"Each BCT was a kingdom unto itself"
On the other hand, some - given orders no more clear than "keep a lid on it" - managed to create our current model for COIN ops.
A response to Mr. Owen's definition
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
So what percentage of support are we talking about, and is that willing consent or coerced consent? If the premise of FM3-24 is as you describe then it is deeply flawed and has not read deeply into the history of irregular warfare. The very fact they call it "COIN" should act as a warning
Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups. One armed group is required to overcome the other. Killing the right people enables that. Killing the wrong people is almost always counter-productive. Until you reduce the enemy's ability to constrain your freedom of action, you can't do any of the so called hearts and minds stuff, which should be focussed on creating a hostile environment for the enemy! - not just a nice environment for the locals!
I am new to this forum so if I speak brashly, I apologize for my inexperience. All my experience with irregular warfare or insurgency comes from one tour to Afghanistan as a platoon leader. In that tour, I definitely fought insurgents, but I also conducted humanitarian operations (the soft side or hearts and minds).
When reading the responses to my second comment, it seemed like the responders glossed over Mr. Owen's first thought: that insurgencies or irregular warfare DO NOT REQUIRE THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION. Mr. Owen then calls the US Army COIN manual deeply flawed. Many responders on this thread gave kudos to him for his definition of warfare while ignoring this comment. I have to ask the people reading this thread, how many people find the FM 3-24 flawed for its belief that insurgencies are supported by the population?
Second, Mr. Owens definition of warfare is a correct start, but leaves out the most important detail. Rank Amateur and Brandon were hinting at this specific deficiency. Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups using violence to achieve political ends. In warfare, the political motivation is everything; it is what separates warfare from criminality. Without politics, warfare would not exist.
Further, Mr. Owens provides the next point: "Killing the right people enables that." Killing is a method, but so is influencing them irregular forces to give up arms, convincing the leadership to join the government, or destroying their logistical support so that they cannot continue fighting. In Carl's link above, Thomas Ricks describes killing people as the least effective way to combat insurgents. I agree. You can kill insurgents or irregular forces, but that is only one method of overcoming an armed force. Convincing whole groups to quit fighting is much more effective and more beneficial in the long run.
Finally, saying "just kill the right people" is easy. On paper, that briefs really well. The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given. And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.
Unfortunately, for soldiers in the US Army and Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan, counter-insurgency is never the simple decision between killing the enemy or population-centric counter-insurgency. Soldiers conduct humanitarian operations, build the local government, train local security forces all while conducting counter-force operations (killing the enemy). What the Rakkasans--to bring this back to the article "Kill Company"--really failed to do was conduct full-spectrum counter-insurgency, and that is why they are a cautionary tale to modern soldiers.
Michael C. at www.onviolence.com
Here's an Afghan related article worth reading, Michael C.
It is from a different perspective and is admittedly biased toward that perspective but it makes a point that merits some thought by a lot of people.
The Civil and the Military efforts in stability operations are two different things. In US practice for a variety of reasons, the Armed Forces have assumed primacy in such operations and we have thus mingled the two efforts in an unsatisfactory blend that does neither the Civil or the Military role as well as could be expected -- and as should have been expected...
One of those reasons, BTW, is not the oft quoted "The military folks have to do it due to the security situation." That can be true early on; it should not be allowed to continue past its 'sell-by' date.
So, biased, yes -- but it merits thought with respect to what is a military function and what is not: LINK.
Good post. Can I join your rant?
Well said all (except that part about me being correct, you misspelled unusual...). Agree with all but two things struck me in particular. One made me laugh, the other is sort of sad:
Quote:
"...meeting with the local malik and pass out a few bags of rice and blankets and then don't get the local Taliban..."
My first thought was why on earth would we expect him to turn himself in. :D
Not funny really but it does happen that we unknowingly give gifts to the local Talib's or Smuggler's point men. What that does to our credibility is an interesting question...
Quote:
"Then they expect the locals to put their lives in danger by cooperating with the government, a government that is absent 99% of the time and has no ability to provide even basic services or security."
True dat. Couple that fact with the problem that we, NATO, other Coalition members and the Afghans do not have the troop strength available to change that. Nor are we likely to. Thus you're confronted with the harsh fact that the only viable military option is to remove as many of the opposition as possible as rapidly and as efficiently as possible. Which, after all, is why the armed forces are there in the first place...
