Afghanistan troop surge could backfire, experts warn
Can our AFG vets lend any credibility to this?
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Deploying additional forces could backfire, however, if the United States and its allies don't devise a coherent strategy to defeat the Taliban insurgency, strengthen the Afghan government, bolster the country's economy and deprive Islamic militants of their safe haven in neighboring Pakistan.
The calls for reinforcing the U.S.-led military coalition come amid the worst violence since the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, with the 7-year-old ''forgotten war'' in May and June claiming more U.S. dead than Iraq for the first time.
More foreign troops, however, would do little more than turn more war-weary Afghans against U.S.-backed President Hamid Karzai if they are not part of a broader and more effective counterinsurgency strategy, some experts and U.S. officials warned.
"There is not one strategy with one person in charge,'' said a U.S. defense official, who requested anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak publicly. "If we had asked the Taliban to draw an organizational chart for allied forces in Afghanistan, they would have drawn this one."
As a result, U.S. and NATO troop have had to cede areas to the insurgents or turn over newly reclaimed territory to poorly trained, ill-equipped and illiterate police who often flee when attacked, are in cahoots with the militants or abuse the local population.
''You win every battle but lose the war because you can't hold any ground,'' said John McCreary, a former senior intelligence analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The U.S.-led coalition is also desperately short of soldiers who can mentor Afghan National Police units. An estimated 3,500 more advisors are needed to live and work with newly trained police units.
Another looming requirement is for more experienced U.S. combat troops to deal with what U.S. commanders think may be an influx of foreign militants who might have otherwise gone to Iraq.
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/story/619363.html
Holistic approach should include more troops
Clearly an increased international effort that uses all instruments of national power is in order for Afghanistan. And reading political tea leaves, I would suggest the increased effort is in the works. The effort cannot be divorced from increased resouces of all types. Thus, leaders working in Afghanistan need more capability which can be provided in part by more Soldiers, Airmen and Marines from our country and others. Speaking from experience, many operations (if not most) are being run on a shoestring. I too am wary of the idea that the "surge" that worked in Iraq should easily work in Afghanistan. However, a "surge" at this point would merely add forces that are sorely needed for a baseline effort.
Keep things in perspective
Of course we need a coherent strategy. As for the other subject, increasing troop levels (for which I have argued for half a year at my place) and killing Taliban will fix the problems with the Taliban.
I am not so worried about the overall problems with Afghanistan. We cannot construct an electrical grid there when our own bridges are collapsing and our infrastructure needs tending to.
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries on earth, and 90% Muslim, but without any of the religious radicalism. Poverty doesn't create religious radicalism. That's just a myth.
I am all for trying to bring stability to Afghanistan and spending the resources to do so, but there is a limit to what we are able to accomplish there. Besides, we could spend until we ourselves were broke, and without ending the religious extremism, all we will have created will be rich religious extremists.
Although there is validity to the approach
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Originally Posted by
MSG Proctor
The only national identity the Afghans have is as Muslims. Afghans on different sides of the same mountain may have zero relationship and feel no obligation toward Afghanistan as a nation (hence, no motivation to support a national government via its fighting forces). Any strategy with a prospect of success will have to include the Mullahs, Islamic scholars and mosque preachers. [Monograph attached].
"This work argues that engaging Afghanistan’s indigenous religious leadership—mullahs and Islamic scholars—is critical to winning the battle of ideas within local populations of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) theater."
Some of the things I've been reading from the regions history lately tells me that in this particular area that might not actually be the best way to go?
Have to dig some more but on the face of it, isn't the indigenous leadership there almost completely intertwined with the very groups we are seeking to overcome, (and in a much more established and well networked way.
Just pondering
Also: can anyone tell me when and who if ever an empire, state organized grouping under statelike pretenses, etc has actually come from within the area we call Afghanistan other than by being asbsored into a larger movement, being enabled(pressed) by an outside entity, or straight up conquered?
There's mullahs and then there's mullahs
It is true that Islam is inextricably intertwined with the fabric of Afghan society, and it is true that mullahs exert great influence as religious leaders. However, keep the following in mind:
1. To speak of 'the mullahs' as if they were some homogenous group with membership cards and annual conventions is misleading. They are as heterogenous as the society they spring from. Some - the minority - are great scholars respected nationwide or within their provinces; most are dreadfully ignorant with horizons bounded by their valley walls. They do not share common goals and are as subject to ethnic, tribal, and local prejudices as anyone else.
2. Some are less motivated by Islam than they are by the prospect of personal or fiduciary gain. Like certain televangelists, they exploit religious feeling for their own ends.
3. They are less important than they used to be. Urban elites - a small but growing and influential group - disparage them as obstacles to development. More importantly, the current generation of fighters is different from the one that drove out the Soviets. Those guys are dead. This generation - and especially the leaders - were raised far from tribal influence in madrassi in Pakistan or recruited from foreign fields. They are far less likely to respect or heed some threadbare mullah in an isolated mud-brick compound and far more likely to derive their sense of self from more pan-Islamic sources.
