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RJ, you might enjoy this forum. During WW I many British had the opinion that we threw away the lives of our own men needlessly--we lost about the same number of men during our six months of fighting in that war as during the entire time of our involvement in Vietnam. The British and to a lesser extent the French were advocates of "amalgamation," with U.S. battalions being under their command instead that of the AEF. Pershing wouldn't go along with it.
Pete,
Thank you for the forum direction.
The Brits lost most of the WWI generation of men in the trenches of France.
France and Germany didn't fair that well either.
The US came to the war late, but I do believe we helped end it quickly. My father fought in the AEF and was wounded at Chateau Thierry.
I believe Pershing was under orders not to let the America Troops be parceled out.
If I remember my history the Brits lost close to 50,000 men in Flanders in a single battle.I believe it was spelled Paschendale'
Shortly after we declared war in 1917 the British and French offered to ship our troops to Europe free of charge provided they didn't bring any heavy weapons or equipment, and that we would allow them to serve under their command as individual soldiers or as American battalions. They said they'd train us and equip us with everything larger than the small arms that would be sent with the men. The hook in that proposal was there wouldn't have been an AEF worthy of the name, except as a sort of personnel replacement depot.
The first senior British officer to visit the U.S. after we declared war, Maj. Gen. Tim Bridges, a cavalrymen who had distinguished himself in 1914 at the battle of Mons, at first proposed that Americans enlisting or being conscripted for war service should perform their service in the British Army, thereby avoiding the need for American officers. Secretary of War Newton Baker refused to go along with it, and he told Pershing he shouldn't either.
A couple of U.S. historians (and nearly all the British ones) have faulted President Wilson for not allowing the amalgamation of U.S. forces into the British and French armies during the nearly successful German offensive of March 1918. As it turned out, the AEF's participation in major combat operations began at the end of April 1918, and by Armistice Day our forces held about 26 percent of the front line of the Western Front.
The amalgamation issue may have been a contributing factor to the "we told you so" attitude of British officers when they saw our casualties mount up when we fought for the most part under our own leadership during the period of April to November 1918.
In 1934, the Infantry School (via one COL George C. Marshall) published what amounted to an anthology of small unit tactics from WWI - (some US, some allied, some enemy). The work was updated in 1938 by two of the editors (Harding and Lanham) who worked closely with Marshall on the first edition.
In four parts from CGSC-CSI (many other interesting titles - freebies - also here):
1939 Infantry in Battle 01.pdf
1939 Infantry in Battle 02.pdf
1939 Infantry in Battle 03.pdf
1939 Infantry in Battle 04.pdf
Total over 400 pages (well mapped)
The philosophy is summed from from the gitgo:
Attachment 1198
IMO: That philosophy seems very relevant today to "COIN" situations and their comparisons - especially to the political side of the military-political equation.
Cheers
Mike
I just finished reading The AEF Way of War by Grotelueschen. The main thesis was the AEF advocated one particular doctrine and the fighting units, mostly divisions, mainly fought the way they thought best, especially after their first combats. Even when a division espoused the AEF doctrine, subordinate units within the division did it the way they thought best.
It was also an interesting look at group dynamics and leadership. I think it is worth the time.
I recall when visiting the WW1 battlefields finding US Army memorials to those who had fallen serving in divisions under French & UK command in the early stages, including near Ypres. IIRC there was a period when Pershing had no choice in this matter as the US build-up gained pace and for a long time, if not to the end, relied on 'X' & 'Y' from the others.
It was a working coalition, with the USA learning alongside and later separately.
I've come to believe that the greatest legacy of American involvement in the First World War was the experience learned in what it takes to raise, train and equip an army in a hurry. The AEF in France and sometimes Belgium had quite a few schools training men in their specialties, and many guys will probably recall that Patton served as the commanding officer of the AEF tank school. That the U.S. Army was able to raise an army of nearly 100 divisions after Pearl Harbor was to a great extent the result of experience gained during the Great War.
Some months ago Ken White and I traded messages on how the compressed training courses in U.S. Army schools--six to eight weeks for Basic Training, the bare minimum necessary for Advanced Individual Training--were in essence something that was inspired by our do-it-in-a-hurry experience in 1917-18. Whether that way of training soldiers produces high levels of tactical proficiency, or whether we ought to keep doing what we've always been doing since 1917, is a topic for another thread. However, in 1917-18 and 1941-45 we had no choice but to get things done in a hurry, even though the model may be inadequate for modern times.
