The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation
New from RAND:
Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation
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COIN and other stability operations are central to the current operational environment and are likely to remain so in the future. These operations demand a unique focus on shaping indigenous audiences. Virtually every action, message, and decision of a force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population. Creating a unified message is key in this regard, as the words and deeds of coalition forces must be synchronized to the greatest extent possible. U.S. force actions help set conditions for establishing credibility and fostering positive attitudes among the indigenous population, which, in turn, enable effective and persuasive communication. We have identified commercial marketing practices that can assist the U.S. military in its COIN shaping endeavors. We have also drawn on the insights of U.S. military personnel and past operational experiences....
The Pentagon Gets a Lesson From Madison Avenue
20 July Washington Post - The Pentagon Gets a Lesson From Madison Avenue by Karen DeYoung.
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In the advertising world, brand identity is everything. Volvo means safety. Colgate means clean. IPod means cool. But since the U.S. military invaded Iraq in 2003, its "show of force" brand has proved to have limited appeal to Iraqi consumers, according to a recent study commissioned by the U.S. military.
The key to boosting the image and effectiveness of U.S. military operations around the world involves "shaping" both the product and the marketplace, and then establishing a brand identity that places what you are selling in a positive light, said clinical psychologist Todd C. Helmus, the author of "Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation." The 211-page study, for which the U.S. Joint Forces Command paid the Rand Corp. $400,000, was released this week...
Info Effects in COIN & Stability Ops
Shifting Fire: Information Effects in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations
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The “Information Operations and Winning the Peace” workshop, held at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, was a collaboration between the War College’s
Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) and the
Advanced Network Research Group, University of Cambridge (UK). It brought together, over a three-day period (29 November to 1 December), an audience of some 60 leaders and practitioners representing the military, national security, intelligence and interagency communities, as well as academia. It included representatives from the U.S., UK and Canada. The venue was CSL’s Collins Hall and the workshop structure consisted of introductory expert briefings followed by small group discussions. Three case studies drawn from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict served as the “driver” for small group work. These case studies examined aspects of the second Intifada phase of that conflict (circa 2002) and looked at the realities and challenges of managing “information effects” in a counterinsurgency at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The case studies provided a jumping off point for discussion of the issues and challenges facing U.S. and coalition militaries in adapting to the complexities of the “long war.” The workshop was an unclassified event, and the Israeli-Palestinian case studies allowed participants to engage issues without prejudice or risk to on-going operations.....
Purpose of Using the Second Intifada Case Study
The Israeli-Palestinian context was chosen for two reasons. First, as a proxy case for thinking about Iraq and Afghanistan, the case study approach freed up participant discussion and encouraged out of the box reflections and learning. Second, the Israeli experience has certain significant parallels with current operations in Iraq, although it also has significant differences. (See page 13 of the unabridged study). The importance of the report is really in the take-aways regarding current operations.
Developing Media in Stabilization & Reconstruction Ops
USIP, 15 Oct 07: Developing Media in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
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Summary and Recommendations
• In war-torn societies, the development of independent, pluralistic, and sustainable media is critical to fostering long-term peace and stability. Post-conflict civilian populations are particularly vulnerable to manipulation by mass media as tensions run high and the possibility of violent relapse remains strong. Many civilians harbor deep skepticism and mistrust of the media, being accustomed to platforms that are controlled either by the state or by political groups looking to further their political agendas.
• An effective media strategy can mitigate postwar tensions by elevating moderate voices and dampening extremist ones. It can create peaceful channels through which differences can be resolved without resort to violence. The creation of a robust media culture will also allow citizens to begin holding their government accountable for its actions and ensuring its commitment to democracy.
• Efforts to develop local media institutions should be undertaken separately from attempts to develop strategic communications. In an increasing number of non-permissive environments (i.e., environments where security is not fully established), the distinction between these two endeavors is blurred because of a mistaken assumption among some players that both activities share the same purpose and goal.
• A poorly developed media strategy can be detrimental in a war-ravaged country still rife with violence. A hastily conceived plan may reinforce divisions between warring parties or create a weak media sector that is vulnerable to exploitation by warlords, political patrons, and spoilers. Media development efforts also fail when the public does not trust them to establish a credible source of information.
