OSINT Assessment of the Afghan War

So, I'm an MA student at King's College London taking a class on British intelligence. Our final assignment for the class was to produce an OSINT intelligence assessment--my group (3 of us, including myself) decided on Afghanistan. Several months and 7,000 words later, we're finally done, and we thought the Council might get a kick out of it. Please let me know what you think!

You can grab the paper from this link - note link broken see later post No. 7 please:

http://sites.google.com/site/djonrob...attredirects=0

...it is in .doc format. Be advised it is on the lengthy side.

A good, quick review and sent to others observers - so thanks.

I fear we avoid asking where are the Afghans who fight alongside ISAF? In a UK documentary following a patrol in Helmand, there was a UK platoon and at most twelve ANA soldiers.

davidbfpo

You're right, that is something we do not directly address. But the implications of what I think is going on--which we highlight in the conclusions--are relevant to those Afghans as well. Ultimately it is all a question of co-opting, or getting buy-in. Because we see the insurgency as fundamentally a local thing, the Coalition's level of popular support is going to fluctuate from one village to the next. And if that level is the center of gravity--which I certainly think it is--then an Afghan who decides to throw in with the Coalition, in whatever capacity, is going to be very exposed. The militants in his village will know him and his family, and where to find them. You have to make the benefit of cooperation greater than the penalty of that Afghan potentially losing his family. Not an easy thing to do, but not impossible either. And so you want a strategy that is flexible enough to allow our COIN measures to look differently in different parts of the country. That is the main thrust of our argument.

I scanned, only, your 7,000 plus words paper. Good effort, even if I do have a younger cousin who did a PhD at Oxford.

Our now in their mid-20s three children all did two degrees each, and a Masters is a very practical job finding tool in the current US labor market...our unemployment is heavily in the industrial/blue collar markets, coupled with creeping white collar unemployment in the related consumer labor market. Anyone is pure sales is really hurting here right now, but consume spending has picked up as Spring commences and Easter historically is a good spending season here for clothing, food, and especially "candy." Understand the UK job market is tough now, too.

On Afghanistan, safety, etc. The Taliban terrorists initially retreated in 2001 into Pakistan and the border region mountains for a few years. Then the Taliban started a campaign of coming back into villages and taking up residence/farming/growing poppies (opium), etc. then the Taliban set about murdering their peaceful neighbors just because they had remained in Afghanistan's villages after the fall of the Taliban.

Then the Afghan police, army, and NATO forces came to the rescue and tried with limited forces to reoccupy areas and provinces previously cleared of Taliban, which permanent local security effort now requires even more native Afghan police, army, and NATO forces to do, coupled with much more infrastructure development and finding farmers willing to switch to non-poppy crops, the loss in cash crop revenue to the farmers to be what we in the US refer to as crop payment subsidy so that there is no loss in real income to a farmer willing to plant other than poppy crops.

You simply pay them the cash flow difference they gave up from growing/selling poppies. This is a very small price to pay to cut the ground out from under the Taliban whose major revenue comes now from opium crop sales. *Problem being thus far too many Afghan farmers are greedy and will both take the substitute crop subsidy payments and still grow some poppies, too! Ouch!!!

And for the record, back to the recorded history era of Marco Polo whose trade routes were through Afghanistan opium/poppy crops from there have for hundreds of years been a basic trade and barter item, so it is nothing new or radical, despite what yellow journalists try to alledge and write to the contrary.

Afghanistan is a highly unorganized, decentralized mess and even though I was last there in 1965, a long time ago, it hasn't made much progress, if any, since then. The King ruled better than the Taliban, in my view.

What would your team think of a return to a monarchy for Afghanistan in a couple of years? A few on this SWJ site and I feel that might be the most sustainable long term style of governance, as you cannot successfully "drop" a so called Islamic Republic down into thin air and wide open spaces where life is about as primitive as it gets anywhere in the world.

Again, good job from a fast overview of your paper. Limited to 7,000 words it is reasonable to say your team of 3 chose to focus on what you felt was addressable effectively with a mere 7,000 words.