Gen. Leslie J. McNair, the commander of Army Ground Forces during WW II, had been the senior field artillery officer in the training section of AEF. I believe the training programs he designed to raise the U.S. Army during WW II were based partly on his Great War experience as a trainer with AEF. He performed a minor miracle training the huge Army that he did from a relatively flat-footed start.
Pershing was an arrogant man whose one acievement was keeping the AEF together.
He believed that the American male was superior to his European counterpart because a sense of adventure running strong in their families genes had drawn them to the North American frontiers !
He believed that inborn marksmanship and fieldcraft combined with an American knowledge of open warfare is what would split the German front wide open.
He, and his higher command poo-pooed effiminate European things like artillery and machine guns...
The AEF could have learned from the mistakes of the French and British without having to make them themselves... but did not.
The 2nd Divisions actions at Belleau Wood, then a few weeks later at the village of Vaux showed how succesful a division could be when they shook of Pershings arrogance and incorporated tactics used by their allies....
http://www.kaiserscross.com/257543/284222.html
Another red herring is the losses suffered by the US troops attached to other armies/divisions....
.... so.... what did they want to bring? :-)Quote:
Originally Posted by Pete
US tanks?
US Artillery?
US machine guns?
US Airplanes?
It seems to me... IMHO... that the allies would have been rather happy NOT to have to provide all of the above.
If I remember correcly, the French handed over 3 000 Field artillery pieces, Tanks, machine guns.... all stuff they could have used themselves.
Did the US have any of the above to bring in the first place?
best
Chris
Not sure about the origins of Pershing's insstence on an "American" army; But our (industrial) infrastructure did an abysmal job of providing heavy equipment.
Most our artillery, and even some of our light machineguns (The Chauchat) were supplied by the French & British. Same for Aircraft, tanks, all the specialist equipment you need for combat. Patton had FT-17's (French Production), one Battalion of the AEF was equipped with British Heavy tanks.
The industrial mobilization for WW II ran on about the same time horizon, very limited quantities towards the end of 1942, suffency in 1943, (two full years in, not counting the long lead by foreign sales in 1939/40), and almost everything we needed in 1944.
Actually, the (two) African American Divisions were given to the French, clothed and equipped by them, and the Infantry Regiments used as fillers (Round out units?) by the French. (That's Eight Infantry regiments, Brigade equivalents today).
Pershing's main strength was his self-confidence and determination to have things done his way. During the last 20 years a few serious historians in America have faulted him for not lending troops to the BEF during the German offensive in March 1918; another suggested that he deserved to have been relieved of command for the confusion in how the Meuse-Argonne offensive was being conducted and that the Armistice of November 11, 1918 was what saved his reputation as a combat commander. Even after training, which was provided during that war by the British and French, the only way an army truly learns to fight is by fighting. The combat record of the AEF is therefore a glass that was half-full or half-empty depending on how you look at it.
As for the production of weapons during wartime, contracts require require lead time. Manufacturers of heavy equipment or weapons can't be expected to ramp up production lines, recruit and train workforces and then be delivering finished products after six months. The U.S. armed forces were much better prepared in terms of having military contacts in place when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941.
The U.S. Army song "Old King Cole" is said to have been copied from the British Army during the First World War. Its lyrics give a fine description of the personnel policies and rank structure in the Army, about which at least one of our members is prone to making wry comments.
The following is from my Dad's copy of the Army Song Book compiled by the Adjutant General's Office and published by the War Department in 1941. It's in the public domain.
Quote:
"The Army's gone to hell," said the generals;
"What's my next command?" said the colonels;
"Where're my boots and spurs?" said the majors;
"We want ten days' leave," said the captains;
"We do all the work," said the shavetails;
"Right by squads, squads right," said the sergeants;
"One two, one two, one," said the corporals;
"Beer, beer, beer," said the privates,
"Merry men are we
There's none so fair as can compare
With the Fighting Infantry."
I highly recommend a CRITICAL reading of Pershing's memoirs from "The Great War".
Please brush off your old college notes about the advantages and disadvantages of first person accounts of events.
