Light infantry TOEs

Since the rifle squad thread seemed to be popular we'll try this.

For deliberate attacks and raids light infantry units are normally organized into three elements, not including the headquarters: support, security, and assault.

The tried and true light infantry TOE has been three plus one; three identical rifle platoons plus the weapons platoon at company level, or three identical rifle companies plus the weapons company at battalion level.

Would there be any advantage to organizing light infantry units into specialized support, security, and assault elements permanently?

This would mean the organization would be optimized for raids and deliberate attacks. Would that effect the organization's ability to successfully conduct constabulary type operations or defensive operations?

If you organized permanently this way at what level should it happen. Companies with support, security, and assault platoons, or battalions with support, security, and assault companies?

If not all light infantry units, perhaps just the ranger battalions?

A permanent relationship is not possible. The same platoon, or same company, cannot continue to be the go-to guys for assault after assault. It's a simple matter of burnout. Higher end folks like the SAs can afford the specialization (e.g. counter-terrorism troops), but when they deploy to a conflict, the personnel start to become fairly "vanilla".

As for the impact on the ability to conduct constabularly or defensive missions, there probably is none. Just look at the multitude of MOS's that are conducting SASO right now. It's a just range of other skills.

Some of the specialization comes from equipment - the support element packs extra machine guns and grenade launchers, while the assault element wants a more streamlined loadout.

It might be possible to task organize the units, but allow the men to rotate jobs once in a while by swapping out weapons when there's a quiet moment. Or would that cause too many complications?

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It might be possible to task organize the units, but allow the men to rotate jobs once in a while by swapping out weapons when there's a quiet moment. Or would that cause too many complications?

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That could work. It would sacrifice some of the specialization, since it would make the designations strictly TO&E based, not soldier based.

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If you organized permanently this way at what level should it happen. Companies with support, security, and assault platoons, or battalions with support, security, and assault companies?

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Definitely not at platoon, thats all I know. Missions and situations change too much and too rapidly to make specialization at platoon level feasible. Having a weapons squad is enough. Flexibility in the "short sword warfighting" is too important to sacrifice.

I looked at this along with the squad and platoon structures with retired SMA Bill Gates and CSM (ret) Jack Hardwick. My driving concern was to give the company greater independent operations capability, especially in an operational environment like OIF and OEF. That meant organic capability to run and sustain a 24/7 tactical operations center and greater organic fire support and direct fire support with heavy MGs and AT. Looked at that way, I saw a need for a heavy weapons platoon at company level and parallel weapons squads in platoons including light (60mm) mortars.

I am not a fan of ultra-light infantry as we have used the term; infantry is light enough without making them paper-thin---you end up adding back in what you took away and than you get into ad hoc organizations for fighting versus how you train.

best

Tom

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I am not a fan of ultra-light infantry

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Im a fan of an ultra-light rucksack...hooah...

Agreed and you will never get one in light infantry

best

Tom

The point of light infantry is its flexibility. Once we start to task organize the platoons we take some of that flexibility away, we take away our military's responsiveness. The issue in the present conflict is not lack of firepower. Our soldiers and marines completely outclass the insurgents as soldiers. The main issue I observed is the training of our soldiers. The training I went through acted like Iraq and Afghanistan was a homogenous conflict, it certainly is not. And Ft. Irwin was useless. We need to train our infantry to be response to an ever-changing battlefield, not slotted into a specific mission.

CPT HOLZBACH has nailed it down !! Reduction of weight carried is or should always be at the top of the planning chart . As an old infantry hand in Vietnam I have vivid memories of heavy rucksacks in that heat . The American foot trooper in Iraq is hideously burdened with equipment it appears to me.

A quick read from Lightfighter, originally posted in 2003:

Soldier's Load

by CPT Bob Mahowald

On the modern battlefield, light infantry soldiers are asked to conduct a wide veriety of missions in constantly changing conditions. Light infantry companies are capable of full spectrum operations, transitioning quickly from search and attack, to military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), and then to support and stability operations (SASO). Today’s infantryman has a multitude of tools to help him accomplish each of these missions: weapons, demolitions, body armor, radios, handheld GPS systems, shoulder-fired anti-armor and anti-bunker weapons, anti-personnel mines, mortar rounds, and the list goes on. With all of this gear carried on individuals’ backs, it is easy to see why Light Infantry often seems to be an oxymoron.

Light infantry leaders have several factors to balance: keeping their soldiers alert, protecting them from both the enemy and the elements, and furnishing them with the right equipment to accomplish the mission—all of which influences the soldier’s load. Infantry leaders, beginning with commanders, must rationally and dispassionately determine what loads their units will carry and then ruthlessly ensure that soldiers adhere to these packing lists.

