U.S. Touts Provincial Reconstruction Teams as a Model

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10-13-2006
SWJED

U.S. Touts Provincial Reconstruction Teams as a Model

13 October Los Angeles Times - U.S. Touts Provincial Reconstruction Teams as a Model by Doug Smith.

Quote:

... In a muted ceremony on a U.S. base in this northern city, Khalilzad inaugurated the reconstruction team for Salahuddin province, the last of seven teams the U.S. has established. In addition, Britain, Italy and South Korea are sponsoring a team each.

While characterizing the reconstruction groups as the "embodiment of the U.S. commitment … to ensuring Iraq's success," Khalilzad acknowledged their limited financial resources...

The teams will focus primarily on developing leadership at the local and provincial levels to continue the rebuilding process with diminishing U.S. financial aid...

The teams represent a "transition from working with them to spend U.S. money to working with them to spend Iraqi money," Robert Tillery of the State Department said in a telephone interview Thursday...

Provincial reconstruction teams are modeled on a similar concept used in Afghanistan. Each team consists of about 65 specialists from the State Department, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, USAID and the American military's civil affairs contingent.

The Iraqi Constitution does not allow local governments to raise revenue, thus forcing the provinces to compete for money from Baghdad. "We hear every time we go to the provinces that governments … want the authority to raise revenue," Tillery said at a recent news briefing. "And you can't blame them."

He said efforts were underway to insert a clause allowing local taxation into Iraq's national charter...
10-13-2006
pcmfr

I always thought the names of the PRTs were somewhat ironic. What kind of infrastructure was there to begin with in AF that needs to be "reconstructed?"
02-12-2007
jcustis

How does this square with recent reporting?

Military Wants More Civilians to Help in Iraq http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/07/wa...He0o40mA2JEsKQ

I'm curious as to how the recent article above relates to the PRT blog entry. Although it totally makes sense that interagency cooperation and involvement would go a long way towards sustainable development, what if a PRT was built and nobody came?

Is it the inherent danger of working outside the wire? Is Iraq (Foreign Service) duty viewed as "hiding in the bilges of a sinking ship" and on par with the sentiment we know exists about advisor duty?

Madame Secretary Rice was referenced to have asked for about 120 military personnel to staff 350 new DoS jobs in Iraq that are a spinoff of the new strategy...I'd go in a heartbeat, but that's not the point.

Have we lost that JFKian sense of selflisness? I look back to my readings in Vietnam history, and there were plenty of civilian govt. employees out in the boonies. Granted, the environment may have been a bit more benign, but if these PRTs are a critical component to the revised strategy, then it is likely doomed if we can't get people on board to pack their trash and go forward.

This lack of cohesiveness is killing us with a death by a thousand cuts, and the insurgents (or terrorists if you prefer) are laughing all the way home. :mad:
10-31-2007
Jedburgh

30 Oct 07 testimony before the HASC Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: Learning from the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Experience:

Ambassador John E. Herbst, Coordinator, Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, DoS

Quote:

My office is charged with two tasks. The first is to ensure that the entire U.S. Government is organized to deal with reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) crises affecting U.S. national interests, to include harmonizing civilian and military activities. The second and equally important task is to build the civilian capacity to staff these missions when called upon to respond.

These tasks are simple to describe, but not so simple to achieve. It requires a major, perhaps even a revolutionary, change in the way the U.S. approaches conflict response. Just as the military underwent tremendous reform in the 1980s following the passage of Goldwater-Nichols legislation, we are proposing shifts across our civilian agencies that similarly promote unity of effort so that we best leverage limited resources, and avoid working at cross-purposes.....

Celeste Ward, Dpty Asst Secretary, Stability Operations Capabilities, DoD

Note: I didn't quote Ms. Ward, because I didn't feel that she said anything substantive. But you can follow the link and decide for yourself.

Joseph A. Christoff and Janet St. Laurent , Director, International Affairs & Trade Team and Director, Defense Capabilities & Management Team, GAO

Quote:

State and DOD have begun to take steps to better coordinate stabilization and reconstruction activities, but several significant challenges may hinder their ability to integrate planning for potential operations and strengthen military and civilian capabilities to conduct them. State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning stabilization and reconstruction operations, but the framework has yet to be fully applied to any operation. The National Security Council has not approved the entire framework, guidance related to the framework is unclear, and some interagency partners have not accepted it. For example, some interagency partners stated that the framework’s planning process is cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it produces. While steps have been taken to address concerns and strengthen the framework’s effectiveness, differences in planning capacities and procedures among U.S. government agencies may pose obstacles to effective coordination.

DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct stability operations but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned from past operations into future plans. These challenges, if not addressed, may hinder DOD’s ability to fully coordinate and integrate stabilization and reconstruction activities with other agencies or to develop the full range of capabilities those operations may require. Among its many efforts, DOD has developed a new policy, planning construct and joint operating concept with a greater focus on stability operations, and each service is pursuing efforts to improve capabilities. However, inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations, and differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of DOD and non-DOD organizations hinder the effectiveness of these improvement efforts.....
11-18-2007
relative autonomy

Does anyone think the PRTs are similar to the Revolutionary Development Cadres in Phoenix Program during Vietnam?
12-12-2007
Jedburgh

5 Dec 07 testimony before the HASC Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on Provincial Reconstruction Teams - Historical and Current Perspectives on Doctrine and Strategy:

Bernard Carreau, NDU

General (Ret) Volney F. Warner

BG (Ret) Rick Olson (Former Cdr CJTF-76)

Kathleen Hicks, CSIS
12-12-2007
Tom Odom

Small world.

Volney Warner was my Corps Commander--his son was my comrade in Ranger School and later in 2-505 when senior had XVIII Corps. Jim (the son) retired in 2006 as a BG.

Rick Olson and I took French together.
01-30-2008
Jedburgh

29 Jan 08 testimony before the HASC Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on Interagency Reform: Can the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Case Study Illuminate the Future of Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations?

Carlos Pascual, The Brookings Institution

Quote:

...as a nation we need to understand that addressing conflict and helping nations build peace is a national security priority. It requires both civilian and military capacity. Yet we do not have a national security budget – we have a budget for defense and another for foreign affairs. A stabilization and reconstruction capacity that is essential for the success of defense missions will remain under funded if it is not seen as part of an investment in national security that cuts across accounts....

Barbara Bodine, Princeton University

Michele Flournoy, Center for a New American Security

Nora Bensahel, RAND

Quote:

....there are some ways to minimize some of the negative effects of interagency competition and increase U.S. capacity for stability operations. These include:

1. Manage interagency competition....

2. Create incentives for interagency secondments....

3. Increase the capacity of USAID....

4. Establish flexible funding mechanisms....

5. There is no substitute for an involved president and an involved Congress....
02-15-2008
Jedburgh

14 Feb 08 testimony before the HASC Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on Provincial Reconstruction Teams: A Case for Interagency National Security Reform?:

Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Policy)

Stephen D. Mull, Acting Asst Secretary, Bureau of Pol-Mil Affairs, DoS

Michael E. Hess, Asst Administrator, Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, USAID

(Barry Pavel, Principal Deputy Asst SecDef (SOLIC and Interdependent Capabilities), also appeared, but a transcript of his testimony is not available.)
02-15-2008
PhilR

Different PRTs

I think its been pointed out elsewhere, but its worth noting that that PRTs in Afghanistan are different from those in Iraq. Having just left Baghdad, I'm more familiar with Iraq. In Iraq, the PRTs are State Department organizations that, while they have military members, are supervised by the US embassy (by the Office of Provincial Affairs--OPA). Iraq PRTs, for the most part, do not have their own organic security capability and are reliant on nearby military units. My understanding is that the PRTs in Afghanistan are part of the military chain of command (reporting through DoD)and have a small military unit (platoon?) organic to provide security and help them move around the battlefield.
I think these differences are significant when you consider the underlying impact on the missions and capabilities of the PRTs in each campaign.
02-18-2008
marct

Quote:

Originally Posted by PhilR

I think its been pointed out elsewhere, but its worth noting that that PRTs in Afghanistan are different from those in Iraq.

From my limited understanding of the PRTs in Afghanistan, it's somewhat more complex than that. I believe there are 12 operating in the American sector, 10 of which are US (1 Turkish and 1 Aus). Lines of reporting are "complex", and sometimes involve a dual structure. There are also separate PRTs and "embedded" PRTs - the ones with troops.
02-18-2008
Surferbeetle

Afghanistan PRT's

USIP Report # 152

The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified

by Robert M. Perito

http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.html

Quote:

