I've seen several obscure references to a 1906 Brit "Small Wars" Manual. Wondering where one could find a digital copy of it.
Thanks!
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I've seen several obscure references to a 1906 Brit "Small Wars" Manual. Wondering where one could find a digital copy of it.
Thanks!
Oops, found it at CARL. Callwell's "Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice".
Yup, the book that inspired the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940. I think Callwell's first edition was older than 1906, by about ten years or so.
Bear in mind that it's not COIN by any means though, the British SOP was "butcher and bolt." Still some great stuff in there though.
I'm more interested in the progression of historical approaches to COIN than getting useful information for current ops. Though the 1940 USMC manual is packed full of stuff that are good to know.
Have you looked at The Guerrilla Reader: A Historical Anthology, edited by Walter Laquer? Published in '77, it is a collection of essays and excerpts from larger writings on the subject throughout history. It is the companion volume to his outstanding book Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study, which was published the year prior.Quote:
Originally Posted by 120mm
No, but I'll get on it.
The author is one of the earliest and most influential writers on counter-insurgency. He was a British military officer writing to teach junior officers on how to defeat non-European forces. While many of his tactics seem rather tough and barbaric, one must be careful to judge him by the standards of his time (early 20th century), not by the whims of today. If one is able to look past many of tougher stances, like destroying the food and water sources of uncooperative local citizens, there is quite a bit worth learning. The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940 owes much to this work. While more modern counter-insurgency writers have overshadowed Caldwell's teachings, he still deserves credit for being one of the first to record the lessons and basic tenets of counter-insurgency. It is amazing the see how little has changed and how well this book holds up. I understand why this book is still required reading at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
http://www.amazon.com/Small-Wars-The...097696-4450507
I do not agree with this, unless you are reading the rare , and hitherto unseen, 'evil edition' version. My copy of this classic is quite pragmatic and, considering the cultural and social mores when it was first written, relatively balanced.Quote:
Originally Posted by Granite_State
Cheers
Mark
Quote:
Originally Posted by 120mm
Could you give me the e-address? I've wanted to read that one for a long time.
Small Wars, Their Principles and PracticeQuote:
Originally Posted by 120mm
Its a scanned pdf copy - in seven parts - of the 1906 third edition.
....or you could just buy it from Amazon.
Callwell was one of the first Instructors at our Royal Military College (Duntroon). He was subsequently at Gallipoli under General Bridges ( the 1st Commandant RMC and Comd of the AIF before he was shot). Subsequently he served with distinction with the AIF and the Brits on the Western Front.
... time for an introduction to the Council.Quote:
Originally Posted by jastay3
I'm not slamming Callwell, and I'll admit to having only skimmed the book, need to have it read cover-to-cover by Christmas. The British were maybe the most humane empire in history, but when it came to small wars, the general idea was a punitive expedition, track down the malefactors, burn their crops or city, and head home. Butcher and bolt. I'm simplifying a bit, but that's generally how it was done, especially on the Northwest Frontier, a small war that went on for a century.Quote:
Originally Posted by Mark O'Neill
Bear in mind that they often differentiated "small wars" from "duties in aid of the civil power" (Anglo-Irish War, Indian communal disturbances, Arab Revolt in Palestine), where the rules of the game were different.
Callwell's approach, while relatively balanced given when it was written and for what purpose, still is, in Kilcullen's terms, enemy centric. This does not make it a bad book nor negate everything the author says. Trinquier's work, for example, is enemy centric and still valuable.
The USMC SWM clearly engages Callwell in a dialogue. It accepts two of his 3 classes of small wars but explicitly rejects his third - wars of conquest or annexation. While the SWM would agree with Callwell on some tactical approaches it is, by contrast, population centric. And, I would argue, after getting by some of its archaic politically incorrect language, most of its approach could be found within the new COIN FM.