When deciding what type of loads their soldiers will carry, a commander must analyze the packing list based on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civil considerations (METT-TC). This can be daunting given the number of items carried by today’s light infantryman and the complexity of the tasks he is asked to accomplish.

For a starting point, leaders need a methodology to begin breaking down their unit’s loads for analysis. In his article The Problem of Individual Military Equipment, Major A. N. Hvidt, an officer in the Danish Army, offered the following framework for separating a soldier’s equipment into two separate groups.

1.
Personal kit and carrying equipment which do not directly or indirectly inflict losses on the enemy, but serve one purpose only, namely to keep the soldier alive and protect him against physical and climatic stress, as well as the consequences of enemy activity.



1. Weapons with accessories which can be characterized as “active equipment.” This category today includes all kinds of equipment such as signal, pioneer, transport and similar gear.[1]



Leader’s can then apply their METT-TC analysis to each group, adding or discarding items based on their current and foreseen needs, all the while focusing a critical eye on the equipment their troops carry. Is their load tailored for the mission at hand, but flexible enough to support likely follow-on missions? Is the load modular, allowing soldiers to drop their rucksacks at chance enemy contact and fight on with only those truly mission essential items or cache portions of their load until needed? Can soldiers survive with the equipment they are carrying without their fighting abilities being degraded?

Through unit packing lists, commanders can dictate the precise weight carried by each individual, but only if soldiers unequivocally hold fast to the prescribed packing list. Individuals must not be allowed to make additions or substitutions without approval at some higher level. Additionally, packing lists must be tailored for each duty position.

For instance, squads and teams can reduce weight by sharing certain items. Ounces can be shaved by carrying only one entrenching tool and sleeping bag for every other man, eliminating personal “junk” food, and sharing a single tube of toothpaste and can of shaving cream within a team.

There are some items we carry only out of habit or tradition. Most units still carry their M9 bayonet—at a cost of 1.8 lbs.—but never employ them. I would argue that the bayonet does not serve a practical purpose, but rather a sentimental one.

Trends at the Joint Readiness Training Center show that many units begin their rotations with overloaded soldiers. Most are able to identify this problem after their initial movements and enemy contacts and make arraignments to reduce their loads through elimination, caches, or company trains. The question remains, however, why were these load problems not addressed while the unit prepared for combat in the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB)? In WWII, Korea, or Vietnam, soldiers had years of collective combat experience to help them determine what was absolutely essential for them to carry. When weighted down with unnecessarily cumbersome loads, soldiers would simply fall back on their expertise and discard the equipment they did not need. Today however, American military campaigns are measured in days, not years. By the time light infantrymen in combat learn what they truly must carry and what is superfluous, the conflict may well be over. These lessons must be learned before men find themselves in combat, and the only way to do this is through tough, realistic training.

A common reason leaders give at JRTC to justify the loads they are carrying is that they simply cannot trust their resupply system. This is equivalent to admitting that their unit has failed to adequately train on logistical tasks at their home station. Each and every field problem a unit conducts is an opportunity to stretch, strain, and improve their logistical tail. Company executive officers and first sergeants must become experts in how to request, transport, receive, and distribute supplies. By forcing soldiers to survive for extended periods of time with only the load they will carry in combat, units will learn to trust that their basic needs will be met, and their mental and physical stamina not wasted.
Scientific study has shown that a soldier can carry 30% of his body weight and still maintain the stamina he will need to engage the enemy. This means a 170-pound soldier would carry a load of 51 lbs. For each additional 10 lbs. carried, the soldier will lose 15% of his agility. When a load reaches 45% of a soldier’s body weight (76.5 lbs. for a 170 lbs. soldier), his ability to functions drops dramatically and his risk for becoming a casualty increases.[2]

These weights pale in comparison to weights recorded at JRTC. For example, here are some average weight loads by position:[3]

Duty Position

Ave. Individual Weight (lbs.)

Equipment Weight (lbs.)

Ruck Weight (lbs.)

Total Weight Carried (lbs.)

Rifleman

169.09

41.70 (24%)

51.20

92.90 (54%)

Machine Gunner

171.67

56.87 (33%)

51.92

108.71 (63%)

RTO

171.76

28.32 (16%)

70.54

98.86 (59%)



A soldier’s load carry capacity can be increased through training, but only by 10 to possibly 20 percent at best. Even with rigorous conditioning, each of these soldiers listed above would exceed their maximum carry capacity.[4]

Leaders need to understand the risks they are taking when their soldiers carry these loads into combat. A leader can assume tactical risk by analyzing his mission and deciding that the benefit gained by carrying excessive loads outweighs the proven dangers of such an action. An ignorant leader, however, heaps accidental risk upon his unit when he overloads them without conscience consideration.

