French & US COIN and Galula (merged thread)

RAND has re-issued Galula's 1963 book Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, with a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman.

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When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France, mired in similar wars for independence in its colonial territories, was in a poor position to cope with further upheaval. The Algerian strategy encompassed varying approaches and was more adaptable than that of the French, necessitating a rethinking of traditional counterinsurgency methods. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command in the district of Greater Kabylia, east of Algiers, at the height of the rebellion, and presents his theories on counterinsurgency and pacification. In the process, he confronts the larger political, psychological, and military aspects of the Algerian war, and provides a context for present-day counterinsurgency operations. This groundbreaking work retains its relevancy as a challenge to traditional counterinsurgency tactics and presents approaches to predicting, managing, and resolving insurgent and guerilla conflict. The parallels between the Algerian war and modern warfare are striking, and lessons can be extracted from French successes and failures in its drive to contain and manage the Algerian uprising. A new foreword by counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman elucidates the relevance of this historic study in the context of modern times.

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I'm curious if anyone can trace the roots of Galula's influence on American COIN doctrine.

I'm sure that having Pacification in Algeria in the files at RAND provided some accessibility (and ease of distribution given that you can download the .pdf and email it), but the first copy of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice that I ever saw was an old copy on a friend's bookshelf which had been issued to his father for a class on revolutionary warfare at USMA back in either 1969 or 1970. Based on that, it seems that Galula had some currency back during the time of Vietnam as well for his book to have found its way into the USMA curriculum.

intelleckshulls as soon as it came out in 1964. The JFK SWC Center Bookstore at Ft Bragg couldn't keep it in stock. With no Amazon, B&N, Borders and such, people were driving to D.C and Atlanta to buy it. Seriously. Now, those of us with a first edition are all old... :D

Unfortunately, those who read it in those early days didn't rise to high command in Viet Nam for seven years or more... :(

That being said, it was not and is not the be all and end all on the topic, just one of many decent treatises on the subject.

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Originally Posted by Shek

I'm curious if anyone can trace the roots of Galula's influence on American COIN doctrine.

I'm sure that having Pacification in Algeria in the files at RAND provided some accessibility (and ease of distribution given that you can download the .pdf and email it), but the first copy of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice that I ever saw was an old copy on a friend's bookshelf which had been issued to his father for a class on revolutionary warfare at USMA back in either 1969 or 1970. Based on that, it seems that Galula had some currency back during the time of Vietnam as well for his book to have found its way into the USMA curriculum.

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Back on page 2 of this same "Training and Education" forum, there is a thread titled COIN: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962. This was a RAND-sponsored syposium that brought together the most experienced professional military minds in the field to discuss all aspects of COIN. This was at a time when serious, structured efforts were ongoing to develop modern US COIN doctrine.

Of course, Galula was one of the participants - and if you read the reprint you'll more than likely come away with the impression that he was one of the most influential of the participants. He certainly weighed in heavily in almost every area of discussion.

If you can find a copy of USMA Revolutionary Warfare Volume V-French Counterrevolutionary Struggles: Indochina and Algeria, dated Dec 68, you'll find that Galula is mentioned not a few times as well.

And here's a declassified TS memo from Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge to President Johnson dated 27 Mar 68 that provides an indication of the high-level influence of Galula's writing:

....I believe that urgent consideration be given to a shift away from "search and destroy" and the "war of attrition", in which a purely military victory appears to be, I believe, the unattainable goal, towards a strategy of using military power as a shield behind which South Vietnamese society would be organized as effectively as North Vietnamese society is organized. This last would be done by intensive and repeated scourings--that is a "comb-out" by repeated police-type methods, precinct by precinct, block by block, house by house and farm by farm, much as was done by General Massau in Algiers and which is set forth in David Galula's book "Counter Insurgency Warfare".....

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Originally Posted by Ken White

....That being said, it was not and is not the be all and end all on the topic, just one of many decent treatises on the subject.

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Along those lines, here's a link to a COIN bibliography prepared by the CIA library for William Colby back in '64:

Bibliography: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Since World War II

Aside from the cover sheets, index, etc. the 32 page pdf file has 27 pages of book listings, starting with general texts, then broken down by regions of the world.

I'd forgotten how many of those I'd read... :o

Ken and Jedburgh,

Thanks for the quick replies.

Maybe you will be surprised to learn that the first french edition of Counter-insurgency warfare by Galula was published.... last week!!!
Indeed, Galula is not well-known in France and this publication is the result of "Galulamania" in the US military (the collection in which it is published, doctrine et stratégie is led by gen. Vincent DESPORTES, head of French Army's Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces, and a specialist of US Way of warfare).
Stéphane TAILLAT
PS: i recently posted on SWJ an english version of French Doctrine on stabilization ops.

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Originally Posted by taillat

Maybe you will be surprised to learn that the first french edition of Counter-insurgency warfare by Galula was published.... last week!!!
Indeed, Galula is not well-known in France and this publication is the result of "Galulamania" in the US military (the collection in which it is published, doctrine et stratégie is led by gen. Vincent DESPORTES, head of French Army's Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces, and a specialist of US Way of warfare).
Stéphane TAILLAT
PS: i recently posted on SWJ an english version of French Doctrine on stabilization ops.

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Stephane,

Do you know why his writings weren't as popular in France?

A matter of timing, perhaps (Pacification in Algeria was published in 1963 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice was published in 1964, both of them written with how to prescriptions but about conflicts already past history for France)?

