U.S. Victory Lost in History
Little-known Korean border war offers lessons for Iraq, Afghanistan
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Dubbed the Second Korean Conflict by historians and veterans, this undeclared and relatively unknown border war lasted 37 months from late 1966 until late 1969.
But if the Korean War is America's "forgotten war," then the Second Korean Conflict is its forgotten echo.
Few know about this successful defensive campaign against North Korean infiltrators who hoped to drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea. Fewer still realize that the fighting along the Korean DMZ marked an American military victory that offers bedrock lessons for the counterinsurgency campaigns against the irregular forces fighting American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"It turned out differently than the Vietnam War, but nobody knows about it," said Army BG Daniel P. Bolger, author of the most detailed comprehensive historical analysis of the Second Korean Conflict and commander of the team training the new Iraqi army. "It was a success. It's like Sherlock Holmes -- the dog that didn't bark. When you hold the line against bad things and you do what you're supposed to do, you don't get special credit for that."
Written when the BG was a Major, his book is available on-line at the Combined Arms Research Library of the General Staff College. But - unfortunately - not in downloadable pdf. You have to read it online, or try to find a hard copy.
Scenes From an Unfinished War: Low Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969
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In Leavenworth Paper No. 19 Major Daniel P. Bolger, USA has subjected the events and evolution of this more recent Korean conflict to close analytical scrutiny. The results of his effort require careful study. He not only describes in detail the vast range of military operations short of war that an adversary can employ against countries supported by the United States, but he also assesses how allied forces can adapt to the unexpected and devise countermeasures that, if not completely effective, can at least disrupt the designs of the adversary so he cannot obtain his primary objectives. Through the exemplary leadership of General Charles H. Bonesteel III, Bolger also demonstrates the importance of personality in warfare and the essential need for officers to recognize the dominance of political considerations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. In short, Bolgers' study reinforces current doctrine. which states emphatically that commanders and staff officers "must adopt courses of action which legally support those political considerations even if the courses of action appear to be unorthodox or outside what traditional doctrine had contemplated".
