New Vision for Joint Concepts
See here
This strongly implies to me that the good General has run out of patience with the "new war" club, and wants to get back to basics. If I am reading this right, then that is to be applauded.
I could quibble with portions of what he says, but the intent seems clear and useful. The problem I see is actually ensuring that this policy lasts. I don't think it's going to stop the silly ideas being held to rigor - and that is the problem.
A great many silly concepts are accepted on the basis of no evidence, or evidence that has no historical grounding. -EBO being an excellent example. The other common trick is the fabrication of history or the use of very poor history such as that which was used to promote Maneuverer Warfare.
I really like the intent, but I suspect it will be long uphill struggle.
Hope his ideas are adopted...
He is rightly critical of the current DoD concept-development process which allows projects that have uncertain or problematic results, coupled with a modest sense of practicality, to thrive. I like that he posits that when writing new concepts there should be greater use of simple, concise language, rather then the current trend to use “trendy buzz-phrases” to describe, in some cases preexisting, concepts. Concepts with merit should be thoroughly vetted and validated by the joint community before being included in doctrine. Those concepts judged to be unfeasible or duplicative should be ceased to be worked on any further. Only in very rare cases should DoD continue to prolong work on concepts with an uncertain chance of successful achievement.
One the best parts: “Under the current system, concepts have proliferated to the point that their sheer number confounds meaningful analysis. Many of the concepts are poorly scoped in terms of subject area. New concepts often are initiated by bureaucratic fiat vice conceptual need – to fill a predetermined hierarchy, lend weight to a new office or justify a new assessment.”
Amen!
I think he advocates change
Posted by Wilf,
Quote:
This strongly implies to me that the good General has run out of patience with the "new war" club, and wants to get back to basics. If I am reading this right, then that is to be applauded.
Not so sure that was the intent, but then again I don't think the memo was clarifying as many of you did. I think the memo simply makes a strong argument for vetting ideas before they become mature concepts and doctrine, which I think most serious military professionals would strongly agree with.
He wrote:
Quote:
We cannot afford to reorganize, initiate multi-million-dollar acquisition programs, or reform education and training curricula based on concepts that are not authoritative or even validated.
I would add that it just isn't the money issue, but the heart of the issue is whether the concept works or not. For example, many have legitimate questions about our new COIN doctrine, just as many questioned the usefulness of EBO. We can frequently recover quicker from misspending a few million dollars on a bad idea, than from the bad idea itself.
Having read a few of GEN Mattis' articles and memo's I'm confident as many have written that he is a big fan of protecting the basics, but I don't think he is making an argument for that in this memo. Instead this memo is focused on concept development and testing, not staying firmly rooted in the past. IMO he clearly makes a strong argument for change when he writes that "States have most commonly revolutionized their own militaries, or even war itself, not by setting out to do so but by trying to solve concrete technical, procedural, and strategic problems they faced."
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This compelling challenge can take the form of either a problem or an opportunity.
Our current struggle against transnational terrorism has presented a compelling challenge that some would argue that our doctrine doesn't sufficiently address, thus the rapid development of new ideas and concepts (plus knocking the dust off very sound COIN, FID and LIC doctrine manuals) in hopes of developing worthwhile solutions to significant military problems.
So again I don't see an argument where he is opposed to change, but rather he makes a case that we need a functional process for identifying and implementing the few gems (great ideas/concepts) and ways to disguard ideas that turn out to be unsound such as EBO.
I think the key is first identifying there is a "gap" in our doctrine to begin with. IMO we simply disgarded a lot of our SASO, FID, COIN, doctrine etc., when we started OIF. As such we allowed the problem to morph to a scale where new doctrine may be necessary.
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A problem exists if we recognize through experience that doctrine is not working or if the strategic or operational context has changed or is changing fundamentally.
I guess you can make two arguments about OIF, and hopefully OEF-a soon. One is that our doctrine failed us, and out of necessity we developed a new doctrinal approach, or two we simply applied validated COIN doctrine that has existed for years.
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An opportunity exists if some conceptual, technological or other advancement could allow us to operate more effectively.
One conceptual idea (out of many) that appears to have some functional merit is social network analysis. There are a number of useful technological innovations that we're incorporating in the conflict also. In most cases it is evolutionary versus revolutionary, but it still needs to be captured in doctrine.
