Ill Informed Blog Post at AM on Advisors
I guess I expect more from AM. This one does not cut it. The reasons for the shift to Polk deal with the congruence in training objectives at the JRTC.
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Polking the Advisor Mission in the Eye
This is the third in a four part series on training advisors.
Six years into the Long War, efforts to train advisors remain mediocre. But they are improving. Fort Riley Training Mission commander Colonel Jeff Ingram deserves special plaudits for taking a thankless mission after having the combat forces gutted from his brigade and attempting to foster effective, survivable combat advisor teams.
As an advisor-in-training in October 2006, the training we received was the worst I had received in the Army to date. The training schedule seemed to be an hour ahead of our current location, and often an hour behind. The idea that operating in Afghanistan might be different than Iraq had perhaps crossed the trainers' minds, but the solutions was simply to train as though we would go to Iraq and finish by saying, "Well, this should help for Afghanistan as well." If I had ten dollars for every time an instructor said, "So, where are you guys headed in Iraq? Oh, you're going to Afghanistan. Well, its about the same thing," I could have foregone combat pay.
A really ignorant comment read:
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The main reason is that Polk is looking for a mission in life vs the somewhat low number of personnel going through the JRTC---why not go to Irwin which is in fact in the desert- replicates both Afghanistan and Iraq has a 1200 role number of Iraqi/American, has a replicated IA/IP, a very active OPFOR, and a scenario built to replicate Diyala Province down to the governance piece, has HTTs, PRTs, NGOs,-has a BCT every month going through and is being strongly supported by the SOF community.
It is dumbfounding how ignorant some folks are. JRTC has trained the majority of units in both theaters for the past 5 years. Most of what goes on at Irwin replicates the JRTC.
Tom
Some of my best friends are from Louisiana ...
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Originally Posted by
Tom Odom
... the thesis that Polk will not be able to do a good job ignores the reality that the JRTC has been doing MREs for 5 years now and made a concerted effort to build MiTTs, PRTs, and other similiar complicating and bedeviing play into those rotations. The decision to move the MiTT effort here was well debated and studied. The drive to move the effort here was to stengthen the connections between MiTT and MREs. As you say you are not convinced Polk is the answer, exactly where do you think that answer might lie?
Tom:
Thanks for your kind reply. Please don't get me wrong--I'm in no way singling out Polk for criticism. My point about training suffering immediately before, during, and after a hand-off would apply regardless of the installations involved. And, admittedly, that's a concern that's decidedly short-term.
We're already feeling some of the effects, for example, as we hear from attendees that instructors at Riley are not being replaced, as that installation draws down its advisor-training role. That (fact? rumor? does it matter?) naturally causes concerns from those who are still scheduled to go through Riley, and not Polk.
As a potential customer, so to speak, I personally like all the resources and capabilities that you and others have described as being available at JRTC. In fact, it sounds like a Tactical Disneyland. So I'm hoping that Polk does prove to be the long-term fix.
Given the realities of the OEF mission, however, I'm specifically looking forward to seeing if/how Fort Polk manages to create Afghantomorrowland (maybe EPCOT Center would've been a better analogy?) as well as Iraqadventureland. Although outside of my personal experience, it seems to me that some of the dynamics present in the former are not necessarily present in the latter.
I guess the larger question--one with which we're wrestling daily as we send more guys into the pipeline--is: How do you create a training scheme and environment that adequately prepares citizen-soldiers to mentor ANA/ANP/other counterparts while working in a combined, joint, and AC vs. RC operation (in other words, whose branch, country and/or task force is in charge?). And, while they'll train as teams, they'll mostly be deployed as individuals once they hit country, often in functional areas completely disassociated with their military/civilian expertise.
One former ETT member described the best-possible training as: Put everyone's job description in a hat, and draw for mentor assignments randomly, regardless of rank or MOS. Now, go mentor that person, who doesn't necessarily speak English, in an area that's 60 percent likely to be controlled/administered by a NATO ally.
