Another name for a raiding strategy
Archer Jones in his [I]The Art of War in the Western World[I] breaks strategies into two different categories, raiding and combat persisting. Since the end of "major combat operations" in Iraq, we have gone from fighting in the combat persisting mode to fighting a raiding strategy. While there has been more emphasis on intelligence in this war, we are finally in a position to employ the operations that have been traditionally used to defeat the raiding strategy. Historically, raiders have been defeated by employing enough force to space to cut off the raiders ability to manuever and retreat. Raiders generally rely on the superiority of retreat to pursuit. With enough manpower you can cut off the raiders ability to manuever. The raider is most vulnerable when moving.
The raider also relies on the amiguity of the time and place of his attacks. That is one reason why the enemy could not effectively attack during the election. The time and place of his target was known and adequate defensive measures were in place to deal with it. In Iraq the enemy is unusually weak. He is totally ineffective at attacking a defended position. With the Iraqi troops providing the man power to meet the force to space requirement needed, the number of attacks has dropped dramatically. I believe the US strategy of waiting for the trained Iraqis was based on the perception that employing US troops in that role would generate greater resistance to "occupation." I also believe they needed to do a better job of explaing this strategy.
Another aspect of defeating a raiding strategy is denial of sanctuaries. Recent operations in Western Iraq appear to be effective in doing that. This includes a focus on weapons manufacturing and supply. By focusing on taking out the bomb makers and the human bomb ordinance as well as weapons caches we have effected the enmy's ability to pursue his strategy. Another unusual aspect of the war in Iraq is the enemy's inability to effect the ability of US forces to operate in the battle space. While all raiders general avoid direct battle if possible, the enemy in Iraq has focused his attacks on non combatants that has no effect on the corelation of forces. While his forces have been attrited, he has not been able to effectively attrite US forces. His strategy has been aimed more at gaining a victory by appealing to the antiwar movement in this country and its political allies who do not have the will to win. That is an area where the current administration has only recent reengaged.
There are many in the anti war movement who are very invested in opposing the use of force in general. These neo quagmirest are quick to suggest that anytime an enemy uses a raiding strategy the US should just give up and retreat before it becomes "bogged down." Defeating an enemy who uses a raiding strategy robs them of their quagmire argument. I think that is why many of them appear to be rooting for a US defeat and a hasty retreat from victory in Iraq.
It is my opinion that Fourth Generation warfare is just another name for the oldest military strategy--the raiding strategy.
What ever it is, we're not good at it
I wonder what Echevarria’s agenda was in writing 4GW and Other Myths? His comments were extremely arrogant; the same type of arrogance that led to poor strategic planning for the Vietnam War and the initial stages of OIF. Although he made some sound arguments, he lost credibility with me when he wrote "everything" on war has already been written. That mind set has persisted throughout history, and it has always been proven wrong. That doesn’t mean that 4GW theorists are right. We have a terrible record of predicting the future. There are always several variables we never calculate for, and then in hind sight they seem so obvious we wonder why we missed them.
There were several areas of 4GW that Mr. Echevarria failed to address, and one that I would like to address is the assumption that the Nation State is steadying losing power, while non-state actors are becoming more powerful. Most folks today hear non-state actors, and they automatically think Al-Qaeda, but the definition extends far beyond this realm of actors. Consider the following:
1. Globalization (economic model, not political) equals increasing power of multinational corporations that make their own foreign policy and have increasing large security apparatuses. There is much concern on how to control them, while some argue not controlling them will actually lead to more stability, because the nation’s economies will be too interdependent to allow waging war upon one another. Hopefully this isn’t wishful thinking.
2. Transnational criminal organizations becoming increasingly sophisticated and capable of influencing significant political influence through infiltration, bribery, threats, and terrorism. The Italian mob is now the babes in the woods compared to Russian, Chinese, and Latin American gangs. I would throw the Aryan Nation under this group and their ilk under this group also.
3. Large sections of the world are defaulting back to tribal and other undesired political organizations because the State (no longer supported as a proxy in the cold war) doesn’t have the power to control the majority of their population, throughout much of sub-Sahara Africa, South Asia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, etc.
4. Ability of NGOs/PVOs to influence the international audience and force states and non-state actors to act.
5. The growing power of religious organizations. We have our own version of the Taliban in the U.S. thumping the bible and advocating non-state sponsored action against abortion clinics, and in some cases calling for separation from the State (Aryan Brotherhood).
In short our world is changing and so is the nature of conflict. Are the 4GW theorists right? I don’t know, but I disagree strongly with Echevarria’s view that all we need to know has been written already.
GorTex is right, unconventional warfare (in varying degrees) has been around throughout the history of man (it brought Rome to its knees), and that our military institutions have been slow to adapt to the reality on the street. Vietnam was a perfect example of a failed PME beginning with a non-functional West Point Culture that generated officers more concerned about maintaining traditions than dealing effectively with our nation’s security issues. However, I think everyone gets it now.
