they will dominate any attempt at resolution. Failure to do this leads to such stupidity as suggesting the survivors should "just get over it," which actively and strongly prevents resolution.
- Ensure you've accounted for everything. That goes beyond declaring something relevant, to explicitly determining what isn't relevant with an explanation as to why. I know of at least one combat system (actually a subsystem) under development today that will never see production because the proponents and developer refuse to account for the fact it will be used in combat. (Yes, it really is that bad.)
I think the paper you attached as well as the paper by BG Czege are advocating exactly this kind of approach. I'm really glad to see people getting back to it.