• Ideally, given the media’s capacity to shape war-torn countries, interveners should apply a coherent strategy in the pursuit of media development. Unfortunately, no such strategy yet exists and thus interveners have little guidance as to what tools and methods work best in the development of media institutions. In fact, media development is still conducted on an ad hoc basis from conflict to conflict.
• This report seeks to fill this strategic gap. More particularly, it recommends that interveners take the following series of steps as they generate a strategy for media development in post-conflict zones.
Complete 20 page paper at the link.
COIN & The Media (catch all)
I’m a lurker on this board who’s a student of the media. In addition to viewing all the usual COIN topics, I spend much of my time reading comments about the media’s actions. The tone seems to me to be generally critical of the media’s performance.
While I can think of good arguments both for and against this assessment, I’m intrigued at how the media, especially our own Western media, seems to be treated differently than other players in the COIN fight. Many who are adept at co-opting former enemy fighters into their COIN strategy are quick to malign, insult or disparage media organizations who, like it or not, will be the ones telling the story to the local populace or those back home.
The media is clearly a part of COIN strategy at higher levels, but for some reason this view does not seem to have trickled down to lower levels to the extent that other COIN strategies have. I’ve heard many soldiers in Iraq tell reporters that they don’t like the media in general or the reporter’s paper in particular. I’ve never heard soldiers tell Iraqis that they just don’t like that person’s neighborhood, party or sect – even if they might feel that way privately. I think you can see this on these very boards: Many complaints about the media, very few complaints about the local populace or their organizations. This seems counterproductive.
My gut feeling is that many view the media as somehow outside the COIN fight instead of an integral part of it. Ironically, it seems many find it easier to conceptualize Arab and Afghan media as part of COIN than Western media. My guess is that this is because we already view the Arab and Afghan populations as the target of our efforts, while we view Western media as unfaithful allies. I’d argue that COIN efforts must target both local media to undermine the insurgency and domestic media to build support for the counter-insurgency.
I’m not saying much of the reaction against the media isn’t justified. I just don’t think leaders and soldiers are as pragmatic in their attitude toward the media as they are with other aspects of COIN.
This is not to say that media shouldn’t be held accountable when they screw up. Yet the top-to-bottom focus should be on relationship-building efforts the same as with any other part of COIN. Even commanders who lose a soldier to an IED don’t stop community development altogether, although they may berate the local council. If they can work with complicit locals in that environment, it should be easy to set aside suspicions and work with media organizations.
So I’m curious, whether you think I’m completely off base. Is the media, particularly Western media, an accepted part of the COIN at all levels or is it seen as an opponent in an us-versus-them conflict?
What Scmedlap said basically tracks what I hear from those serving today.
Tales of misquotes and out of context statements drive the troops to avoid the media. There are exceptions and a few have told me of specific reporters -- also few -- that were always welcome. In fairness to the reporters on the ground, they have frequently complained to people I know that their stateside editors changed the story. My sensing is that AP is held in particularly low regard in this regard...
There were problems early on with local stringers who would appear before fire fights. Thus the troops inferred, rightly or wrongly, that they had connections with the bad guys. Stuff like that gets passed along and grows as it travels. Most outlets then tried to do a better job with the stringers but the problem persisted in Iraq until recently. Afghanistan seems to attract wandering western journalists who appear to want to show NATO / US atrocities or cluelessness more than they wish to get accurate stories. Not there, haven't been -- but have heard that perception voiced by some who have been there.Each theater is a little different.
Tom Odom is correct, the Armed forces and the Media have to live with each other. The Officers and senior NCOs will do that -- however, the lower ranked guys are not as constrained by a sense of duty so they let their feelings show. With them, a lot of trust has been abused in their view and they are not a forgiving bunch of people. It's easy for many media types to dismiss them as the great unwashed and Joe Sixpack in ACUs -- but the troops sense that and they resent it strongly. Some will get along with the media, most will not. I doubt they will try to mend the rift -- and there is one. It doesn't serve either side well but in the view of most I know, the media screwed the deal and Joe isn't disposed to try to unscrew it.
