Where Are Our Priorities Focused…Lack of Knowledge of Basic Enemy Capabilites

I don't like to double post, however this applies to both the training and intelligence sections of this forum.

....All I have to say is we have a problem in the intelligence community...

About three days ago, I had a student that was completely lost during the FTX of the All-Source Intelligence Analyst Course (35F). I was bringing up points on knowing your enemy, their capabilities, what they are equipped with, how this effects you as an intelligence analyst, and how you need to take your knowledge of the enemy to better brief the Commander.

We started to discuss the aspects of the scenario, who the players were, what they were doing, what the pattern of life was, and eventually…we got on the topic of…What are they using to attack us.

I asked a few questions regarding weapons that were within the scenario that would pose a threat to friendly forces operating in that area. I was asked by the student who is about to graduate…

“You mean we need to know enemy weapons too???”

The student was being honest and sincere in their question, which made it hit me that much harder.

What I have been finding out is that there is the focus of targeting, data mining, COIN, etc., however intelligence analysts and combat arms troops alike can not differentiate between an AK-47, AKM, AKMS, or AK-74. I sat through a brief today, and was told that a PKM fires 5.45x45mm, and that an AK-74 is the same as a PKM, that is the same as an AK-47. The other day, the student was doing a scenario brief and tried to explain how the indicator to Indirect Fire (IDF) on a FOB was directly related to SA-7’s and DSHK Machine Guns found in a cache located near where IDF was reported to have been fired from. When I asked, acting as the commander, what the primary target of an SA-7 was, I came to find out that they did not know that it was a Surface-To-Air MANPAD weapon, and is not a weapon utilized in IDF attacks.

Additionally, I asked the students today what the difference between a 7.62x39mm and 7.62x54r was, and how that effected what may be found in a cache and how it might be related to a threat to troops in that area. Not one out of (24) students knew the difference, or could explain that the scenario that was presented to them included the application of that basic knowledge.

What I am finding is that we used to have playing cards that had Warsaw Pact aircraft and tanks on them that were commonly found in units. Only to now find that the students cannot differentiate between the application of an AK-47, and a Dragunov. After (4) months of courseware, these same students had no idea that a DSHK 12.7mm machine gun could take out a helicopter. Well…the problem arose that they didn’t even know what I was taking about at first until I showed them a picture.

What is going on with our training? What is it that the higher commands are expecting from our intelligence professionals, when all they know how to do is to identify data trends in a database? The current focus on upper echelon commanders has trickled down into our analysts not knowing basic information about how to research enemy capabilities, or knowledge of what they use.

I can understand if they have trouble differentiating between a VOIED, RCIED, etc., but to not know anything about weapons that are out there??? The Taliban utilizes weapons that are not lasers, or plasma guns, but basic weapons that have been around since their initial design in the 1940’s with only improvements in design, but still remain similar to the old.

I am finding that the analyst of today is useless without their computer, and unable to perform basic link analysis, enemy capabilities knowledge, or knowledge of common threats to our troops…which includes the everyday weapons that wound or kill our soldiers that leave the wire.

I definitely understand your point.

However, how much knowledge can you expect a single person to know? With all the disciplines, there is simply too much information for one person to gain an expertise in. Where do you draw the line?

Does a general analyst now need to become a small arms expert? Or do they need only a familiarization and ability to find the information if need be? Do they really need to know the difference between every type of MANPAD and what level of threat they pose to the countermeasures of each individual aircraft in the U.S. inventory?

Finally, I would argue that it is more important they understood the difference in IED triggering systems vs. other types of small arms, seeing that IEDs are the #1 killer of our troops.

Of note. Every point you raise was taught in BASIC training to UK infantry in 1980, including the IED stuff, as part of the extensive Northern Ireland briefs.

...having said that, I went on to be NATO qualified foreign equipment recognition instructor, which included being able to tell not only the difference between an AK-47 and an AKM, but also the 8-11 major type variations, in terms of origin - an utterly useless skill!

