What caused the Yom Kippur / October 1973 War?

The war of October 1973 is generally portrayed as a move by Arab states to regain territory lost to Israel in 1967. However, after even a little research, this seems simplistic. There are obviously underlying animosities that extend back to at least WW2 and possibly to biblical times but I can't help but feel that 1973 was about breaking from history rather than continuing it. Was Sadat simply attempting to reinstate his territory and with it national honour or was he attempting to realign his nation with the US in an attempt to secure better economic and development prospects? Did Syria really want to overrun Israel or was it used by Sadat? What role did an engrained sense of honour and justice play in Arab motivations? Did the Soviets or the Americans encourage the war as part of a broader superpower struggle?

I would be interested in any insights anyone would have as I think it is difficult to discern the facts when looking through the lenses of either the contemporary cold war or the current war on terror. Understanding this conflict better may help explain the current situation.

I look forward to your replies.

JD

JD

I used to teach this war at Leavenworth with Dr. George Gawrych. There are levels of understanding as you survey the literature and you have to compare works. The Arabs and the Israelis I taught enjoyed the course ---great debates, noo fist fights--because it exposed them to a variety of works they had not seen.

As for Sadat, he had many goals but the strategic was proving that Egypt was a credible threat and that permanent occupation of Sinai was not possible. Shazli's book is probably the best on this but there is much myth attached and embedded in it.

Syrian goals were similar, targeted toward the Golan, but I believe more radical had they succeeded in breaking through. And they nearly did, as my Isareli students echoed.


Look at Geeorge Gawrych's Leavenworth Paper #21

Here is an intro:

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SYNOPSIS OF LEAVENWORTH PAPER 21
Armies appear to learn more form defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967.
This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain superior success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance.
The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.

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From there broaden out using the bibligrpahy in the LP.

Best

Tom

Thanks Tom,
As always, this is excellent.

JD

Cold War was a secondary cause or an enabler?

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Originally Posted by Culpeper

Cold War was a secondary cause or an enabler?

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Enabler which almost became a direct extension. Sadat threw the Soviet advisors out as he readied for war. They did not believe the Egyptians could cross the canal.

Best

Tom

First post, but I've been a longtime reader of all these threads.

I think there was a rather fundamental difference between the way Syria and Egypt went about achieving their respective war aims.

Egypt crossed the canal, dug in, and waited for the counter-attack. I think it would be very difficult to credibly suggest that Egypt ever planned to threaten Israeli population centers. The Egyptian goal was to demonstrate to the Israelis that continued occupation of the Sinai would not be possible in the long-term; that it was contestable and that the Egyptian government had the political will and military ability to contest it.

The Syrians showed themselves to be much more ambitious from the get-go. The original Syrian war plan called for commando drops to the rear of the Golan, these were scrapped for political reasons, but the political implications are clear -- Syria wanted the ability to threaten Israel proper. While the Syrian political objective may have been to get the Golan back, the Syrian advance was nothing like the Egyptian one -- it looked much more like a conventional invasion rather than the lure into attritional combat that the Egyptian advance was.

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Originally Posted by charter6

First post, but I've been a longtime reader of all these threads.

I think there was a rather fundamental difference between the way Syria and Egypt went about achieving their respective war aims.

Egypt crossed the canal, dug in, and waited for the counter-attack. I think it would be very difficult to credibly suggest that Egypt ever planned to threaten Israeli population centers. The Egyptian goal was to demonstrate to the Israelis that continued occupation of the Sinai would not be possible in the long-term; that it was contestable and that the Egyptian government had the political will and military ability to contest it.

The Syrians showed themselves to be much more ambitious from the get-go. The original Syrian war plan called for commando drops to the rear of the Golan, these were scrapped for political reasons, but the political implications are clear -- Syria wanted the ability to threaten Israel proper. While the Syrian political objective may have been to get the Golan back, the Syrian advance was nothing like the Egyptian one -- it looked much more like a conventional invasion rather than the lure into attritional combat that the Egyptian advance was.

