Bespoke COIN Planning Required?

I read the following link from the BBC about life in Kandahar.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8203830.stm

It set me to thinking that in some places where there is a degree of Afghan normality (whatever that might mean) oughtn't we to be considering reducing ISAF presence to a bare minimum and beginning to run out some of the post insurgency lines of development.

Its just an initial impression that there may be a tendancy to concentrate intellectual and planning focus on the high intensity conflict zones in the southern area, and as a result we may not be actively progressing capacity building in those places where resistance has reduced and where local government might be gaining some traction.

I'm sure this is picked up in a 'campaign plan' or 'roadmap', but I wonder if a slightly canalised focus on the harder edged effects might just lead to a few missed opportunities where softer 'hearts and minds' (and yes I know alot of people don't like the term) might deliver progress thereby allowing a greater degree of non-ISAF/non-military involvement.

Anyway - worth a read as it offers a view on a part of Afghanistan that appears to be in a slightly more mature position than that which we are used to hearing about.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by kingo1rtr

Its just an initial impression that there may be a tendancy to concentrate intellectual and planning focus on the high intensity conflict zones in the southern area, and as a result we may not be actively progressing capacity building in those places where resistance has reduced and where local government might be gaining some traction.

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Good observation.

FM 3-24 says (I-155) that 'if a tactic works this week, it might not work next week, if it works in this province, it might not work in the next'. I think US COIN warfighting doctrine does, to a degree, recognise this.

On the other hand, I agree that a lot of effort is heaped in creating concepts fit for the worse areas, which threatens overreacting and overdoing it where conflict is in a different stage (btw, I don't necessarily agree that reduced resistance and stronger local government actually means less effort is required or that the area is any less 'high intensity' - I think it's more about the how and much less about the how much).

I see the way to this in developing COIN, including the whole spectrum of COIN - i.e. not just 'grunt stuff' but the later stages -, as an organic doctrine that goes down to the individual boot on the ground. Subsidiarity would allow regional and subregional commanders to determine what the appropriate level and form of action is. It would require the big leap of faith to assume that regional and subregional commanders could, and would, get it right. In exchange, it would be a more sensitive approach to COIN.

Again, good point & good observation.