Many members of this site both learn from university inputs and Q&A as well as wish for you guys and gals to do their "homework" in "tome" form for them, so don't be put off by [wishful] questions for other and more analysis, you are not the CIA nor UK intelligence, nor expected to be such. Unless that becomes your chosen civil service career field or miliary career field if you want a UK miliary commission.

Have a good week. Spring in the US is upon us and here in the South flowers are in bloom, trees are budding, with warm days but still coolish nights.

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from JR
Because we see the insurgency as fundamentally a local thing, the Coalition's level of popular support is going to fluctuate from one village to the next. And if that level is the center of gravity--which I certainly think it is--then an Afghan who decides to throw in with the Coalition, in whatever capacity, is going to be very exposed. The militants in his village will know him and his family, and where to find them. You have to make the benefit of cooperation greater than the penalty of that Afghan potentially losing his family. Not an easy thing to do, but not impossible either.

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This problem has been met before - clear, hold the village and secure the villagers. One solution in Vietnam was the Marine CAP program. That amounted to some 15 Marines + some 20-30 PFs (Popular Force militia) in each hamlet - roughly 4-6 hamlets per village in SVN. That program covered some 100 hamlets at its peak (ca. 2000 Marines involved). There were some 12,000-18,000 hamlets in Nam[*] - so, it was at most a pilot program.

Taking just the Pashtun half of Astan, my question is how many hamlets and villages are there ? The answer would give at least a ballpark estimate of the required force structure and personnel requirements.

Anyone ?

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[*] 12,000 hamlets comes from Kerepinevich's figures; MACV stated 18,000. Roughly, the program employed about 75 Marines and 125 PFs per village (ave. of 5 hamlets per ville).

...as of this posting (10:43am 25 Mar 09) - looking forward to seeing your work.

The original link is now broken, so go via JRoberts home page: http://sites.google.com/site/djonroberts/Home and select Graduate Work, where this paper and others sits. I have already PM JRoberts.

davidbfpo

Sorry about that. New link is as follows:

http://sites.google.com/site/djonrob...attredirects=0

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Taking just the Pashtun half of Astan, my question is how many hamlets and villages are there ? The answer would give at least a ballpark estimate of the required force structure and personnel requirements.

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The unsatisfying answer is that we don't really know. One of my team members proposed simply taking the population of each province, not counting major population centers (Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar, etc. etc.), and dividing that by a rough average of the population of a village...say 750 (NB, this is a complete WAG). Figure that one standard-sized dismounted infantry company can maybe cover two villages at most...and scale that up for the total force level you need.

But the ultimate question that I think JMM is asking is whether we could apply the Strategic Hamlet program to Afghanistan. What made that program work in Malaya was that it did two things: it isolated elements of the population that were most susceptible to CT radicalization, while at the same time giving those elements a long-term stake in the viability of the Malayan state. How do we do that in a country where primary loyalties are to clan and tribe? There is a vague concept of an Afghan national idea, but it's still vague, and I'm willing to bet that concept isn't the same across all the various ethnic groups. Malaya had a history of colonial governance and something approaching central administration that Afghanistan doesn't.

So for that reason, I don't think the Strategic Hamlet concept is really transferrable. You might get a short-term dropoff in violence, if your security forces are competent enough to keep the hamlets secure. But unless that initiative is accompanied by political reform that gives the hamlets' populations some kind of a stake in the success of their government, all you're going to end up doing is creating a political underclass that will have even more reason not to like you.

Basically, I think what it comes down to is that the hamlets are already there. Treat each village as its own hamlet, dispense reconstruction/political aid on that level, and get the ISAF forces out into the villages. These people have lived on the land they're on for a very long time...uprooting them and transplating them somewhere else is not likely to be helpful.

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from JR
But the ultimate question that I think JMM is asking is whether we could apply the Strategic Hamlet program to Afghanistan.

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Not a success in SVN; and even a less likelihood in Astan.

Your concern was security for villagers who decide to co-operate. Marine CAP in Nam was the closest thing I thought of (absent an effective police force) to provide that security, bringing together a regular mainforce unit and a locally-recruited militia force.