The main reason why Galula never was popular in French Military is because he was unknown... Note that his celebrity started in the US after his resignation from french army!
A second reason is linked with french experience on guerilla, counter-guerilla and many stabilization ops (or even intervention in West and Black Africa between 1960 and today): the lessons learned and (informal) practices we gained in this period was much more than Galula's one during his experience in Greece, China and Algeria. Others have gained more reputation. Bigeard and Massu (though they weren't using the same coin procedures as Galula) are a good example, as well as gen. DELOYEN who fought againt guerilla in Indochina, in Algeria and in Tchad. Trinquier is best known because of its role in the creation of Groupement Commando Aéroportés (anti-vietminh indigenous maquis during the first Indochina War). French experiences in Indochina and in Algeria gave birth to an original way of doing COIN which differs slightly from Galula's Pacification in Algeria. This latter book was written for US public and especially US military concerned by Vietnam. I wonder if Galula would have written it, as well as Counter-insurgency warfare the same way if it was for french readers.
Last: under De Gaulle, COIN formal Doctrine (Guerre révolutionnaire if you want, though it seems that this term refers to much more than precise procedures and principles) was abandonned because it was politically charged. In French military today, COIN does not refer to Algeria, but mainly with African Contingency or past colonial experiences (Gallieni, Lyautey...)

It appears to me that Galula is much more american than french:his principles relies on Mao's one more than on french tradition of "pacification by oil spot". Unlike french, american military establishment in the 60s lacks concrete experience in counter-guerrilla: Galula's fresh one was a good new!

Stéphane Taillat

spot theory in the US Army in the early sixties and there were units in Viet Nam that used it -- until they got caught and were told to 'search and destroy' -- I happened to be lucky enough to be in one and more lucky to have a commander who told MACV to flake off, he'd fight his own war. He did and did it well.

Search and destroy techniques most on the ground knew intuitively were wrong and unworkable. However the four star commanders from late 1961 until late 1968 believed in them, therefor the staffs and subordinate generals espoused it (which is not the same thing as believing in it). Pity...

Seven long years.

Galula's influence has been far greater in the United States than in France for several reasons. One is that by the time he was writing, France was trying to forget its experience in Algeria; I would draw a parallel with the US after Vietnam. However, Galula's experience in Algeria was highly valued by Steve Hosmer at RAND (who is running an "Airpower in COIN" conference in DC next week--still engaged in intellectual leadership in COIN 45 years after the conference at which he recognized Galula's gifts!)

See http://www.rand.org/publications/ran...6/algeria.html for a brief summary of Galula's thinking, with links to the landmark 1963 study Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 (with a great new intro by Bruce Hoffman) that Galula distilled into Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.

Another reason is that Galula did his best writing in English. In fact, Theory and Practice has just been published in French for the first time, with an introduction by General David Petraeus; see http://www.amazon.fr/Contre-insurrec...1344958&sr=8-1

We relied heavily on Galula's insights when writing FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

We should also note that Galula, his writings and his experience, fit very neatly within the counterinsurgency-only narrative that defines the American Army today. The Coin experts who felt they were the minority and not treated fairly in the American Army in the 80s and 90s latched on to Galula because he fit into the supporting Vietnam loss-narrative that had Creighton Abrams as the guy who got it right because he understood the so-called primacy in any Coin op of the “people” and Westmoreland as the conventional minded, big battle fool (Andre Birtle’s excellent new book on the history of Coin in the American Army goes a long way at debunking this myth) because he purportedly only wanted to go out and kill people and blow things up. Writers like L. Sorely in the 90s created the notion that the Vietnam war was winnable if we had just allowed General Abrams to continue his “population centric” approach. But alas those pesky politicians, the will-lacking American people, and the evil MSM pulled the rug out from under him, or so the story goes.

There were many American army officers who were part of the Coin Group and viewed David Galula as their model for counterinsurgency operations. These individuals and their writings were generally shunned by the conventional minded army in the 90s. However the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan brought them into the limelight and with them came Galula; as LTC Nagl points out the writers of FM 3-24 relied heavily on Galula when writing FM 3-24.

I have argued in other places that the American Army’s current operational doctrine is no longer FM 3-0 but instead FM 3-24 counterinsurgency. In fact one could prove this by simply taking Galula’s book, removing the historical and contextual references by bringing them up to date, give this document to a LT or SFC just returned from Iraq or Afghanistan, ask them what they had just read, and you would get an answer like, “Oh I just read a summary of FM 3-24.” Ask these same individuals to summarize the Army’s new overall operational doctrine or FM 3-0 and they could not even come close. Is our Army, as General Casey has warned, “out of balance?” I think it is.

Back to Galula. I find it ironic that we have premised the Surge in Iraq on FM 3-24 and that doctrine is heavily premised on David Galula’s writings. Remember Galula was an infantry company commander in Algeria in the 1950s. Galula tells us that it took about a year for him and his company of infantryman to turn their area of responsibility and the people within it against the insurgency. It took over a year for an infantry company, sided with a relatively small Algerian population and isolated by terrain and lack of technology from larger population centers to “win.” In Iraq today we assume that the Surge—using Galula’s methods—turned the country around in a matter of months over the summer of 2007. Simple mathematical extrapolation from Galula to the Surge makes such an assumption improbable. The Surge and the so-called new Counterinsurgency methods were not the main cause of the lowered levels of violence but the neo-con spin machine would have us believe otherwise (see in this regard Kim Kagan’s newest oped running today in the WSJ.)

The importance of the writings of the firebrand Ralph Peters and Charles Dunlap on American counterinsurgency doctrine is that they both challenge the fundamental assumptions and premises that went into its creation. A process of meaningful challenging and questioning should have happened when the doctrine was written but it was not. So we end up with a doctrine that is useful but narrow because it is based on a single theory of Coin given to us by David Galula and that theory has unfortunately turned into principle and further turned into an immutable rule that can not be challenged. Because of this we have become dogmatic to the point of thinking that we can do Coin just about anywhere in whatever kind of situation presents itself to us. How else does one explain recent criticisms of certain Nato countries conducting Coin in Afghanistan?

Galula needs to be challenged and read with a historical mindedness; that is to say we should not be looking to the past as a pool of lessons learned to be plucked at will, turned into doctrine, then applied dogmatically on the ground. This is not history but a pop-process of the production of lessons learned. It is hurting us more than helping us.

