You shouldn't bring rule of force and legitimacy so close to each other. It's badly misleading.
Printable View
You shouldn't bring rule of force and legitimacy so close to each other. It's badly misleading.
That process is already going on, isn't it? I'm not sure how much "self-determination" is involved, though. More like determination by whoever has the most armed men in any given place at any given time. I think we may overrate the degree to which the populace will determine who wins. The various portions of the populace will most likely try to stay alive, and side with whoever they think is going to advance - or least damage - their interests. Generally that means siding with whoever they think is going to win.
I personally don't think changing our approach is going to make much difference. We're coming up against limits to our capacity, not limits to our approach. Afghans will govern as Afghans govern. We can't change that. If we aren't going to govern the place ourselves, we have to accept that it will be governed in the Afghan way. We can't force the GIRoA to govern as we think they should, and we can't force either the GIRoA or the Taliban to reconcile and cooperate.
We did have the option, once upon a time, of accepting that our capacity to shape Afghanistan is limited and selecting a similarly limited objective. We could have simply set out to convince everybody in the place that no matter who came to power, attacking us or sheltering those who do is a bad idea with adverse consequences drastically exceeding the benefits. We'd have had a quite reasonable chance of accomplishing that. Instead, we let the mission creep on to "installing democracy"... something that we will someday understand that we cannot do.
If we fail to achieve the objective of reshaping Afghan governance - and I suspect that we will fail - it will not be because we took the wrong approach or used the wrong tactics. It will be because we selected an objective that is out of proportion to our capacity and to the resources we're prepared to commit.
We dug ourselves into this hole when we decided to dictate how Afghanistan should be governed. It's a difficult hole to get out of. I don't think digging deeper - meaning further attempts to shape Afghan governance to suit our objectives - is going to help.
Just a guess based mostly on what I have read of Habermas’s work (all of it in English), but the concept of legitimacy seems to play a far greater role in German discourse than it does in the U.S. So the word ‘legitimacy’ might have a more precise or perhaps just a different meaning for you than it would for an American using the term. Again, just a guess.
Posted by Fuchs
Yes, there was a dark ages period after the fall of the USSR established government for 3-4 years or so before the Taliban established control. I suspect with high confidence that Pakistan played a role in Afghanistan's affairs prior to pushing the Taliban across the border, but at this point (at least on my part) it is largely conjecture.Quote:
The Taliban did not oust the socialist government (which happened in '92 iirc), but the "Mujaheddin" warlords (Hekmatyar etc) who proceeded to have so much infighting that their conflict left more ruins in Kabul than the whole 79-92 conflict phase.
This is a point we all need to remember and why abandoning Afghanistan completely could be a humanitarian disaster. We can downsize considerably without pulling the rug from underneath the people there by still providing some military and economic support.Quote:
but the "Mujaheddin" warlords (Hekmatyar etc) who proceeded to have so much infighting that their conflict left more ruins in Kabul than the whole 79-92 conflict phase.
Ok, yes, my mistake on the timeline, and I made an incorrect assertion because of that.
The major point I was attempting to make, however, is one that we need to stop for a minute and think about. If, internal to a country, be it by force, or ballot, or whatever, a government forms free from external manipulations it is superior to any government created by such external manipulations, regardless of what form that externally created government might take.
If we would have satisfied ourselves by conducting a strategic raid, such as Ken White often advocates here, and either gone home, or simply focused on the hot pursuit of AQ out at the few Special Ops bases without trying to solve all of Afghanistan's problems back in the rear, we would have been fine. And Afghanistan would be more stable today that it is as a result of our well intended meddling to create a government that suited us, led by the man who suited us.
I find fascinating parallels to this as I read Rufus Phillip's excellent book "Why Vietnam Matters." There too we over engaged early to shape things politically to what we felt were best from our perspective, and there too we also reached in and manipulated the constitution to suit us. Diem started off as a man with tremendous potential, but then we manipulated things so heavily around him he soon lost his path and his window of opportunity to make a viable competitor to what Ho and the North were offering. So too in Afghanistan with Karzai. Both could have been the men to lead their people to a brighter future, and both were sidelined in that mission by well intended, but highly manipulative actions by the US to shape things to be what we thought were best for us.
We need to learn to let people figure it out for themselves, and to then be willing to work with what emerges and to stop trying to control things. People will much more gladly accept government that is not very effective if it is their own, than government that is highly effective if it is forced upon them by someone else.
When we overly protect and promote some leader we bury them in the absolute power of our support. And we all know what absolute power does...
Bob, those are good points, and obviously more in focus in hindsight. I'm currently reading "Thinking in Time" and found the authors' comments discussing the difference between developing plans based on advocacy and plans based on real analysis.
We have strong advocates pushing the global COIN/nation building agenda with little to no analysis on how they reached this policy recommendation. I can't help but to think of the damage groups like CNAS have created over the years by pushing (advocating) half baked ideas disguised as analysis.
Only half way through the book, but one of the implied lessons is stop, think, and think again before deciding to take action. Much easier said than done when you have humans making decisions. Maybe if we had Vulcans like Mr. Spock from Star Track in all key positions we could make more logical decisions?:D
Bob, it is always about how to accurately gauge the wishes of the people. Stalin, Asaad, Saddam, Gaddaffi, Mugabe, you name them all claimed to be the legitimate and sole representatives of the people.