In it Pershing explains his version of the how and why he organized, trained, and employed the AEF the way he did. His line and box chart expansion of the Army was pretty innovative. The AEF had its own staff course in theater.
Another really fascinating section is on the re-establishment of large organizations using conventional tactics when the Army was at the time a small wars endeavor scattered across the frontier. So, as Gian likes to remind us, there are problems inherent in having a force that is overwhelmingly conducting non-conventional missions, then having a big balloon go up.
Touché, Mr. J.
I know industry mobilized long before the miitary did to provide weapons to the early combatants, was this just small arms?
"
The capacity of American military firms to produce large quantities of weaponry in a relatively short amount of time was next tested in 1914, when World War I broke out in Europe. Although the U.S. government initially adopted a policy of neutrality in the conflict, President Woodrow Wilson allowed American firms to sell arms and ammunition to the Allied powers. Desperate to supplement their own manufacturing capabilities, Britain, France, and Russia then contracted with American companies to produce large numbers of guns and cartridges. The British, for example, ordered one million Enfield rifles from Remington. As one such order followed another, American military exports jumped from $40 million in 1914 to $1.3 billion in 1916 and $2.3 billion in the final nineteen months of war. This marked the first time that U.S. arms manufacturers played a truly significant role in the international weapons trade.
Read more: http://www.americanforeignrelations....#ixzz0y5GCqiqa
Let's also remember that the American military model at this time called for a massive call-up of state volunteer units (which had happened during the Spanish-American War...with the attendant problems). The Army had always trained (when it trained at all) for large-scale conflicts. The biggest training flaw had always been the small size of the Army, which dictated the two-company posts.Quote:
Originally Posted by Old Eagle
In response to Bob's post...the industrial base had cranked up to a degree to deal with munitions orders and small arms, but things like mass-producing aircraft engines (Liberty engine, anyone?) were well behind that in terms of scale.
The U.S. Model 1917 Enfield rifle was a variation of the design of a weapon Remington and Winchester had been making for the British. As it turned out the British cancelled the contracts when they decided to keep their SMLE .303 rifle for the duration of the war. After we declared war we changed the caliber to .30-06 and made it for ourselves. There were also a lot of American contracts for small arms and artillery ammunition, as well as lots of complaints by the British about the quality of it.
The British Lewis machine gun was the invention of a U.S. Army officer of ordnance who was on the personna non grata list of the then-chief of ordnance, which was the reason the U.S. Army did not adopt one of best MGs of the war.
Remington and New England Westinghouse made Mosin Nagant rifles for the Russians. If I recall correctly their contracts were funded by the British as part of an effort to keep the Imperial Russians in the war. When the Czar was overthrown deliveries ceased, which is why so many of them are to be found in the U.S. Some have Springfield Armory acceptance marks because they were used as a secondary U.S. weapon. U.S. forces sent to Murmansk-Archangel and Siberia in 1918-19 were equipped with them. My Dad had an NCO in 1943 who had been in Siberia.
just not (officially) for infantry use though some were obtained by a few units. It was adopted late in the war in the form of the Savage Arms produced M1917, the .30-06 variant adopted and used mostly as an aircraft weapon. However, the Marines used theirs on the on the ground; Crozier insisted they be taken away from the Marines and issued them Chauchats ILO -- causing a near mutiny. In the event, the Navy and Marines used the gun well into WW II.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pete
Lewis got his revenge. The US Army Ordnance 'designed' -- if you can call an MG42 adapted to gas operation and equipped with the world's most dysfunctional barrel / piston a design effort -- M60 piston and bolt are copies in part of Lewis' system.
During the First World War the British formed a Machine Gun Corps and we did too -- both ended during the funding cuts of the 1920s. In an earlier thread when the subject of Traversing and Elevating Mechanisms for MGs came up I mentioned that most soldiers (myself included) during my period of service in the late '70s to early '80s didn't know how to use them. Around 1980 the first sergeant of my battery told our troops to let him do the range cards for perimeter defense during ARTEPs because they didn't know how to -- in fact they wouldn't have known what they meant. At that time the M2 and M60 MGs had turned into point-and-shoot weapons as far as most troops, enlisted and officer, were concerned. I suppose that's an indictment of our unit training at the time.