I think Galula has achieved cult-like status in the Army because his insights resonate with our experiences. As I've written elsewhere, I did not read Galula until I returned from my first OIF tour, despite spending 2002-2004 at Fort Leavenworth in CGSC/SAMS (Trinquier--yes; Galula--no). Reading COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE in 2005 constituted a series of ephiphanies, of "Oh--that's why that worked (or didn't)." I had been privileged to be the S3 for perhaps the most gifted natural counterinsurgent I've ever encountered (I have no idea if he had read Galula or not), but had no theory to explain what I had practiced until finding this book.

Again, it's hard to understate how underprepared the Army was for this kind of fight, or at least the non-kinetic portions of it. In contrast, in the mid-intensity conflict at Najaf Cemetery, our battalion knew exactly what to do. It was what we had prepared for all our professional lives (albeit on interesting terrain and with a rather unique fire control problem). Likewise as part of the isolating/screening force for Second Fallujah. But in the "war amongst the people" in Kadhamiya and Arab Jabour, we were all "play by ear," and "trial and error."

Galula filled a gap--at least partially. And it's hard not to credit (at least partially) adoption of his general framework for the improvements of 2007. But there is still much work to do in creating a comprehensive doctrine for 21st century warfare.

Doug

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Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

... he fit into the supporting Vietnam loss-narrative that had Creighton Abrams as the guy who got it right because he understood the so-called primacy in any Coin op of the “people” and Westmoreland as the conventional minded, big battle fool (Andre Birtle’s excellent new book on the history of Coin in the American Army goes a long way at debunking this myth) because he purportedly only wanted to go out and kill people and blow things up...

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Could you please provide the title of Birtle's book; cannot find it or him through Google. I'll be interested in reading it.

Can't speak for anything in Viet Nam after my last trip in '68 but from 62 until the fall of 68 with two short trips and two tours and fairly diverse service in all four corps areas, I'll be interested to see if he properly gives credit to the Division and Brigade commanders like Harry Kinnard and Willard Pearson who did what needed to be done in spite of MACV and to Bruce Palmer, the DepComUSMACV who like Westmoreland, understood the problem.

The difference between Palmer the Calvaryman with Pacific experience and his boss, the Artillerist turned Infantryman with European experience was that Palmer also knew what needed to be done while Westmoreland did not...

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...Writers like L. Sorely in the 90s created the notion that the Vietnam war was winnable if we had just allowed General Abrams to continue his “population centric” approach. But alas those pesky politicians, the will-lacking American people, and the evil MSM pulled the rug out from under him, or so the story goes.

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I have read Sorley's book and while not in country during the period, the narrative is, IMO, totally credible. Yes, that's the way the story goes -- and there's a great deal of validity in it. I suggest the the problem was not will-lacking people or the evil MSM (they aren't evil, just stupid) but the politicians did have an effect -- and there is no question that the US Army bears the brunt of the responsibility for failure in Viet Nam due to inept political guidance (outside the Army's control) and inept tactics from 1962 until 1968 (the Army's purview).

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I have argued in other places that the American Army’s current operational doctrine is no longer FM 3-0 but instead FM 3-24 counterinsurgency. In fact one could prove this by simply taking Galula’s book, removing the historical and contextual references by bringing them up to date, give this document to a LT or SFC just returned from Iraq or Afghanistan, ask them what they had just read, and you would get an answer like, “Oh I just read a summary of FM 3-24.” Ask these same individuals to summarize the Army’s new overall operational doctrine or FM 3-0 and they could not even come close...

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I suggest that since what the troops are now doing has a significant impact on what they think and read, that the fact they spew COIN is to be expected -- and that it is no big thing; they can adapt and will if they have to. As Schmedlap pointed out elsewhere, regardless of bad command decisions, the troops on the ground figured it out and did what needed to be done in spite of poor command guidance. That was true in Viet Nam and is true in Afghanistan and Iraq. It'll be true tomorrow as well...

I'd also suggest that the average LT may be aware of FM 3-24 and that may not be true of FM 3-0. I very strongly doubt the average SFC pays much attention to either. That's okay, too...

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...Is our Army, as General Casey has warned, “out of balance?” I think it is.

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Possibly true, certainly the focus now -- understandably -- is on COIN and training is strongly biased in that direction in units also understandably because that's what they're doing. My spies tell me that ain't necessarily true in the schoolhouse...

And that is a good thing.

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... main cause of the lowered levels of violence but the neo-con spin machine would have us believe otherwise (see in this regard Kim Kagan’s newest oped running today in the WSJ.)

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I don't pay any attention to the domestic politics of the situation because various ideologies come and go and most are meaningless froth. The neo con foolishness of today is not nearly as inimical to the nation as was the the liberal foolishness of the 60s. I do agree that, militarily, the surge had little bearing on the overall effort in Iraq. As to whether that surge adversely impacted the institution that is the US Army; possibly. Too soon to tell. I do know that the Army's been around for over 200 years and has seen worse times than today. It's seen worse times in my lifetime for that matter...

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... How else does one explain recent criticisms of certain Nato countries conducting Coin in Afghanistan?

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Never underestimate the power of a Spook to say A to cause B to happen to provoke C to do D...:D

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Galula needs to be challenged and read with a historical mindedness; that is to say we should not be looking to the past as a pool of lessons learned to be plucked at will, turned into doctrine, then applied dogmatically on the ground. This is not history but a pop-process of the production of lessons learned. It is hurting us more than helping us.

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We can agree on the bulk of that; my only reservation is on the last sentence; I'm not at all sure it has done that at this time. It has the potential to do that and you are wise to counsel avoiding that result. It would also be wise not to return to total disavowal of COIN...

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Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

we have become dogmatic to the point of thinking that we can do Coin just about anywhere in whatever kind of situation presents itself to us.

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This is an excellent point and analogous to the thinking that "we have the most firepower so we can win any war." I could see an ambitious general saying to President McCain "we can control the population of Iran" and disaster ensuing.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Could you please provide the title of Birtle's book; cannot find it or him through Google. I'll be interested in reading it.