...but having said that, someone threw me an AK last week and I said it was an East German one, and it turned out to be bog standard Russian!! :o

..and decried the same lack of ability of analysts to relate to these minute details. I have alo begun to notice (or maybe it was always an issue) that the junior analysts do not know a lick about operations and manuever, meaning they hae a harder time assimilating what they see, and comparing it against what maneuver is doing, and therefore how their knowledge is relevant.

This has reared its ugly head among some intelligence officers as well, who unfortunately start out at the same infantry officer's course as every other grunt officer.

I think this also correlates to the issue the intelligence community has in determining some of the "why's" behind what is going on in the environment and with the actors, as opposed to just regurgitating the symptoms.

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Originally Posted by jcustis

..and decried the same lack of ability of analysts to relate to these minute details. I have alo begun to notice (or maybe it was always an issue) that the junior analysts do not know a lick about operations and manuever, meaning they hae a harder time assimilating what they see, and comparing it against what maneuver is doing, and therefore how their knowledge is relevant.

This has reared its ugly head among some intelligence officers as well, who unfortunately start out at the same infantry officer's course as every other grunt officer.

I think this also correlates to the issue the intelligence community has in determining some of the "why's" behind what is going on in the environment and with the actors, as opposed to just regurgitating the symptoms.

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I would agree but with the caveat that it is not a new phenomenon. Analysts will if allowed find a comfort zone and nest. I fault new technology in many ways for encouraging this. With regards to the INTs, most specialists nest inside their discipline, an isolation encouraged by CPOF and other systems. The world becomes what is on CPOF and whatever the latest report says.

The correction remains the same; you must destroy the nest and force the occupant outside into the real world. CPOF does not smell like a battlefield. Looking at a screen does not give the sense of peering through ballistic glass. And nothing beats picking up a weapon, regardless of make, and giving it a spin on a range when it comes to understanding its qualities and its faults.

The same held true for FAOs regarding understanding their AOs. Those that did the minimum and returned to Big Army, tended to see everything in Big Army terms.

You gotta get out and smell it, live it, and dream it. Then you can analyze it.

Tom

I've seen this same problem, but in other parts of the IC where civilian analysts predominate. While they tend to have very valuable cultural and political skill sets that too many MI folks seem to lack (understanding how authoritarian systems work, the major variations in "tribalism" across societies, the sociology of insurgent recruitment, practical experience in the field with NGOs or as journalists, etc.) they have zero military experience, and couldn't really tell you how a MANPAD or ATGM is utilized on the ground, various IED triggers and countermeasures, etc.

If anything, it is potentially more of a problem outside the US, where there is a smaller pool of folks with military experience who subsequently enter the civilian analytical end of the IC.

(The flip side of this, as implied above, is the corresponding blinkers and hierarchical behaviours that the military tends to generate... I just got an excellent, frustrated email on that very issue from an ex-student currently deployed in Afghanistan, and I'll see if I can get permission to post from it.)

All-in-all it points to the need for interdisciplinary IC training and recruitment from a broad array of life experienced.

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Originally Posted by Rex Brynen

All-in-all it points to the need for interdisciplinary IC training and recruitment from a broad array of life experienced.

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For sure...

I disagree with Agrippa on two counts. First, I should be able to expect a person in a job to have adequate knowledge to do that job. Been my experience that most Troopies can do about four times as much as we allow them to do. Our training is better than it's ever been; it is still only mediocre -- that gets proven daily. Too many people won't let the sharp guys do all they're capable of doing because that becomes a threat to their power or position. The Army is full of people that can and will do more than many think.

As Wilf points out, we used to teach Joe these basics (Yes, Virginia, they are basic military knowledge items and the US used to do that as well -- and it worked). Then we got lost in tasks, conditions and standards that a bunch of civilian educators decided were actually tasks when the vast majority were really simply enabling sub-tasks. Even sub-sub tasks. Thus we got sort of proficient at doing a whole slew of sub tasks in isolation -- with little knowledge of how to combine those things into an outcome used in accomplishing a mission...

