For U.S. Unit in Baghdad, An Alliance of Last Resort
9 June Washington Post - For U.S. Unit in Baghdad, An Alliance of Last Resort by Joshua Parlow.
Quote:
... The week that followed revolutionized Kuehl's approach to fighting the insurgency and serves as a vivid example of a risky, and expanding, new American strategy of looking beyond the Iraqi police and army for help in controlling violent neighborhoods. The American soldiers in Amiriyah have allied themselves with dozens of Sunni militiamen who call themselves the Baghdad Patriots -- a group that American soldiers believe includes insurgents who have attacked them in the past -- in an attempt to drive out al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Americans have granted these gunmen the power of arrest, allowed the Iraqi army to supply them with ammunition, and fought alongside them in chaotic street battles.
To many American soldiers in Amiriyah, this nascent allegiance stands out as an encouraging development after months of grinding struggle. They liken the fighters to the minutemen of the American Revolution, painting them as neighbors taking the initiative to protect their families in the vacuum left by a failing Iraqi security force. In their first week of collaboration, the Baghdad Patriots and the Americans killed roughly 10 suspected al-Qaeda in Iraq members and captured 15, according to Kuehl, who said those numbers rivaled totals for the previous six months combined. He is now working to fashion the group into the beginnings of an Amiriyah police force, since the mainly Shiite police force refuses to work in the area...
On using local self-defense forces
I can't speak to the specifics of the situation described in the article or to Abu Buckwheat's critique; I suspect that the ground truth will come out sooner rather than later. I, too, would be interested in Abu Buckwheat's book.
Nevertheless, two points about local self-defense forces stand out:
1. They have been used successfully in many cases - 2 which stand out are the patrullas in Guatemala and the rondas campesinas in Peru against Sendero Luminoso. One aspect of the patrullas was that they often incorporated insurgents which turned out to be an excellent mechanism for population and resource control as there were only eneough weapons for those patrulleros actually on patrol.
2. Insurgents and their supporters always want self-defense units disbanded and disarmed as part of any negotiated settlement.
So, IMO, it is a promising, if risky, tactic that is worth exploring - with much caution for all the reasons Abu Buckwheat mentions.
