Some thoughts on ritualization
Hi Rob, TT, Ken...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
The Marines could -- can, do -- use the tradition aspect to good effect; the Army less so. Our theoretical traditions are abstract and while units pay them lip service, few have anywhere near the depth of meaning that they do in other armies, particularly those who adapted from the British Army.
You're absolutely right, it is much easier in a regimental system where there is a specific focal point (the Regiment) and a specific history. The USMC is, in some ways, a Regiment writ large and, as you note Ken, it is easy to craft rituals for it.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Thus, I'm a little dubious that would work for us sans a major culture change in the US Army. Add to that todays attention spans and the fact that history in US Schools seems to be an almost proscribed subject...
Let's see what Marc comes up with. As he he says there are more esoteric rituals that might have merit. There are also some very practical efforts that could be pursued.
Thanks for the vote of confidence :wry:. Okay, before I start a couple of caveats. First, as you know, I'm a Canadian and have never been in the US military (I know the Canadian military from family tradition) so I just don't know the specifics that would work for the US Army. Second, I can come up with a suggested model for how t build them and how they would work, but I would be relying on others to get the specifics.
Okay, here goes...
I'm going to make an argument from analogy at the level of social structure, so bear with me ;). In many ways, military organizations parallel kinship structures. The regimental system is surprisingly similar to tribal societies: roughly BTN=Sept (or Lineage), REG=Tribe, Army=Clan, Service=Confederation, "military"="nation". Within this system, it is simple to produce "meaningful" rituals since the segmentation (sept, tribe, etc) matches he organizational structure and their are obvious connections between structure, history and structural conflict.
Because you have a continuity of membership that flows with the structure, it is easy to see how rituals develop - they are often segment specific relating to historical events and using a segment specific hagiography (i.e. specific stories about the members of the segment). This is reinforced by segment specific symbology, e.g. things like battle honours on a flag, a unit patch or some other piece of unique clothing. In this type of system, segment specific rituals ("traditions") are often spontaneously generated and, if you really want to build new ones, it's not that hard to do at all - any halfway competent symbolic Anthropologist could do it after spending three months with the group.
Now to the US Army which, alas, does not follow a regimental system but, instead, mirrors kinship and social practices in the US circa the 1920's (i.e. the Fordist model of organization which is, today, totally obsolete). This is a much trickier situation since you just don't have either the historical or the structural continuity inherent in the regimental system. It's made even trickier because the career path within the system is based on an organizational model that is designed to destroy individual connections with most structural segments (except the "branch" which is roughly equivalent to a "professional designation" within Fordist organization). In effect, the system is designed to destroy loyalty to a segment while reinforcing loyalty to the overarching organization.
That type of organizational structure can, and has, worked, but it is currently on the wane in civil society and that is where the military recruits its members from. It also, in part, explains why civil society is so anti-military on the whole (but that is another thread), and why retention bonus' in money just aren't working too well (it's not s symbol that is all that attractive in the newer civil organization - again, another thread). All of this is compounded by the fact that the current conflicts, along with many projected future ones, are not "traditional" state vs. state conflicts. In effect, the US Army is an Industrial Age organization, recruiting from an Information Age civil population fighting Information Age wars.
The structural effects of this disjunction are appalling. None of the rituals or ritual systems that serve an Industrial Age organization will work because they do not match either the civil sociey or the battlespace experience. This disjuncture started showing up in Vietnam, and has really gotten much worse during current operations.
In civil society, we have evolved new structural relationships built around personal networks and virtual, contingent communities, and we are certainly starting to see these flow over into the military (SWC is a great example of this). Again in civil society, some of these communities mimic the segmentation system of the regimental system but, unlike that system, they cut across the formal structures. Just using the SWC as an example, we are starting to see the development of "rituals" - the "beer and burger" fest in DC is an example. Another, more germaine to the general topic, is the increasing use of the SWC as a place to get expert advice. Whether or not most people realize it, this is a return to the Socratic example of "ask the man who knows", and it is totally contrary to the Fordist model.
So, back to ritualization...
At the structural level, we are seeing a lot of "ritual spaces" starting to appear - again, SWC is a good example. In order to create more ritual spaces and appropriate rituals, we need to look at the current structural realities and encourage those spaces that will allow us to reinforce the "traditions" that will be important for the future. So, what are these traditions? I leave it up to the folks in service to complete the list, but there are a couple that we've talked about ad nauseum: adaptability and innovation.
Both of these share a common set of characteristics, i.e. operating outside of the book by getting external (to the Book) ideas and ways of thinking / perceiving (Regiments as Tribes?!?). This type of trait can best be introduced and reinforced (and "ritualized") very early in a military career, i.e. in the military education system. The simplest way to do this is to create assignments in courses that require students to go out to virtual communities and non-military sources for their data. Personally, if I was developing a curriculum stream, I would start this in 2nd year and run it through until graduation. I would certainly require it for any advanced education opportunities.
