MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.
Has anyone taken a look at the paper "Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer" by MAJ Thomas P. Ehrhart? From what I have heard it has caused something of a stir within the US Army. The debate over replacing US infantry weapons and marksmanship training has gone on for a little, but here someone has finally put it into a serious thesis.
If anyone has taken a serious look at it, what are opinions?
Here's the pdf link.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf
Also, here is an abstract of his paper. Sums up the intent pretty well.
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Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy at ranges beyond 300 meters. While the infantryman is ideally suited for combat in Afghanistan, his current weapons, doctrine, and marksmanship training do not provide a precise, lethal fire capability to 500 meters and are therefore inappropriate. Comments from returning soldiers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain. This monograph reviews the small arms capability of the infantry squad from World War I to present. It then discusses current shortfalls with cartridge lethality, weapons and optics configurations, the squad designated marksman concept and finally the rifle qualification course. Potential solutions in each of these areas are discussed.
Once again, any thoughts?
As one involved in the Troop Test of the then AR-15 in 1964,
the good Major's conclusions mirror almost exactly what the report of that test -- which recommended retaining the M-14 for worldwide service while developing a better automatic rifle version and a shortened version for airborne use and buying a few AR-15s for special purpose units -- recommended to DA. I have it on good authority that that report was forward to DoD with a recommendation for approval.
In the event DoD -- Secretary McNamara (assisted by Curtis LeMay, whose troops needed no more capable weapon) -- decided to buy the M-16 and cancel the contract with TRW for the M-14. I'm sure that the fact TRW had contributed to Nixon's campaign while Colt had contributed to Kennedy's had no bearing on that decision. It is noteworthy that the Marines objected and the Army was, as usual, acquiescent...
MAJ Ehrhart's recommendations also track with a number of studies in the 1970-2000 period that found the same problems.
In short, he's right.
I didn't think Fuchs was criticizing anyone or any Army, he is
criticizing governments that engage in potentially fruitless nation building wars which rarely work and are terribly wasteful of people.
He is also saying those kinds of wars teach -- embed, even -- bad habits and the purchase of expensive equipment with limited uses (MRAPS, anyone...). I very strongly agree with him.
As Infanteer said and this is really the point:
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..killing them requires the same skills as facing a regular opponent - only with them you have more considerations to take into account.(emphasis added / kw)
Presuming you mean the "regular" opponent requires more considerations, that's correct. A whole lot more. Artillery just for openers, mass and rapid maneuver capability or two quick additives...
As Fuchs says:
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I know that these statements are not capable of comforting those who serve(d) in AFG, but they're the harsh truth.
They are indeed truths and he's just scratching the surface. I appreciate and thank everyone now serving but no professional should get lulled into believing that either Afghanistan or Iraq were or are wars in the total sense. They are a series of skirmishes against lightly armed opponents and are a totally different thing to warfare against even a near peer opponent. While major war is itself a series of small unit skirmishes, there are so many more of them and so many more elements come into play that a very different mindset -- and equipment set -- comes into play.
The myth that "COIN is the graduate level of war" is dangerous. It does require a degree of thought and interaction that differs from conventional warfare but it does not require less thought or effort. Indeed, conventional warfare is far, far more demanding on commanders and large units even though it is not much more demanding on individuals and small units.
It is simply a matter of scale. It is also a matter of opponent mass and capability. Governments are at fault for committing their troops to poorly thought out campaigns; Armies are at fault for presuming those campaigns are the future. Every war is different, yet warfare changes little and small wars differ considerably from large ones. :wry:
The US Army picked up a number of bad habits in Viet Nam -- some of those bad habits (micromanagement and lack of trust of subordinates being two big ones, overuse of Artillery in COIN like operations and inadequate and insufficient patrolling being two more) still adversely impact the force 35 years later. In fact, the Small War in Korea still has flawed legacy problems (the one year tour, condensed and 'economical' training) 60 years later... :mad:
Micromanaging the military and other things
Ken, I'm glad to see you say that about micromanaging the military. I can't comment on lessons learned from Vietnam, and I'll leave to you where the Army picked it up. I certainly see reflections of corporate America in the Blackberries, instant access to hundreds of e-mails per day, and control over every little jot and tittle of everything that comes up all day every day with the staff level officers. I have even started a category on this:
http://www.captainsjournal.com/categ...-the-military/
Beginning with one of the most absurd instances I have ever seen in print:
http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...-riskless-war/
I'm sure Ken could add several thousand instances from his career. It's disappointing. One of my dislikes of the ROE in Afghanistan is not what it says, although I have my beefs. It is the very notion of a four star general issuing a tactical directive to Lance Corporals and Sergeants in the field under fire. Lord, why can't generals focus in logistics and strategy, and let the boys in the field focus on tactics?
As for the issue of the infantry half-kilometer, there is at least one interesting comment where I weighed in:
http://www.captainsjournal.com/2010/...#comment-29570
This is similar to some comments I am getting to this article via mail. No one in the Army believes that they will ever get the best weapons (or even the best training). It's a matter of making the most of what's there. The Marines do this with their rifle qualifications at 500 yards, and the fact that the Army doesn't do this has to do with strategic choices, not capabilities.
That said, I find it rather criminal that in all these years, the Army / Marines have not seen fit to invest in a replacement for the Stoner system of weapons that at least uses an open bolt system (or better yet, piston), and gives the fire team and squad a more variable choice of weapons at their disposal.
