Optimizing the Marine Corps for small wars
I'm sure this idea has been floated by folks both smarter and much more experienced than me, but I can't remember an SWC thread on it. With the ongoing debate about how to prepare the ground forces for both the full spectrum of small wars and the threat of major conventional war, how about letting the Marines focus on small wars, with maybe amphibious/forced entry as a secondary field? I'm in the Van Creveld camp, that nuclear weapons have virtually ended the threat of great power war, but I think it's a small camp, and even if he's right there are plenty of other possibilities for conventional war (Korea). The Army could maintain it's greatly enhanced small wars knowledge, but make that a secondary mission, in the background but not forgotten.
Letting the Marines focus on small wars would also seem to do away with the need for an Army Advisory Corps, the Marines could carry out that function, maybe dispersed more widely throughout Marine ground combat arms. If we're not listening to Steve Metz and we get caught in another big small war like Iraq, the Marines would be there first and serve as mentors of sorts to Army troops joining the fight.
Thoughts, negatives?
Optimizing the Marine Corps for small wars - A radical approach?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Granite_State
I'm sure this idea has been floated by folks both smarter and much more experienced than me, but I can't remember an SWC thread on it. With the ongoing debate about how to prepare the ground forces for both the full spectrum of small wars and the threat of major conventional war, how about letting the Marines focus on small wars, with maybe amphibious/forced entry as a secondary field? I'm in the Van Creveld camp, that nuclear weapons have virtually ended the threat of great power war, but I think it's a small camp, and even if he's right there are plenty of other possibilities for conventional war (Korea). The Army could maintain it's greatly enhanced small wars knowledge, but make that a secondary mission, in the background but not forgotten.
Letting the Marines focus on small wars would also seem to do away with the need for an Army Advisory Corps, the Marines could carry out that function, maybe dispersed more widely throughout Marine ground combat arms. If we're not listening to Steve Metz and we get caught in another big small war like Iraq, the Marines would be there first and serve as mentors of sorts to Army troops joining the fight.
Thoughts, negatives?
Ah… the debate regarding the role of the Marine Corps; a debate since 1775! Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak (USMC ret.) wrote an excellent book titled First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps, which has become a must read for every Marine and highly recommended for all others! For reasons outlined in this book and others, the Marine Corps will never allow itself to be relegated to focusing on a specific type of war or battlefield. History has shown us that no war is alike. The Marine Corps must focus on the full spectrum of warfare in order “To be ready when the nation is least ready.” It is just as important for the Marine Corps to focus on amphibious operations, as mandated by law, as those “such other duties as the President may direct”, i.e. small wars. Just because we are currently engaged in a COIN environment, we can not lose sight of the fact that the next war may be on the opposite end of the spectrum. Can the Marine Corps do better at small wars? Is it likely that in the foreseeable future we will find ourselves engaged in COIN/small war operations globally? Absolutely to both questions. I do believe the Marine Corps “sensitive paranoia”, as General Krulak wrote in his book as a distinguishing characteristic; will drive a new generation of “thinkers” to better prepare the Corps for future small wars.
Personally, I believe the Corps knows how to forge our nation’s sons and daughters into warriors on the battlefield and into respectable citizens in OUR society. Herein lies the challenge. How do we better prepare the Marine for small wars, where too much force may equate to lost ground, where cultural beliefs and practices may not mirror ours? Where the enemy hides amongst the populace? How do we prepare the iPod and internet generations to operate in an environment where there the people know no such technological luxuries? How do we develop Marines to understand, operate, and positively influence what Robert Tomes writes in Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare; as the “central tenant of counterinsurgency warfare: winning the allegiance of the indigenous population”?
Our current training methods of developing Mission Essential Tasks and instruction through Enabling and Terminal Learning Objectives are great for instructing a Marine how to operate a piece of equipment, handle ordnance, assault a fortified position, etc. This type of instruction can be taught in a classroom and then applied in a field setting. We have excellent Professional Military Education (PME) that teach general military and/or service specific doctrine to our Staff Non-Commissioned Officers and Officers. Our junior Non-Commissioned Officers learn topics such as drill, military customs and courtesies, and may get some basic field skills training such as land navigation or patrolling. This education and training is all very relevant to winning in a small war, but what is lacking in our development revolves around what Tomes cites Lieutenant Colonel Roger Trinquier as concluding in Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency; “that the guerrilla’s greatest advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area…and the support given him by the inhabitants…this total dependence upon terrain and population is also the guerilla’s weak point.” It is the ‘terrain and populations’ Marines must master in order to succeed in future small wars.