A recurring complaint, minor and even petty to some but serious to those making it, is that the media is pretty ignorant about things military. Improper terminology, wrong names and a host of minor misunderstood things appear in print and foster the perception that many in the media don't know much and do not care that they don't know much. That to some is an indicator of low regard and no one likes to believe they are held in low regard. Some media folks have written books about the current wars; I have not heard one universally praised by anyone in uniform, on the contrary, most have been panned for "making stuff up that the writer couldn't have known."
FWIW, this is not a new phenomenon, same thing happened in Korea to a lesser extent and in Viet Nam to about the same extent.with the same set of complaints at about the same volume.
Interestingly, there may be a Texas factor at work here. In SEA in the early days, the Press was enamored of Kennedy and thus, anything we in the area did was fine and was well and pretty accurately reported. After Johnson became President, it all went down hill rapidly. Johnson was not popular with the media and it showed in coverage in Viet Nam post 1965. Some will say it was due to other factors but having been there at the time, that was not my sensing; it was going to be wrong, no matter what.
All true. We need to spend more time educating our
Troops than we now do. It would also help if DoD could develop a concise Pamphlet to assist in the education of the media types so they can use the terminology a little more accurately and understand to whom they were talking. No easy fixes on this one, regrettably...
I had a couple that would...
That was a few years ago. Today's Dogs are also kinder and gentler and just harass the Cats to distraction, they make no attempt to kill 'em.
I think that bullet on the slide alludes to the desire to become a really big name no matter what the cost to competitors or even one's own institution or organization (or, apparently from today's world, ones own ethics). Much as the 'dog eat dog' implies that seniority is not only not respected, it is to one's credit to trump a nominal senior or elder of the pack. It's the Columbia University School of Journalism's apparent answer to everything -- "me, me, me..."
Discussion now carried over to Foreign Policy...
... in our SWJ column This Week at War by Robert Haddick (Westhawk).
The military and the media - two scorpions in a bottle?
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An anonymous journalist who covers the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan ventured onto the Small Wars Journal discussion board to ask the question, "How well have we incorporated the media into COIN [counter-insurgency] efforts?" The anonymous journalist went on:
I'm intrigued at how the media, especially our own Western media, seems to be treated differently than other players in the COIN fight. Many who are adept at co-opting former enemy fighters into their COIN strategy are quick to malign, insult or disparage media organizations who, like it or not, will be the ones telling the story to the local populace or those back home.
The media is clearly a part of COIN strategy at higher levels, but for some reason this view does not seem to have trickled down to lower levels to the extent that other COIN strategies have. I've heard many soldiers in Iraq tell reporters that they don't like the media in general or the reporter's paper in particular. I've never heard soldiers tell Iraqis that they just don't like that person's neighborhood, party or sect - even if they might feel that way privately. I think you can see this on these very boards: Many complaints about the media, very few complaints about the local populace or their organizations. This seems counterproductive.
This reporter's reasonable question was met with some impassioned responses from the Small Wars Council's combat veterans. The soldiers expressed their frustration with what they saw as the media's preconceived conclusions and propensity for distortion. One soldier noted the differences he personally witnessed in the media's behavior covering Bosnia (supportive of the policy) compared to Afghanistan and Iraq (not supportive).
The tempestuous relationship between the military and the media is both ancient and enduring. But it is also an issue that the U.S. military, and especially the Army, is now addressing in a thorough manner. Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, the commander of the Army's Combined Arms Center (a sprawling system of schools and training programs), has had his staff study the issue and prepare "how-to" manuals on media relations, written for soldiers in the field (see here and here). Chapter titles include such topics as, "Arab Media Interviews and the American Commander," "Breaking Through the National Media Filter," and "The Al-Qaeda Media Machine."
It remains to be seen how long it will take General Caldwell's efforts to reach down to the captains and sergeants now on patrol in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
The only achievable accomodation between the media and the military
is in competence. The media is not ever going to be really competent due to commercial pressure. That's life...
The media (and the politicians) will look for stories, bad news sells (and garners votes. Maybe...). The Armed Forces can be more competent than they now are by a fair degree without a great deal of effort and at small cost. Such competence will attract far less adverse media (and political) attention and that will likely offset the slight cost increase.
much as I always try to agree with Ken..
...I don't think the media is quite as incompetent as he does.
Certainly, there are a great number of poor media outlets, lazy reporters, and a lot of playing to the entertainment demands of the market rather than informing and analyzing. Those sorts of weaknesses apply in any industry or organization.