In this particular message I'll admit in advance I'm at the outer limits of my ordnance knowledge, so I'll concede that I may be wrong. U.S. Army Ordnance had thown its weight behind the Benet-Mercie Machine Rifle, Caliber .30 U. S. Model of 1909 firing the .30-06 cartridge. The Lewis gun was probably a competitor to that weapon, which was why the chief of ordnance probably had an intense dislike for the inventor.
(Benet had commanded Benicia Arsenal near San Francisco, and his son Stephen Vincent Benet wrote the epic poem "John Brown's Body.")
The ordnance officer Julian Hatcher wrote in his book Hatcher's Notes how he had been sent in 1916 to the Texas border of Mexico to sort out the reliability problems with the Benet-Mercie MG. He said the issue was that the guys sent to the newly-formed MG units were the misfits, neer-do-wells and alcoholics all the other units wanted to get rid of. So what else is new? Plus ca change.
There is information on the Benet-Mercie Machine Rifle in this article in American Rifleman.
I feel it's only fair to point out the 2nd Divison was a combined Army/USMC divison and was commanded by USMC MG John Lejune, who had seen a lot of small war expeditionary duty before WWI.Quote:
Originally Posted by Seabee
The book I cited above "The AEF Way of War" argues that the AEF doctrine, championed by Pershing, was wholly inappropriate for conditions found on the western front. The doctrine was one created before our involvement in the war and said a lot about "determined infantry", "open order fighting" and musketry. That is what Pershing wanted to see.Quote:
Originally Posted by Old Eagle
The divisions got away from that starting with initial training by the French and British. Once they actually saw combat they did what worked on the field and ignored Army doctrine and what AEF HQ wanted.
The problem wasn't an inability to transition from irregular to conventional ops. The problem was the Army's inability to figure out what was needed before getting to the field. The units had to learn it when they got there.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
http://www.hsp.org/default.aspx?id=945Quote:
The outbreak of World War I in 1914 proved to be a bonanza for Bethlehem Steel. Orders for military products from Great Britain, France, and Russia soon filled the company’s coffers and the plants workforce swelled to over 35,000. Wartime profits enabled Schwab to undertake an expansion campaign, purchasing major steel plants in Steelton and Lebanon, Pennsylvania, and Sparrows Point, Maryland. By the time the United States entered World War I in 1917, Bethlehem Steel had become the third largest industrial company in America.
Indeed, but there were two phases in the action I mention.... Pershings way... then the enlightened way...Quote:
Originally Posted by Rifleman
http://www.kaiserscross.com/257543/284222.html
best
Chris
Fantastic subject gentlemen; I'm reading all posts with enthousiasm!
Seabee, please expand on your objections to the "Pershing way" and advocacy of the "enlightened way." What are the elements of each? I have read the article you linked to and would be very interested in learning more about what your outlook is and how you formed your position.
And just in the intrest of accuracy, as I recall the 2nd ID was commanded by Army MG Harbord at the time of Belleau Wood; USMC MG Lejune assumed command later when Harbord was transfered to an AEF staff billet.
Generally the Pershing way was a suicidal frontal assault without much artillery and the so-called enlightened way was to use terrain, fire and maneuver to pry the enemy from his positions. The celebrated marksmanship skills of Marines and Army guys at the time were probably exaggerations that gratified the gun nuts back in the States, but even if only 10 or 15 percent of riflemen put their long-range marksmanship training into practice the results would have been deadly.
It might be unfair to Pershing to say he wanted suicidal frontal assaults; he did however want objectives to be secured and was impatient when they were not. I've read of battalions that were pinned down and had lost cohesion being told by higher headquarters to keep pounding away anyway. That's when good leaders come up with other ways to accomplish the mission, whether they are part of doctrine or not.
You could replace Pershing with Bradley and not be far off. We did not evolve much at the opertional level between the wars.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pete
Or Bradley with Westmoreland or Westmoreland with Sanchez...Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Please forgive my piecemeal response, but here it is...
