Gun Control in Counterinsurgency

This article showed up on today's SWJ Blog, Chad Machiela, with pdf Gun Control in Counterinsurgency: A Game Theory Analysis.

The author's BLUF, BLOB & CV:

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Application of populace and resources control measures in counterinsurgency is often more art than science, and in Iraq’s Salah Din Province in 2006 the battlespace commander’s attempts to reduce the number of weapons available to insurgents actually caused residents otherwise uninvolved in insurgency to violate the law, while effectively ensuring that the population had no means to resist insurgent theft of supplies or forcible recruitment. Game theory offers a means to analyze the options available to different actors in a conflict, and to help identify courses of action more beneficial to all.
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In conclusion, whenever any authority criminalizes a legal activity in an attempt to reduce the incidence of an illegal activity, second and third-order effects are generated which may result in an outcome not only less effective than hoped for, but even counter to the desired effect. In the case of the al Jazeera desert in Iraq during 2006, the coalition forces’ attempt to minimize the number of weapons available to the insurgents operating in the area contributed to the insurgents’ means of support. The farmers were unable to do anything but support the insurgents regardless of whatever preference they might have for a functioning Government of Iraq. The presence of criminals and the coalition forces’ inability to protect the population resulted in a lack of support for both the legitimacy of the Government of Iraq and coalition forces, and provided the farmers no incentive to follow the rules of an authority that made criminals of a group without criminal intent. By analyzing the options available to the farmers, local commanders could have shifted policy to provide incentive to the farmers to protect themselves, perhaps eventually resulting in less of a need for weapons at all, and a willing reduction of arms.
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CW3 Chad Machiela is a Special Forces warrant officer assigned to 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Joint Base Lewis McChord. He holds a M.S. in Defense Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School and a B.A. in Public Law from Western Michigan University. The opinions expressed here are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

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Of course, I've omitted all the good stuff that is writ large between the 1st and 2nd quote snips.

This is simply an interesting article, dealing with a topic that has been discussed in the MSM and Net (with spin and heat) re: the US-Mexican border, etc.

I'd as soon this NOT turn into a political (Second Amendment) discussion - and simply ask that folks stick to evidence (with sourcing) about the first, second and third order effects of gun control - as Chief Machiela has done well in his article. In light of SCOTUS's Second Amendment cases, this topic has both legal and practical aspects.

Now, Truth in Lending: As those here who know me well already know, I'm an NRA Life Member (from the 1970s); when I was a "barrister", a pro bona participant in the Second Amendment Foundation and its Legal Assistance Program; and my idea of Gun Control is the almost-perfect 1000 yd, 10X 5-shot group with a .338 Lapua (slightly modded to a "300 Hulk" ;) ), Sarver Sets Amazing new LG Record, 1.403", 50/ 5X (gif of target), in this webpage.

While I'm perfectly capable of slugging it out about Second Amendment issues, I do NOT want this thread to turn into that kind of political discussion. What I would like to see are rational, evidentiary postings regarding the various order effects of gun control in the arena of Small Wars (those that favor gun control, those that don't and those that are inconclusive).

Regards

Mike

First, I would like to offer a comment in support of JMM's guidance (violating neither the spirit nor letter of it). One can hold an adamant toe-the-party-line NRA position on the 2nd amendment while also believing that strict gun control is necessary in a small war abroad (or vice versa). The reason for this is that the second amendment issue in our nation is an issue pertaining to... wait for it... the United States Constitution. The United States Constitution is ours, not the Iraqis', Afghans', or XYZians'. Our approach toward interpretation of the US Constitution has nothing to do with how we should approach similar issues in areas where the US Constitution is not the law of the land. So this certainly should not degrade into some BS-ing over domestic political ideologies.

On to my more relevant two cents...

It depends. As I noted on the SWJ blog, I not only found it worthwhile to permit ownership of firearms in my sector in 2003, I found it necessary to go to great lengths to arm them because I could not provide adequate security over such a large area with such a small force, significant constraints and limitations, and competing tasks. I was trying to get a firearm in every home, but I would have preferred more because there was not a reliable means for locals to report threats to us and our response time was so long.

Two years later, we likewise found that it was right to permit every household to be armed for home protection, due to the violent situation. But we also found it necessary to limit each household to only one firearm. The reason for this was that home protection in that environment did not require more than one firearm per home. Reporting measures and our closer proximity allowed us to respond to incidents very quickly. Allowing more than one firearm would have made it easier for insurgent and terrorist organizations in the area to hide amongst the people. They could not dump 10 weapons in a home and expect us to just glance in and say, "oh well, home protection, nothing to see here." They knew that if we found a stockpile of weapons, all of the weapons were getting confiscated and some or all of the men were possibly getting detained. Limitations upon firearm ownership were one measure taken to separate our adversaries from the civilian populace in order to identify and neutralize them.

The incredible burden on the system. If you are doing arms control you are way past counterinsurgency. If not enforcing,prosecuting and correcting the people who had a legitimate right to protect them and theirs.

Law should promote good behavior and deter undesirable behavior. So rightfully possessing a firearm (or jedi light saber) for self defense where people smash one another like I kill houseflies.

Locks keep honest people out.... guns embolden civilians in their environment.

I wish the world could be violence free and dogs and alligators could lie down in the swamps together but that just ain't the way it is and probably wouldn't be much fun either.

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from Schmedlap
First, I would like to offer a comment in support of JMM's guidance (violating neither the spirit nor letter of it). One can hold an adamant toe-the-party-line NRA position on the 2nd amendment while also believing that strict gun control is necessary in a small war abroad (or vice versa). The reason for this is that the second amendment issue in our nation is an issue pertaining to... wait for it... the United States Constitution. The United States Constitution is ours, not the Iraqis', Afghans', or XYZians'. Our approach toward interpretation of the US Constitution has nothing to do with how we should approach similar issues in areas where the US Constitution is not the law of the land. So this certainly should not degrade into some BS-ing over domestic political ideologies.

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Amen - well-stated.

As to your "two cents", I'd call that primary evidence (personal knowledge) which could be presented under oath.

My two cents worth: in a military environment under Laws of War ("martial law" in the vulgar sense), I'd go along with (say) census and registration of firearms for each household - that going into their dossier with all other data and intel. Of course, that's my ideal world where you guys are given the resources to do what (say) Galula and others recommend - more part of the police-political effort than the military effort.

Are you a lawyer yet ?

Best

Mike

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Originally Posted by jmm99

As to your "two cents", I'd call that primary evidence (personal knowledge) which could be presented under oath.

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I'll take your word for it. I've got a grasp of the federal rules, but my understanding is that Michigan went its own way.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

My two cents worth: in a military environment under Laws of War ("martial law" in the vulgar sense), I'd go along with (say) census and registration of firearms for each household - that going into their dossier with all other data and intel. Of course, that's my ideal world where you guys are given the resources to do what (say) Galula and others recommend - more part of the police-political effort than the military effort.

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That may be easier said than done. It appears that gun-registration in Canada has turned out to be a very expensive fiasco. If it doesn't work well, and is soooo expensive in a country like Canada, what chances have they got in a country like Iraq? The example that Schmedlap gave made sense and I assume that, as the man on the ground he was able to control it to a level he deemed necessary. But IMO, once you start legalising that manner of restrictions and you design and install mechanisms to control and police it, you may well create more headache than it's worth through second and third order effect and the law of unintended consequences.

Sorry JMM, not evidentiary posting, just my quick reaction.

I posit this situation: a fictional country in which I am an indigenous national; and, for sake of play acting, a district civil affairs officer. The DCAO has direct control over police, including "Special Branch"; over other civil administration components; and also over mobile military forces who operate in the district. Basically, the Malaya triangular pattern of executive committee co-ordination, including but not limited to intelligence co-ordination.

My district is a contested district, with insurgent main forces neutralized (killed, captured or converted) or split into smaller size groups which can be handled by paramilitary police units. The district would be under "martial" or "emergency law" until restoration to what is considered by the natiional command authority to be an "acceptable civil environment".

The incumbant government, whose national command policy I represent, has an insurgency considered of existential importance to the incumbant government (my government). My choices are four: (1) stick with the government; (2) join the insurgency; (3) start a "third way" movement; or (4) leave the country. I posit that I stick with choice 1.

