German literature on COIN in Afghanistan

Currently writing a dissertation on the evolution of COIN in Afghanistan and I'm looking for articles about the German experience of COIN from their first deployment to now. Having difficulty finding a lot of stuff in English, so if anyone knows of any good articles or even books that cover the German approach to COIN. Also I was wondering what serving German military personnel thought about the American presence in their areas, did they see it as undermining their hard work or were they glad to see them.

Created for TDB's quest, a spin-off from the commentary thread on 'What do the coalition forces think of germany´s army?':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=13351

You could contact the MGFA with your request:

http://www.mgfa-potsdam.de/

http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/B...chrichten.html is somewhat dated, but might have something
interesting.

Marco seliger had some interesting pieces in German in "The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" and "Loyal".
Maybe he can point you to English versions of these articles.
His contact info can be found at http://www.reservistenverband.de/php....php?menu=0415

Fuchs and UWEW, thanks to the both of you, sent of emails.

I'm as much interested in personal experiences. I'm friendly with a few people who've just come back from the most recent Op Herrick and I'm hoping to get a chance to speak to them, no idea if they'll be in my home town the same time as I am. I'd quite like to know what anyone who's served in Afghan has thought about the grand strategy and how it translates on the ground. So if anyone wants to share their experiences or knows of any good articles, please go ahead.

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Originally Posted by TDB

Fuchs and UWEW, thanks to the both of you, sent of emails.

I'm as much interested in personal experiences. I'm friendly with a few people who've just come back from the most recent Op Herrick and I'm hoping to get a chance to speak to them, no idea if they'll be in my home town the same time as I am. I'd quite like to know what anyone who's served in Afghan has thought about the grand strategy and how it translates on the ground. So if anyone wants to share their experiences or knows of any good articles, please go ahead.

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When you find out what the Afghanistan Grand Strategy is please be sure to let me know.

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Originally Posted by JMA

When you find out what the Afghanistan Grand Strategy is please be sure to let me know.

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http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html

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It reads:

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Mission
In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.

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That I read as the military mission. I would like to see the political Grand strategy... if they have one.

Sure. They want to wait till the mission is accomplished.

A Grand Strategy doesn't need to be good or at least sane to exist.


The German government clung to this paper mission of ISAF for years. Their strategy is indeed to sit it out and let 4k troops rot in AFG.

But with the presence of german troops being so incredibly unpopular with German public (or for the vast majority of contributing nations) can the German government afford to play that game? Are the constrains on the mission only there to help politicians sleep at night as opposed to a comprehensive strategy they see working to a greater effect than the cliché "gunho" US approach (by which I mean, conducting large scale combat operations). Two questions really. As for the grand strategy, I was refering to the ISAF mandate and how McChrystal and Patraeus (sp, on my phone so can't google while I type) have set out to conduct COIN.

The German politicians want a low intensity mission in AFG, not a glorious victory. A low intensity and thus low profile keeps the domestic resistance low and allows to play the ####ty foreign policy game of maintaining a "reputation of reliability" or whatever they're playing.

It begun with the quest for a permanent UNSC seat, and then it was set on autopilot.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

It begun with the quest for a permanent UNSC seat, and then it was set on autopilot.

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True. But things seem to be changing. To my bewilderment some politicians
called for counterstrikes after the attack on General Kneip. Will we see calls
for "Vergeltungsaktionen" if the sitiuation deteriorates any further?

Well, there's not much in the news, so some morons crawl out of their holes and open their mouths. It can't be helped.

And here was me thinking it was the 21st century and governments didn't send young men to die in some corner of a foreign field just to prove they could still play the foreign policy game......
Are the ROE really that strict, reading an article about the situation in Kunduz circa 2007 the standard operating procedure was to withdraw if they came under fire. Is the fear that combat would either result in the deaths of German soldiers or Afghan civilians making the battle for hearts and minds that little bit harder? Pretty frustrating for the men on the ground under fire if they can't return fire. Is this down to the German constitution preventing the deployment of German troops on combat missions (correct me if this is wrong, I was informed by a lecturer, he can exaggerate from time to time), that the German population just don't have a taste for it, the shadow the of the Second World War still looming. The most recent generation of young soldiers obviously have no memory of this and are just try to do their job and stay alive, if their having their hands tied by politicians that’s tantamount to negligence. Not that i'm naive to think that would stop them.

Maybe I can help you out with my 2008 BA dissertation 'Politics over Firepower: Assessing Germany's Role in Counterinsurgency Efforts in Afghanistan, 2002-2007'. Just need an address I can send it to.

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Originally Posted by m2r

Maybe I can help you out with my 2008 BA dissertation 'Politics over Firepower: Assessing Germany's Role in Counterinsurgency Efforts in Afghanistan, 2002-2007'. Just need an address I can send it to.

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PM sent, thanks very much.

I'm not an academic, but I have extensive street level COIN and CT experience in CENTCOM as a US Soldier. I am currently attached to a German unit in Afghanistan.

I have also been a first hand observer of many of the dynamics and events discussed in this Spiegel article, and can attest to the truthfulness and accuracy of its content.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/...766857,00.html

I have made a lot of mental observations. Feel free to email me if I can help with anything.

