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Interesting approach in ...
populace-centric counter-insurgency ...
Quote:
from Slap
Insurgency does not work against a ruthless op pent who will kill anybody and destroy anything to win. So if the King supported the Indians against the White Boy invaders he stood a good chance of winning. Not a guarantee but a good chance. The Indians if supported and advised had no qualms about killing anybody not wearing a Red coat and Burning anything not flying the Union Jack.
extermination - which is indeed a tried and true method.
Assuming all those Indians (we should check out the actual numbers) were united vs the "white boys", virtually all of the latter (Rebels, Neutralists and Loyalists) would probably have united against the Indians. At best, the King would have gained a wasteland - and a bunch of united Indians who would say: we can beat these guys ! Insurgency No 2 ! Hey, UBL said something like that after HE beat the SovComs.
The Brits did try to employ another group - the African-Americans, with varying results. That is another story - about the promises of the Declaration of Independence (believed by many whites to apply to blacks) being left by the wayside once the threat was over.
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Why Bob,
What a nice invitation to enter your world. I'll bring my wife and we will never think of leaving and going back.
Functional vs. Operational
Slap - probably worth me addressing the use of functional:
Quote:
When Rob sent me his PPT he told me it was functional so I thought the problem was to choose the best available force in the AO and then do the DLOPthing as SFA, which I still believe was the Indians.
In this case functional only meant addressing the functional capabilities required to support the development of sustainable capability and capacity of a particular FSF to generate, employ and sustain given conditions and objectives. I tried to identify what key capabilities would be required such as the various types of teams while keeping their composition relative to their intended function.
What we often do is look to our existing menu first, then plug the available capabilities into the holes - the problem is we often have not done the work to determine the shape, size or depth of the hole and we wind up with a bad fit - hence the idea of "filling" a requirement vs. "fully meeting" requirement.
This functional design does not mean you that you will be able to fully meet the requirement - it would be nice, but those capabilities may be committed elsewhere, not resident in sufficient capacity in your force(s), or simply not an option. However the functional requirement does not go away, and knowing where you have or have not fully met the requirement allows you to know where you are accepting risk, and put measures in place to either mitigate or watch it more closely so if need be you can reallocate resources.
It is also useful I think in looking further out and beginning a conversation with those who generate capabilities to identify when and how much of a discreet capability you may require so it can be developed in a holistic way and accounted for across the DOTMLPF and policy. In an era of thousands of individual replacements in theater doing a myriad of tasks that were not anticipated in a manner that allowed them to be generated as capabilities matched to functional requirements, I think a functional breakdown of the capabilities required to enable a chosen operational approach could help us both reduce the risk to the policy objective and retain balance in our capability generator.
So the function is not really in terms of you picking the right potential FSF to achieve your objective (in the case of the functional design .ppt), but in terms of matching the required capabilities on your end to develop sustainable capability and capacity in the partner FSF. Now - in an operational design if your end were to prevent the American colonies from gaining an independent state you might have a LOE where you were looking for a partner FSF - and in this case you might rest upon (some of) the indigenous tribes of North America and support the development of capability and capacity in their FSF. But... back to the law of unintended consequences - you better have your ends firmly in mind because as stated, once you develop those sustainable capabilities and capacities they may be used in ways you did not anticipate to ends which run counter to your own.
This is I think one of the values in an operational design in that it helps identify a range of possible outcomes, and where interests converge and diverge. From my read of history neither side was ever really interested in getting past the generate and employ functions wrt the indigenous N. American tribes to be used to support their own ends. To do so would not have supported their own ends - this is something I think many indigenous leaders figured out in due time and as such only bought into the bargain as far it supported some of their own immediate ends.
This brings us back to one of Marc's issues with the lack of a grand strategy - I think you have to balance your desire for an immediate solution to your problem with the needs of your partner's in order to create a broader overlap of what is tolerable and why. What you are looking for ultimately is something more sustainable with less costs so that it goes back under the domestic political radar. Unfortunately, this means often going slower or making a better investment up front so that you don't have to go back and re-do something you did inadequately or poorly under pressure to get things moving (or pressure to reduce risk in other areas). This goes back to one of my original comments that the road to efficiency is through being effective.
Where functional design supports this is by identifying what right and "right sized" capabilities are needed to meet operational requirements based on conditions and objectives. Unfortunately, we tend to gravitate toward addressing the pressures we perceive as the immediate ones and "satisfice" with sub-optimal capabilities without fully understanding what risks that creates to the policy objective, or to the capability generator as a result of indefinitely having to source ad hock capabilities until either we exhaust ourselves (again Thucydides provides a great example where the Athenians melted down their reserve in Athena's armor to coin talents), or lose our will - or wait for the situation to resolve itself.
Time to go get a run in - Best regards, Rob
Not sure whether we have the general framework ...
Here are some quotes from the article you cited, "FUTURE ROLES OF AIR AND SPACE POWER IN COMBATTING TERRORISM" (1997), which is here.