None of this is to deny the importance or influence of 'the mullahs', but it is a reminder that all politics in Afghanistan is local, and that 'the mullahs' are a product of that society. Moreover, I have difficulty envisioning an IO message that both appeals to the mullahs and forwards our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their influence is marginalized. They are not a silver bullet - there are none in Afghanistan.
Galloway_McCaffrey on Afghanistan
On Joe Galloway's commentary today:
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Commentary: A top general says more troops aren't the answer in Afghanistan
By Joseph L. Galloway | McClatchy Newspapers
There's military slang that seemingly applies to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan today. The operative acronym is FUBAR - Fouled Up Beyond All Recognition. That first letter doesn't really stand for "Fouled," and the R sometimes stands for Repair.
One of the sharper military analysts I know has just returned from a tour of that sorrowful nation, which has been at war continuously since the Soviet Army invaded it in late 1979.
Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who retired from the U.S. Army with four stars and a chest full of combat medals including two Distinguished Service Crosses, says we can't shoot our way out of Afghanistan, and the two or three or more American combat brigades proposed by the two putative nominees for president are irrelevant.
Joe Galloway on McCaffery?
Galloway had to have loosely paraphrased GEN McCaffery, a man I respect and admire.
Two combat brigades will make a huge difference in Afghanistan if skillfully employed. A combat brigade can do more than kill Taliban. And combat brigades bring with them leaders; creative, intelligent, and motivated leaders.
Our leaders can figure out how to solve problems that involve more than kinetic options.
Not trying to in any way deny
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MSG Proctor
None of Eden's rebuttals deal with these facts:
1. Islam is the only hope for a unifying principle/theme in COIN ops there;
2. The enemy is co-opting the religious leaders not due to superiority but due to our exposing them to the coercive power of the insurgency.
No one is offering a silver bullet - but I am submitting that we aim the pistol at the enemy instead of at our own heads.
that this is a very important aspect to focus on, that said
consider the rule of the Taliban over the years and how much "control" they actually had over many of these very areas we are talking about. For the most part aside from occasional visits to remind the locals who was in charge, or simply to take advantage of ones position in order to get what they would want. Even during that time how much was local security handled by anything other than locals.
In otherwords that part was pre-existing and would be a focus for change simply in how its done and what the tie-ins to the central govt are. As mentioned before the religious leaders/tribal leaders are almost interchangeable if not the same in many cases and along those lines this differs greatly from Iraq where although the power structures existed they seemed fairly often to be in seperate hierarchies
In order to bring change in those outlying areas they will have to develop a desire to tie in to the larger cities/ govt and that wont happen until the (Whats in it for me) aspects of their leaders are peaked in possibilities for differences. Long story short although those leaders of the faith will have a large part to play the factors which would draw them into the larger govt seem to be outside their faith base and more in the lines of normal human characterisitics.
I don't think that's what anyone said.
You have a bad tendency to try to apparently misquote or misunderstand others...
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
So in other words most here agree that the war is lost because its objective of a stable, power monopoly central state that keeps AQ out won't happen?
No one said that; what was said was that it would not accord to the western 'democratic' vision.
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A victory (using unaspiring definitions of victory that I usually don't share)
I believe that...
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...would then only be possible
First place, there's no such thing as 'victory' in a COIN operation, all one can do is achieve an acceptable outcome, I see no difficulty in obtaining that in Afghanistan
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...if the very goals of the war were changed by our governments (especially deleting the "secular" and allow sharia - you know that won't happen).
Since our governments are adapting on a daily basis to realities on the ground, I think that's quite incorrect. Since Sharia is already in effect in Afghanistan, I'm curious as to on what you base that statement.
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It's not like all warlords had disappeared, after all. Afaik they're just saving their forces for the final fights after the Westerners left, just like most militias in Iraq do afaik.
Probably true; they have long memories over there. However, the answer to your question is generational change and hopefully improvement in attitude. We're there to antagonize and thus accelerate that change from five or more to about two generations-- your kids will see the result. Be patient.. :D.
Agree on much of that but...
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Originally Posted by
Eden
...Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.
This last item is possibly true however, I'll point out that NATO to an extent and us to a great degree have supported extended campaigns (Kosovo; NATO and us, for one example) or expensive long duration stays in unkind locations (from Korea to Kuwait for us). Not theocracies per se but unpleasant regimes and not terribly stable on occasion. In any event, what will transpire is IMO impossible to predict at this point. We'll see.
Hmm. Those start with a 'K' -- Afghanistan doesn't, maybe it'll be a change. Which way... :wry:
Is McCaffrey's report ...
open-source, online ? I'd like to read what he says - not what he is said to have said. So, if there is a url to the report, please. :)
Otherwise, I'm staying out of this one, where I've found out that:
1. My French-Canadian ancestors and relatives started the American Revolution. Not so; but they could have prevented it if Coulon had executed Washington at Fort Necessity.
2. The Revolution was started by the Scotch-Irish. That I can believe, since my wife is 1/8th Scotch-Irish (Blair).
Seriously, an interesting discussion, which is most timely in light of current, breaking events.