American infantrymen are smart, tough, and resourceful. Their will to fight and the skill with which they accomplish their missions are unparalleled. Commanders are responsible for training their units to these high standards, remaining capable of closing with and destroying an enemy at any time. Carefully managing individual loads within a unit helps to preserve both its individual and collective combat power. A commander who effectively manages his soldiers' loads--in concert with sound tactics, detailed planning, and determined leadership--will ensure that his unit arrives at its decisive point ready and able to accomplish its mission.


There are several excellent resources for studying soldier’s load. Field Manuals 7-8 (Infantry Platoon and Squad), 7-10 (The Infantry Rifle Company), and 21-18 (Foot Marches) all offer doctrinal guidance for crafting and managing soldier’s load. Perhaps the best source is a book written in 1950 by S.L.A. Marshall, The Soldier’s load and the Mobility of a Nation. This is an excellent text and should be required reading for all infantry leaders.

An excellent reply and very interesting reading . And I have read S.LA.M. s
Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation. Obviously a great deal of thought is going into the grunt's gear and what he can pack .

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Trends at the Joint Readiness Training Center show that many units begin their rotations with overloaded soldiers. Most are able to identify this problem after their initial movements and enemy contacts and make arraignments to reduce their loads through elimination, caches, or company trains. The question remains, however, why were these load problems not addressed while the unit prepared for combat in the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB)? In WWII, Korea, or Vietnam, soldiers had years of collective combat experience to help them determine what was absolutely essential for them to carry. When weighted down with unnecessarily cumbersome loads, soldiers would simply fall back on their expertise and discard the equipment they did not need. Today however, American military campaigns are measured in days, not years. By the time light infantrymen in combat learn what they truly must carry and what is superfluous, the conflict may well be over. These lessons must be learned before men find themselves in combat, and the only way to do this is through tough, realistic training.

A common reason leaders give at JRTC to justify the loads they are carrying is that they simply cannot trust their resupply system. This is equivalent to admitting that their unit has failed to adequately train on logistical tasks at their home station. Each and every field problem a unit conducts is an opportunity to stretch, strain, and improve their logistical tail. Company executive officers and first sergeants must become experts in how to request, transport, receive, and distribute supplies. By forcing soldiers to survive for extended periods of time with only the load they will carry in combat, units will learn to trust that their basic needs will be met, and their mental and physical stamina not wasted.
Scientific study has shown that a soldier can carry 30% of his body weight and still maintain the stamina he will need to engage the enemy. This means a 170-pound soldier would carry a load of 51 lbs. For each additional 10 lbs. carried, the soldier will lose 15% of his agility. When a load reaches 45% of a soldier’s body weight (76.5 lbs. for a 170 lbs. soldier), his ability to functions drops dramatically and his risk for becoming a casualty increases.[2]

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Interesting because this all came out of my office. We with Natick sent a team to OEF in 2003 to look at this issue--one we just keep relearning. Funny though the Gator and other similar UTVs/ATVs have become the "jeep" of the infantry.

Best

Tom

At the risk of stepping on some collective toes, here, I noticed a basic lack of senior NCO competence in "taking care of the troops." To be sure, we were a CSS unit, so we didn't have a good infantry or armor First Shirt, but our 1SGs and CSMs were extremely weak in caring for their troops. They were hell on uniform violations, but when it came to a basic feeding plan, improving the Co./Bn area and even running a DA 6, they were either incompetent, or were too busy taking care of themselves, first.

I had the honor of serving with two staff E-8s who were constantly picking up the slack for a wide variety of subordinate and superior unit NCO chains of concern. Little stuff like ensuring their troops were being fed, weapons were clean and in good repair, and knowing the pulse of the unit appear to have been neglected, and been replaced with "higher orders" of NCO business such as Powerpoint development, etc..

My Staff E-8s and I would spend 30 minutes or so in the chow line, prior to going through it, either correcting soldiers' weapons handling and/or cleanliness, or addressing soldier concerns. The funny thing was, when my E-8s would violate the other units NCO chain of concern in order to solve a problem, the senior NCO whose turf it was generally didn't appear to care. If I were a senior NCO or Commander, and some other units' NCO was in my business, I think I'd blow a gasket.