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Ken,

http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurge...1373224&sr=8-1

This link is for the second volume - the first volume covers 1860-1941.

Shek

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Originally Posted by Rank amateur

This is an excellent point and analogous to the thinking that "we have the most firepower so we can win any war." I could see an ambitious general saying to President McCain "we can control the population of Iran" and disaster ensuing.

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I think...

You're far more likely to see a General saying "No way we can do that..." Obviously, you've forgotten the Army's reaction to Kosovo (remember the Apaches that could not fly in the mountains).

Not to mention their reaction to Iraq. Both times...

Generals want to protect the institution to defend this nation against attack, they HATE small wars. The myth of the military hawk is leftish foolishness, there are not any Buck Turgidsons out there.

Whilst 'dipping my lid' to John's superior knowledge of the FM 3-24 drafting process, and acknowledging Doug's views regarding the resonance and or usefulness of Galula, I would contend that there is a lot more in FM 3-24 (and our current strategy) than just Galula and that people can easily overstate the case.

'Galula' themes in the FM 3-24 are readily apparent- particularly in its population centric emphasis. However, equally apparent are ideas that could easily be sheeted home to the British doctrine of the 70s and 80s. For example, there are similarities to ideas that could be attributed to Kitson and Thompson (amongst others). It may be claimed that both men were influenced by Galula (his major work came out first) but that claim will be proven spurious when you look at both men's record and read their published works. Other ideas clearly have a lineage with historical precedence in colonial activity (British and American) prior to WWII and into the 19th century. The FM also contains advice in parts that could be viewed, perhaps unkindly, but in my opinion perhaps not, as 'post 9-11, post modernist BS'.

So where does that leave us? Well, Galula has obviously had influence - but he is not alone. He is not pre-eminent in the education we are currently offering coalition troops prior to their entry into the battle space (or the ongoing dialogue we have with them in theatre). He is one of many theorists that are called upon to help understanding as people develop the COIN 'thinking' skills essential to the ongoing 'learning and adaptation' that the fight requires.

It follows that we are not accepting one 'historical' view and basing our education and strategy solely on that. We use history, where appropriate, to inform development of strategy ,options and thought. Despite the assertions of some post 9-11, and then again during the development of the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, not much of what actually occurs on the ground is turning out to be ahistorical. The counterinsurgency 'things' that are working now have worked in various ways before, in other places. And many of the insurgents are doing 'the same old thing'. If you doubt that, read Gwynn's 1934 chapter observing issues with the 'Pathans'....

I have observed that often those who attack a particular approach to the 'counterinsurgency problem' do so for seemingly one (or a combination) of three reasons: they have 'patented' an alternate view (which may or may not be a source of income/influence; they really do not have a view at all but like the attention being a critic garners; or they do not understand and attack from a position of partial or total ignorance. None of these are helpful.

Regarding Gian's concern that FM3-24 is supplanting other doctine in people's reading lists. If that is the case, US military doctrine is in desperate need of a new readership. I have been straw polling groups ( comprising E 7 and O3 upwards) of inbound BCT/ RCT and MiTT/ NPTT. If 40% of them, on average, confess to having read FM 3-24 , then we have a well informed group. The 'right' people appear to be reading it, but it seems to be fallacious to regard its reading as anywhere near universal, even at this relatively late stage of proceedings.

Galula has his place. So does history. Neither are the answer in their own right, but can be part of a sound problem solving approach to the issue of countering insurgency. Overstating Galula's acknowledged influence (on either the FM or current operational thinking) does not do much to clarify or raise understanding of current activities.

Cheers,

Mark

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Originally Posted by Shek

Ken,

http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurge...1373224&sr=8-1

This link is for the second volume - the first volume covers 1860-1941.

Shek

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I have no clue why my Googling didn't turn it up -- other than sheer incompetence, of course... :o

Added:

Heh, Now I see, Gian said Andre and Birtle is Andrew; for want of a 'w' the battle, etc...

I also note it's from CMH. Interesting...

And that it's $49.00. Think I'll wait 'til next time I'm near a Post and hit the Library... :D

Hopefully, he gives any credit to the right folks in veet nam ;)

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Originally Posted by Ken White

You're far more likely to see a General saying "No way we can do that..."

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I hope it stays that way, but Gian is a pretty smart guy, so I'm going to assume that he has good reason to be concerned.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

there are not any Buck Turgidsons out there.

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No, but I bet there are many who'd like to be known in the press as the "Paetreus of [insert name of COIN effort here]"

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"Galula has his place. So does history. Neither are the answer in their own right, but can be part of a sound problem solving approach to the issue of countering insurgency. Overstating Galula's acknowledged influence (on either the FM or current operational thinking) does not do much to clarify or raise understanding of current activities."

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Goodonya...

I defer to my work collegue "Hacksaw" here - for all the worry about our junior officers and NCO's only conceptualizing COIN - you can't have it both ways.

They were adaptable enough to shed MCO and learn COIN.

They are adapable enough to do the reverse, or even better, both, if we figured out how to balance our training base.

Their experience is not nested in FM's it's in practical experience. The reason why FM 3-24 gained wide acceptance is because it bore out the experiences and learnings of those who were "boots on the gound" from 2003 onward. Kilcullen's "28 Articles" was influential to me not so much because it taught me much that I didn't know - it was the first time in my career I had seen all my various education and experience to that point combined in a logical document that made sense.

There is a balance. We can't forget how to go toe to toe, and I don't think anyone's stated otherwise. But we also don't need a force that has to do 2003-2005 all over again, re-learning lessons from previous insurgencies as if they are something new.

Additionally, while the operational force may be COIN centric currently, our Leader development and education is almost the reverse. Consider that five years into two insurgencies we:

a) ....have no COIN proponent in the US Army (Well, the CAC commander is, by default), it hasn't been assigned.

b) have no TRADOC or CAC mandated COIN instruction in our centers and schools. There is absolutely ZERO COIN specific training tasks mandated in our current Professional Military education system. It is not required to be taught at all. Many schools have included it on their own, but it has not been directed for inclusion by the TRADOC commander.

c) have no defined plan to do either.