One word to our British cousins who are of that opinion; July 1, 1916. They have my highest respect but have no room to criticize anyone about wasting lives in the Great War...Quote:
Originally Posted by Pete
RJ, I'd be very interested in learning more about your father; if you wouldn't mind please write about what you know of his experiences and post for the benefit of all.Quote:
Originally Posted by RJ
Quote:
Originally Posted by Pete
It seems to me that neither General Pershing nor his allied counterparts had a high opinion of each other, at least at the infancy of the AEF. The untested Yanks, snobbish Brits and feeble French… Some of it deserved, much was not.Quote:
Originally Posted by Seabee
I've downloaded it and begun perusing; thanks for the link…Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
Read the article on Vaux; interesting information, thanks.Quote:
Originally Posted by Seabee
I have a set of Pershing's memoirs and read them with a great deal of interest. And while as Old Eagle note they should be read critically, I do highly recommend them for anyone interested in the AEF.Quote:
Originally Posted by Old Eagle
Quote:
Originally Posted by Pete
I believe General Pershing was short sighted with an emphasis on the infantry charge during the attack (it worked at San Juan Heights didn't it?), but I'm not going to be overcritical. Pershing also championed maneuver warfare instead of attrition in the trenches and maintaining the AEF as an army separate from either the French or British; both correct in my view. It also seems that the actual ability of artillery to keep up with the infantry and provide effective support, once the stalemate in the trenches had been broken, was something of an unknown, especially when viewed through the prism of trench warfare and considering communications of the day.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pete
When the 2nd ID, commanded at the time by Army Major General Harbord, was ordered up to the line by the French corps commander in June of 1918 it was little more than the little boy plugging a hole in the dyke. The German offensive had smashed the French lines and the only cohesive units of any size between them and Paris were the largely untested American 3rd and 4th Brigades. They had poorly coordinated artillery support and little to no time for detailed planning; by default they were forced into an infantry centered attack with inferior tactics and formations taught by the French. Casualties were certainly high but the last German offensive of the war was stopped cold and the allies got the respite they sorely needed and were able to take up their own.
It is very true that the role played by the 3rd Brigade (made up of troops from the pre-war regular army organized into the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments and 5th Machinegun Battalion) in halting the Germans has been largely overshadowed by the combat encountered in Belleau Wood 4th Brigade (make up of troops from the pre-war regular Marine Corps and organized into the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments and 6th Machinegun Battalion). The role of the 3rd Engineers in direct support of the marines in Belleau Wood is nearly ignored. A large part of this disparity goes back to the army news censors at the time; while specific unit designations were expressly forbidden to be reported, by no less than General Pershing himself, the used of the word "marine" was allowed to slip and so many correspondents, hungry for details to report, made extensive use, sometimes incorrectly, of the label when sending dispatches to their papers back home.
Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918
by Bruce I. Gudmundsson
People reading the current thread on infantry squad tactics might consider reading this book by one of Small Wars Council's own members, Bruce Gudmundsson. It also gives the lie to the idea that tactical thinking was morimund between the years of 1914 to 1939.
This is rather unfair to the British. The British Army of 1918 was not the British Army of 1916. They learned.Quote:
Originally Posted by USMC-03
The British and the French both advised that the AEF do what they did, lots and lots of artillery and machine gun support, very detailed planning and limited objectives. The AEF eventually ended up fighting about like the British and French did because that is what worked.
I know I am a broken record but please refer to "The AEF Way of War." It covers exactly what this thread is about in detail.
I've noticed some similarites between the procedures used by the British army for its conduct of trench raids during 1916-18 and current U.S. Army guidance for patrolling, especially as it is taught by Rangers. The areas where the procedures overlap concern the things leaders are supposed to do in the preparation phase before the operation -- junior officers and NCOs checking the amount of ammunition carried by soldiers, insuring that things like wire cutters, extra MG ammo, and so forth are being carried by designated personnel, and making sure things that could identify the raiding unit -- ID cards, documents, insignia, etc. -- are left behind for the operation. This is one of those little intuitions I occasionally have when reading military history that I have not followed up on with research that might prove that it's true. However, I suspect that parts of our patrolling doctrine came from things the British taught us in 1917-18.
At least the Americans distributed British manuals on sniping, scouting and patrolling in that 1917-1918 timeframe. I have one somewhere. A lot of "SF" stuff goes back to WWI, both from the allied and central power side.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pete
I also suspect that the US army WWII squad was heavily influenced by the British, as well as by the French. For example two soldier per squad should be trained according to the British manual as scouts and used in the roles of sniper, scout and observer. Close cooperation between a sniper/observer and a scouting team was also trained, and the manual showed at least one example of the close cooperation between the three or four scout pairs of the platoon.