Give our military professionals more credit
Quote:
Originally Posted by DDilegge
I would submit that we need to give our military professionals more credit… Small Wars, by nature, has a heavy political element that does not necessarily translate to efficiency and often puts the cabash on the “good ideas”.
Your comment about our military professionals is spot on with the possible exception of Vietnam under GEN Westmoreland's lead. Undoubtedly he faced he faced an incredible challenge on the hill. Maybe his policy of total war against N. Vietnam would have worked if he wasn't impeded by President Johnson who was famously quoted they won't bomb an outhouse unless I give them permission to. While I think the war of movement in Vietnam was probably the wrong approach, and on that we can only speculate with the benefit of hindsight.
Almost all officers I have spoken with from Lts through GO's have an understanding of insurgencies and unconventional warfare. They may all have different recommendations on strategy, but as a whole they're a ray of hope. The bottom line is that the military can’t always translate bad policy into a successful mission. While I think the so called Powell Doctrine was unrealistic, I can definitely understand why many in the military embraced it. We can’t count on our nation to do well in these abstract conflicts, because we do a poor job of educating those we need support from throughout the DIME, which we can discuss in the DIME forum.
You’re right, across the board we have a very professional force that America can and should be proud of.
The communist insurgency in Vietnam failed
After their Tet offensive failed, the communist insurgency was never able to threaten conquest of South Vietnam. It had been defeated for all practicle purposes. The Hanoi leadership recognized this and eventually won using a "convential" or combat persiting strategy that was successful when the Congress denied the South Vietnamese the air support we had earlier promised them.
Keeping up the national will
Bill,
I agree with you on the importance of maintaining the national will and I am glad that Bush has reengaged on this aspect of the war. I think the commanders also should be educating the public on the significance of events. If you recall during the first Gulf War, Iraq captured a small town in Saudia Arabia while the coalition was still in the "shaping the battlespace" phase, i.e. the preinvasion bombing. Gen. Schwartkoph was emphatic in stating that the attack on Kafje was not important and would not divert the plan of attack on liberating Kuwait. As I recall the Iraqis were eventually driven out by the Saudi National Guard troops, because the Saudis thought it was significant. My point is that the General did a good job of shaping perceptions and he was in a much better position to do so than the President. Unfortunately in Iraq the briefings are no longer making a splash on the news back in the states. Perhaps Gen. Pace can command a larger audience. Getting accurate information to the public is clearly an important aspect of this war and unfortunately the media is not likely to cooperate.
Lind on Barnett - Sort Of...
SWC's Zenpundit...
Quote:
William Lind has posted a scathing attack on the work of Thomas P.M. Barnett at Defense & The National Interest as part of a series of responses to critics and commenters on 4GW theory...
4th Gen Warfare is not new
4th Gen Warfare is not new. A serious study of the American Revolution will show that the "Founding Fathers" used 4GW. They used conventional military forces; irregular military forces; insurgency; information warfare; effective local, state and national political networks; social factors; economic boycots; attacks against economic targets; and international diplomacy to win the war.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Uncle Scary
Hello Jedburgh,
I wasn't that familiar with 4GW until I scanned the link that you provided.
Here's an excerpt from the abstract.
"In brief, the theory holds that warfare has evolved through four
generations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver,
and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all available
networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince an
opponent’s decisionmakers unachievable or too costly."
Does the notion of 4GW look as fatally flawed as the author believes? I haven't read the whole link, so I can't speak intelligently about the theory or the author's opinions. But from what I gathered in the abstract, he believes that supporters of the 4GW theory believe that war has gone through 4 evolutions through history, and that modern day insurgents are now employing a "4th Gen" of war. The author believes that this theory is flawed, but I didn't get to the reasons why he believed this. Any opinions?
What of 4GW is new, the practice or the theory?
Quote:
Originally Posted by GorTex6
Insurgency is not new. The theory of warfare as it is has evolved in the past couple of centuries is new- this is 4GW.
My point exactly, 4GW is NOT a new form of warfare. Only the theory is NEW? It's like old wine in new bottles, the same old thing with new lables.
Evolutionary, not revolutionary
Gentlemen,
I think we can all agree that 4GW does not represent the advent of a new unprecedented way of war. It is more a cyclical, evolving response by weaker adversaries and nonstate actors to the development of strategic capabilities of modern states. Yet we should conceed that modern forms of insurgency are characterized by unique trends in adversarial capabilities and TTPs that have not been seen before. Part product of technological proliferation and part product of adaptive doctrine, insurgent forces are developing tailored responses to U.S. and allied (mostly Western) global dominance. In particular, insurgent adversaries are developing longterm strategies to shape the strategic environment in their favor for a conflict with the U.S. at a particular time and place of their choosing.