As a young troop in my son's airplane rifle platoon before his second deployment in 2003 told an inquiring Australian TV journalist who asked what he was going to do; "Shoot bad guys." She said "but isn't this about winning hearts and minds?" He said "Nah, I've talked to 'em, they ain't coming on that, besides the government's got other people to try to do that stuff -- we kill people." Gotta give the kid credit. He was a Specialist, a lowly SPC, an uneducated, far from powerful peon; Joe. Yet he understood the population's attitude and knew precisely what his job was.
And who was responsible for what.
And that was six damn years ago... :mad:
I think the question is *should* that be the case...
The CIDG effort worked well with the right tribes -- and failed miserably with others. That was sometime due to the particular tribe, sometimes due to the particular SF team. There was indeed 'civic action.' Concrete pads for people who insisted on building their dwellings on stilts being my pet example; they built new houses on new stilts and built pens for their pigs on the pads... :rolleyes:
The Mike Force didn't really work all that well and most, after the fact, admitted that overall, the cost of the effort did not get returned by results. Neither program did what was promised. Both affected a microscopic segment of the population while the bulk of the populace derived little to no benefit -- nor did the US derive much from it. Except experience. Which we discarded. So we can now learn the same lessons again...
Quote:
There seems to be a tone of exclusive "either-or" to the discussion. Is that really the case?
I think the answer in the minds of most at this time would be no, that should not be the case, the Army and Marines must be 'full service COIN operators.' I do not dispute that idea in event there is no other alternative but I strongly believe that the Armed Forces effort to both the fighting and the civil side efforts should be restricted to the minimum possible amount of time for each -- and they will likely be differing lengths of time.
Such operations involve trying to aid the population. The Armed Forces are not in that business other than for short term emergencies. They do not have the disposition, inclination or the expertise to do the civil support jobs other than minimally. They can and will do a barely passable job overall. We have been in Afghanistan approaching eight years. Efforts to build up the civil side and remove the Armed Forces from the bulk of that effort will likely take another three or four years to fully implement. State will get the primacy on the civil side they should have always possessed.
The real problem is that Afghanistan is not COIN, it's a war. Our efforts to treat it as COIN effort and our US Government wide institutional failure to be prepared for or to reject participation in such conflicts are partly why it is now a war.
We can do the Stability Op / FID / SFA thing if we must but let's do it right. Going in as outsiders to 'help' people who do not want your help is not easy, not simple, will generally produce stopgap efforts of little merit and really needs to be avoided if at all possible. If we better prepare the Intel Community, State and USAID to do their jobs -- as well as better training our Armed forces -- perhaps we won't have to do this again for a long while. We certainly should not. If we do, one would hope we were better prepared next time.
There are two components to such operations. The military effort can aid the civil power and effort. It cannot replace that civil power and attempts to make it do so will always produce uneven and less than satisfactory results.
The Ranger mentality is not the finest invention of the US Army.
It has a lot going for it but it must be tempered -- and too few are willing to temper the "Kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out" mentality but are more than willing to stomp on any attempts at imaginative or innovative tactics or new ideas.
Hard to fire people in the Army other than those you can Chapter out (too easily IMO); thank, in Steele's and many others cases, AR 600-200, DOPMA and OPD 21 and the Congresses that dictated them in a well intentioned effort to be fair and prevent abuses. It's as difficult to fire people in the Armed forces as it is to fire Civil servants, all thanks to Congress. Plus the personnel system creates a lot of problems for itself. Can't say that COL X is a slug because LTG Y sat on his promotion board. We are reflective of a nation awash in political correctness; can't criticize others, can't embarrass the institution.
While it can embarrass itself with impunity, speaking truth to power -- or the prevailing wisdom -- just isn't done.
Fortunately, some of our friends aren't so encumbered. For example, it doesn't seem to have gotten to these two smart Strynes who have figured out that bogus COIN is not the way to go. LINK, LINK.
What is being called COIN is a dangerous road for anyone. If you're an outsider intervening in another Nations, it is doubly dangerous. If you're a generally disliked outsider, it becomes triply dangerous. If you have not been trained for the role, it is quadruply dangerous. You cannot expect a force told to do only high intensity conflict to adapt quickly to the stability ops environment without hiccups, big ones. Steele and the Rakkasans sort of showed that, the two linked articles sort of highlight it.
