A paper I wrote for a class, seems timely now.
Throughout history, civil wars have been personal affairs that pit brother against brother and countrymen against countrymen. In some instances the struggle may seem to be religious in nature, or may form solely out of a leader’s desire for power. In two examples, the Civil War (as described by Julius Caesar) and the Sunni / Shia conflict of the Iraqis as chronicled by Linda Robinson’s book, “Tell Me How This Ends”, the path to victory is found in reconciliation. Especially in Iraq, leadership sought to smash the belligerents to the conflict with an iron fist, but the lessons learned the hard way pointed the path of victory to reconciliation.
More than two thousand years ago a brutal civil war raged between the factions of the two brightest statesmen of the time, Caesar and Pompey. As the fortunes of these two great men ebbed and flowed, so did the support from various political parties and allies. Caesar apparently recognized the need for political reconciliation as a key victory in his civil war. Caesar ' s clemency was apparent at the city of Corfinium where he besieged the pro-Pompeian Consul Domitius Ahenobarbus. Cut off, starved, dehydrated, and on the verge of defeat, the city was offered up to Caesar by the Pompeian inhabitant’s and he in turn he rewarded them by not only sparing their lives, but offered them employment under his standard. Thus Caesar increased his forces and set a precedent where future foes might be tempted to rely on his leniency and surrender; the alternative being to die in defeat. Caesar again reconciled with the Pompeian forces led by the Consul Afranius; he not only spared their lives, he also allowed the defeated soldiers the option to be discharged from service and further increased his image as he restored their personal property that was lost during the war. Caesar’s clemency ensured the pacification of the defeated foe by offering continued employment and inclusion in the rebuilding of the country. No doubt a hard line stance against the vanquished foe would have created military and logistical problems as large bands of professional soldiers would be left to seek revenge. Better to make friends where possible.
Two thousand years later, the United States created a civil war by doing the opposite. When the shock and awe campaign to liberate Iraq ended, a crucial error was made. Instead of inclusion of the defeated foe, the newly formed Coalition Provisional Authority passed Decrees 1 and 2. Decree 1 denied the top four tiers of the Baath party positions in the new government, essentially denying them the chance to earn an honorable living. The second decree disbanded the security and intelligence services, putting thousands out of work. In their zeal to overthrow the primarily Sunni Baath Party government, the Coalition Provisional Authority unwittingly planted the seed for years of civil war. Only after much blood was spilled did the US military commanders, led primarily by General David Petraeus, start to bring the Iraq War back from the brink of total failure. Petraeus, writer of the revised US Army’s Field Manual on Counterinsurgency Operations, spearheaded a change in operations. He moved to secure the population centers through increasing forces, building walls to limit movement of insurgent groups and sought to reconcile the belligerent parties. Part of the reconciliation process involved employment of Sunni Insurgent groups to protect their neighborhood from Shia death squads who sought revenge for years of repression at the hands of the Sunni Dominated Baath government. One example was the gain made by the 1-5 Cavalry in the Ameriya where Al Qaeda imbedded with Sunni Nationalist insurgents. Through the initiatives fostered by new COIN strategy, Col Kuehl of the 1-5 Cavalry cultivated relations with the neighborhood Sheikhs and Imams, that in turn led to cooperation between the Sunni’s and Americans. Al Qaeda eventually wore out their welcome and the local Sheikhs and Imams decided it was time to take back their neighborhood. In confirmation of the new relationships being formed, Sheikh Walid of the Firdas Mosque contacted Col. Kuehl and advised of Plans that angry residents of the neighborhood had to exact revenge on Al Qaeda (for kidknapping two prominent locals). The Sheikh did not ask for US help, only to advise of his plans. In the end , the US did help when Al Qaeda response became overwhelming. Thus a new era in coopertation started in Ameriya that lead to a sharp reducition in violence.
Though more than two thousand years separates these two Civil Wars, ultimate victory in a civil war has to involve reconciliation between the parties. The Roman and American military might were potent tools in achieving victory (or something other than all out defeat). Caesar’s commentaries indicate that he almost always preferred reconciliation, he realized that combat was costly and leniency was a cost effective means of increasing Roman power and prestige. General Petraeus inherited control of an area that was plunging into all out civil war; he oversaw the reversal of bad governance and instituted keys to victory that would have been recognizable to the Caesar.