Summary

* Important lessons for current and future U.S. peace and stability operations can be found in the experiences of Americans who served in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. PRTs are small, joint civilian-military organizations whose mission is to promote governance, security, and reconstruction throughout the country.
* In June 2005, the United States led thirteen PRTs and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) directed nine. This multinational program was characterized by an emphasis on flexibility, a proliferation of national models, and an ad hoc approach to security and development.
* The U.S. model featured a complement of seventy-nine American military and three civilian government representatives. The U.S. PRTs stressed governance, force protection, and quick impact development projects to "win hearts and minds."
* The PRT emphasis on governance translated into supporting the respective provincial governors.
* Security was limited to self-protection, providing a security presence, and assisting Afghan forces.
* Reconstruction projects suffered from a lack of coordination and oversight. Military involvement in development brought criticism from relief agencies that claimed it put them at risk by blurring the distinction between combatants and humanitarian workers.
* In the view of many PRT veterans, the entire multinational PRT program would benefit from an agreed concept of operations and an effective central coordinating authority. The U.S. PRTs would profit from interagency delimitation of civilian and military roles and improved civilian agency staffing, funding, and administrative support.
* PRT veterans believe the addition of USAID representatives and better coordination with Afghan national development plans improved U.S. PRT reconstruction efforts. Rapidly disbursing long-term funding sources available to civilian representatives would rationalize and speed reconstruction efforts, which should focus on security-related infrastructure.
* PRT veterans also argue that PRTs are primarily military organizations; thus, better suited for performing security-related tasks. PRTs should concentrate on supporting Afghan security sector reform and providing a security presence in contested areas.
02-18-2008
Jedburgh

Quote:

Originally Posted by Surferbeetle

USIP Report # 152

The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified

Also from USIP on the PRTs in Afghanistan, conducted a bit over two years ago:

Oral Histories: Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams

The link brings you to a page of links to pdf files with the transcripts of interviews with US government officials, military personnel, and members of international organizations and NGOs.
02-18-2008
Surferbeetle

German Overseas Military Missions

A 2006 article from Die Zeit in German

http://www.zeit.de/online/2006/44/bu...landseinsaetze

Quote:

Die laufenden Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr

Die Bundeswehr ist momentan mit insgesamt rund 9000 Soldaten an zehn verschiedenen internationalen Einsätzen beteiligt. Ein Überblick über die Missionen.

'The Ongoing Overseas Missions of the Bundeswehr'

'The Bundeswehr is currently covering (partitioned in) 10 different international missions with approximately 9,000 soldiers. A summary (overview) of the missions."

It goes on to cover activities in UNFIL in Lebanon, EFOR in Bosnia, EUFOR RD in the Congo, Active Endeavour in the Atlantic?, UNMIS in Sudan, UNOMIG in Georgia, and UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

For this thread the detail on OEF support to Maritime security off the Horn of Africa and the Humanitarian mission in Northern Afghanistan is of interest.

For those of you who catch the ZDF video podcast of the daily news (in German and free) the 1 February 2008 show pretty much captures Germany's attitude towards sending combat troops into southern Afghanistan 'No we already have the third largest contingent of troops'.

We will see if this attitude changes with the coming spring and associated snowmelt and opening of the mountain passes...
02-18-2008
davidbfpo

Afghan PRT work

I understand the value of PRTs and am aware that the Czechs are soon to have an independent one, with a reinforced Army company alongside - alas cannot recall which province they are going to.

In Helmand, where the UK and allies are there is a UK PRT. There the difficulty has been in getting Kabul to release funding - allocated to Kabul - so £20m in one year built twenty wells. Not value for money there and heaven knows what the annoucement by PM Gordon Brown in late '07 of an aid allocation of £200m actually will produce.

Security first. Then build schools and sink wells.

None of the collective experience augurs well for the much-mooted USAID effort in NWFP, where security is unclear and local hostility guaranteed. Afghans are too poor - yes proud - not to accept help, however meagre.

I suspect the idea of a NATO/UN "overlord", sorry co-ordinator, is underpinned by the diversion of aid funds.

davidbfpo
02-19-2008
MattC86

Quote:

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

I suspect the idea of a NATO/UN "overlord", sorry co-ordinator, is underpinned by the diversion of aid funds.

davidbfpo

Given how mightily we've struggled to coordinate our military efforts, with just a relative handful of military commands theoretically merged into one ISAF command structure, I shudder to think of the difficulties in coordinating the many national agencies under some type of coordinated structure.

Keeping aid funds and agency/NGO work with the decentralized PRTs in theory prevents an ineffective cookie-cutter approach, but the accounting problems you mention mean that HQs are going to step in. . .

Matt
02-24-2008
redbullets

Contractors on PRTs

Here's an unfortunate wrinkle around PRTs and their staffing.

Both in Afghanistan and Iraq, due, I suppose to the lack of enthusiastic volunteers, contractors occupy some positions on the teams. This makes some of the smaller NGOs like mine nervous about information sharing and anything beyond that.

Based on years of experience, when we meet USAID and Department for International Development (DfID, of the UK) personnel in the field, we ask if they are core or contract employees. It makes us nervous to share too much information with folks who might be tasked by their contributing company with both output delivered under the existing contract, as well as business development tasks on top. We've heard more than once, in the field, "well, we're supposed to do that" from contract employees of PRTs, and that causes us to immediately leave the room and cease all contact. The conflicts of interest seem obvious, but they continue to exist, and we're not overly enthusiastic about sticking our own heads in the noose.

