Some links on the Hill case.
About 75 links appear on Googling - "roger hill" "article 32", of which, here are three: What Happened? (by Puckett & Faraj, attorneys); Interrogating Army 'justice' (Wash Times op-ed by Andy O'Meara, Tom McInerney and Paul Vallely); and Help Captain Roger Hill (by his wife).
Law for Schmedlap's example?
Rifleman,
I suspect that the British soldiers action was influenced by the Common law offence of Assisting an Offender (incorporated into statute in 1967) and the wife's refusal to help may have enabled her arrest. Post-VE day the situation in Germany was hardly normal and some form of emergency or military law was available.
Since 1967 additional offences have appeared in statute regarding terrorism notably e.g. failing to report etc.
I am not a lawyer and Schmedlap's example is set in 1945, before my arrival.
davidbfpo
I understand the desire to nitpick the circumstances ...
But the context and details of the story are only marginally relevant. Debating what would have happened if she had refused to provide the information only obfuscates the point. If she had not provided the information, then the plane's engines would have been shut down, she would have known that we were bluffing, and then she would have told all ten people who would listen to her that we bluff. So what?
Other details are also only marginally relevant in my opinion. The main thrust is whether such a practice is moral and legal. I won't comment on legal except that if it is legal in policing work in the U.S. (which it is), I cannot possibly see how it could be illegal in warfare, conventional, counterinsurgency or counterterrorism.
As for the morality of the practice, I cannot see how it could be immoral. In the story we lied to the woman. So what? I can make a Biblical and moral case for lying and deception under many different circumstances, not the least of which is warfare. The enemy is not entitled to the truth. While I don't believe in situational ethics, it's also important to realize that morality is not exlusively deontological (long story, I'll be happey to elaborate in an e-mail to any interested party).
Finally, as for duress, I have no problems with causing distress to the enemy. In your story the woman may not be the enemy, but it simply must be understood by our morally preening society that warfare involves corporate accountability, and that the conduct of war unavoidably and necessarily involves harm to the land, infrastructure, and even though we try to avoid it, noncombatants. In this particular story we have not harmed the woman, only caused her emotional distress. So much the better, because if we get the information we want, we may be able to save lives of our own servicemen. To me, this story presents the clearest picture of a win-win situation. She is unharmed, and we save lives.
As for unavoidable collateral damage and harm to noncombatantct, it is a function of the nature of armed conflict. If the nation doesn't like it, they should consider this fact prior to launching a campaign rather than attempt to change the nature of the thing that they have started.
As one final thought, harm to noncombatants (while this is a little far afield from the subject of the post) does do harm to the overall campaign and of course should be avoided to the extent possible, while also not restricting the right of self defense. But I agree with Ken (I believe it was he who made the point) that I don't believe that anyone is this important. In general, I am no fan of the HVT campaign because I think it is largely ineffective (here I am not referring to the drone campaign in Pakistan, but the SOF raids in the middle of the night to capture mid-level Taliban commanders who will be released later anyway).
Now that I have taken the discussion too far afield, I'll sign off.
Slap, you're losing me a bit on this one ...
Quote:
That is the whole problem with guerrilla warfare....because they don't fight by the rules by the time you figure out which category they are in you may be dead or have lost the war.
The point of the FMs is to relieve platoon, company and battalion combat personnel from classification problems (for detainees) - thus, the generic classification of "detained persons". The general idea of the FMs is to preserve evidence at the lower levels and leave interrogations and classifications for higher levels in the chain.
That being said, CPT Hill's case illustrates two real problems - (1) a breakdown at the battalion and higher levels in regard to indigenous security risk detainees and how they were handled; and (2) totally inadequate forces at the tip of the spear (his company of about 60 was eventually replaced with a force of 1200).
If you are referring to the rules regarding initial contact (kill or capture), you may have a point depending on how the local ROE/RUFs are phrased - and how well educated and trained in those rules the troops are.
Where the concepts of the SROEs and SRUFs are followed (in drafting the local rules), the problem you cite (classification by status) shouldn't occur. The SROEs and SRUFs always default to a conduct standard (a hostile act or threat on the part of the target allows proportionate self-defense on the part of the soldier).
Status classification at the contact level comes into play only where a hostile group is defined by NCA (let's say AQ). In that case (positing that there are no constraints placed on the Laws of War by local ROE/RUFs), kill or capture of one of those defined targets is allowed at any place and any time. The practical problem is identification of the status target hidden amidst the population and hitting the right person (e.g., CORDS-Phoenix in Vietnam, which detained or converted twice as many VC cadres as it killed).
I have no idea of the precise local ROE/RUFs that CPT Hill's unit was operating under (and probably they are classified). So, they may have been the problem, or at least contributed to the problem.
Slap, I wish we lived in something close ....
to an ideal world, but we don't. If we did, CPT Hill would have been able to call in his partnered gendarmerie unit since indigenous security risks and interrrogation of them would be part of that unit's function. Of course, we do not have gendarmerie units. So, CPT Hill is told to Make Do; expected to say Can Do; and everyone lived happily ever after. Except they didn't.
While I won't go so far as your "total immunity", my two cents worth is that CPT Hill should have been pulled out, sent back home and given enough time to decompress, and then promoted to MAJ. That's an emotional response, I know.
As to "The LAW is being used as a weapon aginst US Soldiers", you'll find no argument against that proposition from me. What we should be exploring (and implementing) is how to use the Law as a weapon for US forces. At most, defensive measures have been employed in that area. Purely defensive measures generally don't work well in law. At some point, you have to at least mount a counter-attack.
And, yes, these wars are "Fugged up" - no doubt about that one.