I'm not suggesting CAP as the Holy Grail. First, it was a pilot program (some 800 villages and hamlets were "capped" - the highest number at any one time was just over 100 - a very small % of SVN's villages and hamlets); and a good pilot program does not mean a successful macro program. Second, its "success metrics" varied, depending on whether the ville was anti-VC, neutral or pro-VC, and the motivation of both Marine and village leadership. Third, not everyone is cut out to be a CAPer - so, recruitment was a problem.

Our reference library has a number of articles on the CAP program (in lower 1/3 of screen), which in turn cite more sources. They start with LTG Krulak's "A New Kind of War" and go down the page.

A short article is a CETO seminar with one of the CAP Marines, "Personal Experiences with the Combined Action Program in Vietnam", which does give us some rough metrics to work with. Here are some snips from the article:

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p.1
The guest speaker was Mr. Ed Matricardi, currently an attorney in Northern Virginia, who was a U.S. Marine corporal and served as a CAP squad leader in Vietnam during 1967.

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p.7
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Mr. Matricardi was assigned to a stationary CAP which was responsible for a village and several small hamlets. There were only four trails leading to his village.

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p.2
In Mr. Matricardi’s village there usually were 12 people assigned to a CAP squad, with two squads in the CAP unit.[*]

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p.8
CAPs would always take a corpsman on nighttime patrols and ambushes. There were two corpsmen assigned to Mr. Matricardi’s CAP....

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p.2
Each stationary CAP established a permanent location for its command post. It patrolled and performed all of its missions from a central, unmoving location. Because of their fixed nature, the command post and patrols attached to stationary CAP sites were more vulnerable to planned, coordinated attacks by various means.

Location of a stationary CAP site was dependant on the level of local support, needs, and makeup of the area. To be successful, the CAP teams needed to be widely dispersed and intertwined among local inhabitants and structures. Fire teams were spread widely throughout villages and hamlets.

Defensive wire and munitions encompassed the entire hamlet, not only the U.S. Marines. Segregation of CAP Marines in a separate compound or location, away from locals, was avoided as it made the Marines an easy target for mortars and rockets. CAP Marines occupied local dwellings and buildings, paying rent, rather than constructing their own living quarters.

Based on the surrounding area and local populace, stationary CAPs presented an easier target to the enemy than roving CAPs. This liability was offset by the unit’s ability to fortify and establish permanent defensive perimeters and check-points more substantial than those established by roving CAPs. Stationary CAPs were also better able to build relationships that provided them with intelligence on enemy actions and intentions.

Because of the permanent location of stationary CAPs and the continuous day-to-day interaction Marines had with the locals, personal friendships developed between them. The nature of the stationary CAP enhanced the ability of Marines to assimilate with the local community and individuals, to create dual missions, and to share responsibility to complete the needed tasks and missions.

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Note that CAPs (even more so, the later mobile CAPs) were a military security program - clear, hold and provide local security. They were not intended, as such, to administer the "build" phase. Thus, from Williamson:

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p.19
Growth in the CAP encouraged development of the program's objectives, and resulted in a formalized mission adopted from the PF's six rules:

1) Destroy the Vietcong infrastructure within the village or hamlet area of responsibility.

2) Protect public security and help maintain law and order.

3) Protect the friendly infrastructure.

4) Protect the bases and lines of communication within the villages and hamlets.

5) Organize the people's intelligence nets.

6) Participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the Vietcong.[34]

[34] William R. Corson, The Betrayal (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1968), 184.

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The bottom line (where CAPs were successful) hinged on:

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p.20
Beginning at the lowest level, that of benefiting the peasant, the CAP achieved noteworthy impact for three reasons, according to Colonel William R. Corson, a retired Marine and author of The Betrayal:

1) Small numbers of Marines do not agitate hamlet life or create xenophobic reactions to military forces

2) The Marine squad had adequate tactical firepower to convince peasants of their military competence,

3) The rank, age, attitudes made it easy for peasants and the Popular Forces to identify with the Marines as individuals.[35]

[35] Corson, 190.