Among the many things I'd want to do in the district would be a census and dossier on each household, which would include, as only a part of the whole, a registry of all items that could be used as weapons against me and mine (e.g., firearms), or manufactured into weapons against me and mine (e.g., nitrogen compounds - e.g., fertilizer - easily converted to explosives and with some other simple household items and homemade components - e.g., into remote-controlled IEDs).

To do all that, I have to have the horses (personnel) in close proximity to the grassroots (villages and hamlets; or urban block by block). In Malaya (in the mature stage of the anti-terr effort), Special Branch (operating on a fairly limited budget) had accurate individual dossiers on about 50% of the insurgents.

Since I have posited that the insurgency is existential, the cost and number of personnel is limited only by what's in the national treasury and manpower pool. Obviously, my dream model has little to do with US involvement in Iraq and Astan.

The bottom line (in response to your post) is that the police and political measures required to defeat an existential insurgency may be needed there, but would be very inefficient (and probably not needed or tolerated) in a normal civil environment.

As to the Canadian link, there is also a pro-gun registry side of the argument (although I appreciate personally the anti-gun registry arguments linked :D). As I understand the political situation, the Candaian Senate (as presently constituted) is pro-gun registry. In any event, what may be ineffective and/or inefficient in a normal, civil environment, may be necessary in an existential, contested paramilitary environment.

Regards

Mike

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Originally Posted by jmm99

My choices are four: (1) stick with the government; (2) join the insurgency; (3) start a "third way" movement; or (4) leave the country. I posit that I stick with choice 1.

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Not specifically relevant, but a further option, often adopted in such situations, would be to stay nominally with the government and hedge your bets by maintaining a functional relationship with the other players. The balance point of that strategy would depend on your personal assessment of probable outcomes and your personal likelihood of being hung from a lamp post if the other guys win.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

Among the many things I'd want to do in the district would be a census and dossier on each household, which would include, as only a part of the whole, a registry of all items that could be used as weapons against me and mine (e.g., firearms), or manufactured into weapons against me and mine (e.g., nitrogen compounds - e.g., fertilizer - easily converted to explosives and with some other simple household items and homemade components - e.g., into remote-controlled IEDs).

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Short of kicking down doors and ransacking homes, which will only benefit your enemy, how do you achieve that goal? If your district has recently been in a state of insurgency with active conflict, it's likely that much of the populace will distrust or actively dislike government, and will see a registry of weapons as a likely prelude to confiscation. They aren't going to voluntarily reveal their armaments to a potential enemy. Seems to me that in practical terms the outcome of what you suggest would be a whole lot of weapons being carefully hidden away.

The discussion needs to keep in mind that self defense or security may not be the only reason or even the primary reason behind a desire to acquire and retain armaments. In many cultures a man without a weapon isn't quite a man, and people in these cultures will violently resist disarmament initiatives even if they face no immediate threat that requires them to be armed.

be into "kicking down doors and ransacking homes" - I'm a low kinetic person. ;)

I'm positing indigenous "COIN", where the people in my district are my people (some well-guided, some misguided and some uncertain). I'm not positing non-indigenous FID (much less foreign "COIN" or some half-assed form of co-belligerency) because that introduces too much complexity that clouds even more otherwise complex issues that have to resolved first.

Tactical alternatives to "kicking down doors and ransacking homes" abound - basically the opposites are being the bull in a china shop or a boa digesting a meal (making haste slowly). You may judge where you think my ground would be to stand snorting or to lay sleepily.

Rather than first moving into specific tactics, I'd first have to decide on the strategy to enter the district in the first place. I see two basic options:

1. "Clear, hold and build" (pretty much "standard COIN" for the last 40 years) - the direct approach with the most apparent short-term results - which I've tended to follow (as in post #7) as something of a norm in examples cuz that seems more familiar to most folks; OR

2. "Build, hold and clear" (build an unconventional force which will infiltrate and subvert the insurgent shadow government and forces; hold and expand strategic base areas and disperse the insurgent forces; and clear by the juncture of conventional and unconventional forces) - an indirect approach with slow apparent results (it took Giap four bites at the apple).

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Those more inclined to the first course of action (which I do not reject out of hand), especially those who like the "clear" phase, might be more inclined to Heinlein's Starship Troopers.

On the other hand, the second course of action is somewhat akin to what we find in Isaac Asimov, Foundation - the Foundation's strategy, especially as found in Part IV, the Traders; as "engineered" by Limmar Ponyets and Eskel Gorov.

Limmar Ponyets and Eskel Gorov are not among Asimov's major characters, but I like their style in doing their "things" - infiltration, subversion, etc.; and using the target's weaknesses to create the conditions for the target's defeat (and often demise). Or, perhaps, the motto "Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right." ;)

Part IV can be found here; e.g.:

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Part IV, The Traiders
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TRADERS-… and constantly in advance of the political hegemony of the Foundation were the Traders, reaching out tenuous fingerholds through the tremendous distances of the Periphery. Months or years might pass between landings on Terminus; their ships were often nothing more than patchquilts of home-made repairs and improvisations; their honesty was none of the highest; their daring…

Through it all they forged an empire more enduring than the pseudo-religious despotism of the Four Kingdoms…

Tales without end are told of these massive, lonely figures who bore half-seriously, half-mockingly a motto adopted from one of Salvor Hardin's epigrams, "Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right!" It is difficult now to tell which tales are real and which apocryphal. There are none probably that have not suffered some exaggeration…

Encyclopedia Galactica

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Review here (pp.44-45 of pdf) of the original version of “The Traders.” (Astounding Science Fiction, Vol. 34, No. 3, Issue 167, October 1944 as “The Wedge”).

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The Foundation now controls the four kingdoms by means of religion, but outlying areas are beginning to see that the atomic religion is only a wedge for aggression, and refuse it entry. It is now becoming clear that religion is played out as a weapon, and that the next mode of expansion, trade, is in the air.

***About 75 years after the events of the previous story, Limmar Ponyets is dispatched to Askone, a world rich in raw materials that has thus far spurned any commerce with the Foundation, for fear that it would lead to the Foundation’s Scientism religion controlling their society. Ponyets’s job is to negotiate for the release of Eskel Gorov, a Foundation agent who was sent to find a way to initiate trade with Askone. This was a violation of that planet’s law, and Gorov is scheduled to be executed.

***The Askonian society is dubious of technology, and practices ancestor worship. The Grand Master (their elderly leader) is firm about not accepting any technology from the Foundation, and about proceeding with Gorov’s execution. However, Ponyets convinces them to release Gorov in exchange for a gold transmuter jury-rigged out of a “food irradiation chamber” (presumably a more advanced version of a microwave oven).

***More importantly, Ponyets accomplishes Gorov’s mission of creating an opening for Foundation trade. He blackmails a member of the governing council, Pherl, to buy all of his cargo, which consists of many devices and machines forbidden by Askonian law. This council member, who does not believe in his culture’s superstitions against technology, then has an incentive to work towards the legalization of those machines, so that he can begin using and selling them to recoup his loss. It is indicated that Pherl, who is young for someone so important in government, will be the next Grand Master shortly, further hastening Askone’s susceptibility to Foundation trade and the controlling religion that it brings with it. Ponyets and Gorov head back to Terminus with a shipload of tin, which Ponyets was able to extract from Pherl as part of their bargain.

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Query, should AQ be translated as the "Base" or as the "Foundation" ?

Regards

Mike

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Originally Posted by jmm99

I don't want to be into "kicking down doors and ransacking homes" - I'm a low kinetic person. ;)

I'm positing indigenous "COIN", where the people in my district are my people (some well-guided, some misguided and some uncertain). I'm not positing non-indigenous FID (much less foreign "COIN" or some half-assed form of co-belligerency) because that introduces too much complexity that clouds even more otherwise complex issues that have to resolved first.

Tactical alternatives to "kicking down doors and ransacking homes" abound - basically the opposites are being the bull in a china shop or a boa digesting a meal (making haste slowly). You may judge where you think my ground would be to stand snorting or to lay sleepily.

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I'd point out that indigenous COIN is often a very kinetic and very nasty business, and that in many (I'd guess most) areas that are or have recently been threatened by insurgency there's a history of human rights abuse by government forces and a very active distrust of government. I realize that you wouldn't be planning to do any of that stuff, but you'd likely be dealing with the legacy of such actions... if government is liked and trusted and there's no recent history of confrontation there probably won't be much of an insurgency.

I still think you'll have a very, very difficult time persuading the citizenry to reveal their arms holdings, with any strategy.