It would appear to me that Major Ehrhart's recommendations are basically correct. Other than money, what reason could there be NOT to implement both better training and more latitude in weapons selection?
I generally agree, pointing out only that
Each generation sort of gets its own war(s) and thus learns its own lessons -- which we notoriously do not analyze well or successfully pass on to our successors.
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Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
I would contend that these small wars simply solidified traits and trends that were first formed during the big wars (WW 1 and WW 2), and those traits in turn stem from some of Root's reforms and the historical American reliance on a very small standing army and mass militia in times of conflict (which translates after about 1916 to the draft).
This is not a quibble, it is important:
Each war adds its own fillips to previously absorbed bad lessons.
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Many of the bad habits the force has been saddled with came from poor planning for the next big war, not from participation in small wars.
With that I totally agree.
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The failures and omissions run deeper than "small versus big" or caliber debates.
While that is true, it should not be allowed to obscure the fact that bad lessons accrue in all wars for the next one or that small anything cannot totally prepare one for a big anything. one reason for the phenomenon as you state it is that junior leaders in one war mistakenly presume their next war will be like their last where they may be far more senior and thus able to do far more damage (See again Korea and Viet Nam. See also the Powell
Doctrine...).
It is a matter of scale and that is very important. What you say is true at the macro level; at the micro or personal level it is all too easy to base ones future plans and actions -- and thus ones responses to stimuli -- on current experience.
That is rarely wise
I think maybe we're throwing pet rocks past each other.
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Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
Agree, but we also tend to obsess on the micro level...while in fact the bigger problem remains as the elephant in the corner.
Perhaps a bad choice of words on my part; I 've noticed one can educate the young and even the middle aged. However, old Bull elephants are not going to listen or change. So you've got to get the young to think right in hopes that when they get old, they'll be in the habit. Don Vandergriff sent me a briefing he'd presented to the Chief of Staff -- of which nothing had come -- I wrote him back and suggested he edumacate the LTs and they would change the system as the grew in it and pointed out starting at the top and working down does not work, even a really smart guy like Shy Meyer discovered that.
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And now I'll put the pet rock away and stop derailing the thread...:o
It's not a derail, it's pertinent and you're correct that some obsess over inconsequentials.
However, the difference between low and high intensity war is quite far from being inconsequential. That point needs emphasis.
Kaur:
I don't see any spoiling effect. Your chart doesn't contradict a thing I've written here. In fact, if it does anything, it backs up my comment that "(Fuchs) is criticizing governments that engage in potentially fruitless nation building wars which rarely work and are terribly wasteful of people" and "Governments are at fault for committing their troops to poorly thought out campaigns; Armies are at fault for presuming those campaigns are the future." :wry:
Can you point me to some of those?
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Originally Posted by
reed11b
Sorry Fuchs, but I have read many many AARs that suggest that the "lethality" of arty is not even close to what the manual says.
Sorta make one wonder why the 'manual' would say something different...
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Tima and again, troops that have gone to the ground have survived arty and gotten back in the fight.
Now that's true. Done it myself. Also have just charged right through it and survived. Unfortunately, I had a number of friends who weren't so lucky.
Combat is weird -- you can find examples to prove almost anything. I saw a guy in Korea take a 76mm round that passed through his stomach, you could literally see through him -- he was back to duty in about six weeks...:confused:
Saw a Viet Namese with an undetonated 40mm Grenade HE round in his thorax, the Medics removed it. Wuithout blowing him or themselves up...:D
On balance, Artillery was the biggest killer in WW I and WW II, averages generally running between 65 and 80% if Artillery was involved in the action. There's this:
""The cause of wounds suffered by soldiers varied widely depending on specific circumstances. A British Corps reported 42.8% wounds caused by bullets during the El Alamein offensive. However the percentage of battle wounds to british soldiers by weapon 1939-45 overall was:
Mortar, grenade, bomb, shell ...........75%
Bullet, AT mine................................10%
mine & booby trap...........................10%
Blast and crush.................................2%
Chemical.......................................... 2%
other............................................. ...1%
from J Ellis WWII Databook table 57 p257""
Recall also that those figures and the ones of which the 'manual' cued were based on those who received medical treatment; in a war, no one does autopsies to determine what killed Johnny. Nor do they do memorial services or ramp ceremonies -- too many casualties for all that stuff.
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Example: the actual impact area of an arty round is small and most of the blast energy goes up and is dispersed.
Uh, yeah -- unless they're using VT or Proximity fuzes. Then, as Fuchs said, they pop overhead and rain down. Also, don't discount the damage of fragements deflected from that upward dispersion -- or from the rocks and dirt thrown out of the crater at high speed. I've still got little pebbles and flecks of steel that pop out of my bod from Korea. The piece of steel under my kneecap is a handy weather predictor...:D.
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WOW, where do these mega soldiers live and how do we recruit them! :eek:
No mega bods required. Presented with the opportunity, you'd do it...
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Seriously now, your concept of lethality is not shared by historic or modern AARs.
If you mean AARs from Afghanistan or Iraq (IIRC, 44% of Medevacs in Iraq during 2003-06 were for disease or accidents) or even Viet Nam, they don't really count cause the bad guys didn't really have much in the way of HE support and were generally outnumbered heavily by us (though one could say that their IEDs are poor mans artillery...). Perhaps you can find me some from Korea or WW II that corroborate what you say?
As UBoat 509 said the other day, anyone who thinks the 60mm mortar isn't dangerous hasn't been on the receiving end.