Rolling Thunder heard in the distance...
Ron,
The people you describe are combined the G3 and CoS. Pretty tough jobs, which is why the Div G3 was upgraded from LTC to COL (BDE CMD Designee) and the CoS is generally (BDE CMD complete). No doubt too much to for one man to synchonize, to the required level of fidelity, in his own grey matter.
Sooo.... agree on the required functionality - differ in so far as whether we need another COL to get in the way :D
Live well and row
Taking it to the doctrinal ... mattresses?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Hacksaw
I thought I had fired my FPF in my last entry, and that I was going to retrograde out of my position and this thread. However, much like Michael Corleone (and the Mafia) this thread keeps sucking me back in.
Agreed on the strangely compelling nature of this thread. But if you do manage to break contact, remember the following TTP: "Leave the gun. Take the cannoli."
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Hacksaw
JP 3-13 and other subsequent doctrine lumped the various IO functions together for a reason, one opinion shared between two 4-stars that I was privy to eavesdrop :D was that the purpose was to get the institution's arms around these functions and put some rigor behind the development of concepts & capabilities. During that same conversation, they agreed that it might be about time to break the function apart again, that the consolidation had served its purpose. IO, CNO, EW, PSYOP, OPSEC all have their own named Army proponents (for a reason).
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Hacksaw
There is a strong record of anecdotal evidence (at all levels in Iraq - Corps to PLT) that when the leader makes the mental transition that the info aspects of the operational space are so interwoven with the other aspects that he can't seperate it as a matter of convenience, that he has to view that same operational space through the lens of more than just his own, and that if he considers those facets prior to conducting a tactical action he can multiply the effect of the tactical action several fold by anticipating the effect of his tactical action, mitigating the possible negative impact by proactivly putting in place plans to counter adversary propoganda, and actually use that analysis to perhaps posture his unit to take advantage/turn that negative propoganda/tactical response to his own advantage. If that is PSYOPS, ok, but I prefer to just call it ops.
Given your points, as well as Schmedlap's and Bill Moore's anecdote(s) about the messages implicit in making a big bang to impress the locals, I come around to the old "chicken-and-egg" dilemma of "when is a lesson 'learned' at the institutional level"?
In my thinking, doctrine (and the definitions therein) represents an attempt to institutionalize thought, to give it a theoretical framework and structure that should--even as it (slowly) changes and evolves over time--still outlast whatever specific conditions and commanders are present in a given time and place.
Ultimately, isn't doctrine the way we make sure the next guys and gals to walk in our boots continue to focus on the right things, beyond "simple" TTP and lessons? And, if so, doesn't the issue of how to synthesize the various components of IO remain an organizational imperative, rather than become a thought-experiment that has run its useful course?
Generating yet another Kumbaya
Quote:
Originally Posted by
wm
I don't remember ever saying that H&I achieved its stated purpose. For one's oppponents it primarily serves as a training reinforcement and means of culling the herd. If it has a negative impact on morale, I suspect it does so more on the friendly cannnoneers who have to deliver it at odd hours of the night, sort of like the effect on the unlucky soul who had to pull fire guard in BCT/AIT at 0300. :D
Didn't mean to imply that you did; just saw the "H&I" and that 'technique' raises my hackles on a generic basis... :D
I agreed on the Psyops and disagreed, sort of, on the utility of the M113 and the Bradley -- standard airborne response to clanking tracks -- in other than the cargo toting role... ;)
Hugs! :D
Reachback /Research Anyone?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
wm
Meanwhile back in the RC, the Guard has two operational Theater IO Groups (TIOG), one in Washington State and the other in Texas. The USAR apparently has a TIOG starting up as well, based out of Fort Totten in NY.
And there's also a National Capital Region IO Center in MD. That is all in addition to the AC's 1st IO Command.
What the heck are all these various organizations supposed to be doing?
Perhaps it's effectively easier to research and collaborate on certain aspects when not under fire:confused: Just a guess but would make sense to me since most seem to want to put it in the Op's and above category.
Regional focused study combined with local operations feedback probably offers immense pluses over trying to be there and knowing let alone remembering what all you need to ask about any given thing while you happen to be in contact. I would hope it's something along those lines.
One would think it might also make some of those trying to track the decisions and lesson's jobs a little easier as well.
DOH! Forgot about "DOTMLPF"
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Hacksaw
(To Bill Moore) You can't call something learned, acknowledged maybe but not learned, until it changes behavior. The "Institutional Army/Generating Base/TRADOC and all its satellites" are first and foremost about requirements determination (lesson identified) and DOTMLPF capabilities development/delivery (lesson learned). Our problem historically is we are unparalleled in the identification process, less so with regard to the develop/delivery.
