Proxies and International Obligations
I agree that insurgency is a strategy, not necessarily a description of a conflict. However, I don't think it's a strategy limited to weak organizations. Major powers have used insurgencies, especially through supporting proxies, to achieve strategic goals they could not achieve directly. This was one of the founding principles of Special Forces.
Perhaps you could argue that the system or environment the dominant power is trying to foster "dominates them" by imposing expectations on behavior (or to avoid perceptions of hypocrisy), leading them to take indirect action or work to undermine a rival in a way that avoids wider conflict.
Also, I don't know if this is a general characteristic of ALL insurgencies, but every one I can think of focuses on undermining the legitimacy of its interlocutor while trying to promote its own (or its objective).
Joe Friday Analysis Of Insurgency.....Just The Facts Mam!
Insurgency is a Method....used by a Motivated individual(s).....to exploit any available Opportunity.
From the "War is war" thread
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from BW
.... from a piece I am working on on "Perspectives on Insurgency":
Traditional Perspective: “Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of warfare.”
Updated: Insurgency is an illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design. COIN is the action of that governing body working to prevent or resolve the civil emergency.
Addressing those concepts here rather than there seems more appropriate.
As to the "Traditional Perspective", I'd suggest that it could be presented as:
“Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of politfare and/or warfare.”
"Politfare" being the "conduct of" or "journey into" political action (see etymology of "fare"). Note this is not a rigorous definition, but merely a classification, such as "Homo S and Homo N are complex subsets of Hominidae."
The "and/or" is inserted to recognize that multiple variants can occur even when only two parties are involved: each party could use political action only, military action only, or a mix of both.
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As to the updated definition:
Quote:
Updated: Insurgency is an illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design. COIN is the action of that governing body working to prevent or resolve the civil emergency.
If the political challenge is non-violent, why is it "illegal" and who makes it so ?
Similar thought, if the political challenge is non-violent, why should it be or develop into a "civil emergency" (whatever that is) ?
That definition might apply in an authoritarian country with a very rigid one-party line (all deviations from which, violent and non-violent, are "illegal" and all deviants are "insurgents" - "we shoot counter-revolutionaries.") and with an enhanced state security service which always operates in emergency mode.
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In Geneva-speak re: armed conflicts, we have to have at least two opposing "Powers" to the armed conflict; and, by analogy, at least two opposing "Powers" to political conflicts.
While Geneva-speak talks of "Powers", it does not really define the term - we know it when we see it. ;)
Regards
Mike
Is this completely true ?
Quote:
from BW
I left out the critical word of "internal" as well. If the challenger is from outside it is UW.
We have an External Power which supports one of two Internal Powers (say "Power B"). To the External Power, it is waging UW vs Power A (and vice versa). However, Power A still could regard Power B as an "insurgent" and as a Power in a non-international armed conflict. Sorta Vietnam, ain't it ?
The UW conflict could be an international armed conflict if both the External Power and Power A are states. Your example of AQ (IMO: agree that AQ as a TVNSA wages UW, not a "global insurgency", using inter alia domestic insurgencies as tools) vice a state Power would be a non-international armed conflict, since AQ is not a nation-state and has neither accepted nor applied the 1949 GCs (as required by Common Article 2).
My other questions and comments still apply from the post above.
Regards
Mike
Read Bob's definitions again
Steve, Bob's definitions are carefully crafted in the sense that they are not uniquely Western. Indeed, each of them relies on local interpretation and perception.
As an example that would fall within Bob's definition of legitimacy let me offer one indicator (variable) from Manwaring's original SSI study - "lack of perceived corruption." Corruption is commonly understood as the missuse of public position for personal gain and exists in all cultures. What is unique in each culture is their definition of missuse. So many things that a Westerner would see as corruption are perfectly acceptable in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, or Panama. I would also note that what is perceived as corrupt behavior also changes over time so something that was perfectly acceptable 20 years ago no longer is today. Still, there is a core to the notion of corruption that transcends culture. I believe that Bob has caught this kind of core in his definitions.
Cheers
JohnT
A tremendous number of insurgencies have occurred and likely
will in future occur not due to poor governance but simply to replace whatever governance exists -- good, bad or as most are, indifferent -- with 'OUR governance.'