From chap.1, Introduction
Quote:
Design
The paper begins with a brief overview of US national policy to combat international terrorism and the Department of Defense (DOD) counterterrorism policy. It then applies Colonel John Warden’s system model to analyze a state-sponsored terrorist organization and identify its centers of gravity. Next, the paper discusses the current, traditional roles of air and space power in combatting terrorism, and divides them by phase of application. The paper concludes by suggesting future roles and applications of air and space power in the battle against terrorism, and recommends some areas for future study.
I read this as saying: We start with a national policy model (Corn's rings or some other model); and then, if we are in the Operational Requirements area (in Cornian terms), we develop a targeting model (Warden's rings or some other model). That model (once developed) feeds back into the national policy model (in Corn's model, into Operational Requirements) - where, if the targeting model is not rejected at gitgo, changes may or may not have to be made in the overall national policy model. So folks concerned with the other two of Corn's rings have to go out and check the various bases for their ring. They come back with yays, nays or need changes. And the process goes on..........
The article seems to employ that sequence:
Chapter 2 US Policies to Combat Terrorism
Quote:
National Policy
Current US policy on countering international terrorism was first fully iterated in the Reagan Administration and has been reaffirmed by every president since. It follows three basic rules:
* The US will make no concessions to terrorists
* The US will treat terrorists as criminals and apply the rule of law
* The US will apply maximum pressure on state sponsors of terrorism
The Clinton Administration added a corollary to these rules: helping other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism. This is sometimes addressed as an example of US Government cooperation with other governments in an international effort to combat terrorism, while at other times it is included as a fourth rule of policy.
Chapter 3 Targeting a Terrorist Organization (from whence Figure 1).
Chapter 4 Current Roles of Air and Space Power in Combatting Terrorism
Chapter 5 Future Roles of Air and Space Power in Combatting Terrorism
Chapter 6 Conclusion
Quote:
There is an effective response to terrorism: a coherent national strategy integrating all the instruments of power to combat terrorists and their sponsors. The US has this, but its effectiveness can be improved and the options available to the NCA expanded.
As a component of the military instrument, air and space power already contributes to our nation’s current counterterrorism capabilities by providing global mobility for special operations counterterrorist forces, air superiority to protect those forces, and precision strike capability to target terrorist infrastructures.... [continues on with their pitch]
The point being that Warden's rings are part of the Operational Requirements (the "military instrument" in these authors' words - i.e., part of military strategy, operations and tactics). Corn's rings are one way to illustrate "all the instruments of power". I like them. Others may have an even better graphic means of conveying the concept.
I can see how Warden's rings are used as a targeting model. I fail to see how they (at least in the form given in Figure 1) can be used to illustrate the interplay and necessary compromises at the national policy level (NSC-JCS).
The question is whether you agree that ...
the Warden rings model is part of the Operational Requirements ring in the Cornian model (or for that matter in any national policy model including non-military inputs). Or, phrased another way, the Warden rings model is not intended to be a national policy model, but is intended to develop inputs into a segment of that model.
I think of the Corn model as including some very broad inputs. The "Law" ring includes many different people in many systems (e.g., you and me in the justice system), and various kinds of law. It could, without much problem, be expanded to include that part of our societal structure (many systems) which is evolutionary and which changes slowly. The "Diplomacy" ring encompasses more changeable aspects - subject more to the election cycles and political wind shifts.
You could use both models in the law enforcement context. The police models (for police strategy, operations and tactics) fit into Operational Requirements. There you could use the Warden model or anything else you wanted to use. The other two rings depend on the jurisdiction (e.g., State of Michigan, County of Houghton, City of Hancock), where the "Law" is fairly stable, but local politics (the "Diplomacy" ring) is often not.
A change in one ring probably requires changes in the other rings (clearly so where they intersect). E.g., today's decision in Montejo.
Quote:
Court overrules Michigan v. Jackson
Tuesday, May 26th, 2009 10:09 am | Lyle Denniston
....
Splitting 5-4, the Supreme Court on Tuesday overruled its 23-year-old ruling in Michigan v. Jackson on the rights of a criminal suspect in police custody who has asked for a lawyer. The Court did so in Montejo v. Louisiana (07-1529), in an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia. ...
....
The Court had signaled in late March that it was considering overruling the Jackson decision, a decision designed to assure that the right to a lawyer is not lost during police questioning of a suspect they are holding, resulting in a confession to the crime. The Court ruled there [Michigan v. Jackson] that, once a suspect has claimed the right to a lawyer, any later waiver of that right during questioning would be invalid, unless the suspect initiated communcation with the officers.
Michigan v. Jackson, as an ironclad rule, seemed dumb to me. This moves the test more to a totality of circumstances approach - IMO a good thing.
Written opinion will probably come later today or tomorrow.
This change in the "Law" ring will require some changes in the Operational Requirements ring - and also in the "Diplomacy" ring (How will the local politicians handle it or spin it ?).
Seeing the problem is the first step to the solution ..
Will await your research.