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Going back to the first article, a village with several small hamlets had two CAP squads (roughly 30 Marines). In SVN, about 10 million rurals were spread in some 10,000-20,000 villages and hamlets (I haven't turned up definite metrics, which probably exist somewhere). The 1967 DoD study cited by Krepinevich suggested that about 170,000 CAPers would do the entire country - so, 1 trooper per 60 inhabitants. That is in line with the 30 Marines for a village with several small hamlets.

Now, as to Pashtuns, we have these metrics:

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Pashtuns comprise over 15.42% of Pakistan's population or 25.6 million people.[1] In Afghanistan, they make up an estimated 39%[21] to 42% of the population or 12.4 to 13.3 million people. The exact numbers remain uncertain, particularly in Afghanistan, and are affected by approximately 3 million Afghan refugees that remain in Pakistan, of which 81.5% or 2.49 million are ethnic Pashtuns.[2]

[1] Population by Mother Tongue, Population Census Organization, Government of Pakistan (retrieved 7 June 2006)

[2] Census of Afghans in Pakistan, UNHCR Statistical Summary Report (retrieved 10 October 2006)

[21] Dupree, L.. "Afghānistān: (iv.) ethnocgraphy". in Ehsan Yarshater. Encyclopædia Iranica (Online Edition ed.). United States: Columbia University.

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Not to rain on the parade, but handling, say, 12 million Pashtuns in Astan - and then there is Pstan - would require some 200K "on point" CAPers. Not an easy sell in this current environment.

I hope this clarifies where I was coming from.

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[*] TOE called for 15 Marine per CAP squad (3x4 fireteams, squad leader, asst squad leader, and corpsman), which would have allowed a number of different structures for operations. TOE was the theory; reality was less.

PS: political action

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from JR
But unless that initiative is accompanied by political reform that gives the hamlets' populations some kind of a stake in the success of their government, all you're going to end up doing is creating a political underclass that will have even more reason not to like you.

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No argument here, but as noted above the CAP program was not a political action program. If the governance is on a par with the GVN - see my thoughts on that here - the best that a COIN force can do is to clear, hold and provide security.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

Not a success in SVN; and even a less likelihood in Astan.

Your concern was security for villagers who decide to co-operate. Marine CAP in Nam was the closest thing I thought of (absent an effective police force) to provide that security, bringing together a regular mainforce unit and a locally-recruited militia force.

I'm not suggesting CAP as the Holy Grail. First, it was a pilot program (some 800 villages and hamlets were "capped" - the highest number at any one time was just over 100 - a very small % of SVN's villages and hamlets); and a good pilot program does not mean a successful macro program. Second, its "success metrics" varied, depending on whether the ville was anti-VC, neutral or pro-VC, and the motivation of both Marine and village leadership. Third, not everyone is cut out to be a CAPer - so, recruitment was a problem.

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Agree on the math problem - IF you put a CAP-like org in each hamlet. But each village/hamlet doesn't need its own CAP - only key ones as identified in your analysis of the area. Clear, Hold, Build, and move on - but sustain the ones left behind.

The personnel embedded don't necessarily have to be coalition either.

Niel

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from Cav
The personnel embedded don't necessarily have to be coalition either.

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Could be indigenous mainforce (army or gendarmerie) + local militia Puffs - assuming that the mainforce is competent to do CAPing. ARVN wasn't in SVN; on Astan forces, that's a conclusion to be reached by you and others.

Also, more or less agree (how's that for a lawyerly line :)) with this:

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from Cav
But each village/hamlet doesn't need its own CAP - only key ones as identified in your analysis of the area.

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I'll buy this if you (using "you" generically for a competent field officer) make the analysis for your TAOR. I'd be afraid that "political action" would start calling the shots either at a higher military level (to shift personnel to their higher priorities; e.g., Westmoreland in SVN - "the military professionalism of the Marines falls short.." - p.3); or at a still higher civilian level for any number of reasons inconsistent with sound military tactics.

Hmm...

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from Cav
Clear, Hold, Build, and move on - but sustain the ones left behind.