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Originally Posted by TDB

Currently writing a dissertation on the evolution of COIN in Afghanistan and I'm looking for articles about the German experience of COIN from their first deployment to now. Having difficulty finding a lot of stuff in English, so if anyone knows of any good articles or even books that cover the German approach to COIN. Also I was wondering what serving German military personnel thought about the American presence in their areas, did they see it as undermining their hard work or were they glad to see them.

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Originally Posted by Alsultani

I'm not an academic, but I have extensive street level COIN and CT experience in CENTCOM as a US Soldier. I am currently attached to a German unit in Afghanistan.

I have also been a first hand observer of many of the dynamics and events discussed in this Spiegel article, and can attest to the truthfulness and accuracy of its content.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/...766857,00.html

I have made a lot of mental observations. Feel free to email me if I can help with anything.

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The propaganda war is being lost it would seem. The first part of that article is truly shocking, you can't fight against public opinion like that. Actually speechless. Thanks for the offer, I will probably contact you as and when questions emerge in my mind. If anything I would prefer the opinion of someone on the ground, more often than not it gives you a better understanding.

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Originally Posted by TDB

The propaganda war is being lost it would seem. The first part of that article is truly shocking, you can't fight against public opinion like that. Actually speechless. Thanks for the offer, I will probably contact you as and when questions emerge in my mind. If anything I would prefer the opinion of someone on the ground, more often than not it gives you a better understanding.

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Sadly (Italian) ex-comrades who have done tours in Afghanistan tell similar stories about wild running rumours with similar massage. The biggest problem of ISAF is that it is foreign. Even the best intent and the sweetest candy can not change that fact and for most in doubt the interpretation is always against you. It is maybe even against you in 'no doubt' situations.

As the article states the political elite protected and financed by those foreigners does also play the blame game for quite some time now. At least the Western population won't have to fear a bloody political overtake when a Day X kicks off in Afghanistan.

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Originally Posted by Firn

Sadly (Italian) ex-comrades who have done tours in Afghanistan tell similar stories about wild running rumours with similar massage. The biggest problem of ISAF is that it is foreign. Even the best intent and the sweetest candy can not change that fact and for most in doubt the interpretation is always against you. It is maybe even against you in 'no doubt' situations.

As the article states the political elite protected and financed by those foreigners does also play the blame game for quite some time now. At least the Western population won't have to fear a bloody political overtake when a Day X kicks off in Afghanistan.

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Too true, Karzai is playing a dangerous game though. He fails to realise that he holds no real power over the weak state. I dare say that the ANA and ANP are only loyal to their paymasters (though I use the world loyal with my tongue placed firmly in my cheek) and from what I've read they very rarely get paid on time. I forsee a military coup, if not before ISAF leave. The question will be, what will ISAF do. Will they rally to the defense of Karzai or will they see it as an opportunity to get a fresh face in power. If he continues to play the blame game he runs the risk of annoying the very people he's relying on to stay in power.

Do the German forces have a say in how, when and why spec ops capture/kill missions are run in their area?

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Originally Posted by carl

Do the German forces have a say in how, when and why spec ops capture/kill missions are run in their area?

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I very much doubt it, JSOC operates outside of ISAF command doesn't it? This is a massive issue, as was seen in a documentary which aired on channel 4 on monday, these operations can have a massive impact on the general management of COIN, you can only bend something so much before it breaks, by which I mean the good will of the people. The fact that public opinion is swiftly turning against the foreign forces is fuelled by the operations

I remember some articles in Spiegel and other German media.
As far as I can recall, RC North put some names on TF's 373 hitlist.
Operations should be coordinated with the the RC and the battlespace
owner. Whatever coordination means under these circumstances.

If I understand the position of our government and the BMVg
correctly, German forces have no part in targeted killings and do not
cooperate with any operations that have anything to do with targeted
killings. This is -of course- pure hypocrisy. But German ROE do not even
allow to shoot people setting up an IED.

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Originally Posted by uwew

I remember some articles in Spiegel and other German media.
As far as I can recall, RC North put some names on TF's 373 hitlist.
Operations should be coordinated with the the RC and the battlespace
owner. Whatever coordination means under these circumstances.

If I understand the position of our government and the BMVg
correctly, German forces have no part in targeted killings and do not
cooperate with any operations that have anything to do with targeted
killings. This is -of course- pure hypocrisy. But German ROE do not even
allow to shoot people setting up an IED.

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This beyond ridiculous. This is effectively tying thier hands and dooming them. Regarding targeted killings, this is war by proxy, ROE preventing them from engaging in such actions but allowing someone else to do the dirty work. This seems to be backfiring for the Germans as (Afghan) public opinion is rapidly turning against them.

Half as bad. Target the IED instead...

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Originally Posted by TDB

This beyond ridiculous. This is effectively tying thier hands and dooming them.

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The German media and most of our politicians seem to think that the deployment to Afghanistan is something similar to a police mission. As far as I can see the ROEs are modeled after the 'Use of deadly force' regulations of German police. But we are not the only ones. I have seen Camp Armadillo recently. Looks like the Danes have rules nearly as stupid as ours.