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I would tend to agree on the diifferent aims but I would also say that terrain as much as politics dictated what happened on the two fronts. The Golan's great value to either side has always been it's absolute dominance over coastal Israel. If the Syrians had taken it, I would say that shear momentum would have made stopping impossible, regardless of strategic objectives. All of that aside, the Golan also serves as a funnel, wllowing very little maneuver room. Heights of Courage on the IDF 7th Armored Brigade protrays that pretty well.

In the case of Sinai, Sadat and his generals figured out that if they gave the Egyptian soldier a chance to defend a position with protected flanks and some form of air cover, he would do a pretty good job of it. The terrain allowed for that once the Bar Lev line was penetrated; IDF and IAF assumtions that the Egyptians would fold in front of them proved disastrous. the classic was in the initial counterattacks by Israeli armor, They rushed forward and then turned into what they thought was the Egyptian flank; instead they paraded across the Egyptian front like ducks in a shooting gallery. I used to take visitors out to Sinai for staff rides. There was an IDF Centurion company strung out north to south along where this turning movement failed. The T34 below was part of the Egyptian unit that destroyed them.

Best

Tom

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Originally Posted by Tom Odom

In the case of Sinai, Sadat and his generals figured out that if they gave the Egyptian soldier a chance to defend a position with protected flanks and some form of air cover, he would do a pretty good job of it.

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Leaving aside Egypt's (and Syria's) very successful deception operations and strategic surprise, what also stood out to me was some relatively innovative tactics, ranging from breaching techniques at the Bar Lev Line through to the first ever deployment of ATGMs to substantial operational (and even strategic) effect.

An interesting question is how and why Egypt managed this in 1973, given the many other weaknesses in the Egyptian Army in this era. (Ken Pollock's Arabs At War is good on these issues, although it focuses too much on doctrine, training, decisions, and execution and less on cultural-social-political factors than would be my preference)

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An interesting question is how and why Egypt managed this in 1973, given the many other weaknesses in the Egyptian Army in this era.

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I give three reasons:

A. Leadership: For the first time in its modern history, the Egyptian military from Sadat on down turned on the leadership. They trained. They held folks accountable. And when the fight started, they--those same leaders--were in the fray, rather than beating feet back to Cairo.

B. Motivation. The same leadership used a combination of history, religion, and pride to instill a sense of purpose in the ranks. The Egyptian soldier had on occasion done well against the IDF--first battle of Abu Agheila (George Gawrych wrote a great study on Abu Agheila in 56 and 67, I did the terrain study and took the pics)--when he had a good position, was not getting the crap pounded out of him from the air, and his officers fought with him.

C. Understanding of the enemy. The Egyptians really studied the IDF, doing especially well in identifying the key assumptions on the Israeli side. The first assumption was of course that the Egyptians could not cross Suez and penetrate the Bar Lev before they were destroyed. Second was that the initial IDF reactions would involve flinging armor and air against the Egypotian salient in the belief their enemy would run. Wired guided missiles, RPGs, and tanks--even those old T34s--stopped the armor formations. IDF tanks had almost pure AT munitions so suppressing Saggers and RPGs was made even tougher; we would call for artillery. The IDF called for air--their flying artillery--and the SA6s did a number on them. A friend of mine--Ron Goren who retired as Dep Commander of the IAF--lost two A/C in the first 24 hours. The IDF meanwhile lacked tube artillery to suppress the air defenses the same way they could not suppress the AT defenses (Saggers, RPGs, and armor).

Finally if you take those three factors: A. Leadership; B. Motivation; and C. Understanding the enemy, the IDF failed. Correcting those failures was possbile because the Egyptians did mount a limited offense, which allowed the IDF to get its act together. Golan, however, was different. One measley tank platoon of the 7th Armor Brigade was still in the fight when the Syrians gave up their onslaught. It was a very near thing.

Best

Tom