I will argue that we learn best through exposure. Can we ‘expose’ our Marines to environments where they will gain understanding of both terrain and people? Our military has units that can deploy and ‘train’ both developed and underdeveloped nations. How about we establish a special PME program, a study-abroad, where we send small ‘learning’ cadres to various regions around the globe to learn and at least come close to mastering both people and terrain of a specific region or area. These cadres would consist of Marines from all rank and file. They would eat what the locals eat, shop where the locals shop, and basically live as the locals live. Cadre members would consist of Marines from various occupational specialties. The cadre would learn terrain, not just from a geographical perspective, but from an infrastructure point of view. How does this society move around? How do they get electricity? Water? Who enforces laws and how? Who are the influential members of the society? How do they communicate? This is a very small snap shot of what a cadre would seek to learn. Then what? Cadres would be the nucleus to any larger organization should the need ever arise whether it be a conventional, small war, or humanitarian mission. Cadre members could come from specific standing units or handpicked from across the Marine Corps. These Marines would need to spend at least 6 months in this capacity and potentially return periodically as a refresher. Our goal would be to have most Marines, not just a select few, knowledgeable in one or several regions. Their experiences would be collected, their acquired skills and knowledge retrievable in a crisis. The objective being; the establishment and accumulation of knowledge and understanding of people and terrain on a global scale that will allow us to exploit the social and environmental conditions to our advantage across the spectrum of conflict.
Will geo-political and sovereignty issues become obstacles in addition to a mountain of other challenges? Sure. Expensive? Possibly. Easier said than done? Maybe. But I’m sure that the same was said to Earl “Pete” Ellis in 1920 when he first envisioned amphibious means in the Pacific against Japan that would come to fruition some twenty-one years later. But then again, I am no Pete Ellis.
Thoughts?
Commandant Conway and the Corps' priorities
Abu Muqawama has a couple of posts on this and the current commandant, whose attitudes have been mentioned here:
http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2007...ot-get-it.html
http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2007/12/cmc.html
Looking backwards, falling forwards
I tend to shudder when I hear phrases like optimise, mission specific function and other generalities. Armed Forces are just that, they are designed to protect and project force, to do so they need to be capable of functioning in a wide variety of environments.
Specialisation is necessary to promote mastery of a skill, but it tends to lead to an inward focus of that specialism - let's not share our knowledge etc, this then becomes a bargaining chip in the ever increasing race for resouces (money) and creates a friction that does not need to exist.
Each part of the Armed Forces has a function, they must be mutually supporting and complementary. What we need is to re-think the whole budget system so that we do not have bureaucrats and people removed from the actual business of conducting war, being in total control of the process, they must be part of it, but not all of it.
Using Mission Command as an analogy, the politicians should state clearly what they expect of their Armed Forces, a Mission Analysis is conducted and the bill is presented, the politicians either pay or explain to the country why they did not & let the public decide if they agree.
More than my jobs worth mate!
RJ you make an excellent point.
However if we optimise forces for a specific function, rather than train them for the wide spectrum of operations which the modern day soldier has to undertake? What happens when the COIN war is sucking up all the trained personnel? What about spreading the love (& knowledge)
Would it not be better to have specialists embedded within units, by actually incorporating different operations as part of the education and development process. Not saying that every unit must have a mountain warfare specialist, an OBUA specialist etc, but a ready pool of people who can be used in preparation for these operations and deploy to cement those lessons learnt. These individuals could then form a conduit for passing lessons learnt on the ground back to the widerarmed forces, rather than waiting for an armchair general like me to pontificate, CNN to advise and the inertial mass of bureaucracy to get in gear?
I must confess I do have a bias against too much specialisation, yes we need experts, but we should use them to spread knowledge, not hold them close and subject them to internal political wrangles - which would happen.
I feel that we need to ensure greater clarity from the political masters, not likely in my lifetime, but also the military hierarchy needs to be more forthright in its capabilities and endurance. It has been known for ages that warfighting has an increased wear and tear on men and materiel - why don't we seem to factor that in our plans? Off point but still pertinent.
Cheers
Geoff
recruiting those with unique skills..
Army, Marines give waivers to more felons, CNN, 21 April 2008.
Quote:
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The Army and Marine Corps are allowing convicted felons to serve in increasing numbers, newly released Department of Defense statistics show.
...
It also allowed two people convicted of making terrorist or bomb threats to enlist in 2007, up from one the year before.
The Marines did not immediately respond to request for comment.
Well, that's one way of optimizing for the GWoT... :D
In the US today, things that just 20 years ago
weren't crimes are today 'felonies.' The bomb threats were probably made when they were High School students. Few years ago there was a lot of that down here, got 'em out of classes for half a day sometimes while the Bomb Squad and the dogs swept the building. Got too expensive, so all the states started prosecuting for it. The kids generally get costs, restitution and probation.
You left out the fact that they aren't waiving drug sale offenses; they'll waive burglary and even manslaughter as they should, IMO but not pushing.
Be great to not need waivers, we could do that in an ideal world. It's not an ideal world; never has been and is unlikely to ever be one...
That's another article that's much ado about nothing. The NCOs and Officers will gripe because it makes their jobs slightly harder but by and large it'll make little difference. We've been there before and it doesn't break anything.