The French were the first to use automatic rifles and grenade rifles on a large scale, using them in a interesting manner.
BTW there is a WWII German wartime training movie which is rather interesting, and certainly contains a lot of similarities with WWI actions.
The other day an unusual thread on the Great War Forum inspired me to be in a satirical mood, so I post my essay here so my wit won't entirely go to waste. Someone asked what would happen were a Gurkha battalion to occupy a trench on the Western Front during the First World War. His point was that the average Gurkha was only about 65 inches tall, 5 ft 5 in, whereas the standard trench was 82 inches deep, so how could the little guys see over the parapet? It led to a thread of around 40 messages, with many gravely earnest people posting wartime anecdotes about the proper design of trenches and diagrams on trench dimensions from Engineer publications during the war. (It could be that I need a new way of spending my time.)
Quote:
Would the Great War have been won sooner if all the short guys, medium ones and tall guys been put in different battalions? If that had been done the Pioneers could have saved themselves a lot of extra work from having to dig deep trenches. Instead, had they known in advance that little short guys would be occupying the trenches they might have saved themselves a lot of unneccesary work by having to dig deeper. Conversely, trenches that were dug too deep for little guys required additional exertions to build up steps so the short ones could see over the parapet. When you visualize the scope of this situation across the BEF's entire front it adds up to an enormous amount of work that might have been saved.
Well, I was thinking, had that happened, with all of that saved effort for the Pioneers, Engineers, and Labor Corps, it might have let them work on other projects that might well have brought the Germans to their knees much much earlier than as it turned out. In fact, this issue of the depth of trenches might go down in history as one of the great might-have-beens of the Great War. I never would have thought of this if it weren't for GWF.
My grandfather's unit, the 17th London, was part of the 47th "London" Division. In 1917-18 it was given the task of acclimating recently-arrived U.S. battalions to forward areas before the units were committed to major combat operations.
The first Doughboys my grandad saw in the war were ones who came forward to his trench wanting to know where they could take a bath. Grandpa told them it wasn't a good thing to do in a forward area, but they persisted, so grandpa told them where a creek was. He also told them to be under cover at a certain time that afternoon, when the punctual Germans habitually shelled the area.
They didn't listen and were out in the open when the Germans shelled. Grandpa said they all were killed. He was blunt and matter-of-fact about guys getting killed, it was something that had happened and that was all there was to it.
When the Armistice in November 1918 was declared he was one of the six original members of his battalion left over from 1915. Grandma showed me his wallet from the war, filled with the calling cards of a dozen of or so his buddies -- on the back of them he had written in pencil "killed" with the date when their deaths had happened.
Has anyone seriously (or anyone serious) argued that? Gudmundsson's book is good. It's been a while since I read it, but I believe it was based heavily on this U.S. Army monograph, which also covered how the Germans changed their defensive doctrine from 1916-1918:Quote:
Originally Posted by Pete
http://books.google.com/books?id=8jI...page&q&f=false
On the British side, the best look at the interwar mechanized experiments is this, pick it up if you're interested in the subject and can find a cheap used copy:
http://books.google.com/books?id=00m...page&q&f=false
One of the relatively unremarked upon major impacts of the Great War is that most American men from rural areas didn't realize there was such a thing as oral sex until the Doughboys went to France in 1917-'18. Once they came home a veritable upheaval in intimate behavior in America took place. Word of the practice even reached remote and insular places like Louisville, Kentucky.
The popular American song from 1919 says it all, "How Ya Gonna Keep Them Down on the Farm"?
I will admit I am not much of a Pershing fan but after reading: To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918 by Edward G. Lengel there is no doubt in my mind that he was WAY out of date. The Brits & French had learned to avoid frontal attacks, the use or machine guns and artillery in support of an attack and how to flank positions bu 1918. Pershing refused anything but front attacks with a Doughboy's guts, rifle and bayonet. Billy Mitchel does not fare too well either, constantly reassuring folks that the Germans air force was not attacking our guys on the front, he claimed the guys were misidentifying the place and they were really American and French!
IMHO, there will 10s of thousands of unnecessary losses due to Pershing and others of his ilk, late in the war when other nations (including the Germans) had learned better. Pershing's elitist attitude towards the lowly Brits & French cost our boys their lives.