Open Thread – Which US DoD Dinosaurs Would You Slay?
After 30-plus years in this business; I’ve come to the conclusion many, many times along the way; that the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services, and associated activities have an abundance of antiquated and dysfunctional commands, organizations, offices, programs, and processes. Go figure. With two-plus wars, an ungodly optempo and shrinking resources we really cannot afford the excess baggage anymore.
I’d like to highlight some specifics in a potential Small Wars Journal article and SWJ Blog posting. I’d like this to be a Council effort and therefore asking our members to lay it out in this thread.
The ground rules are:
- Antiquated and/or dysfunctional commands, organizations, offices and processes that hinder progress and are high-impact. Not General Joe Blow “who didn’t get it” or a dysfunctional battalion in Operation ABC. Think big, critical, and long term.
- Identify the problem, cite, and provide recommendations to correct – and be reasonable.
- "Write" - don't ramble or bulletize.
- For those who wish to remain anonymous – e-mail or PM me – as long as I can verify your authority to make such commentary and recommendations you can rest assured your identity “goes to the grave”.
That is all.
I'm giving Dave's request some serious thought.
I came up with several things when I read his fist post in the thread this morning. My problem with all of them is that -- like OPMS and the USAR / ARNG problem (and I very much agree both are major problems) they're things that DoD or the service has had to based on either law or significant Congressional pressure.
I'm not saying that all the inefficiencies can be laid at the feet of Congress; the Services are quite capable of doing some strange things but the really big things that immediately popped to mind are all Congressionally driven. I suspect that will make them difficult to change. I'd guess that, given the right rationale, change to OPMS would be attainable; change to NGB and the USARC are so deeply political I'm not sure they're adjustable.
Difficult, however, is not impossible. Many things need to be changed and Congress can be strange but they also are not totally unreasonable. I think when we proffer a problem, the issue(s) that make(s) it a problem and recommend solution(s), we need to bear in mind that if the item has interest from the Hill, we'll need to give a rationale that they can or will accept and that accords with the legislative cycle.
That is going to be time dependent. For example, many items in OPMS were pushed by Congress in an effort to be very fair to all concerned; to be fair to the point that they accepted degradation of effectiveness and officer competence and capability that resulted; that and the effort to be 'objective' in evaluations as opposed to subjective (as if that were possible...). Point is , a Republican majority just might revisit that 'fairness' angle, a Democratic majority is less likely to do so.
I could cite some things in the Army enlisted promotion system but my spies tell me that is in flux right now. So the status of a system or process -- and very current knowledge of it -- and whether it's embedded or in flux can have an effect on what one recommends...
I mention all that only as a mild caution...
You, as usual, are correct.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
John T. Fishel
we agree more than disagree.
...Changing DOPMA would, I think, be harder to do than tampering with the Reserves, except at the margins. But internal implementation policies and regulations - like OPMS - don't usually engage the interest of the Congress.
True, forgot that aspect. The rest of your comment is distressingly true and there a couple of other winners in OPMS needing a 21st Century thought process applied...