And I would say the momentum to do so is drying up as well as senior leaders grow more concerned about the loss of MCO capability. The Army has not taken action to make COIN knowledge a critical competency for the Army's future leaders in its eductional and training base. Once the war quits, we continue teaching Fulda. The experience rots, and 20 years later my son walks into a COIN scenario and learns the hard way everything the institution forgot.

Most educational and training base sites DO train COIN, but it's not a mandate from TRADOC. Which tells me when the current conflicts subside, that training will disappear unless action is taken.

Note also the insight from this current CGSC student here - it's true. CGSC removed its only mandatory COIN course a few years ago. :(

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Originally Posted by Cavguy

...But we also don't need a force that has to do 2003-2005 all over again, re-learning lessons from previous insurgencies as if they are something new.(

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Just curious as to your periodization and end point at 2005 when the Army finally got it and stopped relearning as you say lessons from previous insurgencies? Why not 2004? Why not 2006? What is your logic for ending in 2005?

Twenty years from now when histories are written about the Iraq war for tactics and operations they will show that by early to mid 2004 up through and to the end of the Surge threre was no substantial difference. Here is an example, Doug Olivant wrote about his experiences in 1st Cav in 04 to early 05 and at least as he states in a posting on this thread when he got back and read Galula it represented to him what he and his commander were thinking, and doing, when they were on the ground in Iraq in 2004/05.

There were some bumps along the way but early in the war and by early to mid 04 we had pretty much figured out how to do coin across the board in the force. Steve Metz says 2005 but i think it happened much earlier.

have a kid who was there and who is very much convinced -- as is most everyone else I've talked to -- that it varied a great deal from unit to unit (or Commander to Commander, sometimes but not always synonymous with the unit) in the '03 to about '05 period. He was there fall of '03, spring '04.

I think most are using 05 because that appears to be about the time the whole Army got it. I suspect it also has a little to do with the departure of Ricardo
Sanchez in Jun of '04 and about six months for Casey to make an imprint and with the rotation cycles, OIF 3 was the first rotation that had been 'COIN trained' prior to deployment if my memory serves (always a dicey proposition...) and it was the one that took 3d ID back in a different mode than had been their first trip.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

have a kid who was there and who is very much convinced -- as is most everyone else I've talked to -- that it varied a great deal from unit to unit (or Commander to Commander, sometimes but not always synonymous with the unit) in the '03 to about '05 period. He was there fall of '03, spring '04.

I think most are using 05 because that appears to be about the time the whole Army got it. I suspect it also has a little to do with the departure of Ricardo
Sanchez in Jun of '04 and about six months for Casey to make an imprint and with the rotation cycles, OIF 3 was the first rotation that had been 'COIN trained' prior to deployment if my memory serves (always a dicey proposition...) and it was the one that took 3d ID back in a different mode than had been their first trip.

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Ken:

this analysis makes sense to me. Your point about the arrival of Casey and the coin academy is spot-on. I was a part of one of the first classes taught at the coin academy back when it was still being done by SF A Teams. As an aside i was fortunate to have an especially strong teacher there who is now i think at Leavenworth working coin issues, Major Mark Ulrich. I learned a lot at the coin academy, so too did my troop commanders.

However I do not think the differences are still that great even between 05 and 04. I was a BCT XO in Tikrit in 03 and the Brigade I was in "got it" pretty much as soon as we hit the ground. Concur especially early on in 03 that there were some units who were outside of the bubble. But I think the transition to effective coin ops across the board in the American Army happens by mid 04; it was by then that some of the early re-thinking on how to do coin ops from people like Con Crane and Steve Metz were starting to have an effect at least on senior leaders in the Army and the disaster at Abu Grahb had a catalyzing effect on us. 1st Cav's run in Baghdad (and their combat actions in Najaf) in 04 along with their first cut at turning Sadr city were impressive efforts. I had a good talk with a combat company commander yesterday who was in 1st Cav, fought his company in Najaf then pulled them back to Baghdad where they continued coin ops. Listening to him, he certainly got it that far back which is why i think the notion of "not getting it" well into the war is simply misplaced.

But to beat this drum again, higlighting the (mistaken) notion that we didnt "get it" until much later fits the narrative that the Surge and its methods (aside from the increased number of troops) really are different, which they are not.

gian

ring a bell? Perhaps, because we do this over and over again. At the end of the Vietnam war the CGSC curriculum was COIN heavy. By the late 70s all of small wars (not just COIN) had been compressed into a mere 8 hours according to John Waghelstein who was teaching there at the time. It wasn't much better in 1986 when Southcom convinced then BG Fred Franks to devote 2 full days (16 hours) to COIN based on the Southcom experience in Central America, Peru, and Colombia effectively doubling the COIN hours. Gordon Sullivan who succeeded Franks and Deputy Commandant kept up the program. When I was teaching there in the 90s, we had about 40 hours devoted to small wars issues. But TRADOC did not direct and was not very interested in a new Stability Operations and Support Ops (SASO) manual as its author retired LTC John Hunt couldn't interest anybody in getting the thing on the street.

As we see in this thread, not only the senior leadership of the Army is concerned that there is too much COIN but others, here represented articulately by Gian, express the same concerns. if i were a betting man, I would bet that when we finally leave Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army will reassert its focus on big wars relegating FM 3-24 to the shelves of CARL.:rolleyes: I hope not but...

Cheers

JohnT

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by John T. Fishel

As we see in this thread, not only the senior leadership of the Army is concerned that there is too much COIN but others, here represented articulately by Gian, express the same concerns. if i were a betting man, I would bet that when we finally leave Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army will reassert its focus on big wars relegating FM 3-24 to the shelves of CARL.:rolleyes: I hope not but... JohnT

---

John:

I hope not either. And that is not at all what i have been advocating. There is a place for counterinsurgency thinking and training throughout the army and not just in a small and isolated cluster of small wars folks. But there needs to be a balance and an assessment of our strategic interests and how as an army we meet the nation's strategic needs. I do not think that "conventional" wars are things of the past and as others have posted on this blog if we do have to fight one and we do poorly the consequences in blood and treasure can be quite servere.

As for your concern about shelving coin after Iraq and Afghanistan like what happened after Vietnam well as you and I both know, at least in theory, history can not repeat itself. That said i think things are much different now, for one I imagine that the United States Army in some form or fashion will be in Iraq and Afghanistan for a long time and will not see and abrubt halt like we saw in Vietnam. In that sense simply because we are there will keep the imperative to not put coin on the backburner. The problem as i see it now is that we are out of balance and the only burner cooking is the coin one. In this sense we should be worried.

v/r
gian

your posts more than you intended. I certainly agree that we need to have balanced education, training and doctrine. I am not so concerned with a temporary imbalance if, when it rights itself, it does so without throwing out the baby with the bath water (to mix metaphors all over the place). My concern is that the Army has a historical tendency to overcorrect and has done so not once but many times. Still, I hope you are right but as General Sullivan put it, "Hope is Not a Method." :wry:

Cheers

JohnT

I always hesitate to weigh in on these Iraq-centric threads because all my operational experience was in Afghanistan, but I do have one observation on this thread and a question for those of you who served in our big small war.

First, the observation. The post-Vietnam army did forget about COIN, but not as a result of terminal absent-mindedness. The Army I joined, one faced with an actual existential threat from the Soviet Union, was still mired in the jungles of Indochina. The cavalry unit I joined -and this is in the early 80's-trained as if we were headed back to the jungle instead of the north German plain, and our leaders at the time made a conscious decision to wrench our focus back to conventional, high-intensity combat. I think this was a good thing, given the world we lived in at the time; the point is, we turned our face away from counterinsurgency on purpose.

My question relates to COIN at the operational level. I don't know when we got it right tactically in Iraq - that is, at the battalion/brigade level - but I assume our junior leaders and NCOs proved to be quick studies, as they always are. But, when did we, or have we yet, break the code at the operational level? That is, when did we learn to properly orchestrate our efforts across the entire theater in a coherent campaign? My observation in Afghanistan was that our operational concept was bankrupt; our tactical successes did not add up to operational success because they were bereft of any context. It was the Kaiserschlacht in a small war setting. Is the same true in Iraq?

Hi Eden--

I found your observation on the post-Vietnam Army particularly interesting especially the lag time between Dupuy's 1976 FM 100-5 doctrine and what troops in Germany were doing even into the 80s. From my perspective during that period - the schoolhouse and Southcom - we were solely focused on the Fulda Gap. COIN and all other small wars got short shrift. Sorta shows to go ya that where you stand really does depend on where you sit.:D

I won't even take a crack at your question - haven't been there. While I have my ideas about both places, I'll wait and see what the boots on the ground have to say.

Cheers

JohnT

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Eden

My question relates to COIN at the operational level. I don't know when we got it right tactically in Iraq - that is, at the battalion/brigade level - but I assume our junior leaders and NCOs proved to be quick studies, as they always are. But, when did we, or have we yet, break the code at the operational level? That is, when did we learn to properly orchestrate our efforts across the entire theater in a coherent campaign? My observation in Afghanistan was that our operational concept was bankrupt; our tactical successes did not add up to operational success because they were bereft of any context. It was the Kaiserschlacht in a small war setting. Is the same true in Iraq?

---

A good question which may better frame the debate here. I would be willing to agree with LTC Gentile that at the tactical level a majority units were beginning to do COIN ops well by early 2004. Some better than others, but enough. They did have certain higher level restrictions, such as imposed ISF handoff (often too early), and consolidation on FOBs. As stated, jr. leaders learned fast, and drove change at their levels but often their successes weren't exploited into larger gain due to the operational framework not being geared to support.

Operationally, I would probably cite the "tipping" point for operational doctrine as being located somewhere between second Fallujah in Nov 2004 and August 2005 when 3ACR conducted operation Restoring Rights in Tal Afar. 3ACR's model certainly influenced 1/1 AD in Tal Afar and Ramadi, and application of the operational concepts facilitated the Awakening in Anbar. Operational design was key to both campaigns - weaving tactical, lethal and nonlethal actions together to create a breakthrough . I am sure some others can be cited, but It's not far off to suggest that we got operational together at the lower levels (BCT) in 2005. I would say we didn't get higher level operational together until early 2007, which I credit to Gen P implimenting a theater wide framework which syncronized what many BCT's were already doing to create greater effects, and expanding upon the opportunities the Awakening presented..

A first draft, and I'm quite open to challenge, just forming the thoughts as I type.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Cavguy

A good question which may better frame the debate here. I would be willing to agree with LTC Gentile that at the tactical level a majority units were beginning to do COIN ops well by early 2004. Some better than others, but enough. They did have certain higher level restrictions, such as imposed ISF handoff (often too early), and consolidation on FOBs. As stated, jr. leaders learned fast, and drove change at their levels but often their successes weren't exploited into larger gain due to the operational framework not being geared to support.

Operationally, I would probably cite the "tipping" point for operational doctrine as being located somewhere between second Fallujah in Nov 2004 and August 2005 when 3ACR conducted operation Restoring Rights in Tal Afar. 3ACR's model certainly influenced 1/1 AD in Tal Afar and Ramadi, and application of the operational concepts facilitated the Awakening in Anbar. Operational design was key to both campaigns - weaving tactical, lethal and nonlethal actions together to create a breakthrough . I am sure some others can be cited, but It's not far off to suggest that we got operational together at the lower levels (BCT) in 2005. I would say we didn't get higher level operational together until early 2007, which I credit to Gen P implimenting a theater wide framework which syncronized what many BCT's were already doing to create greater effects, and expanding upon the opportunities the Awakening presented..