The weight of equipment was a secondary reason, I believe, why we always cruise around in HMMWVs. Its hard to do long patrols with all that crap on, especially in the summer. Another factor that impedes effectiveness is not just the weight, but the bulkiness. Some people loath this idea, but Im a firm believer that speed = security. And there is no speed with all that body armor on and it's associated magazines and commo gear. Actually a better word than speed is agility. You cant be agile with all that on. Imagine getting in the prone, but being held up off the ground by the plate in your vest and your magazine pouches and your MBITTR radio, and whatever else you've got. I was never under direct fire, but I can easily imagine worrying that you cant get low enough to get under some grazing fire or properly use a low piece of cover. On your feet, your a bit top heavy. I suppose you can train for this to some extent by wearing full gear during PT or something. Or doing obstacle courses with it all on. That would suck. And by the way, I got to work around that CPT Mahowald for a couple weeks in Baghdad in 2005. He was the BDE battle captain. Suffice to say that when I heard he had gone down to take over a company, I was jealous of those PLs. The quality of that little piece he wrote was typical of all his work. Definitely a great officer.

From Lightfighter.net member Stephen:

Weight tables:

These don't have the newer items, but it's still a great planning resource.



WEIGHT TABLES-- Figures in pounds
CLOTHING
HEAD
BDU patrol cap 0.22
Wool beret 0.25
Jungle cap 0.30
Cold weather cap 0.26
Muffler 0.38
HANDS
D3B black leather gloves 0.22
D3B wool insets 0.13
Nomex aviator gloves 0.17
FEET
Wool socks 0.19
Leather combat boots 4.20
Jungle boots 3.36
TORSO
T-shirt 0.20
BDU camouflage top 1.50
Lightweight BDU camouflage top 1.13
Wool pants 2.10
Uniform belt/buckle 0.20
Overwhite bottom 2.00
PROTECTIVE GEAR
Climate
M65 field jacket/liner 3.50
ECWCS Goretex parka 1.80
ECWCS Goretex pants 0.80
Poncho 1.70
Poncholiner 1.60
Sleeping pad 1.20
Ecotat lightweight sleeping bag 2.10
Mylar OD/space blanket 0.40
Intermediate sleeping bag 7.50
Extreme weather sleeping bag 9.50
IMPS 5.00
Shelter-half/poles/stakes 4.45
BALLISTIC
PASGT Kevlar Helmet
XS 2.50
S 2.80
M 3.00
L 3.25
PASGT Kevlar Flak Jacket
XS 7.50
S 8.00
M 8.50
L 9.50
XL 11.00
Ranger body armor (RBA) 15.00
Ballistic plate/carrier for PASGT flak jacket 8.00
NBC
M40 A-1 FPM 3.50
M17A1 Mask 2.97
CPOG Clothing (hood, suit, overboots, gloves) 3.78
M258 Kit 0.60
H2O purification tablets 0.06
Katdyn purification pump 1.30
FIELD EQUIPMENT
Load-Bearing
TLBV/ETLBV 2.00
LC-2 suspenders/belt 1.59
Butt pack 0.03
1-quart canteen/cover 2.70
1-quart canteen/cover/cup 3.60
Medium ALICE ruck 2.46
Large ALICE ruck
2.86
ALICE frame 3.10
Coleman Ram-Flex synthetic frame 1.00
2-quart canteen/cover 4.80
Camel-Bak 4.00.
CUTTING/DIGGING
M7 Bayonet 1.30
M9 Bayonet/wire cutter 1.79
Pocket knife 0.40
Leathermen/multi-tool 0.65
E-tool 2.52
HEAT/COOKING
Natick canteen stove 0.20
Matches in waterproof box 0.15
M1950 stove 1.30
COMMAND/SIGNAL
Ranger op-ord board 0.30
AN/PRC-77 24.72
AN/PRC-126 3.00
AN/PRC-119 SINCGARS 22.50
Lensatic compass 0.30
Signal mirror 0.20
Colored smoke grenade 1.40
AN/PVS-4 starlight scope 3.80
AN/PVS-7 night vision goggles 2.70
OEG gunsight 0.25
ACOG gunsight 0.45
MOBILITY
2 ski poles 9.50
2-snow shoes 4.60
T-10C parachute system 23.00
UT-2000 All-terrain/all-purpose cart 10.00
All/extreme terrain A</FONT>mountain bike@ 30.00
WEAPONS
RIFLES
M4 Carbine 6.50
M16A2 7.78
M14 9.08
M16A2/M203 grenade launcher 11.00
OICW 5.56/20mm 18.00
MACHINEGUNS

