I have read the book has anyone else? Has alot of outstanding information that can help. HAs anyone used any of his suggestions first hand?
Printable View
I have read the book has anyone else? Has alot of outstanding information that can help. HAs anyone used any of his suggestions first hand?
Tactics of the Crescent Moon...
H. John Poole and Ray Smith (foreword). "Tactics of the Crescent Moon comes none too soon for deployed U.S. service personnel. Little, if any, of their battlefield intelligence has been tactically interpreted. U.S. analysts are generally more interested in the enemy’s strategic or technological capabilities. Even if those analysts did want to tactically assess the information, most lack the infantry and historical background to do so. This book fills that void. It reveals—for the first time in any detail—the most common small-unit maneuvers of the Iraqi and Afghan resistance fighters. Its author is a retired infantryman and recognized authority on guerrilla warfare. He has traveled the world extensively and still trains active-duty U.S. units. Tactics of the Crescent Moon could save many lives (if not turn the tide of war) in the Middle East. It is a heavily researched, well-illustrated, and spell-binding account of how Muslim militants fight. While the book delves mainly into their tactical method, it also uncovers their cultural orientation. This nail-biting nonfiction covers events as recent as 15 September 2004."
I just ordered the book and will read it and review it from a trainer perspective. It may be the 1st open source discussion of opposition tactics; I can tell you right now that it is definitely not the first.
That aside i am nost interested to hear what he has to say in blending culture with tactics.
Best,
Tom
New release....
Militant Tricks: Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent
Afghanistan - The Bear Trap, by Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin comes recommended by an AD SF trooper (round the time of the invasion of Afghanistan).
It is written from a Pakistani ISI perspective, which makes also the way in which the author portray things interesting.
Martin
Here are some from FMSO at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products.htm:
Night Stalkers and Mean Streets: Afghan Urban Guerrillas, by Mr. Ali A. Jalali and Mr. Lester W. Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. This article was previously published in Infantry January-April 1999.
Road Warriors of the Hindu Kush: The Battle for the Lines of Communication in the Soviet-Afghan War, by Mr. Lester W. Grau, FMSO. Warning - This article is graphics intensive! Please be patient.
High-desert Ambush: Hard Lessons Learned the Hard Way, by Mr. Lester W. Grau, FMSO. Warning - This article is graphics intensive! Please be patient. This article was previously published in Red Thrust Star Jul-Oct 1995; Oct 1996.
Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan, by Mr. Lester W. Grau, FMSO. (CALL Publication #98-17) PDF Format ) This article was previously published in Field Artillery Journal May-June 1997
“Soft Log” and Concrete Canyons: Russian Urban Combat Logistics in Grozny, by Mr. Lester W. Grau and Mr. Timothy L. Thomas, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. This article was previously published in Marine Corps Gazette, October 1999.
Something Old, Something New:Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis, by Lester W. Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. This article was previously published in Military Review July-August 2004.
The Afghan War: The Campaign for the Caves: The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War, by Mr. Ali A. Jalali and Mr. Lester W. Grau, FMSO. This article was previously published in Journal of Slavic Military Studies, September 2001.
The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat, by Mr. Timothy L. Thomas, FMSO. This article was previously published in Parameters, Summer 1999.
There are many more worth the time to read.
Best,
Tom
Thanks, good stuff
He blends morality with tacticsQuote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
yes Mr Grau has written plenty of interesting articles and books. Two on Afghanistan one from the Russian the other from the Guerilla point of view. He wrote an interesting article on the Russian Armor experience in Chechnya which bears alot of relevance for American Armor in Iraq. A shame no one really paid attention before.http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/rusav.htm
Folks,
I said I would order this book, read it, and offer some thoughts so here goes:
Is it worth reading?
absolutely in that it offers an interesting perspective on counter-insurgency set in the context of today's operations.
Weaknesses:
a. Style of writing. The book suffers much from poor editing. it reads in may cases like a power point slide show run rampant. While it is a legitimate technique to repeat key ideas, Poole at times takes repetition to extreme. That also comes across in poor organization; chapters, sections, and paragraphs do not flow. Given the repetition of ideas, I felt like a hamster on a mental ferris wheel going round and round with no progress.
b. Exaggeration of certain key ideas. On this I would point to the role of Hizballah and its sponsor, Iran, especially the Iranian Sepah. Poole states that Hizballah is the main threat to the West and goes to great length to support that contention. Unfortunately his sourcing is poor and not--at least to me and I served in Lebanon and lost friends to Hizballah--convincing. I agree the Hizballah model and method are dangerous and difficult to counter; I don't see them as a universal model. A related issue is his insistence that Asian military culture permeated into the Middle East over the ages. Again it is an interesting idea but one hindered by poor sourcing and superficial analysis.
Strengths:
a. Poole focuses on the root elements of any counter-insurgency, the insurgents and the security forces who fight them. What I really liked about the book was his call for a more capable, more highly trained infantry with offensive infantry maneuver capabilities versus fires dominated thinking.
b. Related to a. is Poole's other key point, that tactical victories based on such a firepower dominated military modely are NOT victories for the forces engaged in COIN. His key point--at least to me--was that civilian collateral casualties in COIN must be given equal or even more weight that friendly casualties. Now this is not something new; the same point has been debated many times. But it is still a point worth considering.
c. Finally I liked the linkages Poole makes between culture and military operations. Some as I have already said were overstated to me. Still he does apply a logic that makes sense in understanding how a diffent culture with a different model for success can develop tactics to achieve that success--and how another culture may foolishly discount that success.
Using an Amazon rating of 1-5 stars, I would give it a 3.
Tom
Tom, thanks for the review. Though I am a big "Gunny" Poole fan, I think I agree with you - overall very good on content but at times the writing style seems a bit choppy.
I suspect you already have Militant Tricks (ISBN: 0963869582) on your to-read list. Its on mine. I look forward to your review of that one.
Man, I couldnt agree more. Mr. Poole always puts out a vast ammount of great info. I still think "The Last 100 Yards" is his best yet. But I gotta say it: the guy is an awful writer. Usually an author needs to cut down on the fluff. Mr. Poole needs to do the opposite and flesh out his writing so it flows smoothly.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
CPT H - I see your "location" has changed - welcome home...
Thanks. Good to be back. Now, on to the task of spending all the money I saved up over there...Quote:
Originally Posted by SWJED
Ok, I literally just finished it. I definitly agree with your review, Tom, and Poole's assessment of our tactical deficiency in regards to COIN. Now the question is, what are we going to do about it? Is there a concerted effort within the military to change our doctrine or is the prevailing attitude one that mirrors President Bush's "technology will win us the war" idea?
One reason Poole's writing tends to be sloppy is that he's often "cutting and pasting" stuff from other sources and not really making an attempt to have smooth transitions. I agree he has some great stuff to say, and his books often give you a synthesis of stuff you'd have to go to literally hundreds of other sources to get, but he'd get his message across more effectively if he'd put a little more effort into combining the sources and maybe adding his own analysis.Quote:
Originally Posted by CPT Holzbach