A few thoughts on MiTTs and ETTs
I had the fortune (misfortune) to be a part of the initial planning for consolidating MiTT training at Riley (previously it was scattered and REALLY bad:mad:). A few thoughts and background on the common points/questions running through this thread:
1. Advisor vs Soldier Skills... Lots of factors, but two are most significant... Army G1 convinced G3 and FORSCOM that PERSTEMPO would only allow for a 60 day training window. I am not casting aspersions... people of this particular rank and skill set are in very short supply and demand is high, we can quibble over whether we ought to train to time or standard but that is part of the calculation. Second, there is a list a mile long of MNF-I, MNC-I, CFC-A, and FORSCOM pre-deployment training that is mandated. If you want a mix for dissatisfaction... mix 60 days + basic soldier skills + experienced soldiers = training dissatisfaction. In fact, what I've heard anecdotally is that 60 days is too much (of course this is based on concurrent training content).
2. Sorry Tom, but I don't think the decision to move the MiTT training to Polk was not as rigorously examined as you are under the impression. More of a knee jerk if you asked my impression. A lot of conjecture is mostly what I have to back that up, so it doesn't merit mention in this forum... but I will say this. The decision to move the training was made before the decision as to whether it was a "relatively" permanent requirement and who ought to be the Army proponent. The synergy of combining the training was pretty much debunked by the responsible TRADOC organization, and if TRADOC were to be named Army lead (makes sense) then I don't think it would have moved it to Polk. Better options such as Knox. No this was a FORSCOM initiative that was pushed very rigorously to make training space for BCTs that will be fielded in the next few years, and my darker angels say to try and force big Army to move the mission to TRADOC.
3. The lack of qualified instructors is an institutional failure. That mechanism was supposed to be in place, but it appears no one wants to tell a returning advisor... "sorry, I know you should go to ILE (or CCC or wherever) but the Army needs you to do this mission for 12-18 months." I understand the desire to give folks who have done a tough mission well, a break, but if you serve long enough we all have taken one for the good of the service.
So in the end... the move to Polk might have some political overtones and was most likely not that well considered or sequenced with other linked decisions, but it was not empire building by the folks at Polk.
MiTT/ETT Training is what it is because we have convinced ourselves that PERSTEMPO will only allow 60 days training; that we can't trust parent units to maintain individual soldier skills; and the personel system seems unwilling to deliver bad news
and....
Security Force Assistance has a new Joint Proponent SOCOM. Good news... DoD actually named a proponent :o... Bad News... Indicates a leaning towards pidgeon holing the capability in SOF and oh by the waywhat does a proponent do???? DOTMLPF requirements determination and capabilities development. Is SOCOM really suitted institutionally and culturally to do capability development for GPF????:mad: Argghh, me thinks not. Sorry Old Eagle, Rob, and Tom... I think the wind direction wrt SFA is blowing us away from port.
Live well and row
SFA: Enduring Mission--Need for Enduring Answers
A fascinating discussion of the Security Forces Assistance Mission, to which I'd like to contribute a few facts and opinions.
First, and most important, is the question of whether this is an enduring mission. The Secretary of Defense certainly thought it was at the AUSA Conference last October: "Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries." He also doesn't (or at least didn't, back on October 10th), think that we have it quite right yet: "How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking.”
Second is the nature and quality of the training for MTT teams here at Fort Riley. This is improving, due in no small part to the fact that the number of former advisors assigned to do the training continues to increase; my battalion of 96 now has 13 former advisors assigned, many in the critically important field grade/company commander/first sergeant roles. Not where we need to be, yet, but moving in the right direction. Similarly, the nascent doctrine for GPF engaging in SFA, now being written by the Air Land Sea folks, is also an important institutional adaptation to the wars we're fighting.
Some good news. However, advisors continue to wonder how the mission they're executing--the enabler of our exit strategy in two wars--will be rewarded by the Army. There are moves in the direction of an advisor Additional Skill Identifer, which would obviously be helpful in tracking this skill set for the Long War, and toward granting KD credit for those who successfully lead TT teams--but there are more incentives that could be offered to increase the desire of our best and brightest to volunteer for this mission, in my eyes at least the most important we're doing as an Army.
As for where we conduct SFA training, that is perhaps less important than any of the other elements of DOTMLPF. Most important is that the Army embrace the necessity to view the combat advisory mission holistically, from Doctrine through Facilities, and within the context of a broader DoD and USG advisory perspective. "Innovative and forward thinking" on this critical mission remains necessary--as does execution of decisions on DOTMLPF.
Close down the Hoffman Building...
Can I ask a really dumb question?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Hacksaw
...2. Multiple sources (Theater and FORSCOM) provide authoritative guidance regarding directed/mandatory pre-deployment training requirements. ...
... (an improvement but a far smaller % than was envisioned when FT Riley backbriefed its concept to FORSCOM in 2006).
Why is FORSCOM involved?
This from one with long (over 10 years) and intimate (too intimate) experience with that Hq...
Quote:
By the way the answer is.... four (Rodney Dangerfield in Back to School)
Heh. I did know that... :D
Sorry to be obtuse, however, I still am confused
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Old Eagle
Ken --
FORSCOM, as the Army's force generation HQ, has the mission to provide trained and ready forces to the warfighting commands, so they write the standards..
I'm aware of their mission and having participated directly for a lot of long hours in that force generation effort during Desert Shield and Storm know that then the gaining GCC provided the tasks and standards; FORSCOM merely executed. I know things change but one expects the changes to be progress, not regression.
I understand FORSCOM involvement on location selection (though I question whether today with ACSIM there should be such a thing as a 'FORSCOM' or 'TRADOC' post...) and operational entity (as Riley/1 ID vs. JRTC) but other than as executor for templating TRADOC doctrine over CentCom requirements at unit level seems to me that their imposing standards is merely job justification???
An added question. Even accepting FORSCOM standard setting for units, am I to understand that the Advisory Teams are considered FORSCOM elements until they chop over to CentCom? The Teams were the focus of my question, while I think the setting of standards is a bit much, I can understand some FORSCOM involvement with units in the generation and deployment process. I'm unsure what their relationship with the Teams happens to be.
Sorry to be a pain, just trying to get a feel for what's happening.