Sorry if all this sounds defeatist or negative. Rather, my objective is just the opposite: The guys who have gone before want to make it better for the guys who are about to go. Any insights you or others might offer on how Polk can meet their needs would be appreciated; and, to flip that question around, any insights you might offer on how soldiers can show up to Polk better prepared for ETT training would also be appreciated.
Thanks for your attention ...
Real Soldiering Versus MiTTs?
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Originally Posted by
patmc
Late night in Fayetteville, so if this is slightly disjointed or rambling, I apologize. Good discussion despite my efforts.
All good points and all tied to the very first question I posted:
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a. What is the future of SFA and advisory capacity?
All things flow from that issue. Much of what you describe is US Army culture driven based on a decades-old mindset that dictates how one gets ahead. For instance:
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If you locked people in at Fort Polk, as an Advisor lifecycle, with 6 months training, 12 months deploy, 18 months trainer, you would take these officers and senior NCO's out of the force for 3 years at a time, and leave them stuck in Polk. How many people would volunteer for that?
We already lock folks at Fort Polk on a 3 year cycle as OCs. IF advisor success is the key to a strategy of drawdown and turnover, asking for volunteers is not the answer. Your 3 year cycle would be a good way to do it.
The idea that MiTT tours are Korea tours is the same thinking that dogged efforts early on in Iraq; the belief this is not what real soldiers do is at this stage like praising the Maginot Line in 1939. The Army has to put up some of its best and brightest and then reward them for what they are doing. The answer to the issue of captains missing command cycle opportunities is to give priority for command to those who have MiTT tour under their belt as well as using MiTT duties as a discriminator on selection to battalion command. That too goes back to the original question.
Tom
A few thoughts on MiTTs and ETTs
I had the fortune (misfortune) to be a part of the initial planning for consolidating MiTT training at Riley (previously it was scattered and REALLY bad:mad:). A few thoughts and background on the common points/questions running through this thread:
1. Advisor vs Soldier Skills... Lots of factors, but two are most significant... Army G1 convinced G3 and FORSCOM that PERSTEMPO would only allow for a 60 day training window. I am not casting aspersions... people of this particular rank and skill set are in very short supply and demand is high, we can quibble over whether we ought to train to time or standard but that is part of the calculation. Second, there is a list a mile long of MNF-I, MNC-I, CFC-A, and FORSCOM pre-deployment training that is mandated. If you want a mix for dissatisfaction... mix 60 days + basic soldier skills + experienced soldiers = training dissatisfaction. In fact, what I've heard anecdotally is that 60 days is too much (of course this is based on concurrent training content).
2. Sorry Tom, but I don't think the decision to move the MiTT training to Polk was not as rigorously examined as you are under the impression. More of a knee jerk if you asked my impression. A lot of conjecture is mostly what I have to back that up, so it doesn't merit mention in this forum... but I will say this. The decision to move the training was made before the decision as to whether it was a "relatively" permanent requirement and who ought to be the Army proponent. The synergy of combining the training was pretty much debunked by the responsible TRADOC organization, and if TRADOC were to be named Army lead (makes sense) then I don't think it would have moved it to Polk. Better options such as Knox. No this was a FORSCOM initiative that was pushed very rigorously to make training space for BCTs that will be fielded in the next few years, and my darker angels say to try and force big Army to move the mission to TRADOC.
3. The lack of qualified instructors is an institutional failure. That mechanism was supposed to be in place, but it appears no one wants to tell a returning advisor... "sorry, I know you should go to ILE (or CCC or wherever) but the Army needs you to do this mission for 12-18 months." I understand the desire to give folks who have done a tough mission well, a break, but if you serve long enough we all have taken one for the good of the service.
So in the end... the move to Polk might have some political overtones and was most likely not that well considered or sequenced with other linked decisions, but it was not empire building by the folks at Polk.
MiTT/ETT Training is what it is because we have convinced ourselves that PERSTEMPO will only allow 60 days training; that we can't trust parent units to maintain individual soldier skills; and the personel system seems unwilling to deliver bad news
and....