M249 LMG 15.16
M240B MMG 20.00
M60E3 MMG 18.50
--barrel/case 13.50
--tripod 15.00
----receiver 60.00
----barrel 24.00
----tripod 44.00
M2 HB HMG 128.00(T)
MK19 40mm GMG 130.60(T)
--weapon 75.60
--tripod 44.00
--cradle/carr 21.00
MORTARS

M224 60mm 35.40/46.20(T)
--tube 14.10
--bipod 15.20
--sight 02.50
--B/plate square 03.60
--B/plate round 14.40
M29A1 81mm 87.50(T)
tube 28.00
Bipod 31.00
B/plate 28.50
M252 81mm
81.00
M121 120mm 135.00
PISTOLS
M9 9mm 2.11
.45 ACP 2.50
ROCKET/MISSILE LAUNCHERS
83mm MK153 SMAW 16.92
SMAW-D 12.00
66 mm M72A2 LAAW 05.20
M136 (AT4) 14.80
90mm RCL 35.00
83mm M3 RAAWS (Carl Gustav) 26.00
M40A2 106mm RR 420.00
Dragon 25.30
TOW 2 ATGM system
171.00(T)
Launch tube 11.00
Guidance set 54.00
Battery assembly 21.00
Missile 58.00
Optical sight 32.00
Tripod 21.00
MPIM/SRAW 21.00
FIM-92 stinger SAM 35.00
HAND GRENADES/MINES/DEMO
MK3A2 Offensive concussion grenade 0.75
M67 grenade 0.85
M18 Claymore Ap mine 3.00
M21 AT mine 17.00
C4 plastic explosive block 1.25
AMMO
30-round box magazine 5.56mm(M16/M4/OICW) 1.01
20-round box magazine 7.62mm (M14) 1.57
15-round box magazine 9mmX19mm(M9) 0.40
--7-round box magazine .45 caliber (.45 ACP) 0.50
200-round plastic box 5.56mm (M249 LMG) 6.92
100-round cloth/cardboard bandolier 7.62mm (M60/M240B MMG) 6.60
100-round plastic assault pack 7.62mm (M60/M240B MMG) 6.70
200-round metal can 7.62mm (M60/M240B MMG) 18.75
20mm OICW cartridge ?????
1 M406 40mm grenade 1.00
1 83mm SMAW/6.9mm spotting round 12.74
1 Dragon 25.30
Javelin 49.50
1 TOW 55.40
FOOD/WATER
MRE 1.50
LRP ration 0.50
1-quart water (in plastic canteen/cover) 2.70
2-quarts water in 2qt. canteen w/cover 4.80

http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/m...LoadReport.pdf

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Originally Posted by Rifleman

Since the rifle squad thread seemed to be popular we'll try this.

For deliberate attacks and raids light infantry units are normally organized into three elements, not including the headquarters: support, security, and assault.

The tried and true light infantry TOE has been three plus one; three identical rifle platoons plus the weapons platoon at company level, or three identical rifle companies plus the weapons company at battalion level.

Would there be any advantage to organizing light infantry units into specialized support, security, and assault elements permanently?

This would mean the organization would be optimized for raids and deliberate attacks. Would that effect the organization's ability to successfully conduct constabulary type operations or defensive operations?

If you organized permanently this way at what level should it happen. Companies with support, security, and assault platoons, or battalions with support, security, and assault companies?

If not all light infantry units, perhaps just the ranger battalions?

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I see several problems.

- A dedicated assault element would have a way to large share of casualties in a force-on-force battle. That would lead to loss of cohesion due to morale and replacement issues.

- The three different tasks don't have very different equipment requirements, so by specializing the training and mission you simply ditch the versatility that you can have almsot for free.

- If moving to contact, you cannot be sure that your elements are positioned correctly. The assault element is probably pinned down and the support element without line of sight. Now the security element would have to act as base fo fire or assault element - possible with versatility, but hard with specialization.

- Rangers are often airbonre and therefore often in disorder after landing and with little support. That stresses the requirement for versatility.

a couple of bandoliers, a couple of frags, a couple cans of ham n' limas, 4-5 canteens, a towel around the neck, a quick prayer for fast delivery of napalm or arty if we got hit bad, stick the boots (new guys) with the m-60 belts and you're good to go for a days worth of humping. What are they carrying all that #### around for when they are only a couple of clicks from base camp and have a guarantee of gunships to suppress anything real heavy duty?

Interesting question, Goesh. Especially when you compare current loads for short patrols to what SOG guys carried into Laos. And those guys had to be ready for anything and not expect immediate support or extraction.:eek: