Developing Foreign Security Forces: Tiered Strategies
Bill Moore had a great idea about transitioning the SWJ article to the discussion board (see the bottom paragraphs from his post below).
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The critic in me comes out though because I believe the bulk of our SFA efforts have been largely ineffective and our military culture is resistant to self criticism, so we do not seriously explore the reasons why. If the efficacies of our SFA efforts are not comparable to our investment in dollars, time and manpower, then we have developed an ineffective strategy.
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Once we transition this to the SWJ council we can discuss strategy and how SFA nests within that strategy in greater depth. Especially when we’re discussing transnational threats that form parasitic relationships with insurgencies, host nation governments, or criminal organizations and are not restricted to national boundaries.
These threats are not 10 feet tall, most nations already have sufficient skill do defeat them if they had the intelligence and the material resources. We don’t need to try to evolve them into mini-American military units or police units, where our doctrine is at best inappropriate for them, and at worst counterproductive. Many nations have defeated terrorist threats with organizations that we would deem to be substandard by U.S. standards, but the bottom line is that they’re good enough.
While Iraq and Afghanistan offer some perspective on how developing a FSF might nest with a strategic end in that one objective begat another, there are others however that are different. This elicits a larger question concerning strategic context as the reasons (ends and objectives) for sustaining or altering an effort may change with conditions.
I think it may be useful to think of this in terms of strategic tiers (or nesting bowls).
Tier 1 might be nation-state objectives that preserve or advance those things or ideas whch are deemed critical to the continued health of the nation state. Note - I mention ideas because the challenging of them may in fact challenge the influence and control they engender. These could be:
- access to foreign markets and other global resources which are seen as somewhat finite and which there is competition for.
- security of people, things, and ideas at home and abroad
There are probably others, but 2 may be enough to discuss the nesting of strategic tiers
Tier 2 might be geographically or entity oriented. These may include:
- a region or country where access is desired
- an entity that challenges the access itself, or the ideas which accompany it.
A tier 2 strategy invloves the question of access to that area and the effect upon the entity who challenges your access as your end, the componets of how you will go about achieving that end as your way, and consideration of the means required to put your preferred "way" into action.
Tier 3 is where I think developing FSF capaibilities comes in as a componet of tier 2. If it does not support the "ends" associated with the Tier 2, then it is not part of the "ways" - some other ways must be established.
There are a number of reasons why it may not fit - or why it may not be the best solution as laid out in the orignal paper.
I hope this serves as a start to the discussion that Bill engendered. What concerns me is we often reach for the Tier 3s of the world withuot identifying or understadning the Tier 1s and 2s. Tier 1s I think shoudl be fairly consitent since they define us. However I think Tier 2 is subject to change because its not just about us, but is also about how other entities approach their own Tier 2s to promote their Tier 1s.
Bill - hope this answers the mail on starting a discussion.
Best, Rob