That having been said, as someone who works with both open source/media information (in my usual academic capacity) and top-end classified stuff (when sometimes wearing an intel analysis hat), I have to say that not only is the former sometimes/often more nuanced and informative than the latter, but that above and beyond this 1) the latter would often make little no sense without the broader contextualization offered by the former, and 2) the fact that so damn much of value now appears open source allows collection to be focused on confirming OS information, or examining the known (and potential) unknown unknowns.
Of course, it depends on what particular issues you're working on. I do political assessment. If, on the other hand, I wanted detailed analysis of military deployments or combat operations, I wouldn't look to the media for particularly informed or nuanced material.
Well, when you don't, I tend to relook my position -- or statement...
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Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
...I don't think the media is quite as incompetent as he does.
(He probably doesn't either but he does have fun slinging mud at them...) :D
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That having been said, as someone who works with both open source/media information ... and top-end classified stuff... I have to say that not only is the former sometimes/often more nuanced and informative than the latter...
Agreed
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If, on the other hand, I wanted detailed analysis of military deployments or combat operations, I wouldn't look to the media for particularly informed or nuanced material.
True -- and, the generic reason for my less than nuanced shotgun blasts. That's where their ignorance and thus inadvertant incompetence show.. :wry:
Thus my comments and my belief that we have a problem of almost mutually repellent objects that can have a non problematic relationship only if one object changes; it is IMO to the advantage of the military for them to change as insistence on media change is unlikely to be heeded.
There is no news in jobs well done; dog bites man is not a story...;)
I bow to your superior wisdom.
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Originally Posted by
J Wolfsberger
I have to disagree with you, Ken. The media is very competent. The real question is: competent at what...
1. Advocacy journalism....
2. The media is involved in COIN - for the other side...
3. Using soldiers as pawns to advance their narrative. Haditha. Enough said?
I appreciate that the media should have a role. But I come from a period in time when the ideal of that role was to present all the facts and let people decide. The media of today sees itself as an active participant in affairs, one with special privileges, having no accountability to anyone, and acts accordingly.
Not only do I bow but I will also present corroborative evidence of your brilliance:
LINK.
With an attitude like that, who needs enemies. An award for advocacy journalism, COIN involvement and the tossing of a Pawn or two on the fire... :rolleyes:
That causes me to restate something I said earlier: "...it is IMO to the advantage of the military for them to change as insistence on media change is unlikely to be heeded."
Sad. Really.
I agree that Administrations have tried to run roughshod
over the other two -- and for longer than the last 15-20 years (See Roosevelt, F.D and Truman, H.S.). Few can compare to the abilities of Johnson (because he knew Congress better than any before or since) or Nixon (who didn't care) in the fairly successful running business. Yet, both of them effectively got trumped by the other two...
Clinton got squashed by Congress several times, as did Bush 43. The courts also backed off Bush 43 on several counts. All Presidents try to extend their power, few succeed. The current one will also try (already is) -- he's equally unlikely to succeed.
Most covered my heartaches
and my thoughts with the press today. Honestly I say we throw them all out, stop providing them security, and let's see how far they get. Funny how quickly they forget Daniel Pearl!!!!
Don't dare use the word terrorist.
Don't remind people about 9/11 by replaying the images of the twin towers burning.
Don't report what truly takes place, put your spin on it, to get headlines and be the editors pet for the day.
Journalist are about as lowly as politians in my eye!!!
Yes I am jaded and will be for years to come.
Hey you journalists out there anyone want to come tell the stories of the men I work with who are still doing their jobs with limbs missing? Not sensational enough for you, you'd much rather cover the woe is me, look what happened to me and now I'm against the war people. Guess what those people volunteered, they signed the paperwork, they are just upset they had to actually go earn their paycheck. None are worse than this one Duckworth.
Want me to respect you and be somewhat open to you, you have got to earn it, do what is right. As long as you continue your shady ways, I will continue to go out of my way to avoid you and crush you every chance I get.
Sorry for the rant, but you wanted to know why I feel the way I do, this is just a small taste, the politically correct version.
How to bridge the journalist-military divide
(Just a note - I hope my off-the-cuff comment above about the gov't doesn't end up derailing this conversation.)