Secondly, IEDs may be the big killer today but that's a function of several things, can change and is borderline irrelevant to the job of preparing Intel Analysts for fighting wars -- anywhere, anytime, anyhow...

As usual, JCustis and Tom Odom hit the important points.

I posted this on another thread (LINK) in response to another Tracker 275 post on the same issue:

"If training was outcome based instead of process based you wouldn't have that -- really unforgivable -- problem. The Task, Condition, Standard based model of training was never appropriate for a military force and was foisted on the Army by a series of civilian Education 'professionals.' It needs to go...

We need to apply Outcome Based Training and Education totally and rapidly instead of in spots and sporadically.

That some individuals or units are able to transcend the existing system is a compliment to them and the few people who got the extra mile to try to properly train them. Like you...

Thanks for doing that -- you might have helped someone keep some folks alive down the road..."

I can't comment on how it works in the US Army, but sometimes in the broader IC I'm struck by how easy it is to get training on what you already know, and how difficult it is to get training on things you don't.

Case in point: I was chatting to a very bright junior analyst a few weeks ago who had just come back from an intel course that his shop had sent him to. His verdict: too much of it repeated things he knew, and very little of it pushed him into unfamiliar areas. What he really wanted to do was to be sent on training courses that were entirely outside his area of expertise (so as to expand his horizons), but it could be difficult to identify such opportunities and/or receive institutional support to pursue them.

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What he really wanted to do was to be sent on training courses that were entirely outside his area of expertise (so as to expand his horizons), but it could be difficult to identify such opportunities and/or receive institutional support to pursue them

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That was exactly one of my problems while I searched for a way to enroll in the UN's Peacekeeping Institute's distance education course. I looked high and low in an attempt to source funding to do it, but never found a way (and I asked a lot of sources). Now, the Marines are not doing peacekeeping and peace operations as much as they were in the 90's, but there has to be relevant information of some value that i don't know within the modules. :(

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Originally Posted by Agrippa

I definitely understand your point.

However, how much knowledge can you expect a single person to know? With all the disciplines, there is simply too much information for one person to gain an expertise in. Where do you draw the line?

Does a general analyst now need to become a small arms expert? Or do they need only a familiarization and ability to find the information if need be? Do they really need to know the difference between every type of MANPAD and what level of threat they pose to the countermeasures of each individual aircraft in the U.S. inventory?

Finally, I would argue that it is more important they understood the difference in IED triggering systems vs. other types of small arms, seeing that IEDs are the #1 killer of our troops.

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I agree with you. But I don't know what level a 35F is but as the job description indicates it seems to be a person who assists in most things. Could this be like and Int Clerk in the old days? A corporal or at most a sgt? I don't know.

At that level it is less about what the individual already knows and more about the hunger to learn, yes?

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Originally Posted by JMA

I agree with you. But I don't know what level a 35F is but as the job description indicates it seems to be a person who assists in most things. Could this be like and Int Clerk in the old days? A corporal or at most a sgt? I don't know.

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He can range from a Specialist -- your Int Clerk -- to a Sergeant Major (WO 1). Most are mid grade NCOs equivalent to British Staff Sergeants and WO2 types, above merely clerkly stuff, they are supposed to be able to produce intelligence. Most can and do it well, frequently covering for know it all Lieutenants and Captains -- and the occasional Major...;)

The word "assists" appears in the synopsis (and it is that, a lot of detail is omitted) that you linked five times. An analyst assists in those items to which the word is tied because he obtains the information for his analysis from primary sources and, as is true in any military heirarchy, he has help from others and then he passes things up the chain. What you missed in looking for an attack point was this:

"The Intelligence Analyst is primarily responsible for supervising, coordinating and participating in the analysis, processing and distribution of strategic and tactical intelligence.

...