In some ways your scenario resembles the place where I live. We had an active insurgency going on from the late 70s to the early 90s, and there are still bands of NPA active in the area. From the local view the insurgency was fought to block government plans to dam rivers, log mountains, and set up mines; all those plans were shelved, so the locals see themselves as the winners. From the government point of view the insurgency was a subset of the NPA's armed struggle to topple the government. People here actively dislike the military and don't like them around, but are no longer shooting at them as long as they don't get too aggressive. The image of the NPA is a little better but most people don't want them around either, as wherever they go the soldiers also go.

The populace is heavily and illegally armed, but the weapons are not displayed. The police are local people and are not going to do a thing about it. Military forces know the guns are there but as long as the guns aren't used against them they pretend not to know: they've no desire to stick their heads back into that particular hornet's nest. So the deal is basically that the locals will keep the guns under wraps and not shoot soldiers as long as the soldiers stay low profile and avoid confronting civilians. It mostly works, though it's not ideal.

To illustrate my point above... back in 1988 a group of drunk soldiers fired weapons in the town center here and killed 2 kids, one 2 years old, one 11. Nobody was prosecuted or punished. 20 years have not chilled that memory one bit. My wife still feels very uncomfortable in the presence of anyone from the Philippine military, and most of the populace feels the same way. If the people who shot your kids (it's a tribal society, the kids of one are the kids of all) come around wanting to know how many guns you have, will you tell them?

They keep; I Know

from this:

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from Dayuhan
The populace is heavily and illegally armed, but the weapons are not displayed. The police are local people and are not going to do a thing about it. Military forces know the guns are there but as long as the guns aren't used against them they pretend not to know: they've no desire to stick their heads back into that particular hornet's nest. So the deal is basically that the locals will keep the guns under wraps and not shoot soldiers as long as the soldiers stay low profile and avoid confronting civilians. It mostly works, though it's not ideal.

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They are my police (I'm the district civil affairs officer) and indirectly my military. Now, if you're telling me that my cops and troopers won't tell me what they know, then we're into a different problem.

Sounds to me that what you have is a pretty good solution. The local population in effect is its own power center, with its own armed force, so that, at the least, it has something of a Mexican standoff (the Magnificant Seven x2) with both the government and insurgents.[*]

So, this district officer would not rock the boat, but would want to know as closely as possible what potentially harmful stuff is out there. Patience and time would yield those answers - the python who slithers, not the bull who stomps. It would also help if the district officer is at least something close to local - and not some knucklehead born and raised in the capital's suburbia.

Outsiders ?

Which takes me here:

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from Dayuhan
To illustrate my point above... back in 1988 a group of drunk soldiers fired weapons in the town center here and killed 2 kids, one 2 years old, one 11. Nobody was prosecuted or punished. 20 years have not chilled that memory one bit. My wife still feels very uncomfortable in the presence of anyone from the Philippine military, and most of the populace feels the same way. If the people who shot your kids (it's a tribal society, the kids of one are the kids of all) come around wanting to know how many guns you have, will you tell them?

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Were the soldiers (and their Os and NCOs) outsiders ? I could relate to that if a bunch of Trolls (them that live under the Bridge; it being the Mackinac Bridge) were sent up here to garrison us Yoopers. Obviously, my solution (as the fictional district officer) would be different (both preventative and reprobative) than what occured in your town in 1988.

I suggest that, where the folks that represent the government are "outsiders" (wherever the locals draw that line), those folks (1) are very similar to an occupying foreign force; and (2) are practicing what is in effect foreign COIN - as we did in Iraq, and are in Astan, by being the lead sled dog.

So, the ideal is to have locals involved, as Giap had in SVN ca. 1959-1965. By the end of that time, he'd run through about 100K of his Southern-born military and political cadres; and had to use more and more Northern-born PAVN. That did have an adverse effect on the VC (although other factors also entered the picture).

Interesting discussion for me (although I'm a poor fiction writer). I'd say our views are probably similar; but, of course, not in lockstep - which would be no fun at all. :D

Regards

Mike

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[*] Illustrating the practical effect of an armed citizenry, keeping and bearing arms - something that appeals to this libertarian for more than esoteric legal and political theories.

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Originally Posted by Kiwigrunt

That may be easier said than done. It appears that gun-registration in Canada has turned out to be a very expensive fiasco. If it doesn't work well, and is soooo expensive in a country like Canada, what chances have they got in a country like Iraq?

Sorry JMM, not evidentiary posting, just my quick reaction.

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The program you point to is long-run registration, not gun control. The former failed because long guns have legal and long-established use on farms, hunting etc. and a single-shot .22 rifle is rarely used in crime, hence the pushback on registering them. Canada has effective, and extremely well accepted among citizens, gun control on other weapons from handguns to assault weapons and "gun control" just isn't an issue, just licensing requirements for long guns.

Of course, if the guns never get into the hands of the citizens in the first place, you have an easier time regulating them, just like pretty much everything else you can think of. That's why I don't think you can transfer the Canadian experience to Detroit, let alone Basra.

We face a peculiar dynamic in terms of weapons registration in my AO, which need not be that hard to resolve, but it is. Locals have weapons for sure, to include the ubiquitous AK-47 or variant, and some of the bigger players are known to control many weapons at once. The problem has arisen, however, that they are afraid to keep these weapons around for fear of being connected to the insurgency and a weapons facilitator, so in at least one case the weapons are reported to be buried. What is truly odd is the fact that these same villagers complain about being strong-armed and intimidated by the Taliban, yet have never reported a single instance where they used weapons to defend themselves. To some degree, they are caught between the proverbial rock and hard place of openly carrying an AK and risking getting fired upon by coalition forces, or being attacked by the Taliban for appearing to be actively defending themselves and putting up resistance. We assess that the average man who wants to register his weapon with GIRoA is even too afraid to take it to the DC in order to have its serial number recorded and logged into a district registry.

The bottom line is that the locals do not seem to have weapons on them at the right time to defeat the insurgents’ actions. Giving them a weapons registration card doesn’t necessarily mean they are suddenly start carrying an AK-47 in a cross-body fashion while they farm their fields or tend to the goats. I think a win for everyone down here lies in the more widespread use of pistols. For starters, they are short range, conversational distance affairs, with lower risk of collateral damage. They are also easier to conceal. If a patrol or vehicle checkpoint comes across a local with one on him, he need do nothing more than what conceal carry permit holders do in the US, assuming he has registered his weapon with the district government. Retrieve the ID card surreptitiously and present it for review. The coalition forces involved need to have the savvy to not retrieve the weapon and brandish in front of every onlooker, but a cursory inspection on the card and the individual is all that is required.

This all requires an almost herculean effort to combine information operations messages, engagement with district officials, security forces mentoring approaches, patrolling strategies, biometrics collection efforts, and litany of other synchronized tasks in order to be accomplished, but it can be done with the appropriate amount of effort and sense of “give a you-know-what.”

Now, in the current environment, concerns abound about central government control and authority, and masses of armed civilians moving about the districts under arms and potentially massing on their own to take action outside the scope of normal law and order, or outside the scope of the security apparatus. This worries many people for certain, from the President himself, down to think-tankers who spend a lot of time analyzing the influence of small arms in failed or failing states, and instability. There is good reason for concern, but it need not result in hand-wringing. In fact, in those areas that are under-governed, an armed society can shape itself into a polite and civil society, and resist the influence of those knuckleheads who would seek to take over a village via their own inkblot strategy. Right now, learned helplessness is keeping these people on their knees, and it doesn’t need to be that way

and thank you, Jon, for a non-armchair response which tells us what the real, practical issues are.

It doesn't need any armchair comments from me; except I have to say that it ends in an astute observation:

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Right now, learned helplessness is keeping these people on their knees, and it doesn’t need to be that way.

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Thou art a worthy successor to the CAP guys of 45 years ago.

Regards

Mike

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Originally Posted by jcustis

We face a peculiar dynamic in terms of weapons registration in my AO, which need not be that hard to resolve, but it is. Locals have weapons for sure, to include the ubiquitous AK-47 or variant, and some of the bigger players are known to control many weapons at once. The problem has arisen, however, that they are afraid to keep these weapons around for fear of being connected to the insurgency and a weapons facilitator, so in at least one case the weapons are reported to be buried. What is truly odd is the fact that these same villagers complain about being strong-armed and intimidated by the Taliban, yet have never reported a single instance where they used weapons to defend themselves. To some degree, they are caught between the proverbial rock and hard place of openly carrying an AK and risking getting fired upon by coalition forces, or being attacked by the Taliban for appearing to be actively defending themselves and putting up resistance. We assess that the average man who wants to register his weapon with GIRoA is even too afraid to take it to the DC in order to have its serial number recorded and logged into a district registry.