Government is not a terribly natural thing. It is needed but it is rarely truly good -- people intrude and screw it up -- I can think of no nation that has a truly 'totally satisfied with the government' population. I can think of a great many that have political parties or grouping that do not like the current milieu and wish to change it. The drive to do that violently often comes from the "poor governane" aspect -- it also comes from the 'we want OUR governance' crowd.
As Steve Metz said:
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The unspoken assumption is that insurgencies occur because states don't adequately follow the Western-defined path, and will be defeated if states do.
That's true and the western construct can lead one down a primrose path...
Seems to me that Insurgency thus can be -- most often is -- a strategy. If adopted as a strategy by the Insurgents, their issue then becomes the degree or intensity for the insurgency, i.e, what techniques or methods will be used to implement the strategy.
Or, to quote Slapout9:
Quote:
Insurgency is a Method....used by a Motivated individual(s).....to exploit any available Opportunity.
Yep and IMO, that makes it a Strategery to use that method to exploit sumpn... ;)
Common sense versus American Liberalism
Ken, as you well know I strongly agree with your view,
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will in future occur not due to poor governance but simply to replace whatever governance exists -- good, bad or as most are, indifferent -- with 'OUR governance.'
Legitimacy is concept that we in the West approach with great bias based on American liberalism (and usually promoted by our lawyers), yet it has little to do with real reasons people fight. In the simpliest and truest terms insurgency is a violent struggle for power. The victor whether insurgent or the current regime will never be viewed as legitimate by all in the vast majority of countries. America and some nations are unique in that we established a functional melting pot, but that is not a model we can impose on other nations. Of course that didn't happen overnight, and it can be argued we didn't achieve internal stability until 100 years after the Civil War.
Posted by John T.
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Sir Robert Thompson said, in his book Defeating Communist Insurgency, "If the [revolutionary] organization is already established, well-trained, and disciplined., it will not be defeated by reforms designed to eliminate the cause. It will only be defeated by establishing a superior organization and applying measures to break the revolutionary organization." (For revolutionary organization we can substitute the insurgents or insurgent organization.)
This is a fact that has been demonstrated again and again throughout history. At this point it is no longer really about politics, but more about basic pychology and sociology principles that influence people's behavior. Too many people confuse the underlying causes that led insurgencies to oust the illegitimate colonialists after WWII with all cases of insurgency. Insurgency in 2010 is not about throwing out colonial governments and replacing them with even worse governments, but a struggle for power that has little to do with legitimacy and much more to do with greed and hatred.
Finally injecting UW into the insurgency debate simply muddies the waters. UW is an American definition for a means that other nations and non-state organizations have used for centuries. For the regime still being challenged it is a State sponsored insurgency. It is still an insurgency. Iran may use the strategy of insurgency to pursue its goals in Lebanon for example. This is the risk of falling in love with our definitions, we'll end up describing and responding to the conflict in a way that conforms to our pre-determined definitions and doctrine.
Bill, the insurgent clearly has a choice of ways and means
as well as ends. Unsually, the ends are the overthrow of the recognized (or at least constituted) government. But, if he has control of such means as key parts of the military he can choose a coup d'etat has his method (way). If, on the other hand, he has half the army (means), he can fight a conventional war (way). If he has neither and limited political organization, he can use his few resources to conduct terrorist attacks in the hope of using that to gain the resources (militias, more terrorists, front groups) to mount a classic revolutionary campaign.
Anyway, that's what I mean.
Cheers
JohnT
Steve, you are asking the wrong question
It is not whether El Sal (to keep my typing down) was less corrupt at the end of the war but whether it was perceived by Salvadorans as less corrupt. But even that is the wrong approach. Perceived corruption is one of a number of variables that we argue make up the Factor we called Legitimacy. So, the real question was whether Salvadorans perceived their government as more legitimate than it was when the insurgency began. The evidence certainly supports that case. One of the reasons that can be adduced is that in the 1988 and 89 elections the Salvadoran voters threw the Christain Democrats out - largely over perceived corruption. The fact that another party could take over the government peacefully was a factor in bringing the FMLN to an agreement. They, of course, won the most recent elections and now govern the country.
Cheers
JohnT