Potentially useful reading.
Heard the authors on the John Batchelor show sometime back. Have not read the book but it may be of interest:
Quote:
These experts in the field challenge commonly held views about the success of the global war on terrorism and its campaign in Afghanistan. Their book questions some fundamentals of the population-centric COIN doctrine currently in vogue and harshly criticizes key decisions about the prosecution of the Afghan war. It is the only book to compare the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan from a national strategic perspective. It questions several key operational factors in Afghanistan, including the decision to give NATO the lead, the performance of both civilian and military leaders, and the prosecution of an Iraq War-style surge. It also contrasts the counterinsurgency campaign styles and the leadership of senior American officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan. A final chapter outlines key lessons of the two campaigns.
http://www.amazon.com/From-Kabul-Bag.../dp/1612510221
Any suggestions on what to read regarding coalitions and counterinsurgency or is our NATO experiment kind of a first?
If you go back to the 2002-3 period and are given the military task again, given that NATO and the US wanted to stay in some peace keeping capacity, is there a different way to do things? I suppose the complaint back then is that requests for troops were turned down. How to stabilize in a more modest way if you are given that civilian task, whether it be wise strategically or not?
Coalitions and counterinsurgency
Madhu just asked:
Quote:
Any suggestions on what to read regarding coalitions and counterinsurgency or is our NATO experiment kind of a first?
In modern times the USA has fought several wars, some of them with an insurgent component, with a coalition. Sometimes the extent of US fighting has been very small, e.g. French Indo-China as the logistic supplier and maybe money too.
The UK considers some of its small wars have been coalition efforts too. Not only in the colonial era, such as Malaysia and Kenya; then Oman comes to mind. To be fair even when sovereign states were involved the UK was in the lead.
What is not clear from Afghanistan is what the balance was between NATO the alliance and individual members on policy-making. An alliance that had worked together preparing for war - in Europe - appeared when campaigning in Afghanistan to - be diplomatic - lose focus.
Five points from an armchair
1) Respect and understand history - from all viewpoints. In the Afghan context this appears to have come rather late - as indicated in the briefing for the UK's forces after 2006.
2) Remember however mighty external power seems local works better, even if not to our standards. This was obscured by the initial success in ejecting the Taliban and the faith on the strictures of the Bonn Agreement.
3) If external intervention in - a sovereign state - ignores or thinks that problems like corruption, drugs and a nearby "safe haven" can be accommodated defeat is more likely.
4) Professional militaries bleed and back home support will shrink over time. This effect is enhanced if reserves are called up. Expensive too.
5) If you are not welcome, don't stay. Ignore this only if you can be ruthless to all the population beyond your own announced standards.