I would also require a course that teaches history at a structural level - i.e. patterns of action and interaction. Ideally, this course should be team taught by people who have totally different backgrounds. Think about Heilein's idea of History and Moral Philosophy as the exemplar for this.
Rob is absolutely correct that this would have to be institutionalized - the question is where such institutionalization should take place. I would suggest that many of the MOS' be used as the basis for institutionalization, possibly by arranging for "exchanges" between the private sector and the military (probably work best in the policy, analysis, engineering, law enforcement, etc. areas - definitely not the combat ones :D). In this case, we are attempting to "ritualize" personal networks by creating situations where people create non-military networks they can draw on.
With the type of structure we are seeing now, the best way to "create" traditions and rituals is to help create ritual spaces that allow for them to come into existence. If we go back to the kinship analog that started this post, we actually have seen this happen in a number of different cultures with the development of occupation based "secret societies", and this is the type of model that I can see working in the US Army.
Marc
TT, I believe you and Rob see the problem...
Some stream of consciousness thoughts.
From Rob:
Quote:
"Can you really do this without an outside catalyst? What are the different stimuli for change? Seems there is the outside - which for us means civilian something, and an inside which might be a grass roots from the lower ranks."
Good question and there are several ramifications to any answer. "Civilian something" implies the Executive or Congress. Given previous efforts, I am not optimistic about either; there is a ferocious tendency to put quick fixes in place and these are rarely effective. I can cite my favorite whipping boy, DOPMA and there are other examples of well intentioned but ill informed and unproductive tampering. I suggest that given out governmental milieu, a better approach is to present a logical plan and expect them to tweak it (and they will...), hopefully not too badly.
I think Rob's comment implies that many of us would not expect a cutting edge solution from the current senior leadership and thus it will be a bottoms up -- or mid level up -- effort. Probably true. TT mentions the tribes and they are ever with us -- they dominate any talk or concept of reform. Simply put, it is illogical to expect a person who's spent 30 years or so in a tribe not to be colored by that and to expect him or her to oversee the diminishment of that tribe -- much less its dissolution.
Quote:
"How are the two different?"
My suspicion is that the difference is the civilian solution will opt to the domestically politically attractive while the military solution will debase into a tribal squabble. In my view, it would be great if we could elect a broad consensus on a future strategy for the use of force (an extremely difficult proposition, I know) and the course of our Foreign Affairs ove the next decade or two (even more difficult). While that's in the 'hard' box, I do not believe it's in the 'too hard' box.
Then a design of a force to support that strategy could be undertaken. Blank sheet of paper type. That may well be in the too hard box...
However, I'm a firm devotee of "ask for 20, expect ten and get five..." :D
Which leads to:
Quote:
"Which one is more effective? In terms of it being reinforced or accepted?"
My guess would be the military solution would be better accepted and reinforced. If a civilian solution is imposed, it if unloved will not be reinforced by the armed forces; deviously perhaps -- but there it is. Conversely, if the military solution is sensible and achievable, it will be supported by the civilians to include the Nation at large (as or more important than Congressional acceptance) and will be reinforced by the system that designed it.
Quote:
"Can there be a blend?"
Obviously there must be but the key is who initiates.
TT says:
Quote:
"I would add here that most innovation studies do not focus on changing culture (or the ‘organizational society’) which is a key part of any serious rethinking of our militaries but the change management literature also generally agrees that the right leadership is a requirement (the details on how to effect change are differing in this literature, however, and our military organizations are not quite the same as business organizations)"
Totally correct in my observation and yet, a MAJOR cultural change is what's needed. Ergo... :eek:
He also says:
Quote:
"...And yes, even under these favourable conditions large scale change such as seems to be being argued for will take a lot of time (and so can be seen as evolutionary)."
Which is important and correct -- it will take a generation to get such a sweeping change implemented and embedded -- and our penchant for quick fixes will inevitably be at cross purposes to that. The interesting thing will be the tiffs between the "I want this done on my watch" types versus "This will not happen on my watch " types. The greater good of the Nation and the forces in totality should be the driving parameters but we're still dealing with humans.
TT again:
Quote:
"...The second is to effect a change in ‘behaviour’ (which encompasses the junior to field command ranks) which includes revamping training, which teaches the tangibles of ‘what to think’ and what the answers ought to be, and revamping the education system to impart to these more junior officers the intangibles of ‘how to think’ and what the questions ought to be (Marc’s suggestions above re the education system fit very well here)..."
Raise them right and teach them well and they will do well. We have to start with the Basic Courses -- Officer and NCO, you cannot change one without changing the other -- and they will change the system and processes as they grow.