A first draft, and I'm quite open to challenge, just forming the thoughts as I type.

---

With my window on BCTs coming thropugh here I would say you are pretty close to my own sensing. You do bring up a critical point, that being uniformity of approach. The CTC program has done many great things for the Army; one that perhaps has been less positive is the institutionalization of great variance in BCT operations. While I would agree that some units "got it" when we started pushing "it" here in 2003 into 2004, some units did not. COIN was not even widely spoken of unitil the COIN Academy set up in Iraq. Much of what we did here used targeted effects and stability operations as the framing ideas--we were really doing (or at least teaching) COIN.

GEN P's promotion to 4 Star and posting to theater did much to push the ideas further--and there in provided what you say--a common standard.

Best

Tom

Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion

Entry Excerpt:

Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion:
An Interview with Etienne de Durand
by Octavian Manea

Download The Full Article: Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion

How important were Charles Lacheroy and Roger Trinquier in shaping the French School of COIN compared to David Galula?

There was much debate and opposition within the French Army regarding the proper answers to guerre révolutionnaire, and no single school of thought ever prevailed. If there is such a thing as the French School of Counterinsurgency, its founding father undoubtedly is Charles Lacheroy, and with him the proponents of DGR (doctrine de guerre révolutionnaire or French Counterinsurgency Doctrine) to include Jacques Hogard. During the French Indochina and Algeria wars, they were extremely influential towards French policy and strategy leading conferences and lectures, contributing to doctrinal manuals, and advising on day-to-day operations. Lacheroy, for instance, had high-level contacts within the government and was able to implement his views in 1957, with the creation of 5e bureaux all over Algeria and the generalization of guerre psychologique (psychwar or psychological operations).

Roger Trinquier is at first more of a practitioner. He wrote on COIN at the end of the period and should therefore only in retrospect be included as a central, yet not foundational, figure of French COIN.

Contrastingly, David Galula was an intelligence officer and most of what he wrote was marginal in France. Nobody knew of him.

Download The Full Article: Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion

Etienne de Durand is director of the Security Studies Center at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI) in Paris. He is also professor at the Institut d’études politiques de Paris and at the Ecole de guerre. He is the author of the chapter dedicated to France in “Understanding Counterinsurgency-Doctrine, operations and challenges” (Routledge, 2010) edited by Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney. He is contributor to the Ultima Ratio (http://ultimaratio-blog.org/) a blog focused on debating contemporary security and defense issues.



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Deconstructing Galula

Entry Excerpt:

Deconstructing Galula

Much ado surrounds the myths of T.E. Lawrence and David Galula. So much so that academics fawn, foreign policy is derived, and military manuals preach their stories as holy works. From the practice, beautiful theory was born that enlightened westerners can deploy into the hinterlands, win hearts, minds, and souls, and unilaterally transform societies through the spread of democracy and capitalism.



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Dear SWJ,

Can anyone recommend a biography of David Galula, or a work that has significant biographical material about his experience? The closest I've found is Ann Marlowe's book:

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...cfm?pubID=1016

While helpful, I was looking for more of a biographical root for his ideas, based on his experiences and education. Am I wrong in assuming there remains no professional biography of his efforts?

JSR

to prove your assumption wrong. Searching "David Galula" (Google Advanced Search; French only) yields only 6000+ hits; but then he was not that popular in France.

You might try the French sources; if nothing else, we find Un gourou pour Hervé Morin - La doctrine militaire de David Galula, officier français mort en 1968, est enfin reconnue… Grâce aux Américains.:

http://www.bakchich.info/local/cache...oliv-a59d7.jpg

Ah, but my friend Lagrange will tell me that this obviously superior example of new weapons technology has been banned by the ICRC. :D

Regards

Mike

But has there been a comprehensive bio of him dans l'anglaise?

Quote:

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from Ridler
But has there been a comprehensive bio of him dans l'anglaise?

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Your initial assumption and question:

Quote:

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from Ridler
... Am I wrong in assuming there remains no professional biography of his efforts?

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My answer:

Quote:

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from jmm99
I don't know of anything .... to prove your assumption wrong.

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Don't know of anything means don't know of anything.

Regards

Mike

http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.f...e_insurect.htm
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Galula
http://www.dissertationsgratuites.co...ula/27267.html
http://secretdefense.blogs.liberatio...rm%C3%A9e.html

The book you mention is the only one about Galula up to now.
You’ll find here some links, I believe you’ve already been consulting on article about Galula (all in French).

The first one and the last one are the most interesting I believe as they are from the ministry of defense for the first one and the last one from a high quality blog on military affairs.
In the first one you have the rediscover (or discover) of a French officer work by the French army and the last one reminds that Galula was first kicked out from the French army during WW2.

Greece being, with Algeria, his first source of inspiration, I would look in that direction. If you're lucky, you might find something.

Mike: As long as US do not ban Mac Donald, we have the right to defend ourselves... ;):D

bonjour ou bonsoir - wherever in He££ you happen to be "lodging" today. :)

As to this:

Quote:

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from MAL
Mike: As long as US do not ban Mac Donald, we have the right to defend ourselves...

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... touché - and you are the awardee of this fine weapons system:

http://www.militaryheritage.com/imag...t%201728_1.jpg

http://www.militaryheritage.com/images/1728bayonet1.jpg

which did prevail at the 1760 Battle of Sainte-Foy - Monument aux Braves, where d'Aiguebelle's Grenadiers were the tip of the bayonet at Dumont's Windmill.

-----------------------------------------
After that shameless promo for Québec tourism, we return to the subject at hand.

I also found your fourth link, Quand Galula était rayé des cadres de l'Armée ..., by Googling "David Galula" "biographie" "juif" (an example of a Gallic "mind" working ?). That article deals with the dicey problem faced by the young David Galula - that of being a Jew in Vichy France and Vichy Algeria. He survived - “Clausewitz de la contre-insurrection” (par Petraeus et Nagl) - that black period, Une page noire, jamais écrite, de l'histoire de l'armée.Quand vichy internait ses soldats juifs d'algerie.