Security Force Assistance has a new Joint Proponent SOCOM. Good news... DoD actually named a proponent :o... Bad News... Indicates a leaning towards pidgeon holing the capability in SOF and oh by the waywhat does a proponent do???? DOTMLPF requirements determination and capabilities development. Is SOCOM really suitted institutionally and culturally to do capability development for GPF????:mad: Argghh, me thinks not. Sorry Old Eagle, Rob, and Tom... I think the wind direction wrt SFA is blowing us away from port.
Live well and row
SFA: Enduring Mission--Need for Enduring Answers
A fascinating discussion of the Security Forces Assistance Mission, to which I'd like to contribute a few facts and opinions.
First, and most important, is the question of whether this is an enduring mission. The Secretary of Defense certainly thought it was at the AUSA Conference last October: "Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries." He also doesn't (or at least didn't, back on October 10th), think that we have it quite right yet: "How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking.”
Second is the nature and quality of the training for MTT teams here at Fort Riley. This is improving, due in no small part to the fact that the number of former advisors assigned to do the training continues to increase; my battalion of 96 now has 13 former advisors assigned, many in the critically important field grade/company commander/first sergeant roles. Not where we need to be, yet, but moving in the right direction. Similarly, the nascent doctrine for GPF engaging in SFA, now being written by the Air Land Sea folks, is also an important institutional adaptation to the wars we're fighting.
Some good news. However, advisors continue to wonder how the mission they're executing--the enabler of our exit strategy in two wars--will be rewarded by the Army. There are moves in the direction of an advisor Additional Skill Identifer, which would obviously be helpful in tracking this skill set for the Long War, and toward granting KD credit for those who successfully lead TT teams--but there are more incentives that could be offered to increase the desire of our best and brightest to volunteer for this mission, in my eyes at least the most important we're doing as an Army.
As for where we conduct SFA training, that is perhaps less important than any of the other elements of DOTMLPF. Most important is that the Army embrace the necessity to view the combat advisory mission holistically, from Doctrine through Facilities, and within the context of a broader DoD and USG advisory perspective. "Innovative and forward thinking" on this critical mission remains necessary--as does execution of decisions on DOTMLPF.
Close down the Hoffman Building...
Can I ask a really dumb question?
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Originally Posted by
Hacksaw
...2. Multiple sources (Theater and FORSCOM) provide authoritative guidance regarding directed/mandatory pre-deployment training requirements. ...
... (an improvement but a far smaller % than was envisioned when FT Riley backbriefed its concept to FORSCOM in 2006).
Why is FORSCOM involved?
This from one with long (over 10 years) and intimate (too intimate) experience with that Hq...
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By the way the answer is.... four (Rodney Dangerfield in Back to School)
Heh. I did know that... :D
Sorry to be obtuse, however, I still am confused
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Originally Posted by
Old Eagle
Ken --
FORSCOM, as the Army's force generation HQ, has the mission to provide trained and ready forces to the warfighting commands, so they write the standards..
I'm aware of their mission and having participated directly for a lot of long hours in that force generation effort during Desert Shield and Storm know that then the gaining GCC provided the tasks and standards; FORSCOM merely executed. I know things change but one expects the changes to be progress, not regression.
I understand FORSCOM involvement on location selection (though I question whether today with ACSIM there should be such a thing as a 'FORSCOM' or 'TRADOC' post...) and operational entity (as Riley/1 ID vs. JRTC) but other than as executor for templating TRADOC doctrine over CentCom requirements at unit level seems to me that their imposing standards is merely job justification???
An added question. Even accepting FORSCOM standard setting for units, am I to understand that the Advisory Teams are considered FORSCOM elements until they chop over to CentCom? The Teams were the focus of my question, while I think the setting of standards is a bit much, I can understand some FORSCOM involvement with units in the generation and deployment process. I'm unsure what their relationship with the Teams happens to be.
Sorry to be a pain, just trying to get a feel for what's happening.