Afghanistan Chain of Command at the Top?

Can anyone point me towards an accurate unclassified org chart with the present chain of command for Afghanistan? Have we figured out whether the current number of 4-star generals running things is two, three, or four?

Chris Schnaubelt

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Originally Posted by CMSbelt

Can anyone point me towards an accurate unclassified org chart with the present chain of command for Afghanistan? Have we figured out whether the current number of 4-star generals running things is two, three, or four?

Chris Schnaubelt

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Is this what you looking for?

http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/bio/index.html

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Originally Posted by jkm_101_fso

Is this what you looking for?

http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/bio/index.html

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Thanks for the link, but it is not quite what I'm looking for.

To be more specific, I'm wondering if there is there something that actually shows how Petraeus as CENTCOM commander (or Dempsey as acting CG for a few more days) fits into the mix. Isn't there still a large chunk of US troops under OEF who are not part of ISAF? Does McKiernan report only through JFC Brunssum to Craddox as Supreme Allied Commander-Operations? Who does the CJSOTF (or at the least the US portion) report to--McKiernan or McRaven? Also, I'm told that several of the non-US PRTs report to their home capital and not to ISAF.

In short, is there Unity of Command, yea or nay? If nay, has anyone created the chart that looks like the schematic for the Starship Enterprise but accurately depicts the interrelated C2 arrangements?

Sorry, no chart, but I can answer a number of questions. McK as ISAF commander reports through JFC-B to ACO in Brussels. There are US forces in Afghanistan that are not part of NATO; with a few oddball exceptions they fall under CSTC-A (formerly CFC-A). McK, double-hatted as CSTC-A commander, reports to CENTCOM in regards to these forces. The last slice is US SOF. Some of these (at least as of about one year ago) were allocated to NATO. Others worked for SOCOM - they coordinated with and responded to ISAF and/or CJTF-76 (now CJTF-101), which was also a subordinate unit of ISAF. To further muddy the waters, from time to time forces assigned to CSTC-A have been placed TACON to ISAF. Clear?

The US has consistently worked the C2 setup so that our commanders have flexibility to work both sides of the street - including those technically subordinate to NATO.

Lessee, there are also national (non-US) forces in Afghanistan that report directly to their nation rather than NATO, and also non-US forces working for CJSOTF. As far as I know, all PRTs technically report through the appropriate ISAF regional command, but national caveats may modify their actual command relationship.

There is a reason why you are having trouble finding a C2 chart.

Many thanks! It sounds like with the exception of some SOF, McK with a dual hat is the closest thing to a single point in the C2 chain.

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Originally Posted by Eden

Sorry, no chart, but I can answer a number of questions. McK as ISAF commander reports through JFC-B to ACO in Brussels. There are US forces in Afghanistan that are not part of NATO; with a few oddball exceptions they fall under CSTC-A (formerly CFC-A). McK, double-hatted as CSTC-A commander, reports to CENTCOM in regards to these forces. The last slice is US SOF. Some of these (at least as of about one year ago) were allocated to NATO. Others worked for SOCOM - they coordinated with and responded to ISAF and/or CJTF-76 (now CJTF-101), which was also a subordinate unit of ISAF. To further muddy the waters, from time to time forces assigned to CSTC-A have been placed TACON to ISAF. Clear?

The US has consistently worked the C2 setup so that our commanders have flexibility to work both sides of the street - including those technically subordinate to NATO.

Lessee, there are also national (non-US) forces in Afghanistan that report directly to their nation rather than NATO, and also non-US forces working for CJSOTF. As far as I know, all PRTs technically report through the appropriate ISAF regional command, but national caveats may modify their actual command relationship.

There is a reason why you are having trouble finding a C2 chart.

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Eden,

Brilliant. I think you have summarized our major obstacle to success in Afghanistan. Just to be contrary today, I am quoting doctrine.

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Originally Posted by FM 3-24, Ch 1, Principles of COIN

Unity of Effort Is Essential

1-121. Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation. Otherwise, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit. Ideally, a single counterinsurgent leader has authority over all government agencies involved in COIN operations. Usually, however, military commanders work to achieve unity of effort through liaison with leaders of a wide variety of nonmilitary agencies. The U.S. Ambassador and country team, along with senior HN representatives, must be key players in higher level planning; similar connections are needed throughout the chain of command.

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and

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Originally Posted by US Army Principles of War

Unity of Command

For every objective, there must be a unified effort and one person responsible for command decisions.

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Understanding that reality is much harder than theory, are we even close to the above in A-Stan? We seemed to have grasped the problem in Iraq between Crocker and Petraeus, but are having challenges in Afghanistan.

to point out that while doctrine is important we historically ignore it in many situations due to political imperatives (and I use the word 'imperatives' advisedly). This among other things feeds back into the end state in Afghanistan discussion.

While such clarity is certainly desirable and while unity of command is extremely important, neither political clarity or unity of command are always possible. There was and is more of both in Iraq than in Afghanistan but even Iraq has a fluctuating end state and lacks unity of command -- not to the extent that both detriments occur in Afghanistan but both theaters have the problem. The 'Stan has the complication of NATO and non-NATO nations who keep national strings on their folks. That is not going to be eliminated unless those contingents disappear (which is not a good idea politically). Nor is SOCOM going to submit to theater (either) control entirely...

They are detriments and they are problems, no question but they are not insurmountable problems unless one wishes to make them such. They are an obstacle to "success" in Afghanistan but I submit not a major obstacle (Afghanistan itself is that...). They have occurred many times before in our wars. They will again and we need to accept that.