An interesting question is to what extent (if any) did Galula's Jewish background influence his practice ? One answer is here, Deux grands stratèges juifs ont théorisé la guerre victorieuse de contre-insurrection.

Another question, for which I've seen no direct evidence, is whether Galula had close US links during WWII - such as the OSS ?

Regards

Mike

Hello Mike,

Well, I am actually in Kenya but working on DRC...:o A little like in the first circle of hell: not too far from the trouble but not in the heart of the fun. :D

This said, I also found the following links:
In French:
http://pedagogie.ac-montpellier.fr/h...galuladoc2.pdf


In English:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...cfm?pubid=1016
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...ula-april-1962


I tend to personnaly believe that Grece was the turning point of Galula reflection. It's after witnessing the victory of the colonel regime in Grece that he developped his personnal COIN approach. An approach he put in action in Algeria and then got promoted.

Quote:

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Another question, for which I've seen no direct evidence, is whether Galula had close US links during WWII - such as the OSS ?

---

In deed, an interresting point. To be digged.

Two RAND documents have been cited here at SWC in a number of posts. They are:

1. Counterinsurgency, A Symposium, April 16–20, 1962:

Quote:

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This report is based on the Symposium on Counterinsurgency held at RAND’s Washington Office during the week of 16 April 1962. The purpose of the symposium was to bring together those with first-hand experience of guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare for informal exchanges of information that might lead to fresh insights and a detailed body of expert knowledge. The subjects discussed include patterns and techniques of counterinsurgency, effective organizational and operational approaches, political action, psychological warfare, intelligence and counterintelligence, and requirements for victory. This new release of the report includes a new foreword by Stephen T. Hosmer that elucidates the relevance of this symposium to contemporary guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.

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(direct to pdf). Rufus Phillips (a participant) refers to this in the SWJ brief cited by M-A. From the participants' bios, Galula was the only Marine (of any country) participating. ;)

2. Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958 (1963) (by Galula):

Quote:

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When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France, mired in similar wars for independence in its colonial territories, was in a poor position to cope with further upheaval. The Algerian strategy encompassed varying approaches and was more adaptable than that of the French, necessitating a rethinking of traditional counterinsurgency methods. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command in the district of Greater Kabylia, east of Algiers, at the height of the rebellion, and presents his theories on counterinsurgency and pacification. In the process, he confronts the larger political, psychological, and military aspects of the Algerian war, and provides a context for present-day counterinsurgency operations. This groundbreaking work retains its relevancy as a challenge to traditional counterinsurgency tactics and presents approaches to predicting, managing, and resolving insurgent and guerilla conflict. The parallels between the Algerian war and modern warfare are striking, and lessons can be extracted from French successes and failures in its drive to contain and manage the Algerian uprising. A new foreword by counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman elucidates the relevance of this historic study in the context of modern times.

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(direct to pdf). Polarbear1605 likes this book (especially the "oven roast ruse"). ;)

Galula's Introduction begins:

Quote:

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I left Hong Kong in February 1956 after a five-year assignment as military attaché. I had been away from troop duty for eleven years, having specialized in Chinese affairs since the end of World War II. I was saturated with intelligence work, I had missed the war in Indochina, I felt I had learned enough about insurgencies, and I wanted to test certain theories I had formed on counterinsurgency warfare. For all these reasons I volunteered for duty in Algeria as soon as I reached France. When my four-month leave was over, I was assigned to the 45th B.I.C. (Colonial Infantry Battalion) to which I reported on August 1, 1956. I was to spend two years in Algeria, first as a company commander until April 1, 1958, then as a deputy battalion commander until August 1, 1958.

---

A fair inference (from what Galula says) is that the "certain theories" had been shaped (in some measure) by "Chinese affairs" and "the war in Indochina".

No reference is made to his service in Greece - perhaps the omission says more than a brief mention. Of the three situations (China, Vietnam and Greece), Greece was more similar to Algeria - both being military wins for the "COIN".

To fill a gap in my ignorance, did Galula file any reports (which are available) re: his service in Greece as a UN military observer ?

Regards

Mike

Thanks, Everyone. I've interviewed Rufus a number of time, and read his book. All great stuff and very helpful.

Cheers,

JSR

Galula's name appears in nearly one hundred threads and this meagre thread is is the result of merging three threads, plus re-titling it. Why?

I spotted this comment by Gian Gentile and thought it valuable to capture:

Quote:

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please do consider the fact that Galula, when he applied his 8 methods in Algeria (contrary to what he says in his book) actually FAILED at most of them. This argument is made in a new book by French researcher Gregor Mathias. The book is based on primary source evidence.

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Or David Ucko, who wrote the foreword to Mathias's book:

Quote:

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All of this – Galula’s mixed record and his tentativeness in proposing his concept – should instill a much-needed measure of humility about what is possible in counterinsurgency operations, and through military intervention writ large. For this very reason, it is incumbent on those militaries with expeditionary ambitions to study the history of their intellectual forefathers, to learn from their experiences, and try not to repeat their mistakes.

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From the comments section in:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts..._live_the_coin

The book is: 'Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory' (Pub. Praeger Security International, October 2011), with one review to date:http://www.amazon.com/Galula-Algeria...56?afsrc=fstfx

Looking elsewhere I found a thread 'The Roots of Galula's Influence on US COIN thinking?' and will merge that in too.

The Galula Doctrine: An Interview with Galula's Biographer A.A. Cohen

Copied for reference

Book Review: Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer who Defined the Art of Counter-Insurgency

Copied for reference

David Galula, Frantz Fanon, and the Imperfect Lessons of the Algerian War

Reading Galula in Afghanistan

Myth-Busting French Counterinsurgency

The Extraordinary Life of David Galula

From SWJ Blog.