The bottom line is that the locals do not seem to have weapons on them at the right time to defeat the insurgents’ actions. Giving them a weapons registration card doesn’t necessarily mean they are suddenly start carrying an AK-47 in a cross-body fashion while they farm their fields or tend to the goats. I think a win for everyone down here lies in the more widespread use of pistols. For starters, they are short range, conversational distance affairs, with lower risk of collateral damage. They are also easier to conceal. If a patrol or vehicle checkpoint comes across a local with one on him, he need do nothing more than what conceal carry permit holders do in the US, assuming he has registered his weapon with the district government. Retrieve the ID card surreptitiously and present it for review. The coalition forces involved need to have the savvy to not retrieve the weapon and brandish in front of every onlooker, but a cursory inspection on the card and the individual is all that is required.

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I don't disagree with your point, Jim, it's excellent, but an AK comes with a strap, a pistol needs a holster, esp if you're wearing local manjammies. How long would it take for groups of Taliban to start frisking farmers? And one of two things will happen, they'll either come up with a pistol or an empty holster, neither of which indicates long-term survivability for the local. I'm given to understand that even American LEO are less than impressed to find empty pistol holsters on people, and the Talib are all about face-to-face contact, they don't roll around in Strykers.

I would still imagine the farmers would rather have a well-hidden AK or two than a pistol on their person (and where is a poor farmer going to get ammo for a pistol that doesn't fire ubiquitous 7.62 and needs regular cleaning so it works, unlike an AK?)

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Originally Posted by jcustis

What is truly odd is the fact that these same villagers complain about being strong-armed and intimidated by the Taliban, yet have never reported a single instance where they used weapons to defend themselves.

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Is this odd at all? Unless village action is collective, large-scale, and sustained to the point that it deters future intimidation, using a personal weapon against the Taliban seems likely to result in larger-scale retribution. Indeed, from an insurgent point of view, it would be essential to make the point that "resistance is futile." Unless counter-insurgent forces have sufficient presence and response time to prevent it, the insurgents control the "escalatory ladder." (This is probably why some of the more successful cases of village self-defence in Afghanistan occur near colaition forces or where there are embedded SF teams... think of it as the Magnificent Seven effect.)

This is potentially a very different situation from defending oneself from criminal activity, where the perceived cost-benefit structure is rather different from the criminal's perspective, and where criminals are likely to focus on the easiest pickings.

On a larger note on the gun control issue, it very much depends on the context. If we're talking rural Iraq or Afghanistan where gun ownership is longstanding and widespread, there may be little point (and indeed, some dysfunctional effects) of attempting civilian disarmament. Conversely, if the area is one where gun ownership (especially military small arms ownership) has been rare, growing civilian gun ownership can escalate small local conflicts over grazing rights, etc. into much larger, violent, and bloody confrontations than used to be the case (a growing problem, for example, in Kenya).

While 2nd Amendment advocates certainly claim bearing arms is a right, the “gun control” issue to me is really more about “prior restraint.”

This would be true in the US as well as many other countries. Consider this first; can we agree that in most countries the number of law abiding citizens who legally own guns typically heavily outnumbers those who use guns to commit crimes? This would exclude countries that have total gun bans, such as Japan (and Japan’s societal attitudes towards personal weapons ownership date back thousands of years and made a total gun ban fairly easy to implement).

If so, then the following is at the root of the world view of the two sides of gun control:

Gun Rights Advocates: As a free person you are considered innocent until you prove yourself otherwise and are trusted to inherently respect the rights of others and would only use firearms if necessary in self defense. (I would posit this applies to most people)

Strict Gun Control Advocates: You are to be considered untrustworthy and absent laws and strict enforcement will not inherently respect the right of others and would use firearms inappropriately. (I would say this almost universally applies to criminals, terrorists, insurgents, etc)

Criminals, to include terrorists and insurgents, tend to not obey the laws of the state so gun control laws will not prevent them from acquiring or using guns in criminal activity. The police and/or security forces cannot be everywhere all the time; that is unless you create a police force that is virtually 1 to 1 to the citizenry. That is both unfeasible from a fiscal standpoint and from the view that it would literally create a “police state.” So while “To serve, and protect” is a nice motto for many law enforcement agencies; the reality is an emphasis heavily weighted towards “serve” rather than “protect.” In fact most US courts have found the police have "no duty to protect" an individual citizen. They protect by removing criminals after the fact, thus "protection" come under the rules of law in the form of dissuasion to not break laws through the penalties for the inappropriate use of guns.

“Gun control” is just one of the several issues concerning a state's control over its citizenry. In a free society the state should limit its control over individual activity and restrict itself to advising the citizenry of potential danger or punishing those who do grievous harm. For example, I have no problem with warning labels on alcohol and tobacco products or even the government requiring McDonald’s to put caution “high saturated fat content” warnings on its Double Quarter Pounder with Cheese wrapper. But the government has absolutely no business telling me I cannot drink, smoke, and consume Micky D burgers all day long should I choose to. Or that I cannot own guns.

So one of the effects of criminalizing what was previously a legal activity, whether in COIN or in societies in general, is that there will be those who willfully disobey the law by possessing guns, preferring to feel secure and willing to suffer the consequences if they must use the weapon in self defense.

Another effect would probably be the expansion of an underground market for weapons, particularly if the security situation is poor and police and security forces unable to adequately provide security. This expansion of illegal activity would no doubt prompt a response from law makers and law enforcement thus adding to their responsibilities. As to what order of magnitude these would take on would depend on other factors such as the pre-ban number of weapons, the overall level of personal security, and the size of the security forces in relation to the security level.

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How long would it take for groups of Taliban to start frisking farmers? And one of two things will happen, they'll either come up with a pistol or an empty holster, neither of which indicates long-term survivability for the local.

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Hopefully they'll come up with a pistol to their temple. This is the whole point of allowing the common man to be armed. All the farmer need do is present the weapon to said Taliban center-mass areas, pull the trigger, rinse, and repeat as necessary.

I agree though, it requires collective response. We get collective complaints when patrols stop by to conduct engagement...perhaps it is best the collectively address the issues of knuckleheads encroaching on the perimeter of their village.

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Originally Posted by Umar Al-Mokhtār

If so, then the following is at the root of the world view of the two sides of gun control.

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I'm not sure a great many societies would recognize the world views that you set forth as accurately describing their perceptions of the issue. Moreover, I suspect that there's no correlation at all between levels of general societal interpersonal trust and attitudes to gun control.

Let's take the Canadian case again. As 40below has already mentioned, there is much more support here for a significant degree of "gun control" than in the US, with the only issue that is really debated being the long gun registry. However, Canada actually has somewhat higher levels of interpersonal trust than the US, suggesting that while we think you're less likely to use a handgun in a bad way, we are also less likely to think you should have one in the first place.

I'm not stating that as a generalizable global hypothesis at all--it's only to argue that your perception of what the gun control issue is about is not one that would resonate in much of the rest of the Western world.

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Originally Posted by jcustis

Hopefully they'll come up with a pistol to their temple. This is the whole point of allowing the common man to be armed. All the farmer need do is present the weapon to said Taliban center-mass areas, pull the trigger, rinse, and repeat as necessary.

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Originally Posted by Rex Brynen

Unless village action is collective, large-scale, and sustained to the point that it deters future intimidation, using a personal weapon against the Taliban seems likely to result in larger-scale retribution. Indeed, from an insurgent point of view, it would be essential to make the point that "resistance is futile." Unless counter-insurgent forces have sufficient presence and response time to prevent it, the insurgents control the "escalatory ladder." (This is probably why some of the more successful cases of village self-defence in Afghanistan occur near coalition forces or where there are embedded SF teams.

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I think Rex is right on this one. There are good and obvious reasons why an armed farmer wouldn’t want to bring his weapon along on his daily rounds. The Taliban get to show up where and when they choose, and if there are 5 or 10 or 20 armed Taliban and one armed farmer it’s not likely that the farmer would be presenting his weapon to the center-mass area of the Taliban. More likely the farmer would have to choose between contributing his weapon to the Taliban arsenal and fertilizing the field of his sons. The gun is likely to stay home, where it gives its owner the option of banding together with similarly armed neighbors to fight as a group if it’s necessary to do so.