"Analyzes current intelligence holdings to identify gaps, and subsequent intelligence collection requirements. Considers enemy Order of Battle records in the development of collection tasks and assessment of enemy vulnerabilities and probable courses of action. Assists in the preparation of reports on captured enemy material. Drafts periodic and special intelligence reports, plans, and briefings." (emphasis added / kw)

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At that level it is less about what the individual already knows and more about the hunger to learn, yes?

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Thus you're correct for the entry level but the more senior Analysts are competent to do -- and in fact do -- all sorts of things in the production of usable Intel. Many do not like to leave a comfort zone but there are enough that will to make a difference.

As for the hunger, at any level that should be true. Well, hopefully, anyway... :wry:

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Originally Posted by Agrippa

I definitely understand your point.

However, how much knowledge can you expect a single person to know? With all the disciplines, there is simply too much information for one person to gain an expertise in. Where do you draw the line?

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To be a subject matter expert on weapons is not feasable, however to be familiar with the overall categories and types in general is. Additionally, just like a soldier being unable to memorize every Army Regulation we have, the ability to know where to look it up is the most important. The ability for the new intelligence analyst to know where to find information on enemy threats, and be able to educate themselves on specific things in their AO is the key. Most definitely is it not to memorize all weapons studied by NGIC or DIA, but the ability to find what they need when they need it is.

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Originally Posted by Agrippa

Does a general analyst now need to become a small arms expert? Or do they need only a familiarization and ability to find the information if need be? Do they really need to know the difference between every type of MANPAD and what level of threat they pose to the countermeasures of each individual aircraft in the U.S. inventory?

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No, they do not need to be a small arms expert, however they are not taught in the current POI where to find the information. No, they do not need to know every MANPAD in existance, but they need to be able to recognize what is a MANPAD in reporting so they can go look up the threat and brief it to the commander. As far as learning the countermeasures of each individual aircraft in the US inventory, that was definitely a very sarcastic comment, because you know that the analyst only needs to identify what maybe a threat to the type of aircraft they are responsible for reporting threats for.

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Originally Posted by Agrippa

Finally, I would argue that it is more important they understood the difference in IED triggering systems vs. other types of small arms, seeing that IEDs are the #1 killer of our troops.

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Oh....so you know, that comment about IED triggering systems...that is not covered at all. Actually, there is nothing concerning IED's in any form in the POI for the All-Source Intelligence Analysts (35F) Course. I just had to explain to a student today the difference between a CWIED, RCIED, SVBIED/VBIED, VOIED, etc.

Personally, since I just returned from a tour only weeks ago with EOD/WIT, I think I can educate them on that. However, it is most definitely not part of the current curriculum.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Of note. Every point you raise was taught in BASIC training to UK infantry in 1980, including the IED stuff, as part of the extensive Northern Ireland briefs.

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I will tell you that you received probably better and more indepth training in regards to IED stuff in 1980, than what the Basic Training Soldier is taught now after fighting two theaters that involve them. Sad, but true.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

...having said that, I went on to be NATO qualified foreign equipment recognition instructor, which included being able to tell not only the difference between an AK-47 and an AKM, but also the 8-11 major type variations, in terms of origin - an utterly useless skill!

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I most definitely feel this is an area that not only combat arms troops, but intelligence professionals are truly lacking knowledge in. There is a lot to be gained from knowledge of such items in developing the COP of an OA/OE for land owners in combat theaters.

Most people can differentiate the difference between a MIG-17 and a MIG-29, however most have never seen them in recent combat. Yet, when it comes to identifying a recently purchases by such countries as Iraq when involving a 2007 Serbian (Zastava) M91 Sniper Rifle, or a old smuggled in 1975 Russian (Tula) SVD Dragunov, they are unable to understand the importance of either. Most would report the M91 as a Russian Dragunov, and fail to understand that the M91 more than likely was smuggled out of current Iraqi Army arms stores, which poses an even greater threat to USF force protection. That is only one example of how small arms, and their identification are able to send up warning signals that intelligence professionals can better advice ground commanders on. We can only hope that in theater, this scenario does not present itself, as we are unprepared to report it accurately at this time.