I'm not sure when the US drifted into the 'everything is negotiable' mode but I suggest that is the source of the current US global weakness.
I accept that the recognition of the Saudi Kingdom is based on oil, I accept that the recognition of China is based on the fact that China owns the US and so on.
But by what stretch of logic does accepting and tolerating the worlds largest drug operation in Afghanistan take?
By what stretch of logic does applying military force to maintain a corrupt and illegitimate Karzai government in power?
Now there are many trying to stretch logic to justify walking away from Afghanistan and leaving it to slide back into its medieval iron-age existence by applying some barely believable spin.
Bob, Afghanistan (post the 2001 bombing campaign) was a class 1 cock-up. It is better to admit so and withdraw like the Soviets did rather than wait around to be bled dry and soundly humiliated.
We must have drifted into "everything is negotiable" mode a long time ago, then, because I don't recall any American objections when the British Empire was running probably the largest and most successful opium dealing operation in history.
More recently I seem to recall the US providing money and arms to a bunch of coke dealers in hopes they'd overthrow o government of Nicaragua that we didn't much care for.
When exactly was this mystical time when everything wasn't negotiable?
Bill,
You posted:Not heard of the book, I assume it is 'Thinking in Time:The Uses of History for Decision-Makers' by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May? Pub. 1986 and a FP review:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...ecision-makersQuote:
I'm currently reading "Thinking in Time" and found the authors' comments discussing the difference between developing plans based on advocacy and plans based on real analysis.
Moderator's Note
I have moved many of the recent posts to this thread, from The UK in Afghanistan, as it is a far better place for them.
Meantime carry on. Yes, I cannot alter the post's title.
Are you for real?
Everyone knows about Perfidious Albion. They did it for Empire.
...at least they never railed on and on about ethics, integrity, honesty, honour, truth, justice, morality etc. etc. while they were swimming at the bottom of the cesspool with the scum of the earth.
No, I'm not following you into a school yard argument.
My point is simple, and that is today everything is negotiable. Specifically the following:
"ethics, integrity, honesty, honour, truth, justice, morality"
This is the state of play today and the who, what, when and where of the past (while maybe interesting to some) does not alter this fact (even if some try to use the past to justify the present ;) )
You made specific reference to "when the US drifted into the 'everything is negotiable' mode". That suggests pretty strongly that you think there was a time when some other mode applied. I don't think there was one, and I can't think of any time, anywhere, when any nation has ever tried to build a foreign policy around "ethics, integrity, honesty, honour, truth, justice, morality", negotiable or otherwise.
Why lament the passing of a fantasy that never existed... and why try to attribute today's problems to a drift out of a state we were never in?
There was a time when the U.S. did not negotiate about things concerning expansion of the Soviet's influence, for example.
Even today not everything is negotiable. To discuss along this extreme idea that everything is negotiable is misleading and fruitless. You better focus on the original theme; the readiness to do business with dictators.
That, btw, was always there - and it should be. There's no reason why a nation should refuse a win-win negotiation with a dictator if it doesn't compromise its own rules.
that is, subject to the process of negotiations - but, not everything is agreeable or even acceptable - WRT to the end result of that process.
Regards
Mike
audible farting has been banned for some Marines downrange because it offends the Afghans.
http://militarytimes.com/blogs/battl...here-you-fart/
I had the opportunity to go to Kabul for two weeks, and spent some time speaking with my friend General Wardak and some of the ISAF/NATO commanders.
It seems to me that the military leaders are very apprehensive of a draw down of the military, even though most civilian experts (Andrew Wilder, Rory Stewart, Michael Semple and myself) have been advocating it for years. They believe they are making progress and the changes by Obama to be detrimental to that "success."
What do the posters think of the proposition of having between 10,000-20,000 Special Forces and nothing more in the country, a reduction in foreign aid to curb corruption and promote patient re-building, and a larger civilian presence (diplomats) that will engage in negotiations and treaties with the Taliban?
Taabistan asked:Sounds good is my first reaction. Then I thought what are the objectives? Is it in very short summary: keep AQ out of Afghanistan or build a 'new' Afghanistan?Quote:
What do the posters think of the proposition of having between 10,000-20,000 Special Forces and nothing more in the country, a reduction in foreign aid to curb corruption and promote patient re-building, and a larger civilian presence (diplomats) that will engage in negotiations and treaties with the Taliban?
From my faraway "armchair" your 'Four Points' suits keep AQ out. Cost benefit analysis when applied needs to factor in political sustainability at home and the financial cost. The way your plan is presented will differ which side of the Atlantic Ocean you are.
Foreign aid needs to be greatly reduced either way; the more one learns about Afghan ways the less I want to pay for it. As for more civilians that is fanciful, as proven already by the difficulties in getting them in country, let alone out of Kabul and compounds.
My understanding is that Afghans prefer their own ways an outsiders can only nudge them along. My expectation is that a smaller military presence (even smaller than 10-20k SOF), less aid, fewer civilians and less nudging would suit Afghans across the country.
Finally I do not want to see the UK, let alone the West & allies, in Afghanistan in such a format in five years time (max).