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Originally Posted by Rex Brynen

Canada actually has somewhat higher levels of interpersonal trust than the US, suggesting that while we think you're less likely to use a handgun in a bad way, we are also less likely to think you should have one in the first place.

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The desire of a populace to hold weapons is not necessarily proportional to perceived threat or trust. In some cultures it’s simply expected that a man will have weapons and know how to use them, whether or not there’s an immediate threat and whether or not police and security forces are generally adequate.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

They are my police (I'm the district civil affairs officer) and indirectly my military. Now, if you're telling me that my cops and troopers won't tell me what they know, then we're into a different problem.

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Again, based on the actual realities in areas with insurgency issues, that’s a problem you’re quite likely to have.

Again looking at my area, the cops and the military know there are plenty of guns out there, but they do not know exactly who has them or where they are… and they aren’t going to start asking, lest they find themselves on the receiving end of that well-stashed arsenal.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

Sounds to me that what you have is a pretty good solution. The local population in effect is its own power center, with its own armed force, so that, at the least, it has something of a Mexican standoff with both the government and insurgents.

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It’s an adequate solution. Essentially the communities have agreed to accept the nominal authority of the national government, as long as that government doesn’t press to make that authority actual.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

So, this district officer would not rock the boat, but would want to know as closely as possible what potentially harmful stuff is out there. Patience and time would yield those answers - the python who slithers, not the bull who stomps. It would also help if the district officer is at least something close to local - and not some knucklehead born and raised in the capital's suburbia.

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In this case “as closely as possible” would mean accepting that there’s enough stuff around to make a major mess, that you don’t know where it is or who has it, and that you can’t find out without provoking a major mess. It helps in our case that the communities are tribal societies with effective methods for internal dispute resolution, which means there’s little likelihood of the guns being used unless the community as a whole sees itself as threatened.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

Were the soldiers (and their Os and NCOs) outsiders ? I could relate to that if a bunch of Trolls (them that live under the Bridge; it being the Mackinac Bridge) were sent up here to garrison us Yoopers. Obviously, my solution (as the fictional district officer) would be different (both preventative and reprobative) than what occured in your town in 1988.

I suggest that, where the folks that represent the government are "outsiders" (wherever the locals draw that line), those folks (1) are very similar to an occupying foreign force; and (2) are practicing what is in effect foreign COIN - as we did in Iraq, and are in Astan, by being the lead sled dog.

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Yes, they were outsiders, and you’re right, they were (and are) viewed largely as a foreign occupying force.

We don’t have district officers, of course; we have locally elected Mayors and Governors. Police and military forces are answerable to a national “outsider” chain of command, though in the case of the police, who are mostly locals, actual affinity in practical terms is more with traditional tribal governance. The military chain of command and the local power structure have a somewhat uneasy relationship.

I realize that in your hypothetical situation you would not condone or tolerate abuse of the populace. My point was that given the realities of most places with active insurgencies you would probably have to deal with the legacy of events that happened before you arrived… and that trust once broken is difficult to restore.

No doubt:

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from Dayuhan
I realize that in your hypothetical situation you would not condone or tolerate abuse of the populace. My point was that given the realities of most places with active insurgencies you would probably have to deal with the legacy of events that happened before you arrived… and that trust once broken is difficult to restore.

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where the "legacy of events" shortly or long past (consider No. Ireland) determine the present; and that lack of trust (lack of "legitimacy") (lack of "good governance"), for whatever reason(s) and attribution or not of particular fault, underlie discontent growing into the level of violence that becomes unacceptable.

So what ? You still have to find an acceptable way to deal with the problem(s).

I suppose that one possible way would be to always walk away from the problem(s) - "Walk away, Dryden. Walk away. Always walking away, aren't you?" ;)

So, what are your positive suggestions ?

Regards

Mike

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Originally Posted by jmm99

So, what are your positive suggestions ?

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And relinquish my role as eternal pessimist??

Ok, assuming your populace is armed and intends to remain armed, the real question is whether or not those arms pose an immediate threat to you and to your plans. If they do, my best suggestion would be to walk away or change sides. If not, I say agree to ignore. Let it be known quietly that as long as personal arms aren't used against you or in criminal activity, you're not interested.

Registration creates the impression of an intrusive presence that wants to hold the option of confiscation, and is likely to add to distrust and suspicion. It doesn't even gain much: the guns will still be out there, and the chances are the vast majority will never be registered, turning ordinary citizens into at least rule-breakers, if not outright criminals. I just don't see how it gets you anywhere.

Getting involved in gun control efforts in another nation is wasted effort...

Ignore them (the guns in the hands of civilians). If they stay neutral, all's well. If they get turned on your opponents, you're ahead. If they get turned on you they are unlikely to do more than superficial damage and you can kill the shooters.

and makes no sense being an eternal optimist. ;)[*]

Buying in part, not buying in part, as to this:

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from Dayuhan
Ok, assuming your populace is armed and intends to remain armed, the real question is whether or not those arms pose an immediate threat to you and to your plans. [1] If they do, my best suggestion would be to walk away or change sides. [2] If not, I say agree to ignore. Let it be known quietly that as long as personal arms aren't used against you or in criminal activity, you're not interested.

[rationale for 2] Registration creates the impression of an intrusive presence that wants to hold the option of confiscation, and is likely to add to distrust and suspicion. It doesn't even gain much: the guns will still be out there, and the chances are the vast majority will never be registered, turning ordinary citizens into at least rule-breakers, if not outright criminals. I just don't see how it gets you anywhere.

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Taking point [1], if an armed force poses an immediate threat to me and if I have the means to overcome that armed force, my morals and ethics (as well as law) suggests that, all else being equal, shoot center mass - and there will no longer be an immediate threat. There may be reasons (besides my inferiority in opposing force) to withdraw in the face of an immediate hostile armed force, but I better have worked that out before the immediate threat develops.

From how you describe the community, it will remain neutral so long as its semi-autonomy is respected. OK with me; so long as the neutrality is genuine and I am not dealing with a Laos-Cambodia situation on my flanks (which is somewhat akin to what Jon Custis described with his villagers).

So, situation [1] (an immediate hostile armed force) is not likely to come from your community, but from either the insurgents or criminals.

I can't argue with your [rationale for 2] cuz I believe pretty much the same thing. Someone else will have to dispute that point. BTW: Knowing who has what firearms and/or munitions does not have to involve a formal, overt process.

Now how would you go about getting information about the firearms and/or munitions held by the insurgents and criminals, who are very likely to be an immediate hostile armed force against me (and possibly against the otherwise neutral community) ?

Regards

Mike

-----------------------
[*]

If you're not a commie at age 20,
you have no heart.
If you're still a commie at age 30,
you have no brain.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

Buying in part, not buying in part, as to this:

Taking point [1], if an armed force poses an immediate threat to me and if I have the means to overcome that armed force, my morals and ethics (as well as law) suggests that, all else being equal, shoot center mass - and there will no longer be an immediate threat. There may be reasons (besides my inferiority in opposing force) to withdraw in the face of an immediate hostile armed force, but I better have worked that out before the immediate threat develops.

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Minor misunderstanding... when I said this:

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assuming your populace is armed and intends to remain armed, the real question is whether or not those arms pose an immediate threat to you and to your plans. If they do, my best suggestion would be to walk away or change sides.

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I meant that if the armed populace is a hostile force, better to not be there. If you assume an armed force external to the populace, the situation changes... but that would not require you to manage arms held by the populace.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

From how you describe the community, it will remain neutral so long as its semi-autonomy is respected. OK with me; so long as the neutrality is genuine and I am not dealing with a Laos-Cambodia situation on my flanks (which is somewhat akin to what Jon Custis described with his villagers).

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The degree of neutrality may be difficult to assess, but trying to collect or register community-held weapons is likely to tip that balance in favor of your opponent.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

BTW: Knowing who has what firearms and/or munitions does not have to involve a formal, overt process.

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Possibly not... but my guess is that as soon as you start asking questions, everybody is going to know, and that doing it covertly may raise more suspicion than doing it overtly.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

Now how would you go about getting information about the firearms and/or munitions held by the insurgents and criminals, who are very likely to be an immediate hostile armed force against me (and possibly against the otherwise neutral community) ?