You may have been using the term institution as reference to the corporate whole of the Army... Then I would say its mostly about changes in operational behavior, but caveat that the same change is only transitory (specific to particular time, place & individuals) until the considerations from that lesson learned have made their way into the generating base processes/infrastructure.
Certainly, the latter is how I also meant the term "institution"--pertaining to how the military learns as a "corporate whole." Thanks for your analysis of my earlier points--given that my lessons-learned team tends to focus on the brigade-and-lower levels, we have a tendency toward some of the vulnerabilities you state above: We do well on lesson-identification, we're OK at lesson-learning and -integration throughout our tactical organizations, but we're perhaps less effective at higher levels.
We do casually assign or align our lessons with DOTMLPF implications, but we don't own much more in that fight. We plug into Big Army for that kind of heady stuff. Bottom-line and lesson-learned: Thanks for helping us put our process and our arguments into ... "TRADOC-ian?" "TRADOC-ese?" "TRADOC-eze?" (I vote for the latter--because it looks and sounds like a floor wax, and a tasty dessert topping.)
That said, and at risk of zapping whatever citizen-soldier credibility and goodwill L2I Iowa may enjoy on SWJ, I've got to admit I've got no visibility or knowledge on the "Theater IO Groups" that wm and Ron Humphrey just mentioned. I now have to go make some calls and get some more smarter.
In the meantime, however, I can at least partially answer wm's question regarding deputy commanders in the modular BCT. My IBCT has an 06 commander, an 06 deputy commander, and an 05 executive officer. The deputy, notably given the topics of discussion on SWJ, is quite likely to inherit oversight of major portions of a given BCT mission, such as being named as the unit's MiTT Tzar. Don't know whether this would help or hurt the possibility/efficacy of being named IO Tzar as well.
Until later -- "IO Avengers ... Assemble!"
IO and the psychology of staffs
Setting aside the question of what IO is and whether it is a useful construct, my own observation is that the status and position of the IO staff has a profound effect on the orientation of the headquarters.
I was intimately involved with two higher staffs in Afghanistan, one NATO, one American. In both, the commanders emphasized the importance of information operations in their commader's intent. The NATO commander went so far as to say he considered Afghanistan as primarily an 'information operation' and that all physical actions must support IO objectives.
On the NATO staff, there was a colonel labeled 'Chief, Information Operations' who worked directly for a brigadier called 'Chief, Joint Effects'. The brigadier outranked all other primary staff. As a result, the rest of the staff was oriented to think in terms of IO and effects to a greater extent than they might have been; even those like myself who were less than enthusiastic supporters were obligated to feed the beast, and the IO community had a heavyweight advocate at the commander's table - for good or ill.
On the American staff, there was a colonel IO, but his title was "Chief, non-lethal effects". His career was nearing its end, unlike the J2, J3, and even J4, who were command-designees. His little organization was stuck in about two levels below the decision-making level and was not well integrated. He did not have the energy or personality to overcome these organizational handicaps. As a result, he had less influence on the commander, staff, or operations than some of the brilliant young majors in the planning cell.
My point is that integrating lessons learned - about IO or anything else - at the operational level requires appropriate organization of the staff. In the US case, segregating IO into a functional area handled by specialists relegates that particular skill to the same level as, say, the ADAO: an expert who can be taken out of his box when required but is otherwise largely ignored.
"Just Do IO"(tm) T-shirts now available in the lobby ...
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Originally Posted by
Eden
Setting aside the question of what IO is and whether it is a useful construct, my own observation is that the status and position of the IO staff has a profound effect on the orientation of the headquarters.
...
On the American staff, there was a colonel IO, but his title was "Chief, non-lethal effects". His career was nearing its end, unlike the J2, J3, and even J4, who were command-designees. His little organization was stuck in about two levels below the decision-making level and was not well integrated. He did not have the energy or personality to overcome these organizational handicaps. As a result, he had less influence on the commander, staff, or operations than some of the brilliant young majors in the planning cell.
My point is that integrating lessons learned - about IO or anything else - at the operational level requires appropriate organization of the staff. In the US case, segregating IO into a functional area handled by specialists relegates that particular skill to the same level as, say, the ADAO: an expert who can be taken out of his box when required but is otherwise largely ignored.
I find your insights very compelling, particularly in that they speak to my life as a lessons-learned integrator, as well as an amateur/armchair IO guy. Working with our Big Army colleagues at the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, we've informally tried to figure out, capture and share how/why our little rag-tag lessons-learned team has been successful.
(More disclosure/background/context: We work for a G3-level green-suiter, but increasingly find ourselves working with blue-suiters on DSCA stuff; M-day side, I work in an IBCT staff environment.)