I will say that there are some perfectly good journalists out there who are trying hard to do the best job they can. I will also say that many military folks I know paint journalists with a broad brush of adversarialism with very little understanding of a journalist's perspective. Journalists are from an entirely different world, and many times they will make errors of context, perspective, or understanding not out of malice, but out of lack of knowledge. It's ignorance, not animosity. You can educate and train, but without living the military 24-7-365 it's hard to understand for an outsider.
This is why you will see quotes taken out of context - because the reporter lacks the context to properly frame them.
A great example was back in the '90s when ABC did a report on racism at Ft Bragg. Sam Donaldson was hammering on some company commander about why he didn't investigate reported racist incidents in his company. The CO CDR had reported the incidents to the BDE EO office, and was told that they were investigating. Under the Army policy at the time, the CO CDR was forbidden from investigating EO incidents himself, which is why he turned it over to the BDE EO office. Donaldson kept pounding on this CPT about why he didn't 'take responsibility for his unit' (paraphrasing) and investigate anyway. Donaldson lacked the requisite context of the EO office and how it worked to understand why the CO CDR backed off. It was not his job. But he was the guy sitting in front of the camera, so he got the questions.
I will tell you that I've got 14 years in uniform under my belt (4 active, 10 ARNG) and I work with a defense contractor now that I'm out. I also have my first 21 years growing up in the Army with my father, a career redleg. Oh, and my Master's degree is in Journalism, and 2 of my dad's brothers are journalists. I see this from both sides.
There are young guns out there - as there are in every field - who want to make a name for themselves by pushing for something that grabs attention. For every cub reporter out there trying to play 'gotcha' with a soldier, there's a soldier out there trying to be uber-sniper of his rifle platoon, and for every editor out there that thinks he's onto the great cover-up story of our generation, there's a brigade S2 or S3 out there who thinks he's cracked the code on the local insurgent groups and how to get them to stand down.
What is lacking is the context (to each other) of how those guys are motivated, trained, led, and resourced.
How do you fix it? Well... for one thing, I think the journalism field is one that could benefit greatly from an influx of military folks. I don't mean retired O-5 pundits, either. I'm talking about a horde of E-4s who do their 3-4 years and head off to college on the GI Bill, who enroll in J-schools with the intention of becoming a reporter somewhere. It ain't easy, either, because after earning your way up a few ranks in the Army, then going through 4 years of school, you're going to be starting over at the bottom of the journalism food chain, wondering why you're on the same rung with some 21-year-old fresh-faced undergrad who'd never traveled more than 50 miles from home, except for a trip with the Spanish Club back in high school. But you're walking into an interview with a newspaper with an understanding of deadlines, commitment, sacrifice, mission-focus, and world of perspective that those kids won't have (and likely a few more passport stamps, too). You're used to working crappy hours, and a lot of them. You understand hierarchy and that you earn your way forward in the office and that things aren't just handed to you.
There's a lot that one-termers can teach a newsroom, but it won't be a situation where you walk into a new job, and 2 weeks later you're off to cover ISAF as an embed. You'll start out covering city council - and surprise, surprise, there's a lot of context and understanding that reporters lack there, too. You'll have to write stories about planning board meetings, the sheriff's new anti-speeding task force, and school reassignment. But you earn your way forward, and you eventually get that assignment cover a deployment to the Horn of Africa.
What does all this have to do with incorporating media into COIN efforts? You have to understand the people you want to incorporate. You have to work out some sort of 'exchange' program where you do more than just host an embed for 6 weeks on deployment. Host an embed for 6 months at your post. Have him show up for everything - formation runs, IWQ, NBC training, the NTC deployment, the re-enlistment ceremonies, the hail & farewell.
And then send your PAO, a company XO, one of your S3 NCOs, all to the local newspaper to work there for several months. Let them shadow a reporter when he goes to cover the school board and see what he goes through. Let the company XO write a news story - on deadline! - about a local political campaign event, and have the newspaper editor critique it.
It'll take some balls to get some BDE/DIV commander to approve that, but if you want to really understand how the media work, this is something to consider. Once you get an understanding of how the media work, you're much better positioned to incorporate them into any effort, not just COIN.
(boy, that was a LOT longer than I'd intended to write)