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Assuming that the insurgent or criminal force is external to the community, that's a completely different problem, no? More an intel issue than a community relations issue, posing a whole different set of problems with solutions entirely dependent on local context. If we want to keep focused on arms held by the populace, I have to agree with Ken's comment:

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Ignore them (the guns in the hands of civilians). If they stay neutral, all's well. If they get turned on your opponents, you're ahead. If they get turned on you they are unlikely to do more than superficial damage and you can kill the shooters.

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You will have to accept that some members of the community may be sympathetic to the insurgents, or may be insurgents. Given your original scenario:

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My district is a contested district, with insurgent main forces neutralized (killed, captured or converted*) or split into smaller size groups which can be handled by paramilitary police units.

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it would seem that the insurgency is in a state of decline, and it would seem to me that your best move would be to try and sustain the rate of decline, rather than trying to stomp out the remaining insurgency all at once by tracking down insurgents or sympathizers and going all kinetic on them, which might easily just get things flaring up again. That would mean fighting armed core insurgents when you can find them outside of population centers, while simultaneously trying to address the root causes of the insurgency and provide incentives for part time insurgents to give up the fight.


*converted insurgents, managed carefully, would likely be your best source of intel on the remaining insurgents.

survives the first round, even if it's a blank. ;)

What has been added is a large population, armed but nominally neutral unless its ox is gored by someone. They seem not to be sheep. If they present a problem, it would seem to be a political problem; that is, they don't want the central government there.

The insurgents and criminals would be fringe elements, presenting a military or paramilitary problem only to whoever has to deal with them.

What are the reasons for the central government to be so interested in this area - so that it has to deal with insurgents, criminals and concerns about firearms and munitions ?

What reasons (if any) are there for the central government and the local population to cooperate on issues - if so what are the co-operative areas (what are the win-wins) ?

I'm a lousy fiction writer.

Cheers

Mike

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Originally Posted by jmm99

What are the reasons for the central government to be so interested in this area - so that it has to deal with insurgents, criminals and concerns about firearms and munitions ?

What reasons (if any) are there for the central government and the local population to cooperate on issues - if so what are the co-operative areas (what are the win-wins) ?

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If we're talking about my neighborhood, I could tell you... if we're talking about your scenario, you get to make it up, so you tell me! I just noted that there are points of similarity between you original scenario and my neighborhood; didn't mean to hijack the scenario.

I'm just getting a kick out of the idea that an Afghan farmer could consistently (or even once) hit centre mass on a group of armed Taliban using a handgun. Like they're on the range every other day getting expert training and painstakingly maintain their personal weapon. I've watched the ANA/ANP shoot AKs, and they couldn't hit centre mass on No Drug Mountain from 20 metres out, and they're supposedly the ones with training. I don't think handguns are the solution to the problem, unless the problem is that there are too many Aghan villagers.

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Originally Posted by 40below

I'm just getting a kick out of the idea that an Afghan farmer could consistently (or even once) hit centre mass on a group of armed Taliban using a handgun. Like they're on the range every other day getting expert training and painstakingly maintain their personal weapon. I've watched the ANA/ANP shoot AKs, and they couldn't hit centre mass on No Drug Mountain from 20 metres out, and they're supposedly the ones with training. I don't think handguns are the solution to the problem, unless the problem is that there are too many Aghan villagers.

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You've got to stop letting reality intrude on the discussions here, 40below. :D

cuz I ain't Isaac Asimov. I do better on analysing a given data set, present or historical.

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from you

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JMM: What are the reasons for the central government to be so interested in this area - so that it has to deal with insurgents, criminals and concerns about firearms and munitions ?

JMM: What reasons (if any) are there for the central government and the local population to cooperate on issues - if so what are the co-operative areas (what are the win-wins) ?

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If we're talking about my neighborhood, I could tell you

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Obviously what I'm looking for are any useable "bridges" from the central government to your "Obstinentinians", but also what "dams" separate the central government from them.

As I see the scenario, your large, neutral unless gored, armed group is the political key to the area. The armed insurgents are not in the mobile warfare phase, but can bite. I'm also including some renegade criminal gangs (you might not have them; but they were in the SF author's OP scenario and could be expected in an area of unrest) that can bite. I'm positing that the insurgents and criminals are part of your population group; and that whatever problems they present will be finally resolved only if your population group is involved.

An historical example (which provides no cookbook answers; and your population might not like some of the recipes actually used), on a macro level, of a new national government (saddled with excess baggage from the past) having to deal with armed insurgents, armed criminals and armed semi-autonomists, was SVN ca. 1955. Briefly, over 100K of the Viet Minh military and political cadres had gone North (temporarily) as regroupees, leaving perhaps 10-15K cadres in the South. Diem's initial problems were the Saigon Mafia and two well-armed religiious sects near Saigon (Wiki):

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Diệm's position at the time was weak; Bảo Đại disliked Diệm and appointed him mainly to political imperatives. The French saw him as hostile and hoped that his rule would collapse. At the time, the French Expeditionary Corps was the most powerful military force in the south; Diệm's Vietnamese National Army was essentially organised and trained by the French. Its officers were installed by the French and the chief of staff General Nguyen Van Hinh was a French citizen; Hinh loathed Diệm and frequently disobeyed him.

Diệm also had to contend with two religious sects, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, who wielded private armies in the Mekong Delta, with the Cao Dai estimated to have 25,000 men.

The Vietminh was also estimated to have control over a third of the country.

The situation was worse in the capital, where the Binh Xuyen organised crime syndicate boasted an army of 40,000 and controlled a vice empire of brothels, casinos, extortion rackets, and opium factories unparalleled in Asia. Bảo Đại had given the Binh Xuyen control of the national police for 1.25 m USD, creating a situation that the Americans likened to Chicago under Al Capone in the 1920s.

In effect, Diệm's control did not extend beyond his palace.

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So, nothing new under the sun - the problem of firearms and munitions "control" (over groups not overtly "enemies") has been, is and will be with us in "small wars" in many guises.

Two other adds to the scenario.

1. The local population has members in the police (how about the higher grades, "Os" and "NCOs"), but apparently not in the military. Reasons for that ?

2. What is the relationship between the local population elites and the national power elites ? E.g. (not saying it's this), semi-feudal, neo-colonialist, comprador bourgeoisie (as one type), or something different.

Feel free to ruminate.

Mike

Relevant
http://niqash.org/content.php?conten...id=2181&lang=0

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Niqash: What government procedures are in place to maintain control over awakening councils and people committees in the future? Aren’t you afraid that these councils may turn against the government and prevent it from implementing policies which may not be in line with the tribal vision?

Al-Bakhati: There are many procedures in place to control all forms of non-state militias, and we have no problems with people committees because they are still under control. In regard to the awakening councils, there are tribal parties who coordinate between the councils and the prime ministry, keeping disagreements contained within limits. We do not want to transform the country into a power struggle between armed groups. We are seeking to put weapons under the exclusive control of the state, and to respond to all demands through dialogue.

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and also this:

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Niqash: Does this mean that people committees and awakening councils were armed despite government objections?

Al-Bakhati: Yes, the tribes were armed despite government objections. U.S. troops insisted on arming the tribes, and on giving them a role in the security dossier, despite the opposition expressed by many political factions. We prefer limits to this, otherwise the official security establishment in the country would be badly compromised.

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but one must distinguish between the tribes and awakening councils:

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Niqash: You always try to distinguish between the tribes and awakening councils, and you tend to separate one from the other. What are your reasons?

Al-Bakhati: There is a clear difference between the two. Not all the tribes are members of awakening councils, and there are many tribes that support government policies. However, there are tribe members of awakening councils that oppose these policies. In reality, the awakening councils represent a part of the tribes but not all of the tribes.

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Overall, the interview is a clear statement by a central government in favor of total weapons control - although the initial impact seems aimed at a limited (disfavored by the central government) group.

Question for those in the know about Iraq and awakening councils: if I am a member of an awakening council, should I be nervous about my future well-being ?

Regards

Mike

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Getting involved in gun control efforts in another nation is wasted effort...

Ignore them (the guns in the hands of civilians). If they stay neutral, all's well. If they get turned on your opponents, you're ahead. If they get turned on you they are unlikely to do more than superficial damage and you can kill the shooters.

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Best post of the thread.

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It's becoming clear that Asimov's psychohistory reflects an undoubtable truth that all the world's different social networks interact in multiple ways to generate a single future. From people to corporations, cities to governments, all the pieces of society must mesh. What appears to be the madness of crowds must ultimately have a method, a method that science can discover.

