Flawed in concept, flawed in delivery
Bob's World in part stated:
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The entire concept of "radicalization" is premised in the flawed construct that good citizens go bad due solely to outside influence. Prevention seems to have been focused at these bad outside influences.
Yes, I would agree the UK counter-radicalisation strategy is undermined IMHO by adherence to the concept of 'vulnerability' of the 'good citizens'. I am not sure why officialdom has taken this course, but I suspect that the previous Labour government did not want foriegn policy to be acknowledged as a factor. Something the Chilcot Inquiry on the Iraqi War has heard from retired officials.
I am also mindful that in the UK we focus on the 'vulnerable' and the "bad guys", without enough consideration of the vast majority of citizens and the majority of Muslims. We need to be wary of state actions that provoke this majority and cause them to shift allegiances, if only to a clear neutral "I see no evil" stance.
What is clear in the UK, since 2005, is the clear lack of public, political involvement and their reluctance to be engaged in the public debate of the issues that can contribute to radicalisation. All too often, usually aimed at the "silent majority", engagement has been by "hired hands" or "extremism entreprenurs", civil servants - who with few exceptions recite the official "line" and those in the "frontline".
So much so that for many, notably in the urban Muslim communities, 'Prevent' is a dirty word and best kept away from.
This may all be changing:http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2...lent-extremism
My brother and the deadly lure of al-Shabab jihad
The BBC have this article supporting a File on Four radio documentary, on the unclear impact of Al-Shabab on the Somali community in the UK:
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Jenny Cuffe investigates how British-based Somalis are being lured into fighting for the al-Qaeda-linked Islamists of al-Shabaab.
There have been consistent rumours that dozens, perhaps scores of British-based Somali men have travelled to Somalia to join the militant Islamist group which was banned by the British Government earlier this year.
File on 4 explores the techniques used by Al-Shabaab to persuade young members of the 250,000-strong British Somali community to sign up for Jihad in Somalia. Members of the close-knit and reticent British Somali community tell Jenny Cuffe of their fears that youngsters are being seduced through the internet and by shadowy recruiting sergeants for the Horn of Africa's most feared military force.
And the programme travels to the state of Minnesota to see how a vigorous FBI investigation and cooperation from the Somali community have laid-bare a pipeline which first lured, then transported young American Somalis to the training camps and battlefields of Somalia.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11667690 and the File on Four podcast:http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00vkxkc
I noted the references by US Customs to the issues around Khat being smuggled into the USA, via the UK originating from Kenya and the suspected fund raising for Al-Shabbab. Khat is not illegal in the UK, unlike the rest of the EU and USA.
It's true, it's all our fault
We refuse to convert to Islam as a nation (or in the West), and we refuse to implement Shari'a law, and we refuse to suppress our women, and we refuse to do a lot of things that we simply think our wrong headed ideas/beliefs.
John Smith is a loser (and it's obviously our fault) sitting in bumfudge, NY looking for meaning in life, and then he finds it finds on Anwar Awlaki's website and starts a dialouge with him, maybe attends a mosque that is relatively close. Ah he has found meaning and happiness now, and has decided to take his self actualization a step further by attempting a terrorist attack in a crowded mall over the weekend. He now knows if he dies conducting Jihad against the evil government that oppressed him all these years he'll get to go to paradise. I'm not how that is our fault due to our foreign policy, but apparently it is.
Most "terrorists" come from middle class or upper class families (fact), most terrorists have education beyond high school (fact), most terrorists come from secular or non-practicing families (fact).
Our approach to challenging terrorism? Economic development, build schools, and focus on secular education? I'm sure this is completely logical and a good use of our tax dollars, but I don't see it, maybe you can help me contect the dots?
The reality is there are narratives and ideologies that simply incompatible in the real world outside of academia. More education and economic development will not change their minds, the issue is neither, it is their beliefs. Obviously not every Muslim, nor even most, embrace the views of the extremists that desire to murder civilians to achieve their goals. Something about the radicalization process pushed them off the fence. They may have been sitting on the fence because of their perceptions of oppressive governments, etc., but there was a process that pulled them into the ranks of terrorism (not talking insurgents, although the two are frequently confused in SWJ). It is worth continuing to see is we can lessen that calling, and for those affected by the radical narrative, at least offer another view that may at a minimum put them back on the fence again. I readily admit most programs to date have been terrible failures.
However, it is time we move beyond the liberal self imposed view that we're too blame for a few men attacking the U.S. and murdering thousands of civilians, or attacking the public transportation systems in England and Spain and murdering hundreds of innocents. The blame is a belief system that is NOT compatible with the modern world.