Some of our L2I talking points include explicit instructions from our boss:
- 80 percent of our targets are self-identified and self-initiated.
- Double-O meeting-taker status: "Invite yourself to any meeting you want."
Others have been identified through experience:
- Have enough rank on the team to be perceived as an asset, not as a threat.
- Have enough experience on the team to know how organizational/staff functions interconnect. ("Who else needs to know this piece of information?")
- Hire individuals that respect the chain of command and military tradition, but also have enough longevity (or confidence or personality ... or "civilian-earnings potential") that they aren't afraid for their jobs. ("What are they going to do, fire me?")
So, like you, I see on-staff status and position as being part of the IO-as-a-construct-and-as-an-application discussions, but I also think you've identified some "softer," less measurable factors in successful instilling and implementing an IO-friendly command culture. Factors, I suppose, like personality and a willingness/ability to walk through (organizational) walls.
Final vignette, one that I hope both illustrates the old-Nike-ad "Just Do It" mentality and speaks to your IO-and-ADA comparison:
Quote:
A junior-enlisted airman/soldier assigned to an Army unit downrange as a FAC/FAO can't get the time of day from the brass--until he stops wearing rank. Suddenly, everyone starts calling him "Mister," and his opnion starts to be taken seriously within the organization. He didn't really break the rules (other than, perhaps,
AR 670-1) or its Air Force equivalent, but he definitely bent them to his will, given that he never aggressively disabused anyone of the notion that he might be a Warrant Officer. Not necessarily a recommended technique, but one that worked for him, an
Air Force or Army of One.
Hmm. I'd suggest just adapting their best practice
Quote:
Originally Posted by
dguidry1
The international community of IO practitioners outside the United States - especially in Europe - have a very good grasp of IO with a high degree of common understanding of its application in both military and civilian environments.
in that case -- but, of course, that wouldn't pass the 'Not invented here' test...:(
I'd rather looks at this another way...
I was drug (kicking and screaming) into IO before FA-30 was invented when I was working on the Joint Staff, in the J2, the only Army guy in the office. I wasn't tainted by preconceptions, not school trained and couldn't even spell IW/IO. Later I was the IO LNO to the CIA, NSA, FBI, and DISA, and technically assigned to DIA, so I had a very different perspective. Anytime anyone mentioned IO it was synonymous with CNO, specifically protecting from state-sponsored hackers. I grew restless and began inviting SMEs from all the Services to brief us on more full-spectrum IO. I began inviting in folks from other countries to teach the Joint Staff and the office that began forming around me (they were taking pity on me, I suppose). Eventually, by the time IO began reducing from 13 elements in the USAF doctrine, we began to relax, the doctrine was not as complicated.
Fast forward to 2008 and I am talking with almost all the same folks as i was in the mid-90s, except now they are all in positions of authority, major influencers of doctrine and policy at the USG, Joint, Combined and Service levels and almost to a person they miss the 13 elements of IO. What they miss is that IO was the principal doctrine and everything was considered to have some effect on the targeted audience. Folks have actually said it here and Eden described how the NATO command executed that as a staff element in what I consider the proper perspective: everything must be evaluated for its information effect, so having a Brigadier as the Chief, Joint Effects:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Eden View Post
On the NATO staff, there was a colonel labeled 'Chief, Information Operations' who worked directly for a brigadier called 'Chief, Joint Effects'. The brigadier outranked all other primary staff. As a result, the rest of the staff was oriented to think in terms of IO and effects to a greater extent than they might have been; even those like myself who were less than enthusiastic supporters were obligated to feed the beast, and the IO community had a heavyweight advocate at the commander's table - for good or ill.
serves that purpose well.
I was asked to describe the future of EW the other day, and define its relationship with CNO in context with the new 'Cyber' discussions. I do NOT want to hijack this thread, but this is pertinent because of some folks asking how to view this divide. I've been explaining to folks for years that IO has a soft side and a hard side. The 'hard side' deals with electrons and is EW and CNO and all that cyber stuff. It was suggested we call this spectrum warfare. I don't disagree but I don't necessarily agree. Then there was the 'soft side' of IO: PSYOP, OPSEC and MILDEC. I called this Information Warfare, but someone here suggested Influence Operations and I tend to agree.
Ken White, you hit the nail on the head, the "not invented here" syndrome has killed more great ideas than anything else of which I am aware.
selil, if you really want to see someone 'do IO' well, look at the Chinese stuff. Tim Thomas wrote an absolutely excellent book on Chinese IW, if you'd like I'll see if I can get you a copy. But beware, it will cause you to question everything you know about IO and will cause you to always be paranoid about anything China ever does or says or... I'm hosting a Chinese IW forum March 4th 2009 here in Washington DC as a part of InfowarCon, be there.