Only in the sense that people are
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Originally Posted by
MattC86
I'm wondering if in anyway the current Basrah fighting can be compared to ARVN operations in Laos in 1971-72...
shooting at each other.
maybe I'm just a cynic, but...
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Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
the Mahdi Army in the Baghdad area was no longer under Sadr's control but Iran's.
I'm not sure the word "control" ever applies to contemporary Iraq, especially as it pertains to the role of external actors.
Influence? Sure. Allies? Yes, although always temporarily. Control? Underestimates the local dynamics, and the extent to which the locals and supposed "clients" are able to use (and even abandon) the externals and supposed "patrons" as vice-versa.
Reference: see "al-Anbar Awakening, US control over..."
Your political characterization is correct but those are among
the few corollaries. Urban vs. jungle; Two moderately trained and competent Armed forces vs. one less well trained against a group of semi-trained irregulars; Armor and air mobile ops vs. mostly dismounted urban combat; massive US air and artillery support vs. a little; two (sort of nations) in a fight in a third nation vs. a civil disagreement in one; we probably didn't push this on the HN vs. one that the HN didn't really want to do; and so on...
More difference than similarities.
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In that sense, I see a comparison to Basra. Not only is the operation providing a major test of the indigenous security forces, but if they are shown to be extremely wanting (as the ARVN was) it will have further impact on US domestic support, as well as the legitimacy of the Maliki government.
If is a big word; "extremely" wanting is likely to be in the eye of the beholder; impact on US domestic support will have little real effect on much of anything; and the legitimacy of the Maliki government is determined by how it got in power, not by events that occur after it is in power -- though such events can affect its durability and / or survivability, different things.
With respect to the Laos incursion, the real object lesson was not the progress or lack of it of "Vietnamization," it was the failure of the US Army to properly train the Viet Namese or to assist them with detailed planning that was far beyond their capability. In fairness to MACV, XXIV Corps and ARVN, undue and quite wrong pressure by the Bobsey twins of Kissinger and his idiot Mini-Me, Alexander Haig caused a major rush and arguably contributed significantly to the failure just as much as the fact that the south VN fought in Battalions and had NO experience in even Brigade ops, much less multi Division. Dumb political battle and essentially a US fomented effort as opposed to a real local desire...
The fact that the high vis units, Ranger Bns, Airborne Bns and Marine Bns were used was a political failing by both US and VN cdrs.
In regard to what it means
Matt,
Although some of the characterizations of the situation are understandable and maybe even likely; who's helping who and why etc. I think there is one thing we can all bet on.
The militias will not win this one. It seems pretty obvious considering the various elements reviewed even in this thread that the main players all have a somewhat win/win option available and along those lines it would seem unlikely that the militias would be the overall victors.