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CAP wasn't a "Build" operation. When CAP left and ARVN took over, the ville was subject to the same VCI pressures. So, agreed that "build" and "sustain" are essential unless a permanent CAP-like garrison is the plan.

If IIRC, your company accomplished that essential in your 2nd OIF tour - after you gained a barracks PhD in counter-insurgency tactics. Good job. :D
Has the "sustain" held up there ? - if you can say.

Still, in the long run, "sustain" requires political action and good governance by the incumbant nation outside of the scope of direct military actions. Not in SVN; perhaps, in Astan ?

These questions could be getting nearer to OpSec issues than we should go.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

Could be indigenous mainforce (army or gendarmerie) + local militia Puffs - assuming that the mainforce is competent to do CAPing. ARVN wasn't in SVN; on Astan forces, that's a conclusion to be reached by you and others.

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I'll buy this if you (using "you" generically for a competent field officer) make the analysis for your TAOR. I'd be afraid that "political action" would start calling the shots either at a higher military level (to shift personnel to their higher priorities; e.g., Westmoreland in SVN - "the military professionalism of the Marines falls short.." - p.3); or at a still higher civilian level for any number of reasons inconsistent with sound military tactics.

Hmm...

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Certainly and always a risk. I would argue (as did my BN CO at the time) that we withdrew from Tal Afar far too quickly in late 2006. In the context of the time (wheels coming off the bus), you couldn't justify keeping an entire BCT (Feb-May), and then a heavy BN (May 06 -Oct 06) comitted to an area with only .2 violent incidents daily when you had other cities (like Ramadi) in flames.

We knew that the civil governance and HN security forces weren't fully prepared to assume full responsibility for the AO, but were sent south anyway, and risk was accepted. 3-4 CAV (a light div cav sqdn) replaced 2-37 AR in October and subsequently withdrew outside the city to FOB Sykes - this small organization was responsible for all of west Ninewah (a sizeable chunk of land).

Fortunately, things have held together there, the local government and security forces have maintained order despite a few hiccups. I would offer we were more lucky than good in some respects. However, it would not have succeeded if not for the efforts described by our BN S5 in this article.

I would also submit the MNC-I leadership at the time just had a bad set of choices all around, and made a decision to accept risk of re-failure in Tal Afar in order to attempt to stabilize other, more critical locations.

On the analysis comment, once you understand what is unique about COIN and read FM 3-24, you can use systems like ASCOPE to analyze your environment, it becomes much easier to do proper "Clear, Hold, Build". Of course, this requires a good understanding of the nature of insurgencies and some good leadership. (sorry, promo for some classes I use in the COIN Knowledge Center under OPD/NCOPD)

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CAP wasn't a "Build" operation. When CAP left and ARVN took over, the ville was subject to the same VCI pressures. So, agreed that "build" and "sustain" are essential unless a permanent CAP-like garrison is the plan.

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Exactly.

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If IIRC, your company accomplished that essential in your 2nd OIF tour - after you gained a barracks PhD in counter-insurgency tactics. Good job. :D
Has the "sustain" held up there ? - if you can say.

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As far as I know it has. I do know that when I left in Feb 07, there had been zero enemy SIGACTs in Sa'ad since May 06.

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Still, in the long run, "sustain" requires political action and good governance by the incumbant nation outside of the scope of direct military actions. Not in SVN; perhaps, in Astan ?

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Absolutely. You point out the RVN was not capable of this. Neither were the IP's or IA when we began operations in Tal Afar or Ramadi. By the time we left, they were very far along, and in the lead in most cases. As I described in my "Sisyphus" article, we had to partner completely with HN to achieve success.

You've given me a great idea for another article.

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from Cav
You've given me a great idea for another article

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but I'd modify that to - I gave you another idea for a great article. A little bit of sucking up, but you do write well.

I'll take a look at your "promo" stuff at home - have to use another computer. This one does not do Powerpoint. :D

here and at home, where I read your reading assignment.

Your dynamic ball and stick molecular model (forget which .ppt) of how insurgency and counter-insurgency worked fascinated me. Probably because I slogged through an engineering school as a Chem major.