The Muslim "radicalization" myth
Hat tip to CLS alert (a consistently good daily news alert on CT issues) for an article in The Salon: 'The Muslim "radicalization" myth: Debunked. What Peter King missed this week: How the government should actually fight homegrown terrorism'.
Which summarises a longer report by the Brennan Centre and ends with:
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If we're going to talk about radicalization, let's look at the evidence that's out there. Let's not rely on stereotypes or preconceived notions about what radicalization is and who is susceptible to becoming a terrorist. The empirical evidence that is available so far is directly in contradiction to the theories that have been put forward by the FBI and the NYPD. So we want to make sure that those theories -- that are unfounded and contradicted by the social science evidence -- are not being used to influence policy.
Link to The Salon article:http://www.salon.com/news/politics/w...tion_explained
Link to the Brennan Centre report:http://brennan.3cdn.net/3ff468de1211..._hwm6beu15.pdf
On my first, quick read I noted the emphasis on outwardly visible signs regarding the Muslim faith being taken as indicators of radicalisation; a good point IMHO and as Muslim police officers repeatedly have said to me rarely an indicator of political radicalisation.
Incidentally the Brennan Centre report is very critical of an earlier NYPD report, see posts 15 & 16 on this thread 'The Homegrown Threat':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3672
First Minneapolis, now Toronto
A fairly standard article on the flight from Toronto, Canada of naturalised, if not born there Canadian-Somalis, except two women have fled:http://www.thestar.com/news/article/...ppeal-to-youth
One hopes that the two affected communities are in contact.
The Process of Islamic Radicalization in Intra-State Conflict
The Process of Islamic Radicalization in Intra-State Conflict
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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
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Key Factors for Effective De-Radicalisation Programmes
An ICSR paper and from the flyer:
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ICSR’s latest paper – ‘De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States’ – identifies key factors that make de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation programmes more effective.
Written by Professor Hamed El Said, it examines the approaches of eight Muslim-majority states that have developed ‘soft’ strategies to counter and prevent jihadist radicalisation.
The study has found that the factors which contribute to the effectiveness of such programmes include:
• National consensus – Lack of popular and political support has denied Jordanian de-radicalisation efforts the social underpinning that contributes to their relative success in Saudi Arabia. In Yemen, initial support for de-radicalisation has ebbed away, while in Algeria it has remained relatively strong.
• Committed national leadership – Enthusiastic leadership by national governments can provide ‘soft’ counterterrorism policies with impetus; inject them with confidence; build trust in their purpose; and – in doing so – create and maintain the needed national consensus.
• Civil society – The engagement of civil society can provide new ideas and reinforce the state’s actions by empowering local communities and associations, especially those that are vulnerable and hard to reach for the government.
• Non-religious programming – Religious dialogue alone will not eliminate violent extremism. Programmes must not ignore the social, economic and political factors that contribute to radicalisation and consider them in their mix of programming.
• Cultural awareness – De-radicalisation programmes must be consistent with, and derive from, each country’s mores, culture, rules and regulations, and take account of what is acceptable and not acceptable in their societies.
El Said shows that each programme has different approaches and objectives – often depending on the nature of a particular society and the terrorist threat with which it has been faced:
• Countries like Morocco and Bangladesh, for example, have focused on countering and preventing further radicalisation, whereas Saudi-Arabia and Yemen have emphasised rehabilitating and counselling those who have become radicalised.
• Saudi Arabia has developed well-structured official programmes, while many others, including Jordan, have relied on individual and civil society based initiatives.
• Some countries, such as Egypt and Algeria, have gone through processes of collective de-radicalisation (whereby an entire group denounces violence), whereas others deal with individuals on a case by case basis.
This diversity in approaches, El Said argues, is one of the various programmes’ greatest sources of strength. However, this also makes it difficult to measure success and produce valid comparisons. One size, he concludes, does not fit all.
Link:http://icsr.info/paper/de-radicalisi...ajority-states
I wonder how well Western countries would fare if the key factors were applied?
Rethinking Radicalisation
Hat tip to Randy Borum, a SWC Member, to a special issue of the 'Journal of Strategic Studies' on Rethinking Radicalisation, which is free to access:http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/
Economy of effort needed, Randy's introduction is on:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/vi...50&context=jss
Indian Mujahideen is symptom of deeper rot
A rare IMHO article by an Indian commentator on radicalisation, which also looks briefly at Asian examples:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analy...-of-deeper-rot