An alternative to the GCC as means to implement Grand Strategy?
Picking up where the Higher HQs as an Operational and Strategic Enabler thread left off, but also reaching back to the Direct and Indirect thread and the Stability vs. IW thread, it would seem appropriate to start a new thread to discuss the need for a means to implement grand strategy (all the elements of national power), one that might better might facilitate the ways that have been identified – such as that idea of a comprehensive, whole of government approach that applies the means in a way that is complimentary to the conditions – not necessarily in equitable measures, but appropriate ones.
SWC member OE and I were tossing around names and implications, and he came up with a better one then mine – the Office of Regional Engagement (ORE for the acronym happy).
Before I go much further, let me address where this relates to the some of the problems on the uniformed side. Chief among them may be that we have identified the limitations of military power to achieve our political objective(s) – this is not to say it’s a pure limitation, but also that there is the issue of the constraints of our strategic culture, which is an outgrowth of our national one – the who we believe we are as a nation, not a state culture. Time and again we’ve identified that while our use of military means are often a critical component to achieving or sustaining a political end, it alone cannot sustain the political end as we define it based on how we define ourselves. You could go with some of the examples drawn from ancient empires, but even those are somewhat anecdotal and do not provide the complete context of how or why decisions were made – we often make use of them because they are convenient and offer some form of a solution that appears more final and as such economical, I’d suggest that while attractive, they may also be fallacious.
Political objectives, particularly when the end is large, and involves the acceptance, compliance, coercion, compelling, agreement, etc. of other peoples, organizations, states, etc. with the power to resist, interrupt, disrupt, distract, cooperate, etc., the use of military means as a deterrent or as a solvent brings with it risk and chance, and depending on the nature of the political objective its use may create an outcome that is anything but the one for which it was originally employed. Because it is often about the use of force in some fashion, to achieve an objective that is perceived as being either unachievable or one that can be expedited and realized faster to accommodate some timetable, the use of force compresses complex interactions, the lethal or kinetic aspect changes or redefines the nature of the interaction to produce what Clausewitz referred to as the objective nature of war while the broader political context of the objective of the different sides taking part in the war defines its subjective nature. This is kind of a tieback to Thucydides remark about “fear, honor and interest”.
All of that to discuss the limitations, risk and consequences of using military power to achieve political ends. While “means” of implementation such as the GCCs may have been the most appropriate when the political objective was preservation and expansion of Democratic Values and Capitalistic Markets in the face of Communistic ideology which was also trying to expand (BTW Colin Gray did a great piece on the Cold War in his book on Strategic History), a contest in which the natural interests created an appearance of bipolarity (taking into account those who aligned themselves based off material and not ideological interests to secure their regime, etc.), it could be that the GCC may not be the best means of implementing grand strategy where the whole of government is required. While a GCC can do some diplomacy and does have informational and economic levers it can coordinate or pull its principal function is that of a combatant command. Its natural inclinations and bias is inherent to its composition. While personality can overcome a great deal of bias, its natural function is still the implementation of military strategy, not grand strategy. While you can augment a GCC with JIACG like liaison functions, or attach a POLMIL advisor to make a military commander more astute and legitimate in pursuing other policy areas, it is not a natural function; it’s a bridge or band-aid like appliqué.
Changing the means of implementation from a GCC to something like an ORE is a huge strategic culture shift. We sometimes use the “turning the super-tanker” analogy to discuss evolution in the DOTMLPF arena, this might be more akin to changing planetary orbit! There are all kinds of challenges associated with the magnitude of the task, to name a few: articulating the rationale behind it to overcome domestic political resistance (which involves overcoming lobbyist and the military – industrial complex , congressional districts, jobs, etc.); enhancing existing bureaucracies and cultures in the Inter-Agency such as DoS, DoJ, USAID, etc. to work on a scale that is representative of the scale of the political objective – and deployed forward – think along the lines of DoD (this has not only $$$ and faces associated with it, but planning cultures and educational requirements like DoD); overcoming the inertia associated with our current means of implementing or political objectives – there is more then just the internal aspect to this, but the external aspect – who is the most trusted organization amongst the government?; the “whole of government” does not get to some of the means – there is the aspect of private enterprise and the role the interactions between them on a national, regional and international scale play toward economic development (same could be said for informational). This will all take time.
Its interesting when you look at how some of this is occurring already – Secretaries Rice and Gates have made many state visits in tandem as of late, many more IA work groups, AMB Crocker and GEN Petraeus testified together, the speeches made by SEC Gates, the emerging military doctrine, etc. Should we proceed in an ad-hoc and incremental fashion, or should we offer up some type endstate or strategic vision in line with our political objective that guides the development of our means ($$$, time, people, etc.) that accounts for the level of risk?
Best, Rob
Function following Form, or Form following Function?
Hi John,
I figured it'd been brought up before - there is almost nothing new:D - which always brings me back to "lessons available" vs. "lessons learned". What may have changed (or changing) is the conditions, or at least our perspective on the conditions.
It gets back to the idea of establishing and maintaining a bureaucracy - do you want a from that does not facilitate the function(s) that enables the achievement of your objective, or do you want a form that follows function and allows leadership to be animate in pursuit of the objective? The conditions, or rationale for changing the status quo must be understood and agreed upon before people will even begin to contemplate it - in this case, even identifying and agreeing upon the ends ways and means, would require significant work to get there.
Anyway, it seemed like a good way to raise the issue of why we perpetuate something most from my generation take as gospel so to speak, when it may not offer the best form to fulfill the functions we've stated are critical to winning.
Sometimes to consider something small I have to step back and consider the macro pieces to see the relationships - enablers and impediments, etc.:D 100% agree that in the end, its up to the leadership to make it work - warts and all, but if the foundation only allows for so much flexibility, that is all you'll probably get.
Best, Rob
The newest COCOM as an ORE experiment?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
– the Office of Regional Engagement (ORE for the acronym happy).
Changing the means of implementation from a GCC to something like an ORE is a huge strategic culture shift. We sometimes use the “turning the super-tanker” analogy to discuss evolution in the DOTMLPF arena, this might be more akin to changing planetary orbit! There are all kinds of challenges associated with the magnitude of the task, to name a few: articulating the rationale behind it to overcome domestic political resistance (which involves overcoming lobbyist and the military – industrial complex , congressional districts, jobs, etc.); enhancing existing bureaucracies and cultures in the Inter-Agency such as DoS, DoJ, USAID, etc. to work on a scale that is representative of the scale of the political objective – and deployed forward – think along the lines of DoD (this has not only $$$ and faces associated with it, but planning cultures and educational requirements like DoD); overcoming the inertia associated with our current means of implementing or political objectives – there is more then just the internal aspect to this, but the external aspect – who is the most trusted organization amongst the government?; the “whole of government” does not get to some of the means – there is the aspect of private enterprise and the role the interactions between them on a national, regional and international scale play toward economic development (same could be said for informational). This will all take time.
Seems to me we could be in the process of forming up such an entity (even if the poor attempt to put a continent inside a shape akin to a Masai shield--or something else ;)--was misguided). Anyone have any insight into what is actually happening in the creation of AFRICOM? I have garnered some understanding of how it is organizing some of its intel assets, but that is a far cry from seeing the COnOPS and command relationships diagrams.