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From a brief article on Asimov's meshing of psychology and math in Foundation for those who have an interest.

Asimov's 'Foundation' theories on society move from fiction to academia - Jewish World Review, July 16, 2004.

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Originally Posted by jmm99

cuz I ain't Isaac Asimov. I do better on analysing a given data set, present or historical.

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I'm trying to think of a way to present the local data set without writing a book. It's actually more relevant as a case study of a degraded but still present insurgency than as an example of management of arms in civilian hands... the "we'll conceal if you ignore" compromise seems pretty effective.

More ground reality, though...

There are local people in the army, but they are spread out. The police have long had a policy of staffing this area only with officers from this area. The army does not, so the locals in the army are all over the country and diffuse.

The police and courts in this area actually don't do much. Disputes within villages are generally settled by village elders. If the dispute is between two villages or parties from different villages the elders of those villages try to sort it out. If they fail, violence sometimes ensues. A few years back a village in my town got to shooting with a village over the hill... people from one had built rice terraces on the other side of the ridge, which was seen as territorial intrusion and water poaching. Police, army, and insurgents stayed out; local gov mediated and a settlement was reached.

Local elders and elected local government overlap; effectively the local gov is composed of those elders elected to deal with the outside. "Elder" doesn't necessarily mean old, just a person who has earned trust by demonstrating competence. No tradition of inherited power.

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Obviously what I'm looking for are any useable "bridges" from the central government to your "Obstinentinians", but also what "dams" separate the central government from them.

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"Dams" is appropriate. The national government wants to exploit the region's extensive forest, mineral, and hydroelectric resources. The locals don't like the idea. At this point the locals have pretty much won that fight, though every once in a while some Manila politician will vocally wonder why they let a bunch of primitive tribes keep them from getting all that valuable stuff.

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As I see the scenario, your large, neutral unless gored, armed group is the political key to the area. The armed insurgents are not in the mobile warfare phase, but can bite.

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They are the area. In Kankanaey-speaking areas the populace is probably 97% Kankanaey. In the Kalinga heartland it's effectively 99.9% Kalinga, almost no outsiders at all. The Isneg/Tingguian areas north and west are a bit different... the tribes are less militant and less organized and the river valleys are wider and more open. They've had a lot of lowland intrusion; the town centers along the river valleys are dominated by lowland immigrants, and they control municipal governments. The highland villages are tribal. The lowlanders want outside investment and see the tribes as primitives obstructing progress, the tribes see the lowlanders as invaders. Not surprisingly, this is where the insurgents are strongest. They do come over the mountains (the area between these tribal zones is an almost uninhabited wilderness) to try to exploit residual sympathy, sometimes staging an ambush. The goal as far as I can see is to force the military to escalate its presence, hoping they will create incidents that bring the larger and more aggressive tribes into cooperating with the insurgents.

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I'm also including some renegade criminal gangs (you might not have them; but they were in the SF author's OP scenario and could be expected in an area of unrest) that can bite.

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No real criminal gangs, certainly none preying on the local populace, who are not very attractive to predators. Maybe by the standards of the outside government there could be. There are clusters of villages that grow a lot of weed, but that's locally seen as cash-crop agriculture, not crime. There's a group some ways north that's officially wanted, first for killing a group of lowlanders who dissed the boss, second for killing a group of Manila cops who came up "undercover" (imagine Godzilla trying to make a covert entrance into Tokyo) in an attempt to arrest them and claim the reward. They are locally seen as good folk who stand up for their rights, and are not at all in hiding, though it wouldn't be wise to go looking for them.

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I'm positing that the insurgents and criminals are part of your population group; and that whatever problems they present will be finally resolved only if your population group is involved.

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Very true.

You have an area with extremely difficult mountain terrain. Very limited road net, and the locals are quite willing to deny themselves road mobility if they need to deny it to an enemy. They will close the roads and keep them closed if pressed.

The people are habituated to very unfriendly terrain; they build terraced fields onto mountains to plant crops. You could call them the Philippine equivalent of Sherpas; or Gurkhas. They are very tough, practical, resourceful people, also very clannish and very suspicious of outsiders. They don't like to be told what to do. It's always been a warrior culture; there are still living veterans of headhunting raids in Kalinga. The standard of education in much of the area is quite high, a legacy of American Episcopalian missionaries; there's a large professional class and many locals working abroad in good positions.

The men all grow up hunting, especially those outside the town centers (most). Level of woodcraft is very high; they know the mountains. Very good with all kinds of traps and snares, the kids make beautiful intricate tiny snares for birds and rodents and the adults run trap lines for wild pigs and deer. The standard of marksmanship is fairly good, not fantastic but better than the Philippine military. Particularly in Kalinga, they have embraced the designated marksman idea: the best shots all carry Garands, which they prefer for range and penetration. No optics, but they can do aimed fire at 600-800 meters. Not precision sniping, but aimed fire. They tend to harass from range and try to bait antagonists into chasing them into prepared ambushes in dense mossy forest areas. The intel net is superb, they always know where everybody is and what they're doing.

People from this area have been highly sought after for generations for work in mining and road construction; they are very good with rock. As a result of this, there are lots of guys around who are familiar with and fond of explosives, and one way or another they've managed to stash a goodly bit of stuff for a rainy day.

All in all it's a populace one would prefer not to antagonize; they are peaceful enough if you don't push them but if pushed they will push back. They don't like the government but they aren't really all that fond of the NPA either. They worked with the insurgents when the government was actively pressing them, on the "enemy of my enemy" concept, but the insurgent leadership are also lowlanders and outsiders and not inherently trusted. As I said above, the insurgents are still getting some traction out of the lowland settler/indigenous highlander conflict northwest of here.

There's a larger data set; analyze as you will. My preferred solution for the Government side (and I'm biased, being in the middle of it) is to leave the people alone, let them run their own show, and ignore the fact that they have lots of illegal weapons and explosives.

Aguinaldo country; and you have mining company issues. The hunters like Garands with iron sights; and you have mining company issues.

Have to learn some more by stumbling about the Net.

Cheers

Mike

Aguinaldo passed through this area - he'd have passed down the road in front of my house - on his way from Tirad Pass to Palanan, but didn't stick around. He and his people were lowlanders and didn't much enjoy the mountains.

The mining companies have pretty much lost interest and given up, not really much of an issue any more. Just too much trouble... deterrence works in all sorts of environments!

Perspectives on gun control may well match with how one sees the issue of Populace Control as well.

Many in the COIN business speak of the need of government to "control the populace." Personally, I see populace control as a noun rather than a verb. Government should not set out to implement measures designed to control the populace (verb), rather, that government that does its job properly will serve a populace that is under control (noun). Its fall in the same bin with reintegration in that regard. If government is on track, it will just happen as a by product. Insurgents will reintegrate into society and the populace will be controlled Both, for that reason, actually far better metrics for COIN success than they do programs intended to produce COIN success.

Similarly, if one thinks the role of government is to exert control over the populace one is also probably more apt to believe that exerting control over firearms is a important aspect of the larger issue of controlling the populace. The problem with taking this path is two fold. No populace likes to be "controlled", and efforts to take away firearms will logically raise issues of trust among the populace as well. The COIN effects are apt to be the opposite of what is desired. And then there is always the critical issue of if one has rendered the populace powerless, who then is left to ensure that the government remains under control as well?

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Similarly, if one thinks the role of government is to exert control over the populace one is also probably more apt to believe that exerting control over firearms is a important aspect of the larger issue of controlling the populace. The problem with taking this path is two fold. No populace likes to be "controlled", and efforts to take away firearms will logically raise issues of trust among the populace as well.

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True, but you're not always dealing with "a populace". An example might be the valley to the northwest that I described above, or for that matter much of the main island of Mindanao. here you have two populaces, one composed of settlers that have been largely in place for several generations and see themselves as the natural and progressive inheritors of the land, the other an indigenous populace that sees themselves as oppressed by invaders. Both populaces are heavily armed and ready to go at each other at the slightest provocation. It's often forgotten, for example, that the Muslim "insurgency" in Mindanao did not begin with secessionist insurgents fighting the government. It began with militias formed by Christian settlers fighting militias formed by indigenous Muslims.

I wouldn't necessarily say the best approach is to disarm, but the situation is a whole lot more complicated than just respecting "the populace"... especially when various populaces have mutually exclusive demands and are prepared to fight for them.