"honest, balanced, and thoroughly disturbing"
In the interest of balance - in that the article itself isn't accessible, a couple brief quotes from it:
"During his deployment in Iraq, Steele saw eighteen of his soldiers killed in action—the same number as in Somalia. The brigades that preceded and replaced the Rakkasans each lost more than twice as many men."
and
"Quantifying the level of discipline in a unit as large as a brigade is not easy, but, according to Army data, the number of Rakkasan escalation-of-force incidents in 2006 was below the median for brigades in Iraq."
Meanwhile, elsewhere and more recently (while it could stand alone I think it has a place here)...
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htm...anistan08.html
CAMP LEATHERNECK, Afghanistan — U.S. Marines trapped Taliban fighters in a residential compound and persuaded the insurgents to allow women and children to leave. The troops then moved in — only to discover that the militants had slipped out, dressed in burqas, the loose enveloping robes some Muslim women wear.
The fighters, who may owe their lives to the new U.S. commander's emphasis on limiting civilian casualties, were among hundreds of militants who have fled the offensive the Marines launched last week in southern Helmand province.
Not a problem; we're here to learn and disagreements are part of that.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Michael C
I read this comment echoed several times on this thread and others. Afghanistan is counter-insurgency fighting. An insurgency attempts to overthrow the government; a counter-insurgency attempts to defeat those attempts. By defining insurgency and counter-insurgency like this, we can see that politics is the key driving force on either side (whether your politics are religiously motivated or not, they are still politics).
I agree with all that. I could quibble and point out that most armed disagreements have politics as the key force on either side but that's minor.
Quote:
I have to define Afghanistan as a counter-insurgency because it will require political solutions.
Does this mean that war is not amenable to political solutions?
Quote:
When commenters say it is not COIN it is war, what they mean is it is not Iraq.
Incorrect statement. It may be true for some people but you did not qualify it by adding 'some.' It is absolutely not true for me. I suspect most others here who have said the same thing would also say it is not true for them.
I said it is not a COIN operation for the simple reasons that: (1) the US is not the government with an Insurgent problem; It may be a COIN effort for the Government of Afghanistan, it is not for the US. That, as they say, is doctrine. We are engaged in FID LINK and SFA LINK (both links .pdf) (2) there are other armed and hostile players aside from the insurgents that are admittedly present thus while there may be insurgents, there are other -- and larger -- problems. If that were not true, we would likely not be there in the first place... (3) Facets of conventional and irregular warfare aside from COIN like efforts are imperative or the coalition casualty rate will climb rapidly.
None of that is semantic or doctinaire nit picking, those are significant points and that last item is overlooked by entirely too many, some in high places, some actually on the ground, who fail to understand that reality and get people killed unnecessarily.
Quote:
...it is a rural insurgency fought mainly with guerilla tactics.
So far and in general if not in totality; we'll see if that remains the case. Night vision devices and much improved TTP have already been detected in use by the bad guys...
Quote:
It is also extremely intense and kinetic, but it is still COIN.
You may call it what you wish. What is important is that we realize the US is not engaged in a COIN effort, it is engaged in a stability operation assisting a foreign government which has an insurgency and a major lawlessness problem and that many efforts that government would apply in a COIN effort cannot be applied by us in Afghanistan as we aren't the government nor can many be applied by the Afghans themselves due to the nature of the society and their economic circumstances. Also, as you say, it is indeed extremely intense and kinetic and thus many things one would do ordinarily in support of a COIN effort cannot be done at this time (I'd suggest that alone makes it a war, YMMV).
I'm reminded of Rifleman's old tag line (and use it hoping he won't mind) quoting a Hessian officer who said, "Call this war by whatever name you may, only call it not an American rebellion; it is nothing more or less than a Scotch Irish Presbyterian rebellion." He was correct but many British Officers disagreed -- they were also correct as later events showed. Names aren't that important. What is important is that those involved (and those here in CONUS) realize it may be a COIN effort for the Afghans with us and others in support and that certain techniques must be employed but that it is in fact a war for all practical news release and funding purposes.
More important is what's being done to bring it to a reasonably acceptable conclusion. You're doing your part, for which I thank you.