It isn't the weapon that is the point, it is being able to identify the weapon, know how to recognize origin, and even determine possible smuggling of such weapon.

A lot can be learned by what you find in a cache, however I rarely see a cach reported with any sort of accuracy in regards to contents.

I feel bad that your training has proved useless. However for myself, it has proved to be extremely profitable, and that profit has been utilized extensively by commanders in our current combat theaters.

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Originally Posted by Rex Brynen

Case in point: I was chatting to a very bright junior analyst a few weeks ago who had just come back from an intel course that his shop had sent him to. His verdict: too much of it repeated things he knew, and very little of it pushed him into unfamiliar areas. What he really wanted to do was to be sent on training courses that were entirely outside his area of expertise (so as to expand his horizons), but it could be difficult to identify such opportunities and/or receive institutional support to pursue them.

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This is the same frustration I have as an Intelligence Analyst/Instructor. I have even provided entire course layouts based on my own experience as having been Infantry, Signals Intelligence Analyst, and All-Source Analyst.

However, I was shot down due to the zillion different committees, boards, and other individuals that sometimes have never even been deployed, who call the shots.

Trust me, it is frustrating when you have something that is sought after by analysts, but you can't teach it, because you may end up "stepping on someones toes."

The political game has come in full force, and most definitely effects the training of our soldiers of tomorrow. Unfortunately, those that dictate course curriculum, are typically not the same folks that repeatedly get sent down range.

I was a 35F student many moons ago and I can relate to your post because I had the same problem your students had. I hope my post will be helpful.
Keep in mind: your students may be 18 years old and may have just finished BCT before they came to your school. They may never have seen any weaponry or explored any terrain in their lives until Basic Training. I received training on weapon systems when I was in school, but it's hard for many students to really visualize the battlespace and all the forces and equipment. Looking at an image of a piece of equipment on the WEG or on a playing card is not enough.

Give them as much hands-on time as possible. Have them see the equipment in real life or in action when possible. Ask them the Socratic dialogue-type questions. The ZPU point you brought up is excellent. Ask about weather. Show them what a 6% slope really looks like. Show them. Show them what cover and concealment really look like. What does an orchard really look like? What can realistically move through there? Ask them where they would put a given piece of equipment and ask them what the positives and negatives of that decision would be.

That method helped me a great deal, but it occurred when I got to my unit. Unfortunately, there's little time in the POI so your students will have to take the initiative to ask a lot of those questions of their unit SME's when they graduate. I was lucky to work for an intel officer who was formerly a scout. He was very helpful and when I asked him, "What is the biggest mistake analysts (or CDRs) make when they deploy scouts"? He had great insight.
One of the best things you could do I think would be to instill in your students a thirst for knowledge and a willingness to ask questions. Knowing where to find information, as you say you're teaching them, is really important.

In a complex environment, what information is prioritized by the commander in his intelligence requirements? What products does the commander expect of the intelligence section? I don't expect my analysts to know everything, but I expect them to have the initative and desire to find out.

Tracker, I feel your pain. Two months ago, I was slaving away in the same schoolhouse, thinking similar thoughts. These kids are lacking in so much basic knowledge and so many basic skills it is simply impossible to teach them everything they need to know in the time allotted. The sad part is, TRADOC (supposedly experts in training) refuses to acknowledge this and allocate more time to the POI. They will not acknowledge that the scope of knowledge for an All-Source Analyst far exceeds that of a CI agent or a GEOINT or SIGINT analyst. We need more time to turn out a competent, well rounded analyst, but we will not get it. Now I teach at the NATO School; no committees deciding what I can and cannot teach, no "task-condition-standard", no formulaic approaches to lecturing. I teach what experience and common sense tell me to teach.

BTW...apologies for the Afghan Scenario...in hindsight, I totally buggered that thing up.

How familiar are the Taliban with their own capabilities?