Cheers,
02-24-2008
Surferbeetle

PRT Analysis

This Princeton report is linked on the the SWC site and covers the US, UK, German, Canadian, Italian, and Lithuanian PRT's. "The Lithuanian PRT includes Ukranians, Croatians, Georgians, Icelanders, U.S., U.K., and Danish soldiers."

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...truction-team/

Quote:

To date, there has been no comprehensive review of PRT models to evaluate effectiveness or address shortcomings. This report seeks to answer three questions in order to begin filling the knowledge gap:

- Should the United States and coalition partners continue to use PRTs?
- Are PRTs achieving the goals for which they are funded?
- What are the best practices of countries that sponsor and contribute to PRTs?

Because there is very little standardization of mission and operations across PRTs, we used the following assumptions as the basis for our analysis and research.

-Using a variety of models, missions and functions, PRTs initiate progress on reconstruction, security, and development in post-conflict environments.
- The PRT concept is part of a larger set of responses to post-conflict challenges.
- PRTs are part of an evolutionary process of civil-military relations and interagency cooperation.

Here is a British Army view, CMIC oriented, presented by MG Riley

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Nat...rity/hl893.cfm

Quote:

I thought I would give you a divisional commander’s view, informed by two years’ service in Iraq with the British and U.S. armies, as well as in Sierra Leone and the Balkans. These operations have all been complex, involving kinetic warfighting, counter-insurgency, information operations, humanitarian support, civil– military cooperation (CIMIC),[1] and security-sector reform running concurrently in the same battle space.

Here is a short German analysis (March 2004) of their military structure vs. mission requirements:

http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/...5cf84e2145757a

The article examines how ~242,000 Bundeswehr personnel are utilized in terms of a strategy which must address european security and political concerns, international terrorism, conflict prevention, and coping with crisises. It appears that ~35,000 soldiers are designated for high intensity operations.

The Bundeswehr website provides this snapshot (2007) on funding for reconstruction work

http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/C12...-6460_isaf.pdf

Quote:

Deutschland unterstützt als viertgrößter bilateraler Geber den Wieder- aufbau und die Entwicklung Afghanistans seit 2002 mit jährlich über 80 Mio. Euro. Dieser Beitrag wurde 2007 auf 100 Mio. Euro erhöht und soll 2008 auf 125 Mio. Euro steigen.

'Germany underwrites as the fourth largest provider for Reconstruction and Development in Afghanistan since 2002 with a yearly 80 million Euro. This became 100 million Euro in 2007. Funding/Euro was increased and will rise to 125 million Euro in 2008.'

(This entry leads to questions about the funding contributions of the 1st through 3rd place providers, insight would be appreciated).

Wikipedia has an interesting link on PRT's as well

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinc...struction_Team
03-03-2008
jcustis

Quote:

Provincial reconstruction teams are modeled on a similar concept used in Afghanistan. Each team consists of about 65 specialists from the State Department, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, USAID and the American military's civil affairs contingent.

I just came across a solicitation of sorts on the Lightfighter.net forum, posted by someone who states that: "The company I work for is gearing up for a major Iraq-wide project involving management and leadership of provincial reconstruction teams.

There are a wide variety of positions, from construction, public planning, liason with local groups, engineering, etc.

Experience in country is a must, as are leadership skills.

If you are interested, send me a PM. This is a long, long term contract."

I paid particular attention to the use of the word company vice agency/organization. What are folks' thoughts on the merits of contracting out "leadership skills"?

Will this mean that, as with PMCs delivering security products, there could be companies out there contracting the business of PRT work, assuming that some govt agencies will not be able to source the manpower that is required (and needs to be willing) to fill the PRT slots?
03-04-2008
marct

Hi JC,

Quote:

Originally Posted by jcustis

I paid particular attention to the use of the word company vice agency/organization. What are folks' thoughts on the merits of contracting out "leadership skills"?

Isn't that the modern way :wry:? I paid more attention to the phrase "this will be a long, long term contract." There are some very interesting assumptions behind that statement, most of which I really don't like. For example, a friend of mine just finished bidding on a contract to do provincial reconstruction in an African country - full infrastructure upgrades, training, economic development, etc. - and that contract is only going to last for 3 years.

Quote:

Originally Posted by jcustis

Will this mean that, as with PMCs delivering security products, there could be companies out there contracting the business of PRT work, assuming that some govt agencies will not be able to source the manpower that is required (and needs to be willing) to fill the PRT slots?

They already exist JC. Increasingly we are seeing government agencies refusing to develop internal capacity. By way of a parallel, they are operating in exactly the same way the Byzantine bureaucrats did after the death of Basil II - I just hope that there policies don't have a similar effect (think Manzikert, 1071).