I suspect that this situation is not unique... it's simply meant to illustrate the limitations of the assumption that internal strife stems from the relationship between a government and a monolithic populace.

they can come back - "they" being mining companies reinforced by venal politicians. It depends on the projected selling price of the mineral vice the extraction costs, which sometimes include the costs of neutralizing (kill, detain or convert) the opposition.

Your area is protected by the terrain (where even a lowlander from Cavite, like Aquinaldo, could hang out in Lubuagan for a couple of months). However, the still-unexploited mineral resources of the mountains suggest to me that the last chapter has not been written.

But, perhaps, I'm taking my life's experiences with mining companies and venal politicians, and moving them improperly to another venue that only looks similar from this armchair. And, maybe, these entities (moving from older to newer), e.g., Benguet Corporation, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation and Philex Mines - Padcal, are as benign as their PR folks make them. But, I expect those entities have done far more for themselves and Makati City than for the Cordillera.

He who would bring in outside muscle to chastise a traditionalist mountain population would do well to view the movie Matewan; and the non-fiction accounts of the Battle of Matewan and the Battle of Blair Mountain. Of course, the mining companies and their paramilitary forces "won" most of those battles in the short term; but what they "won" in the long term is questionable.

As you say - "too much trouble". So, the logical COA would be to bypass militarily (and forget about gun control), but build whatever links could be built with the local Sid Hatfields.

This, the Copper Country Strike of 1913–1914 (Wiki & MTU Archives), still raises hackles after 97 years.

Regards

Mike

The working mines are well south of here, mainly in Benguet, though Lepanto (established during the US colonial period, long before the tribes were coordinated enough - or well enough armed - to mount effective resistance) is on the southern edge of Kankanaey country. Observation of the impact of those mines is one of the main reasons why the opposition is so energetic.

The resistance isn't all military. The locals are heavily networked with environmental and indigenous rights groups worldwide, and they're good with media. (The chairperson of the UN Permanent Commission on Indigenous Issues lives just over the hill from me, and other locals are well distributed in similar positions.) If an American, Australian, Canadian or European company got involved they could count on demonstrations at HQ and at shareholder meetings, attention from local media, and everyone from their shareholders to their grandmothers getting letters accusing them of genocide. The combination of armed resistance and political pressure works pretty well; the companies are PR conscious and there are other easier deposits of minerals. I suppose the greatest danger would be a venture combining Chinese and Philippine political crony influence; a lot less concern with popular opinion there. We'll see. So far the fear that attempted exploitation would put the tribes back in the NPA camp has been more potent than the desire for minerals.

Aguinaldo got stuck in Lubuagan, an interesting story. They were trying desperately to get out to the Cagayan Valley but the Americans were onto them and kept blocking the routes. They ended up passing through some places that would make a rough and difficult trip even today. Judging from the diaries of some of those involved it was a very unhappy time...

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from you
The resistance isn't all military.

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Good for you all - stick to your guns. :)

Cheers

Mike

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

True, but you're not always dealing with "a populace". An example might be the valley to the northwest that I described above, or for that matter much of the main island of Mindanao. here you have two populaces, one composed of settlers that have been largely in place for several generations and see themselves as the natural and progressive inheritors of the land, the other an indigenous populace that sees themselves as oppressed by invaders. Both populaces are heavily armed and ready to go at each other at the slightest provocation. It's often forgotten, for example, that the Muslim "insurgency" in Mindanao did not begin with secessionist insurgents fighting the government. It began with militias formed by Christian settlers fighting militias formed by indigenous Muslims.

I wouldn't necessarily say the best approach is to disarm, but the situation is a whole lot more complicated than just respecting "the populace"... especially when various populaces have mutually exclusive demands and are prepared to fight for them.

I suspect that this situation is not unique... it's simply meant to illustrate the limitations of the assumption that internal strife stems from the relationship between a government and a monolithic populace.

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People naturally flow from Bad to Good, in terms of places to live; and if a place is Good, then there are typically people already there. At work they were chewing on the problem of illegal immigrants to the US; I came in late to the debate so I listened to what they were discussing from where my head was in the realm of insurgency. My sound byte was: "We don't have an immigration problem, we have an integration problem. "

There will always be friction between those who are first in time and those who come after; or more accurately, those who are there currently and those who come next; as any place worth living has seen this play out repeatedly through the history of mankind. It's natural, like a forest fire or a hurricane is natural; so is the friction and violence. Nature has a way of sorting itself out, but our question is how to we quicken the process and mitigate the violent aspect of it.

I link this to the "Respect" category on my model. Both sides of the story have legitimate issues, but do both feel that they are being treated as equals by the government? Do both sides feel that they receive "Justice" under the rule of law? Do both sides recognize the legitimacy of the government, both locally and nationally, and do they feel that they have trusted and certain means to influence change?

If the answer is yes to all, then this will all integrate in short order and no gun control is required. If, on the other hand the answer is no, then there will be continued problems that may well erupt into violence, and no amount of gun control can prevent it. I doubt very much that either group wants to be "controlled"; but if one group can leverage the government to control the other you will have insurgency and it will be the government's fault when it happens.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

"We don't have an immigration problem, we have an integration problem. "

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Well said.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

I link this to the "Respect" category on my model. Both sides of the story have legitimate issues, but do both feel that they are being treated as equals by the government? Do both sides feel that they receive "Justice" under the rule of law? Do both sides recognize the legitimacy of the government, both locally and nationally, and do they feel that they have trusted and certain means to influence change?

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Ideally, of course, the government would act as an honest and impartial mediator in such cases. When we get out of models and into the nastiness of reality, this becomes very hard to do, because the various sides in the picture will have deeply skewed and incompatible definitions of neutrality.

Think of a hotly contested European football match between traditional rivals. The supporters of the losing side will always blame the referee and claim bias. If the match is a draw they would have won if not for the ref. They only see the decisions that seem to favor the other side; those that favored their side are invisible. If violence ensues after the match (as it sometimes does) it's really not because of bad refereeing, it's because there are large numbers of testosterone-fueled lads on both sides itching for an excuse to have at each other.

In practice, neutrality often just pisses off both sides, especially when much of the populace is demanding bias.

I agree that in such cases neutrality and equal justice are the best policy and that gun control specifically is not likely to accomplish much, but those goals are very difficult to achieve and they do not in any way assure a peaceful outcome.

Fearful Iraqis scrambling to buy weapons

By Leila Fadel
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, August 31, 2010

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BAGHDAD - Four days after his brother was slain in a Baghdad robbery this month, Muntather Shaker borrowed $1,500 and bought a pistol. He carries it in his back pocket, sleeps with it under his pillow and is ready to use it to defend his family.

"If I thought the government could protect me, I would never buy a weapon," he said. "We don't know what will happen when the Americans leave."

Shaker is one of many Iraqis who feel they must depend on themselves for protection now that the U.S. military has drawn down to just under 50,000 troops and will end combat operations Tuesday.

The withdrawing troops have left behind a country with only a tenuous hold on stability: Nearly six months after parliamentary elections, no new government has formed, violence is on the rise and Iraq's security forces are being targeted.

Despite assurances that the United States is not abandoning Iraq, people here are scrambling to prepare themselves. Weapons dealers in Fallujah, Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk said sales of personal-protection weapons are up by 30 to 50 percent in the past four months....

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It is no surprise. The OP article and Schmedlap's comments (page 1 of thread) presaged what many Iraqis feel is needed - personal security weapons. Whether they will or will not provide that security is quite another issue.

The irony is that Iraq is a very gun-controlled, gun-licensed nation (snip from the current article):

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For Kobaissi and the Shaker family, the hope is that weapons will deter the next attack. But their weapons are illegal.

The Interior Ministry, which oversees police and security issues, stopped issuing weapons licenses more than a year ago, and it is illegal for anyone to have a weapon without a license. But Iraqis still buy weapons from black-market dealers. Men train their wives to use the guns in case of emergency, and they hope it will be enough.

Local police largely look the other way, in spite of Interior Ministry orders.

"The number of personal weapons in a country like Iraq are too high right now, even though the Ministry of Interior is not issuing new licenses," said a statement from the Interior Ministry's general inspector's office.

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Regards

Mike

Those who pound their guns into plows, plow for those who don't.

...That is all I have to say on their situation. Of course, no different than anywhere else in the world.