In COIN how do we describe the relationship of the levels of war?
This is something I've been trying to work through for about a month since I got back from the Overland Campaign staff ride. There I finally thought I understood, by virtue of physically having gone over it, where Operational Art, Campaign Design, and the Operational Level fit in the relationship between the Tactical and Strategic levels of war.
I understood that tactical engagements could be a means to achieve an operational advantage, and the goal of that advantage is to translate it into a strategic gain - say against an operational or strategic center of gravity, then you could win the war. It also struck me as important that you could win tactically, but lose on the operational and strategic level - and conversely, you could lose tactically (at least relatively), but win on the operational and strategic level by taking away and retaining the initiative at the Operational Level.
Since then the question of Operational Art in COIN has continually bothered me as I look and consider what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan.
You can see that there are many different types of Lines of Operation - doctrinally some of these are logical lines of operation - going on in Iraq. There are Diplomatic, Economic, Informational, Military, Financial, Intelligence & Legal LOOs. Some seem to be having better success then others within the PMESII - Political, Military, Economic, Social, Intelligence & Infrastructure framework then others - but how do you tie all this together in a COIN campaign plan to achieve a strategic objective?
It seems to me MNF-I is on to something. At first it did not register to me what I thought was the significance of Kilcullen saying they were "hardwiring the social environment" to prevent AIF from getting back in once they were separated. I also did not infer a connection between that (rightly or wrongly) and the "tribal revolt" against the AQ in Iraq, and the thought of enlisting sheiks toward achieving a secure environment in areas where ISF and the central government have little authority.
I feel like these are elements of "Operational Design" to achieve a broader strategy of securing the population so that some political progress can be made, but its not exactly the same thing as Grant continually stealing the move on Lee and extending him from Richmond to Petersburg while cutting his LOCs to the South and exhausting his means & will - its different.
I think this is a good question to consider - given the discussion on likely threats, and the debate on military force structure and adaptability here on the Council.
Thanks, Rob