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Originally Posted by TDB

Regarding targeted killings, this is war by proxy, ROE preventing them from engaging in such actions but allowing someone else to do the dirty work. This seems to be backfiring for the Germans as (Afghan) public opinion is rapidly turning against them.

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The turning of the public opinion seems to have other reasons as well. Just recently a local ANP commander accused German soldiers of shooting and killing a woman. This was proven to be false. But what could the ANP guy gain from his accusations?
Has he been cut out of the corruption loop and wanted revenge? Or did he think he could get a cut of the compensation money that might get paid to the victim's family?
And he is only one example. Why is the local, non pashtu elite turning against us?

I've been outside the wire with the Bundeswehr recently. When in contact with the enemy their goal is to break contact, not to close with and neutralize. They don't have the mission to do otherwise. They are first rate soldiers. I have seen the competence and professionalism of their SchutzKompanie and FeldJaeger PSD elements firsthand. They are well equipped with ammunition and weapon systems. Their platoon leaders are professionals.

Clearing and holding are critical success factors in COIN. The Bundeswehr does not have enough firepower or troops to hold. The mission here in Kunduz is essentially police training and a CIMIC mission. Partnering with and standing up the national government is also a critical success factor. Enough has been written elsewhere demonstrating the futility of this effort.

The local, non Pashtu elite are not so much turning against us, as they are realizing that the interests of ISAF do not coincide with theirs in the long term. The Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek elite in RC-North are positioning themselves for when ISAF leaves. ISAF just doesn't have enough "juice" on the street to be a factor in long term survival considerations by local and provincial power holders.

Lots more I could say on some of the other issues raised but OPSEC considerations prevent it.

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Originally Posted by uwew

The German media and most of our politicians seem to think that the deployment to Afghanistan is something similar to a police mission. As far as I can see the ROEs are modeled after the 'Use of deadly force' regulations of German police. But we are not the only ones. I have seen Camp Armadillo recently. Looks like the Danes have rules nearly as stupid as ours.



The turning of the public opinion seems to have other reasons as well. Just recently a local ANP commander accused German soldiers of shooting and killing a woman. This was proven to be false. But what could the ANP guy gain from his accusations?
Has he been cut out of the corruption loop and wanted revenge? Or did he think he could get a cut of the compensation money that might get paid to the victim's family?
And he is only one example. Why is the local, non pashtu elite turning against us?

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Thanks for your reply. Most of the press coverage about Afghanistan here in Germany is really bad, so posts like yours help to put things into perspective.

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Originally Posted by Alsultani

Clearing and holding are critical success factors in COIN. The Bundeswehr does not have enough firepower or troops to hold. The mission here in Kunduz is essentially police training and a CIMIC mission. Partnering with and standing up the national government is also a critical success factor. Enough has been written elsewhere demonstrating the futility of this effort.

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Some recent reports and Gen. Fritz's statements (also quoted in the Spiegel piece you linked) had me believe that our operations have become more aggressive.
The reports stated that Bundeswehr troops were clearing territory together with the 10th MD and ANA and holding the cleared areas together with "local police forces" (not ANP).
They were even building some COPs around Baghlan and partnering with former Taliban to man them. Were these operations the exception rather than the norm or has there been a
recent change in attitude back to the old "force protection is our top priority" mode or our early years in Afghanistan.

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Originally Posted by Alsultani

Lots more I could say on some of the other issues raised but OPSEC considerations prevent it.

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Maybe you could take some notes and publish them at a later date?

Good luck to you and our people out there.

Afaik the "hold" part has to be delegated to indigenous forces except for temporary measures one a handful of focus places.

A small part of the few thousand troops are at any one time outside the base camp, and many of this small part have different missions than "to hold" terrain.

There's simply not the manpower for "hold", and it wouldn't even be there if all troops had to leave the base camp and bivouac in tents next to villages that shall be "held".


"hold" is effectively a political mission, and it's the regime that's failing badly.

An article written by a German Lieut. General Rainer Glatz, entitled 'ISAF Lessons Learned: A German Perspective' appeared in CCO's periodical PRISM in March 2011 and is on:http://www.ndu.edu/press/ISAF-lesson...rspective.html

Abstract:

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Germany has followed the comprehensive approach for the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) area of operations in Afghanistan, providing counterinsurgency support primarily for security, economic aid, and social development. The author, commander of the Bundeswehr Operations Command in Potsdam, Germany, provides a German perspective of lessons learned from the ISAF mission. To be effective, counterinsurgency requires comprehensive measures and adherence to fundamental guidelines advancing legitimacy and unity of effort, taking into account political factors, establishing rule of law, and isolating insurgents. NATO must strengthen its intelligence capacity, promote unity of effort, and prepare for a long-term commitment.

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Found yesterday when in RUSI, hopefully helps and only skimmed to date.

Skimming through older issues of PRISM I found 'Afghanistan: The German Factor' by a US diplomat:http://www.ndu.edu/press/afghanistan...an-factor.html

Sad news is i've had to scrap this chapter in my dissertation! Just using the articles from what i've go so far in other chapters.