So, what did happen on Market Street with its home-grown Stan the C-4 Man ?

Also kept getting a trailer for John Milius' Red Dawn - NRA infiltration ?

I should mention I probably used the wrong word ("competence") about ARVN, which you logically enough translated to "capable". I should have used "disinclined" (or some such), because of many political, economic, family and personal factors. Besides knowing the language and culture, some of their officers (usually long-serving & down the totem pole) were former VM in the very early days.

I co-authored the above article.

I apologise for being so slow in my response here. I have been out of the country for work.

After reading the above comments I decided that because my knowledge of this facet of counter insurgency is less than complete that I ought to ask someone with first hand experience for their input. As I am fairly sure this was done under Chatham House Rules i cannot identify said individual, although it would be fair to say that he is an expert on the strategic considerations in Afghanistan and one of the UK's top serving military officers.

Specifically, I asked for his thoughts on a Strategic Hamlets type programme albeit modified for the Afghan situation, bearing in mind the platoon houses disaster...

So for what its worth here is a summary of his (informal) response ...

Summary of Officer A's Thoughts on Platoon Houses:
When the Brits took over from the Americans in 05-06 it represented a massive increase in forces in the Lashkar Gar area from 130ish to over 4000. Because of the low number of Americans present previously, they had not ventured out much. As the Brits moved out, they over extended themselves and moved up to the three platoon houses where a protracted engagement between the Paras and Taliban commenced. Incidentally, the Uk fired more rounds in 2nd half of 06 in Afghanistan than it did in either of the gulf wars. Fortunately the forces were significant enough at these platoon houses that they could just about look after themselves but eventually we were forced to pull back from those platoon houses. The platoon houses had become targets and were reducing overall security in those areas - they were a tactical mistake that came about for a variety of reasons. [Declined to go into further details as time was pressing although admitting he could talk for hours on it]

Summary of Officer A's Thoughts on Strategic Hamlets:
Essentially a redeployment of population into managed developments - protect these areas and then build out. He thought there was a logic to doing the same in Afghanistan but he would call the strategic Hamlet approach a "tactic" that would depend on what the over all strategy was. If the strategy was to secure the northern boundary (between Pashun population / Taliban Heartland and the relatively peaceful north) then it might be appropriate - essentially, Hamlets would be a tactic that he "would dine on a la carte" depending on what one had decided the strategy was. If a strategic hamlets type tactic was adopted, he would make sure it was part of the wider strategy, at the same time as "securing" the strategic hamlet he would pay equal attention to judicial reform, the police and development in those areas, with a concrete view as to how to build out. But he "wouldn't do it as we have done a lot" as a rather scatter gun thing - "like we did with home guards" with bits and pieces of them all over the place as we sort of tried to get to grips with it. In summary he thought it would be appropriate within the context of a coherent strategy; At this point his colleague interjected and pointed out how painfully awkward it was having to explain to the Afghans why you have just spent 5 years disarming them only to give them their guns back in the space of 6 months because they were now civilian defense volunteers.

Now I am not sure what you want to glean from that, I am sorry it wasn't in a more formal format but I am paraphrasing from a recorded conversation and i am currently too short on time on a Wednesday morning to rewrite the conversation as an article.

B.Cook

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Originally Posted by BJohnC

At this point his colleague interjected and pointed out how painfully awkward it was having to explain to the Afghans why you have just spent 5 years disarming them only to give them their guns back in the space of 6 months because they were now civilian defense volunteers.

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B.Cook,

That sentence is a real 'gem' and this failure to communicate to the locals regularly features on SWJ. How did we manage this in Malaya?

Thanks for the update.

davidbfpo

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

B.Cook,

That sentence is a real 'gem' and this failure to communicate to the locals regularly features on SWJ. How did we manage this in Malaya?

Thanks for the update.

davidbfpo

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Population control measures particularly food restrictions.

If you want to eat, you work. Not quite politically correct, but adaptive and population centric. Cuts to the heart of need versus want.

v/r

Mike