I'm also a firm devotee of "It is better to ask forgiveness than to seek permission" and the old Staff Officers watch words -- "Answer the question that was asked, answer the questions your answer will generate and answer the question that should have been asked." I alway liked the SAS Motto, too -- but I like the SBS Motto better, the original, not the new one... ;)
Of paradigms and parables
Hi Folks,
First, a great big "Thanks You" to everyone - I start teaching my course in applied epistemology (aka theory and methods in interdisciplinary studies) this coming Thursday, and this thread is really helping to hone my mind for it :D.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
selil
What I'll be looking at are the changing techniques of war and balancing that on the ideas of paradigm by Thomas Kuhn. Not I believe a new idea but critical for some other work I'm doing.
The changes we see and the associated objections and obstructions to change we perceive even in the face of mission failure I think hinge on these concepts of paradigm and practices of adoption.... I find though these concepts are linked to another concept of risk. If the cost of conservatism is so high that lack of adaption/adoption of new paradigms incurs financial or societal hardship there may be a way to quantify that and ameliorate any negative feedback.
Sam, there is an interesting problem here that I've run across before, and it has to do with the concept of "cost". All too often in human history, we have seen that people are willing to pay almost any cost as long as they don't have to change their beliefs. I've been reading a fair bit of cognitive neuroscience lately (another project) and I think that the "conservatism" regarding paradigms (loosely construed) is actually rooted in how humans neurophysiologically construct their perceptions (I'd postulated that in my dissertation, but now we are getting some really good MRI evidence of it). Anyway, the point I am trying to make is that he key locus of resistance to change is not rooted in financial or societal risk but, rather, in personal risk - a point that Kuhn alludes to, even though he was writing in the neuropsycological dark ages (i.e. pre-1973).
I don't think that any form of quantification of risks will work, at a general social level, unless it is matched with a concurrent social movement that "re-programs", for want of a better term, cultural perceptions of those risks in personal terms. Basically, you have to convert a static symbol with positive emotional connotations, to a dynamic symbol with both positive and negative connotations. Or, in maketingspeak, "sell them a problem with a built in solution".
Marc
You tryin' to say I'm old or sump'n?
SF as you know was -- is -- disliked by the 'conventional' Army. Several Chiefs of Staff (and even more DCSOPS of the Army and local commanders) had rocky relations with them. Because of that, a lot of Officers who rotated through SF jobs got confined to purgatories of one sort or another. The guys couldn't get promoted (similar to the then and current problem with Foreign Area Officers. Due to the Eagle Claw mission problems, there was a lot of fomentation in Congress to create a separate Special Operations Command. DoD and the Army fought it tooth and nail. Then MG Barbwire Bob Kingston was one of the people who disagreed and he spent a lot of time lobbying Congress during the early '80s to disregard DoD and set up the Command. Wayne Downing was at that time a BG and was in the five sided funny farm, he was also lobbying for a SF Branch. The formation of aviation Branch in 1983 had greased the skids a bit, Downing -- a persuasive guy -- worked on John Wickham, then the CofSA and the branch was created in 1987 IIRC. USSOCOM followed a couple of years later.
Mixed bag, in my view. Folks in the branch are better protected but that cross fertilization with the rest of the Army is sorely missed by both sides. Though I'm sure many disagree, I think it was it very beneficial. I also think USSOCOM should keep the shooters and some CA but that all SF should revert to the Army with the bulk of the CA units. Sigh. Nobody ever listens to me -- until it's too late and they've already stepped on their string. :)
Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the 1st ID supposed to be headed into that advisory role???
One problem with the SF (and SOF, though they're two different critters to my mind) expansion is the number of people who truly can adapt into the jobs. It is not for everyone. One thing I discovered in my SF time was that I do not have the patience required to do that job. I can kick doors with the best of 'em but instructing surly indigenous types who didn't want to be there on a half bowl of rice and a rotting fish every other day was, er, trying. I did okay but not as well as I should have, wrong temperment. I later got to be one of the guinea pigs for the SFSB and that proved I was too demanding and impatient. :(
My wife will not hear of that remark, please -- I can't stand it when she goes into the ROFLOL mode.
Anyway, I'm not at all sure they can be expanded much without a major quality problem -- and that, either use, DA or ID, is no place for quality problems.
I strongly agree with you the GP units can do much more than we ask of them; all that's required is proper training (and we do not yet have that right) for the job they're head for. That, as opposed to schools which should train to levels higher than the next job, is necessary due to unit turnover.. A decently trained Infantry Battalion can do anything a Ranger battalion can do -- and at far less cost; give any Battlion the training time, gear and money a Ranger Battalion has and he'll be close enough in capability for government work.
As an aside why on earth do we not send the same units to the same theater and to the same locations as much as possible. Guy learns the people and the territory, returns a year later and they stick him in another province. That ain't smart. :mad:
I don't think ID is a pure SF mission. The Army as an entity needs to do that and units can be trained to do what's required. It would be beneficial in my opinion to transfer the SF units back to the Army and they could assist in training GP units to do the ID mission as well as enhancing the ID effort itself in the country(ies) of choice. The Army has got to be a total spectrum force, not three block but rather two pastures, a date plantation, two industriail complexes, fifty blocks and the mountains beyond. The whole spectrum...